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This research, grounded in political theory, had two major purposes: 1) to explain 
a case of non-incremental policy change within the realm of school finance reform; and 
2) to test the utility of Mazzoni’s (1991) arena model for explaining state-level school 
finance policymaking. These goals were accomplished through an examination of the 
Vermont state legislature’s policymaking process in response to the Vermont Supreme 
Court Brigham v. State (1997) ruling declaring the state’s system of school finance 
unconstitutional. This analysis sought to explain how key political actors, taking 
	  
advantage of favorable reform conditions, utilized power derived from positional 
authority as well as personal influence to impact the passage of Act 60, an innovative and 
forcefully redistributive piece of school finance legislation.  
The research employed a qualitative case method as a means to answer the 
research questions. Data collection drew from an informant interview process supported 
by extensive primary and secondary source document review. Data were systematically 
analyzed against the conceptual framework, presented in a case narrative and discussed in 
light of related literature to generate analytic conclusions with regard to the process of 
state education policymaking for school finance. 
Study findings highlight the general utility of Mazzoni’s arena model in 
explaining non-incremental policy change in the realm of school finance reform; the 
importance of politically savvy and well-situated policy entrepreneurs who can take 
advantage of propitious events such as a court ruling to advance non-incremental policy 
reform; and the role of political elites in advancing the cause of school finance reform. 
Suggestions for future research include the potential refinement of the arena model to 
include a judicial arena and the use of other policy frameworks to analyze non-
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 Although states are constitutionally obligated to provide public education, most 
have delegated a major portion of this responsibility to local school districts. For 
example, states have long tasked local districts with the primary responsibility for 
funding public education. These districts have traditionally relied on revenue collected 
from local property taxes to fund their schools (Ward, 1998; DeMoss, 2003; Schmidt & 
Scott, 2004; Shelly, 2011). However, disparities in taxable local district wealth have 
frequently led to sizable differences in school funding levels across school districts within 
any given state (Rebell, 2009). While state financial intervention has ameliorated school 
funding discrepancies in most states, locally generated revenue still accounts for 
approximately 45 percent of school budgets and sizable funding discrepancies persist 
(Baker, Green & Richards, 2008). As McUsic (1999) notes: “The distribution of 
educational resources is remarkably unequal in the United States, skewed across lines of 
race and class” (p. 88).  
Yet, a quality education is viewed as an essential component of a successful and 
productive adult life. Structural impediments such as funding disparities frequently 
prevent equitable access to education for America’s poor and minority students. School 
finance reform1 is often viewed as one front in the push for eliminating those structural 
impediments and is predicated on the belief that improved access to education funding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In her study of the politics of school finance reform in four Midwestern states, Siegel 
(1976) defines the term school finance reform as “…attempts by state governments to 
restructure their school aid formula in order to provide greater equity in the distribution 




can improve educational outcomes for students (Card & Payne, 2002; Jimerson, 2001; 
Jimerson, 2002).   
Since the late 1960s, the courts have served as the primary vehicle for those 
groups seeking to address discrepancies in school finance. In the ensuing decades, no 
fewer than 46 states have been involved in school finance litigation (Dinan, 2009). 
Plaintiff rulings have generally defined equity in terms of “fiscal equity” and measure it 
through the equalized capacity of school districts to raise school funds (Underwood, 
1994). In short, these rulings seek to close the gap in per-pupil expenditures between high 
wealth districts and low wealth districts.  
The philosophical arguments for the school finance reform movement were 
largely based on two influential works: Arthur Wise’s Rich Schools, Poor Schools, 
published in 1968, and Coons, Clune and Sugarman’s Private Wealth and Public 
Education, published in 1970 (Ward, 1998; Roellke, Green & Zielewski, 2004). Their 
ideas, which tie school funding discrepancies to the constitutional concept of equal 
protection, have served as the basis for education finance reform litigation. 
California’s Serrano v. Priest (1971) is generally noted as the landmark case that 
initiated judicial reform of state education finance systems. In Serrano, the California 
Supreme Court held that California’s state system of school finance was unconstitutional 
in that it violated the U.S. Constitution’s 14th Amendment guarantee of equal protection. 
Importantly, the Serrano court adopted Coons, Clune and Sugarman’s concept of fiscal 
neutrality as an ideal for providing equal protection under the law (Guthrie et al., 2007; 
Ward, 1998). Fiscal neutrality – the lack of a correlation between education spending and 
local district property wealth – subsequently became the standard for challenging the 
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constitutionality of school finance schemes at both the federal and state levels 
(Vandersall, 1998; Roellke, Green & Zielewski, 2004). 
A quarter century later, the concept of fiscal neutrality is echoed in the Vermont 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Brigham v. State (1997) where the justices concluded: “The 
distribution of a resource as precious as educational opportunity may not have as its 
determining force the mere fortuity of a child’s residence” (p. 15). Regarding this point, 
the court further clarified: “Equal educational opportunity does not necessarily require 
precisely equal per-capita expenditures, nor does it necessarily prohibit cities and towns 
from spending more on education if they choose, but it does not allow a system in which 
educational opportunity is necessarily a function of district wealth” (p. 17). Based on 
these judicial principles, the court charged the Vermont legislature with creating a new 
system of school finance that afforded students “substantial equality of educational 
opportunity” by dissolving the existing relationship between district wealth and per-pupil 
expenditures. 
Dayton and Dupre (2007) remark:  
…there are always winners and losers in school funding reforms, which 
often leads to protracted litigation in these cases…. School funding 
reforms directly affect tax burdens, the distribution of resources and the 
allocation of educational opportunities. Competition over limited 
resources is inevitable. (p. 482) 
 
As a result, court-mandated school finance reform is contentious and legislative 
compliance with court mandates is quite slow in several states (Carr & Fuhrman, 1999; 
Dayton & Dupre, 2007; Rebell, 2009). However, just four months after having its school 
finance system declared unconstitutional, the Vermont legislature dramatically reduced 
the state’s longstanding reliance on local property taxes to fund schools in favor of two 
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new funding mechanisms that redistributed property wealth from property-rich school 
districts to property-poor school districts. These mechanisms included: 1) a statewide 
property tax used to provide a $5,000 per-pupil block grant; and 2) a guaranteed yield2 
second tier local property tax for those districts wishing to spend above the block grant. 
Funds collected under the second tier property tax were pooled through a recapture 
provision and redistributed back to school districts based on taxing effort.3 
Known formally as the Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1997 (but 
commonly referred to as Act 60), this landmark legislation did much to equalize funding 
in a state where, in 1994, local funding accounted for 62.5 percent of school district 
budgets; a rate exceeded by just two other states (Monk & Brent, 1997). Commenting on 
the legislation’s new funding mechanisms, economist Thomas Downes (2002) remarked: 
“Act 60 may well have represented the most radical reform of a state’s system of public 
school financing since the post-Serrano, post-Proposition 13 changes in California in the 
late 1970s” (p. 1). Similarly, school finance reform scholar Michael Rebell deemed Act 
60 “one of the most radical fiscal equity remedies in the country” (in Picus, 1998, p. 167). 
Sass’ (2007) examination of the bill’s fiscal impact led her to conclude that, under Act 
60, “…tax rates and educational opportunities were substantially equalized across school 
districts…” (p. 1).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A guaranteed yield formula ensures that each local district can function as if it had an 
equal property tax base per pupil (Odden & Picus, 2008). 
3 The upshot of this mechanism was that property-wealthy districts paid more – 
sometimes significantly more – into the “sharing pool” than they received back through 
the guaranteed yield.  
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The legislation’s reputation as “a radical fiscal equity remedy” lies primarily in its 
use of a recapture provision to fund schools above the statewide block grant. Steinman 
(2005) asserts that direct recapture such as that used in Act 60 is unique: 
Act 60 importantly diverges from traditional district power equalization in 
the financing of the system. While state funds traditionally supplement the 
tax yields of the low property wealth towns, Act 60 created a sharing pool 
that directly tapped local property tax revenues from property-rich towns 
to supplement yields of property-poor towns. The sharing pool’s 
redistribution mechanism directly seized local tax fund dollars from gold 
towns in addition to providing revenue to property-poor towns, 
simultaneously increasing the marginal tax price of education in some 
towns, while reducing the tax rate required for a given level of additional 
education spending in others. (p. 3) 
 
In Act 60’s first year of implementation, property taxes increased in 43 property-wealthy 
towns known colloquially as “gold towns” (“Robin Hood,” 1998). In one of the more 
extreme cases, Act 60 required the property-wealthy town of Stowe to send seventy cents 
of every dollar it raised above the block grant to the state sharing pool for redistribution4 
(Shelly, 2011). 
Fowler (1994) notes that “[n]on-incremental education reforms are of 
considerable theoretical interest because in the American policy process it is not easy to 
innovate” (p. 335). Dayton and Dupre (2007) argue this is particularly so with the issue 
of school finance reform because “despite threats from a court, state legislatures will try 
to avoid unpopular tax increases or school funding recapture provisions that redistribute 
resources from more affluent school districts to poorer school districts” (p. 490). Instead, 
Timar (1990) remarks that: “With few exceptions, states have responded to political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 According to Ripley and Franklin (1991), redistribution policies are “intended to 
manipulate the allocation of wealth, property, political or civil rights, or some other 
valued item among social classes or racial groups” (p. 21). These policies tend to create 
highly visible political controversies because the stakes for winners and losers are 
perceived to be high as valuable assets are transferred from one group to another. 
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pressure by ‘giving a little something to everybody’” (p. 72). While more politically 
feasible, this approach tends to reduce the redistributive capacity of reform legislation 
(Fuhrman, 1978; Nelson, 1997). 
Indeed, the search for politically feasible finance mechanisms has produced 
incremental reforms to state systems of school finance. As Fuhrman (1978) discovered in 
her review of state legislative responses to school finance court rulings, reform was 
“much more evolutionary than revolutionary” (p. 162). However, Vermont’s atypical 
speed and approach to school funding leads one to believe that the policymaking forces 
operating within Vermont were somewhat more conducive to passing non-incremental 
school finance reform legislation. As such, Act 60 serves as an interesting case for 
examining the type of state policy environment that produces legislation with a strong 
fiscal equity thrust. 
Topic and Purpose 
This research, grounded in political theory, has two major purposes: 1) to explain 
a case of non-incremental policy change within the realm of school finance reform; and 
2) to test the utility of Mazzoni’s (1991) arena model for explaining state-level school 
finance policymaking. These goals will be accomplished through an examination of the 
Vermont state legislature’s policymaking process in response to the Vermont Supreme 
Court Brigham v. State (1997) ruling declaring the state’s system of school finance 
unconstitutional. This case study analysis will seek to explain how key political actors, 
taking advantage of favorable reform conditions, utilized power derived from positional 
authority as well as personal influence to impact the passage of Act 60, an innovative and 




 The 1990s witnessed the reemergence of school finance reform as an important 
education policy matter confronting state legislators. Since 1989, plaintiffs have won 
legal suits alleging the inequitable or inadequate nature of school funding in 22 states 
(Hunter, 2011a). The courts’ willingness to declare state systems of school finance 
unconstitutional marks a departure from the 1980s (Vandersall, 1998; Rebell, 2009) and 
places the burden of conceiving and implementing reform measures squarely upon the 
shoulders of state legislatures. 
Recent literature on the issue of school finance reform largely focuses on matters 
surrounding this recent spate of court litigation. Three main issues appear to be of 
particular interest to educational researchers. These include: 1) the role of the judiciary in 
bringing about reform; 2) the use of “educational adequacy” as a standard by which to 
judge state systems of school finance; and 3) the ultimate ability of judicial intervention 
to distribute finances equitably among school districts. In contrast, comparatively little 
has been written about the political processes involved in devising and enacting school 
finance legislation following these court-ordered reform mandates (Kirst, 1990; Nelson, 
1997). Specifically, this study proposes to extend knowledge in the area of state 
education policymaking for school finance reform in the following ways: 
First, as previously mentioned, Act 60 was an unusual school finance bill in that it 
redistributed funds generated in property-rich school districts to property-poor school 
districts through a statewide property tax and a recapture provision. Such redistributive 
policies are only reluctantly contemplated by state legislatures (Nelson, 1997; Carr & 
Fuhrman, 1999, Dayton & Dupre, 2007). As McUsic (1999) notes: “The political arena 
	  
 8 
does not prefer the poor school district and at least in the past 20 years or so has seldom 
preferred increased education funding over reduced taxes” (p. 89). Yet the funding 
mechanisms included in Act 60 are just the policy provisions championed by advocates 
of fiscal equity. Therefore, Vermont’s passage of Act 60 serves as a revelatory case (Yin, 
1994) through which we can examine the rare phenomenon of non-incremental policy 
enactment. 
Second, despite the recent reemergence of school finance reform as an important 
education policy matter confronting state legislatures, very little has been written about 
the political processes involved in devising and enacting school finance legislation 
following court-ordered mandates. Yet McUsic (1999) notes that “because it is not the 
courts but the legislatures that ultimately establish and fund a school financing system, 
successful school finance litigation under state constitutions is a legislative process as 
well as a court procedure” (p. 108). This study will help address this gap in the current 
literature by focusing on the political process of policy formation of school finance 
legislation in state legislatures in the wake of legal challenges. 
Third, what little literature exists on the politics of school finance reform dates 
largely from the 1970s and early 1980s. However changing economic, demographic, and 
societal conditions impact policymaking (Carr & Fuhrman, 1999). For example, while 
school finance reform during the 1970s was frequently conducted in a time of fiscal 
plenty, recent reforms efforts have been conducted in eras of economic downturns and 
strong government and anti-tax movements (Carr & Fuhrman, 1999). Such fiscal 
constraints have limited school finance reformers’ historic reliance on leveling up as a 
strategy for achieving legislative consensus. In addition, while most court cases in the 
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1970s turned on a state’s equal protection clause, more recent strategies have focused on 
a state’s right to education clause (Hunter, 2011b). As Berke (1976) notes, “legal 
remedies derive from effective jurisprudential argumentation…” (p. 85). These differing 
legal standards have impacted the manner in which legislatures dispose of court 
mandates. Thus, changing sociopolitical conditions and legal rationales create an 
opportunity to update and extend our understanding of the politics of school finance 
reform. 
And finally, apart from being dated, much writing on the politics of school 
finance reform is generally atheoretical in nature (Cibulka, 1994; Fowler, 2006). While 
this literature provides a useful chronology of events and highlights particularly 
important actors and their influence strategies, it does not seek to explain the policy 
process. In contrast, the case study being undertaken here seeks to embed findings in an 
established theoretical framework that has proven its utility in other state education issue 
areas. In this way, while gaining much needed information concerning the policy 
processes involved in the passage of school finance reform legislation, this research also 
will test the general utility of Mazzoni’s arena model (Mazzoni, 1991) for explaining 
state-level policy innovation by extending it to the realm of school finance.  
Conceptual Framework and Central Research Questions 
 This study examines the Vermont state legislature’s decisionmaking process 
surrounding the passage of a non-incremental school finance reform package known as 
Act 60. This case study explores and analyzes these decision dynamics utilizing a 
conceptual vantage point that is largely absent in the study of the politics of school 
finance reform. In its investigation of the use of power in state-level legislative 
	  
 10 
policymaking, this study seeks to answer two central questions: How did contextual 
forces and actor relations interact to bring about a non-incremental school finance 
reform policy in Vermont? and In what ways does Mazzoni’s (1991) arena model account 
for or fail to account for these policy dynamics? 
  The theoretical framework used to focus this study is grounded in political theory. 
In general, political perspectives view policymaking as a means to “regulate social 
conflict and retain institutional legitimacy” through the “strategic use of power” (Malen 
& Knapp, 1997, p. 428). The specific framework that is utilized—Mazzoni’s (1991) 
arena model—was developed as a means to combine political theory’s two historically 
dominant approaches to the use of power in policy formation: the social control-systems 
approach and actor-influence perspective (Gamson, 1968; McDonnell, 2009). To this 
end, the model allows the user to observe both structural power and strategic power at 
work in the policy process.  
 Mazzoni’s arena concept is grounded in the systems approach in that it 
acknowledges the structure that arenas provide to the policymaking process by 
legitimating a certain set of participants and establishing the institutional and social 
context of policy formation. In this regard, government institutions structure the rules of 
the game, define the relevant players and resources, and shape influence strategies. 
However, within these arenas the mechanisms of pluralistic power-based policy 
formation operate as political actors representing various interests deploy available 
resources and strategies in their attempt to influence the policy process. Thus the “pulling 
and hauling” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999) of politics is mediated by the arena. 
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 This approach to policy research is not novel (see Schattschneider, 1960; Lowi, 
1964; Redford, 1969; Chandler, Chandler & Vogel, 1974; Thurber, 1991; Baumgartner & 
Jones, 2009; Kingdon, 1995). Rather, it was originally based upon an extensive review of 
political theory literature and has been refined through empirical testing in the state 
education policymaking arena. In fact, other researchers in education policymaking have 
found the arena model to be a fruitful heuristic for explaining educational policy 
innovations at the state level (i.e. Fowler, 1994; Cody, 1994; Freedman & Hughes, 1998). 
The specific framework to be utilized along with associated research design methods will 
be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
Organization of the Study 
 The case study is organized into six chapters. This chapter has provided a brief 
overview of the case study project, including its topic and purpose, possible contributions 
to theory and research, conceptual framework, and central research questions. Chapter 
Two offers a review of the relevant literature and elaborates the conceptual framework 
that guides the study. Chapter Three describes the case study methods utilized, including 
research design, data sources, and data collection and analysis procedures. Chapter Four 
presents a review of the policymaking context and issue background. Chapter Five 
provides a case narrative surrounding the passage of Vermont’s Act 60. Chapter Six 





 DISCUSSION OF RELATED LITERATURE AND DESCRIPTION 
OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to describe the literature that guides this case study 
research. This review encompasses the literature in two central areas: 1) the issue area – 
the politics of school finance reform; and 2) the theoretical framework – the process of 
state education policymaking.  
Issue Area: The Politics of School Finance Reform 
Historically, education has been seen as providing many important contributions 
both to individuals and to society as a whole. In this regard, psychologists, political 
scientists, sociologists, and economists have chronicled the positive impact of education 
upon the quality of life, the transmission of cultural values, and economic development. 
Because many of these positive educational outcomes are believed to benefit society at 
large, public expenditure in the education sector has been justified. To this end, the public 
commitment to education is codified in the constitutions of all 50 states and education 
spending constitutes the largest portion of each state’s annual budget. 
However, despite the well-documented benefits of education to society and 
individuals alike, the distribution of funds earmarked for education remains remarkably 
unequal (Carey, 2004). For example, throughout the 1990s the state of Vermont’s high 
reliance upon local funding resulted in a considerable disparity in per-pupil spending, 
ranging from a low of $2,979 in some districts to a high of $7,7265 in others (Picus, 
1998). As McUsic (1999) notes: “This inequity of educational resources would not be so 
noted (or perhaps so notable) if it were not matched with inequality of educational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Financial statistics for school year 1995/96. 
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achievement” (p. 89). Indeed, in places like Vermont, the achievement gains of students 
in property-rich school districts consistently outstripped those of students in property-
poor school districts (Jimerson, 2002). 
Vermont’s fiscal disparities during that era reflect the reality of a revenue 
generation process that was tightly linked to local property taxes and highlight the 
enduring appeal of local control in the state’s education sector despite its potentially 
negative impact upon fiscal equity. Indeed, this tension between decentralization and 
inequity raises questions regarding the proper role of government in resource 
redistribution (Wong, 2008). Students of the politics of school finance reform understand 
that broad values such as local control and equity are at stake in the settling of school 
finance disputes. This section will provide a brief overview of the role of values in 
education policymaking and more specifically in the politics of school finance reform. 
Values Underpinning the Politics of School Finance Reform 
According to Bailey et al. (1962), politics is “the fashioning of coalitions of 
influence in an attempt to determine what values will be authoritatively implemented by 
government” (p. vii). In education, equity, efficiency, and liberty are commonly 
perceived to be the fundamental values pursued in the distribution of education resources 
(Guthrie, Garms & Pierce,1988).  Guthrie, Garms and Pierce (1988) define equity in the 
realm of school finance as equality of educational opportunity as it is neither possible nor 
desirable to educate all students to the same level given differing preferences and 
abilities. Their definition recognizes that equality of educational opportunity has 
historically been expressed in terms of assuring equal dollars per student or, alternatively, 
sufficient money to provide comparable educational experiences. They define efficiency 
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as a desire to obtain adequate education for as little money as possible. Finally, their 
definition of liberty encompasses the idea that local communities have a right to control 
the education provided to their children. 
These goals are derived from principles of liberalism which serve as the basis of 
the American form of government as developed by the Founding Fathers in the mid-18th 
century. Guthrie, Garms, and Pierce (1988) note that equity, efficiency, and liberty “are 
viewed by an overwhelming electoral majority as conditions that government should 
maximize” (p. 22). As such, public policymakers seeking to distribute educational 
resources tend to operate within this philosophical framework when making policy 
decisions. 
While equity, efficiency, and liberty are held dear by the American populace, 
many philosophers and policymakers have observed an inherent tension among these 
goals that make them difficult, if not impossible, to maximize simultaneously. According 
to Guthrie, Garms and Pierce (1988), the “equilibrium among the three values constantly 
shifts, with the balance at any particular point being fixed as a consequence of a 
complicated series of political and economic compromises” (p. 23). Given that 
“education is one of the prime instruments through which society attempts to promote all 
three values” (Guthrie, Garms & Pierce, 1988, p. 23), the value wars are played out 
fiercely in the education policy arena. With regard to the issue of school finance reform, 
Firestone, Goertz and Natriello (1997) write: 
The design and enactment of reform legislation is a complex task that 
requires consensus on such philosophical questions as the meaning of 
equality of educational opportunity, the appropriate balance between the 
state’s constitutional responsibility for education and local control, how 




Strong emotions and a sense of urgency about America’s future propel citizens to action 
in support of policies they believe best accord with their answers to these philosophical 
questions (Margolis & Moses, 1992). 
Malen and Knapp (1997) write that “public policies and social values are 
inextricably and reciprocally linked” (p. 433). For example, school finance reform 
advocates generally seek to close the spending gap between rich and poor school districts 
as a means to promote equality of educational opportunity through increased fiscal equity 
(Shelly, 2011). States working towards this end possess a variety of policy options, 
including the reallocation of existing tax dollars to poor districts, the levying of additional 
taxes to be allocated to poor districts, or the curtailment of education spending in high-
wealth districts. However, these options do not tend to be politically appealing because 
they “can awaken dormant conflicts, aggravate existing cleavages, and spark new battles 
about what constitutes an appropriate course of action or an appropriate distribution and 
utilization of [resources]” (Malen, 2006, p. 84). 
In their efforts to enhance fiscal equity between poor and wealthy school districts, 
state governments have taken increased responsibility for financing education over the 
last several decades. Yet funding disparities between wealthy and poor school districts 
persist as efforts for a more equitable distribution of funds have met with substantial 
resistance from advocates of local control who claim that state taxing limits and funding 
plans curb their liberty to finance schools as they see fit (Carr & Fuhrman, 1999; Nelson, 
1997; Margolis & Moses, 1992, Shelly, 2011). As Guthrie, Garms and Pierce (1998) 
comment: “Whether fact or fiction, the doctrine of local control has broad legislative and 
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popular support. Attempts by legislators to restrict local spending or redistribute local tax 
dollars among districts have to contend with this doctrine” (p. 208).  
Indeed, acting in the name of local control, political and social elites have brought 
potent resources to bear on elected officials to ensure that their schools remain well 
funded (Nelson, 1997; Ward, 1998; Reed, 2001). Margolis and Moses (1992) remark 
that: “Legislative decisions reflect the pressure of local interests, the views of which can 
only be ignored at the peril of each elected official—especially regarding such a critical 
issue as school aid” (p. 126). As a result, school finance reform legislation tends to be the 
product of bargaining and compromise. Alexander and Salmon (1995) write: 
An examination of methods used by the states for allocating state funds 
shows that political compromises have been reached in many states by 
allocating a part of state funds on a flat grant basis or by guaranteeing a 
minimum of state funds to wealthy school districts, to secure passage of a 
state equalizing appropriation. (pp. 265-66) 
 
These compromises, resulting from the need to balance the competing values of equity 
and liberty, produce incremental legislation that only marginally advances fiscal equity. 
As a result, equity advocates have returned again and again to the courts to seek remedies 
against what they view to be unresponsive legislatures (Camp & Thompson, 1988). 
The court’s strong agenda setting ability has made school finance reform one of 
the most salient education issues facing state legislatures today. Legislatures from around 
the country are currently grappling with how to devise and implement reform measures 
that not only meet judicial standards but also pass tests of political feasibility. Here, as 
Reed (2001) notes: “Judicial quests for greater educational opportunity (defined as either 
adequacy or equity) come into conflict with the political incentives and structures that 
favor inequality” (p. 66).  
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Reconciling the interests and values of these groups renders the policymaking 
process highly dynamic. Within the parameters set forth by the court, pluralistic 
bargaining occurs where competing interests vie to impact policy decisions. As such, 
school finance reform is as much a political process as it is a legal process where, in the 
end, legislative outputs turn on negotiation, compromise, and the skillful use of political 
power. 
Mazzoni (1993) writes that “examining the political genesis of policy innovation 
provides an illuminating prism for understanding basic conflicts of interest and ideology, 
and their related power dynamics in a polity” (p. 359). This section has detailed the 
values that undergird the political debate surrounding school finance reform to help 
explain why the push for equity has been such a political struggle. The following two 
sections describe the policy arena in which this values debate takes place to further 
contextualize the politics surrounding the passage of school finance reform legislation.  
The Politics of State Education Policymaking 
The politics of school finance reform exists within the broader realm of the 
politics of state education policymaking and, at times, has been studied in this vein. This 
section will review this more generalized politics of state education policymaking 
literature to provide a broad historical backdrop concerning how educational politics at 
the state level has evolved over the course of the last several decades. The literature 
surrounding the more focused topic of the politics of school finance reform is nested 
within this broader literature and will be described in a subsequent section in an effort to 
highlight those actors, goals, resources, and strategies most relevant to this particular 
sphere of state education policymaking.  
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Although political analysis is among one of the oldest social science disciplines, 
the formal study of the politics of education is a relatively recent phenomenon dating 
back only to the early 1960s (Mitchell, 1990). Before this time, political scientists shied 
away from the study of education policymaking due to a longstanding presumption that 
the education arena should be shielded from the corrupting world of politics (Wirt & 
Kirst, 1989). In 1959, political scientist Thomas Eliot, noting a dearth of scholarly 
inquiry in the field, issued a call for expanded research into the politics of education. 
While acknowledging that speaking of the politics of education may seem “abhorrent to 
educators,” he noted that public schools were, indeed, part of government and, as such, 
served as a “fit subject for study by political scientists” (Eliot, 1959, p. 1035). This call 
for expanded inquiry coincided with the beginning of a period of increased upheaval in 
the education arena that helped to unmask the myth of education as an apolitical 
enterprise. Mitchell (1990) cites the rise of the cold war, desegregation, and increased 
teacher militancy as key events bringing to an end “the urban reform, progressive 
education, scientific management anti-political consensus that had dominated education 
policymaking for half a century” (p. 156). Taken together, these events spurred 
researchers’ interest in education policymaking as a political pursuit and “invited power 
and influence into the vocabulary of educational governance” (Geary, 1992, p. 34). 
The Early Years: Collaboration and Compromise 
The first major treatment of the politics of state-level education policy was 
published just three years after Eliot’s essay first appeared. This comparative study, 
entitled Schoolmen and Politics, by Bailey, Frost, Marsh and Wood (1962) examined the 
politics of state school aid in eight Northeastern states and was built around the 
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proposition that state education appropriations are determined politically. As such, it 
focused on the legislative process through which state education funds are authorized.  
Bailey et al. identified four groups of pro-school interests generally responsible 
for promoting increased state funding for public education: education academics or 
“scribblers;” officials in state government concerned with educational issues; 
professional educators; and “surprise” actors whose goals may, at times, coincide with 
more traditional education interest groups. These “schoolmen” sought collaboration and 
cooperation through a variety of strategies including grassroots organizing, coalition 
building, and legislative lobbying. Bailey’s work highlighted the role of cohesion among 
“schoolmen” in achieving policy goals. When united, they formed a powerful alliance 
brokering in the expertise and information needed by legislators to make informed policy 
choices. However, their efforts could at times be thwarted by countervailing forces 
termed “depressants.” These depressants, including tax-minded business people, rural 
interest groups, and conservative politicians, sought to counter efforts to increase state aid 
to schools.  
Masters, Salisbury, and Eliot’s (1964) study of education decisionmaking in 
Missouri, Illinois, and Michigan also reinforced the importance of cohesion in the policy 
process during this era. In both Missouri and Illinois educational interest groups were 
highly unified and, therefore, quite influential. This unity allowed them to integrate 
themselves into the overarching political power structure. Prizing predictability and 
incremental change over radical reform, they avoided conflicts that might open the 
“scope of conflict”6 and activate opposition groups. By not overstepping their reach, 
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these groups kept decisionmaking within the education policy subsystem where their 
influence upon the legislative process was more assured.  
However, in a portent of things to come, Masters, Salisbury and Eliot discovered 
that the policymaking process in Michigan was radically different. The education lobby, 
fractured by clashes between teachers and administrators and rural and urban interests, 
was only nominally effective. As a result, the governor and key legislators stepped in to 
fill the power vacuum left by these divided forces. Thus, with the waning influence of 
outside groups, decisions were left to “the sovereign authority of inside groups” (Geary, 
1992, p. 37). 
Tumultuous Changes of the 1960s and 1970s 
Based on the research conducted by Bailey et al. and Masters et al., Laurence 
Iannaccone (1967) developed a typology of four educational policymaking patterns 
linking educational interest groups with their legislative counterparts. Writing in the late 
1960s during a time of education upheaval, Iannaccone’s typology of differing 
relationships between interest groups and legislatures acknowledged that the strong 
alliance that once existed between legislators and the education lobby was no longer 
normative. Iannaccone’s first policymaking pattern was labeled the locally-based 
disparate pattern in which local groups, lacking statewide organization, lobby their local 
representatives. Lacking unity, education interests were hindered by the forces of 
localism. He termed his second pattern the statewide monolithic structure. In the 
statewide monolithic pattern, statewide education coalitions have formed a consensus on 
goals and strategies that allows them to speak to policymakers with a strong and unified 
voice. The third organizational pattern described by Iannaccone was the statewide 
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fragmented structure where fractured state educational organizations, having failed to 
reach agreement on key goals, press their competing interests on the legislature with 
mixed success. The final pattern, known as the statewide syndical organization, describes 
a situation where education interests have become institutionalized in a governmental 
body that seeks to resolve group differences before presenting them to the legislature. 
Commenting on Iannaccone’s classification structure, Burlingame and Geske (1979) 
note: “The nature of each linkage type and the role of its corresponding interaction 
between the educational leaders and their legislative contacts significantly determine the 
ability of the education lobby to influence legislation” (p. 52).  
In 1969, Usdan, Minar and Hurwitz examined the influence of groups representing 
elementary-secondary education and higher education in 12 states and again highlighted 
the connection between cohesion and power. In their study, they noted that at the K-12 
level new environmental forces such as increased teacher militancy and public criticism 
of education placed a strain on the cohesion of education coalition members. This strain, 
in turn, produced disorganization and loosened the education lobby’s traditional grip on 
the reins of power. Conversely, at the same time, an increasingly unified higher education 
lobby was reaping the benefit of cohesion in the form of increased state appropriations.  
In 1973, Milstein and Jennings performed an in-depth examination of the politics 
of education in the state of New York. The study identified four key groups active in 
policymaking: the governor, the state department of education, education interest groups, 
and the legislature. Like other researchers during the period, Milstein and Jennings noted 
that the relationships among those actors involved in the education subsystem were 
undergoing changes. Cooperation was being replaced by tension and competition among 
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interest groups as the teacher-administrator relationship fractured under the stress of 
collective bargaining demands. At the same time, the increased ability of state 
legislatures to collect and interpret data was liberating legislators from their dependence 
upon the state department of education and education interest groups for information. The 
authors presciently predicted that fallout from these changes would be an increased role 
for the governor and legislature in state education policymaking.  
As Milstein and Jennings had predicted, Campbell and Mazzoni’s (1976) 
examination of state education politics in 12 states found that throughout the early years 
of the 1970s governors were increasingly influential in matters of education policy. 
However, Campbell and Mazzoni found that these governors were more interested in 
setting the education agenda than in formulating actual policy proposals. Conversely, 
state boards of education and chief state school officers yielded comparatively less 
influence than they had in previous decades. With regard to education interest groups, the 
study characterized the education arena as an “open system” with multiple access points 
for exerting influence on policy outcomes. This “openness” was viewed as the result of 
the increasingly fragmented education policy sector and marked a significant departure 
from earlier decades when education policymaking was perceived as a predominately 
closed alliance between the education lobby and its state bureaucratic counterparts. 
Despite this heightened internal discord, Campbell and Mazzoni found that the education 
lobby remained an influential presence in the state policymaking process due to its 
impressive array of resources. Importantly, Campbell and Mazzoni’s conclusions directly 
challenge previous studies’ findings that tied influence ability to cohesion. Among 
education interest groups, legislators found teacher organizations to be the most 
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influential pressure group. This influence was derived from their large membership rolls, 
money caches, and willingness to exert overt political power through campaign activity 
and financial contributions.  
Five years after the release of Campbell and Mazzoni’s report, Rosenthal and 
Fuhrman’s (19817) State Legislative Education Leadership Study sought to focus on the 
state legislature’s role in education policymaking. This narrow focus was justified due to 
the increased role of state legislators in the policymaking process resulting from the 
increasingly divided education community. The study discovered that education policy 
leaders in state legislatures tended to be experienced, senior, and focused 
disproportionately on fiscal matters. As such, they were more likely to sit on 
appropriations, finance and ways and means committees. In terms of external linkages, 
legislators relied upon the state department of education for raw data and teacher 
associations and executive branch budget staffers for networking contacts. Increasingly, 
legislators turned to interstate organizations such as the National Council of State 
Legislatures and the Education Commission of the States for information and networking 
purposes.  
The 1980s and 1990s: Rise of Outside Interest Groups 
While Rosenthal and Fuhrman (1981) concentrated on the role of the state 
legislature in policy formation, other studies sought to reveal the rising influence of 
interest groups outside the traditional education lobby. Malen’s (1983) longitudinal 
analysis of the enactment of tuition tax concessions in Minnesota demonstrated how a 
sustained focus on a single issue enabled a coalition of parochial school interests to 
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research conducted in the 1970s. 
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overpower established education interests to secure tax concessions for parents who sent 
their children to private schools. Also in Minnesota, Mazzoni and Clugston (1987) 
studied the role of business groups in bringing about education reform during the 1985 
legislative session. They found that although big business emerged from the session as a 
recognized policy actor, its influence was dependent upon the backing of key politicians 
and constrained by the countervailing forces of an entrenched education lobby that 
commands “a de facto veto over proposals for major change” (p. 322).  
Seeking to explore the theoretical underpinnings of the politics of state education 
policymaking, Geary (1992) utilized a political bargaining model to explain special 
education funding in the state of Utah. Geary argued that the open and pluralistic process 
leading to the passage of special education legislation in Utah supported the bargaining 
model’s notion that policymaking is the product of “compromise, conflict, and 
confusion” (Allison, 1971, p. 162 in Geary, 1992, p. 401). Like Malen (1983), Geary 
found that a single-issue interest group could be a critical actor in the policymaking 
process. However, this influence may be contingent upon: 1) issue salience; 2) 
dependable resources; 3) early intervention; 4) the will to sustain influence effort; 5) 
alignment with key actors in the policy process; 6) a supportive political context; and 7) 
fiscally feasible proposals.   
Over the last several decades, the state of Minnesota has served as a focal point 
for the study of state education policymaking. Here, a number of studies have been 
conducted on a wide variety of educational issues. In 1993, Mazzoni reviewed 24 
Minnesota case studies conducted over a 20-year period to distill lessons learned. 
Mazzoni’s review largely reinforces the findings of prior scholars with regard to the 
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changing nature of the politics of state education policymaking. It highlights the role of 
legislators, particularly those on education and finance committees, as policy innovators; 
demonstrates the powerful, yet episodic, role of governors in policymaking; chronicles 
the decline in relative power of the traditional education lobby; and charts the explosion 
of interest groups attempting to influence education policy. His overall conclusion is that 
“…Minnesota’s state education policy system has steadily become more pluralistic, 
politicized, and bureaucratized…” (p. 372).  
In 1994, Mazzoni turned his eye to the national scene with his appraisal of the 
state education reform movement that took hold across the United States in the early 
1980s. As with his work in Minnesota, Mazzoni chronicled the increase in pluralistic 
state-level policy activity during the period and credited enhanced legislative capacity, 
economic prosperity, heightened competition to attract and retain economic resources, 
and judicial intervention as enabling and energizing forces. In terms of notable trends, 
Mazzoni highlights gubernatorial activism, the involvement of big business in education 
policymaking, and the rising influence of national organizations such as the National 
Council of State Legislators and the National Governors Association through their policy 
proposals and networking opportunities. However, despite the changing dynamic brought 
by new policy actors, Mazzoni found that legislators and traditional education interest 
groups still “…exercised preponderant influence over most issues and over most stages of 
policymaking” (p. 68). 
 In summary, this 40-year examination of state education politics charts a rapidly 
changing policymaking terrain. Where the education policymaking arena was once the 
primary if not sole purview of the department of education and teacher and administrator 
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organizations, it is now open to a wide array of interest groups including a multiplicity of 
single-issue groups and big business. In large part due to the fracturing of the education 
lobby, policymaking has become increasingly centralized at the state level where 
governors and legislators dominate efforts to develop and adopt policy initiatives. Yet, 
despite this fracturing, the traditional education lobby still remains among the strongest in 
the state capitol when it comes to education policymaking. Centralized policymaking is 
also the result of demands for wide-scale education reform in the post-A Nation at Risk 
era. The issue’s saliency has attracted the attention of previously inattentive governors 
and state legislators who have highlighted education reform as part of their political 
agendas. The process of education policymaking has proven to be highly contextual, 
varying from state to state depending on its particular history, political culture, formal 
structures, and operating procedures. However, across the nation, resources such as 
money, data/information, persistence, membership numbers, and media attention are 
found to be consistently effective in influencing policy outcomes at the state level.  
The Politics of School Finance Reform 
 While a fair amount of scholarly attention has been paid to matters surrounding 
the politics of state education policymaking over the last several decades, research 
concerning the more focused topic of the politics of school finance reform is not as 
plentiful. The literature that does exist generally confirms many of the conclusions of the 
state education policymaking research. In fact, school finance as an issue area was 
featured prominently in three of the state education policymaking studies mentioned in 
the previous section (see Bailey et al., 1962; Milstein & Jennings, 1973; and Campbell & 
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Mazzoni, 1976).  Yet, because school finance reform creates unique political fault lines, 
it warrants its own in-depth examination.  
 The bulk of the research into the politics of school finance reform dates from the 
10-year period between 1975 and 1985. During this period, school finance reform rose to 
the top of the political agenda as a result of a wave of court rulings declaring many state 
systems of school finance to be unconstitutional. In recent years, however, despite 
renewed political interest in matters of school finance reform, there has not been a 
commensurate increase in the level of scholarly attention paid to the issue. Characterizing 
the literature as dated, sporadic, and atheoretical in nature, Kirst (1990) notes: “The 
politics of school finance has not been a field with a sustained research base or a 
committed group of scholars. The research is topical and short-lived” (pp. 23-24). 
Despite these shortcomings, this section will review inquiry into the politics of school 
finance reform to help identify key actors, along with their goals, resources, and 
strategies, to understand how they attempt to influence the policymaking process in this 
political arena. 
 The literature supports six observations regarding the politics of school finance 
reform. First, reflecting a larger trend in state education policymaking, policymaking for 
school finance reform over the last several decades has been pushed out of the micro 
arena and into the macro arena. As court rulings have raised the issue of school funding 
up the policy agenda, governors and legislative leaders have increasingly wrested control 
of the finance issue from once-cozy state education interests. This transition from the 
micro to the macro arena has made policymaking more unpredictable, more vulnerable to 
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environmental forces, and more dependent upon the skill of individual policymakers to 
forge winning coalitions. 
 Campbell’s (1979) examination of the political turbulence in New Jersey 
following the Robinson (1973) decision holds the state out as emblematic of the growing 
strife surrounding school finance decisionmaking. He suggests that this unrest was the 
result of a shift from a closed decisionmaking setting to a more open one in which a 
larger number of policy actors pursued their own specific interests. This opening, he 
argues, constrained policymaking by creating larger amounts of environmental stress in 
the decision arena as groups vied to pass legislation that served their own narrow 
interests. As a result, policymaking became more unpredictable, more vulnerable to 
larger environmental forces, and more dependent upon the skill of policymakers to forge 
coalitions among competing parties. 
 Writing during the 1990s, Carr and Fuhrman (1999) examined political responses 
to court mandates in Texas, New Jersey, Alabama, and Kentucky. In their work they note 
that state legislatures grappled with a national anti-tax, anti-government sentiment that 
restrained their ability to raise the revenue needed to satisfy court rulings. At a time when 
public attention was turned to non-governmental education initiatives such as vouchers, 
school choice, charter schools, and private management contracts, legislatures were being 
asked to dedicate more state funding to education. This erosion of public will for 
continuing traditional school finance reform measures hindered consensus on alternative 
school finance strategies. Limited fiscal revenues served to sharpen dissent among 
education interest groups because school finance reform was increasingly seen as a “zero 
sum game” with clear winners and losers. The issue of race also served to heighten 
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dissent among competing interests. The authors note that white majorities in Alabama, 
New Jersey and Texas refused to approve tax increases and resource redistribution 
schemes that disproportionately benefited minority students. However, despite these 
political, social, and economic challenges, meaningful school finance reform has been 
accomplished in some states. Carr and Fuhrman point to the role of “…successful 
litigation, strong political leadership, and extensive public education efforts…” in passing 
reform legislation (p. 166).  
 Second, the literature on school finance reform highlights a process that is 
dependent upon a variety of enabling social, political, and economic environmental 
forces for change. These factors include: 1) a court ruling mandating changes in the state 
aid structure; 2) popular resentment aimed at an issue that can be linked to school finance 
reform such as property tax rates or education quality; 3) a political transition (i.e. shift 
from Republican to Democratic power); 4) national reform networks providing training 
and expertise; and 5) fiscal surpluses. These environmental forces create a “window of 
opportunity” (Kingdon, 1995) that can be used by policy actors to implement reform 
measures. 
 Geske’s (1976) examination of the legislative decisionmaking process that led to 
the passage of Wisconsin’s revised school aid formula in 1973 found four key 
environmental pressures that built momentum for reform. These key environmental 
inputs included: 1) demand for property tax relief; 2) school finance court cases prevalent 
throughout the country at the time; 3) the state’s revenue windfall; and 4) new 
Democratic control of the governor’s office and the state assembly. Geske concludes that 
these environmental factors strongly contributed to the passage of a school finance 
	  
 30 
reform measure in Wisconsin by creating an atmosphere that made reform a particularly 
attractive option for the state.  
 Reviewing the process of school finance reform in Minnesota, Michigan, Ohio 
and Wisconsin, Siegel (1976) also found that reform was the product of extraordinary 
economic, judicial, and analytic pressure that was brought to bear on the political system. 
In particular, a push for property tax relief figured prominently in the call for school 
finance reform. 
Fuhrman’s (1978) synthesis of multiple case studies conducted throughout the 
first half of the 1970s revealed that a number of important factors external to the ordinary 
state education decisionmaking process were also seen as crucial to facilitating reform. 
These factors included the rise of a national network of reform-oriented groups 
highlighting the issue and providing technical knowledge, court rulings (or the threat of 
rulings) mandating legislative reform, popular dissatisfaction with local property tax 
schemes, and financial surpluses that made reform more politically palatable. Fuhrman 
concludes that when combined with political compromise, leadership, and expertise, 
these fortuitous factors produce an environment conducive to meaningful school finance 
reform. 
 Lehne’s (1978) case study of the New Jersey legislature’s protracted response to a 
1973 New Jersey Supreme Court ruling declaring the state’s educational funding system 
unconstitutional highlights the important role of the courts as agenda setters in the school 
finance policymaking process. In this regard, courts have the capacity to shape both the 
nature of the issue as well as the features of the remedy. Lehne found that despite the 
unfavorable political timing of the court decision, the persistent nature of judicial rulings, 
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coupled with hardball tactics by the New Jersey Supreme Court justices, eventually 
compelled the passage of reform measures by the legislature. Lehne concludes that the 
Robinson (1973) decision made the issue of school finance reform “persistent, 
ambiguous, immediate, visible, legitimate, and intrusive” (p. 207) and notes that 
legislative outcomes were the combined product of judicial agenda setting and existing 
political and social conditions in New Jersey at the time of the ruling. 
 Berke et al. (1984), too, observed that court rulings served as a key “precipitating 
event” that heightened the saliency of the school finance issue in state policymaking 
circles. While precipitating events help to break the logjam of legislative inactivity, Berke 
et al. (1984) also argue that to be successful the state should have some tradition of 
reform that can be built upon such as an equalization formula already in place or the 
policy proposals of a study commission because policymakers require “technology, 
familiarity, and/or time to bolster confidence that a new system is feasible” (p. 64). 
 Third, the school finance reform literature suggests that the push for reform 
within the school finance reform policy arena is driven largely by governors and 
legislative leaders who are able to take advantage of their positional authority and 
personal influence to build the coalitions necessary to pass school finance bills. For 
example, Siegel’s (1976) study of school finance reform in the Midwest revealed that a 
major factor “in translating pressure for change into actual pieces of legislation” was the 
governor (p. 232). Key strategies for passing governor-sponsored reform measures 
included: 1) making education reform a key component of election campaigns; 2) 
appointing task forces composed of a wide array of special interests to promote 
compromise initiatives; 3) including reform measures in annual budgets to “enlarge the 
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negotiating arena” by presenting opportunities for funding tradeoffs and bargaining 
leverage; and 4) linking school finance reform with property tax relief through the 
infusion of increased state aid to schools. In terms of resources, governors relied upon 
easy access to media outlets and the extensive information and research capacities of 
education staffers to help shape and define the issue. 
Fuhrman’s (1978) multiple case study review also demonstrated that reform 
legislation was highly dependent upon the political leadership of those governors and key 
legislators who were both willing to use political muscle to forge compromises among 
competing interests and capable of navigating the legislative process. Reform legislation 
was also more common among those states with a history of reform efforts, in part 
because momentum built by these efforts over time made reform “much more 
evolutionary than revolutionary” (p. 162). 
Berke et al. (1984) also highlight a “the role of an active and informed political 
leadership” (p. 60). Their study revealed that in each state where meaningful change 
occurred, political leaders such as the governor or legislative committee chairs seized 
upon school finance reform as their central issue. These leaders took the time to develop 
policy proposals, form coalitions, and shepherd bills through the legislature. Key to their 
success was the able assistance of education staff members who reviewed background 
materials, evaluated finance data, and developed policy options. 
Finally, Carr & Fuhrman’s (1999) work noted that while rulings in favor of 
plaintiffs can act as a catalyst for reform by opening what Kingdon (1995) would term a 
“window of opportunity,” without the political leadership from the governor or key 
legislators successful litigation, alone, does not guarantee reform. They found that these 
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leadership efforts must be accompanied by a public education campaign that clearly 
articulates the benefits of school finance reform to the public as a whole. As the authors 
note: 
Because the arguments in favor of school finance reform are complex and 
usually contentious, while those opposing reform are fairly simple and 
often have more widespread appeal, extensive and prolonged efforts to 
educate the public and create a community of interest for reform are 
essential. These efforts are necessary both in building consensus around 
the need for reform and in garnering support for specific reform bills. (p. 
167) 
 
Fourth, other important policymakers active in the politics of school finance 
reform include representatives from outside the traditional education lobby such as 
taxpayer organizations, business interests, and urban and municipal groups. Support from 
these organizations helps to bring potentially reluctant legislators, such as those from 
property-rich districts, into the reform coalition. However, the change resulting from 
these bills tends to be incremental in nature because coalition building: 1) spreads 
available resources out among a variety of parties; and 2) stymies radical reform 
propositions such as redistribution of funds from property-rich to property-poor school 
districts. As a result, the potential redistributive capacity of state funds is largely diluted.  
According to Fuhrman (1978) because “the legislature is a traditional arena for 
give-and-take, negotiation, and compromise” (p. 160), school finance reform legislation 
was most likely to pass when it was included as part of a larger package of measures. 
This strategy not only allowed for bargaining but also for side payments to other interests 
to garner their support. However, Fuhrman concludes that this type of legislative 
complexity is a “double-edged sword” because, while it increases the likelihood of the 
bill’s passage, it also entrenches interests and dilutes the redistributive capacity of state 
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dollars in that it weakens the ability of policies to direct funds from wealthy localities to 
poor districts. 
Fuhrman et al. (1979) followed state legislative action regarding school finance 
reform in seven states throughout the 1970s, including Maine, Florida, New Mexico, 
Oregon, California, Missouri and South Carolina. The authors describe the politics of 
school finance as a prime example of coalition politics. Because state aid to schools 
affects citizens throughout the state, it may be necessary to ally a variety of disparate 
interests in order to fashion a winning coalition. These coalitions are built by offering 
favors and promises in return for support. Coalition fashioning necessitates the 
participation of political elites such as governors and key legislative members because 
they are the political actors in the best position to authoritatively apportion available 
resources such as money and support on legislative action. 
 Task forces, generally appointed by governors, were a particularly successful 
strategy for bringing these disparate interests together to hammer out palatable 
compromises away from the glare of the legislative floor. With agreements obtained 
beforehand, legislative sponsors could be sure that they were bringing bills with 
numerous backers to the attention of the full House and Senate. The reform strategy most 
frequently included in these bills was one that proposed “leveling up” low spending 
districts through the allocation of additional state funding while satisfying high spending 
districts by allowing them to continue spending at their current level or adding funds 
through categorical allocations. Furman et al. (1979) characterized leveling up as “…the 
politics of mollifying the ‘haves’ while aiding the ‘have nots’” (p. 82). This strategy was 
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available to states throughout the 1970s thanks to record fiscal surpluses brought about 
by strong economic growth and federal revenue sharing. 
Conversely, Elmore and McLaughlin’s (1982) detailed portrait of the California 
legislature’s protracted response to the California Supreme Court’s influential ruling in 
Serrano v. Priest (1973) highlights what happens when a reform coalition cannot be 
secured. This in-depth case study examined the linkages between judicial rulings and 
legislative output and concluded that the courts serve as only limited agents of reform 
without a mobilized constituency willing to carry the banner of reform in the political 
arena. They note: “The Serrano I decision did not significantly increase political support 
for reform; it simply secured a place for school finance reform on the agenda to be 
debated by a stubborn governor and a fractious legislature” (p. 78). The fact that most 
California legislators possessed schools in their districts that would be both helped and 
harmed by reform measures served to neutralize key legislative support for change. This 
lack of a viable political coalition was detrimental to the ability of reform advocates to 
secure meaningful change in California’s system of school finance. Echoing the coalition 
strategies outlined by Fuhrman et al. (1979), Elmore and McLaughlin comment that 
“…ultimately education finance reform was less a matter of framing technically correct 
solutions than it was of building a politically feasible solution that would bind together a 
broad coalition of education interests” (p. 133). 
Fifth, largely absent from the school finance reform discussion are representatives 
from state education interests. Frequently, these groups are paralyzed by an issue that pits 
one group member against another. Siegel’s (1976) research noted that the increased 
involvement of the governor in policy formation had consequences for other education 
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sector policy actors. With more state aid flowing to schools, governors sought greater 
control over how this money was to be spent. As a result, traditional actors such as the 
state department of education, the state superintendent, and the state board of education 
saw their influence wane. Similarly, the state education lobby comprised of teacher and 
administrator groups, already hobbled by internal strife, proved only nominally capable 
of influencing policy outcomes.  
 Fuhrman et al. (1979) also discovered the participation of traditional education 
interests such as the state department of education and educator’s groups was notably 
absent in the states studied here. Apart from the fracturing caused by unionization and 
accountability, these groups were also paralyzed by an issue that further divided their 
membership into wealthy versus poor and rural versus urban factions. The authors note 
that traditional interests played an active part in developing school finance reform 
measures in just two of the seven states studied. A broad array of nontraditional policy 
actors filled the void left by the traditional education interest groups. In particular, 
taxpayer organizations, business groups, and urban and minority groups played important 
roles in shaping reform measures.  
Sixth and last, because the cause of school finance reform, by itself, is generally 
not popular enough to gain widespread legislative support, the literature highlights 
several strategies used by political leaders and school finance reform advocates to build 
winning coalitions. These include: “leveling up” property-poor school districts with 
additional state funds; the use of side payments to potential allies to build support for 
reform measures; introducing reform measures into the general budget (as opposed to a 
stand alone bill) to widen the scope of the negotiating area; and linking reform with other, 
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more popular, measures such as property tax relief or educational accountability 
proposals. 
Fuhrman (1978) found that a key strategy utilized by proponents of reform in the 
states she studied was the process of leveling up property-poor school districts to at least 
average state spending levels through the provision of additional state aid while holding 
property-rich school districts harmless. Thanks to the plentiful fiscal surpluses of the 
early 1970s, most states were able to avoid the more politically explosive path of 
redistribution of funds from rich school districts to poor school districts. 
Elmore & McLaughlin’s (1982) study of school finance reform in the wake of the 
Serrano decision demonstrated that Californian’s resistance to reform produced a series 
of legislative measures that tinkered with the existing system largely through leveling up 
poor school districts and offering side payments of additional categorical funding to 
powerful urban interests. In this regard, the legislature, working in concert with a series 
of reluctant governors, was able to nominally satisfy the requirements of the court 
without completely upsetting the existing balance of political power in the state.  
According to Berke and his colleagues (1984), successful school finance reform 
legislation was the result of “creative compromise” that balanced the twin goals of fiscal 
equity and political feasibility (p. 61). These compromises were necessary to gain the 
support of influential allies. Important strategies in building compromise agreements 
included leveling up low-spending districts (rather than leveling down high-spending 
districts), side payments to rural and urban interests, policies that phased in funding 




Odden and Wholstetter’s (1992) study of school finance reform agenda setting 
noted that throughout the 1970s, court rulings, property tax revolts, excess state revenues, 
and the emergence of a national school finance reform policy network served as 
important “triggering mechanisms” that helped the issue of school finance reform to rise 
up the political agenda. Political leaders and blue ribbon commission members sought to 
link school finance reform with property tax reform as a way to broaden the coalition of 
actors interested in reform. Agreements were secured through the liberal use of side 
payments such as compensatory funding to urban interests, transportation funding to rural 
areas, special education funding to suburban schools, property tax relief, and tax and 
spending limitations.  
 According to Odden and Wholstetter, agenda setting for school finance reform in 
the 1980s reflected many of the same themes found in the 1970s. For instance, the courts 
still served as an important triggering mechanism, with key rulings in Texas, Kentucky, 
and Montana. Also, political leaders (governors in particular) continued to push for 
reform and blue ribbon commissions still served as a locus of policy formation. However, 
new triggering mechanisms and policy initiators entered the picture. New triggering 
mechanisms included: 1) the release of A Nation at Risk which chronicled the decline of 
the American education system; and 2) persistent economic stagnation which was blamed 
on the lack of a well-educated work force. In response to these triggering mechanisms, 
business leaders joined political leaders in pushing for education reform. As was the case 
in the 1970s, school aid was linked with another issue to build a winning reform 
coalition. In this case, money for education was linked to improved school performance. 
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 In conclusion, a review of the literature on the politics of school finance reform 
reveals a policymaking process that operates in a largely pluralistic environment that is 
dependent on the ability of policy actors to skillfully deploy resources to achieve 
politically feasible compromises among a wide variety of policy actors. Over time, the 
circumstances that prompt consideration of school finance reform measures have changed 
in response to external environmental factors. Yet, the key ingredients of policy 
formation have remained largely constant. 
Theoretical Framework: The Process of State Education Policymaking 
 While the literature on the politics of school finance reform just described 
highlights key actors, their goals, resources, and influence strategies, it generally does not 
seek to explain the workings of the policy process itself. There remains a stark absence of 
theory-driven research about the political processes by which school finance reform 
decisions are made. This absence highlights both a gap and an opportunity to develop 
tentative ideas concerning the process of state education policymaking using an 
established theoretical framework. The next several sections describe the utility of 
policymaking frameworks in general and, more specifically, explain why the Mazzoni 
arena model has been selected as an appropriate theoretical framework for this study.  
 Classic Conceptions of Policymaking Frameworks:  
Criteria for Selecting a Framework 
 Within the realm of political science, scholars generally agree that educational 
policymaking such as that described above turns on power. In their seminal work, Power 
and Society, Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) write “political science, as an empirical 
discipline, is the study of the shaping and sharing of power” (p. xiv). An essential 
question that this study seeks to answer is: How is power wielded in state-level legislative 
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policymaking vis a vis the issue of school finance reform? A policymaking framework 
helps to answer this question by structuring our understanding of how power is used in 
political decisionmaking.  
 A review of classic political theory literature reveals two general schools of 
thought with regard to the use of power in politics: the actor-influence perspective and 
the social control perspective (Gamson, 1968; Moss Kanter, 1972; Geary 1992). 
According to Harold Lasswell’s (1936) classic treatise, the study of politics helps to 
answer the question “who gets what, when, and how.” Lasswell’s analysis is grounded in 
the actor-influence perspective which highlights the distribution of scarce resources 
among competing factions and emphasizes the conflict that is so frequently engendered 
by the process of resource distribution (Bolman & Deal, 1993). These competing groups 
and individuals wield influence through the strategic deployment of their power resources 
in an effort to impact policy outcomes.  Thus power is “decentralized, fluid, and 
situational” (Lowi, 1964, p. 679). The actor-influence perspective primarily concerns 
itself with analyzing the interaction of actors within a system rather than the impact of the 
system upon individuals and groups. It views discontent among a system’s actors as an 
opportunity for political gain or loss rather than as a problem of social control (Gamson, 
1968). Policy analysis heuristics which belong to the actor-influence camp include: 
symbolic interactionism (Moss Kanter, 1972), group theory (Truman, 1951), and political 
bargaining theory (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999). 
 The social control perspective provides an alternative approach to the study of 
power in politics. The focal point of this perspective is the political system itself, rather 
than the individual actors within the system. As such, systems models are able to “capture 
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features of the larger cultural and socioeconomic environment which shape what enters 
the political system” (Cibulka, 1994, p. 114). According to David Easton (1965), the 
major function of the political system is the “authoritative allocation of values for a 
society” (p. 50). In this approach, demands and supports are inputted into the system and 
translated into outputs in the form of decisions and actions (Easton, 1965). This approach 
to policymaking seeks to understand the ability of a system to utilize its power resources 
as the means by which to regulate conflict and reach societal goals (Gamson, 1968; 
Easton, 1965; Bolman & Deal, 1993). Policy frameworks centered on the social control 
approach to the deployment of power include: structural-functionalism (Almond & 
Coleman, 1960); systems analysis (Easton, 1965); rational choice theory (Allison & 
Zelikow, 1999; Dye, 1978); and incrementalism (Lindbloom, 1959). 
 Like all analytic frameworks, heuristics grounded in either perspective highlight 
certain aspects of a policy case while overlooking others. The influence approach’s focus 
on strategic power is frequently faulted for overemphasizing the ability of individual 
actors or subgroups to influence the decisionmaking process (Moss Kanter, 1972) and for 
ignoring the important role that institutions play in shaping politics (Lowi, 1964; March 
& Olsen, 1984). Alternatively, the social control perspective’s focus on structural power 
is cited for denying human agency by overemphasizing the effect of structural limits on 
decisionmaking (Moss Kanter, 1972; Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976), for assuming a 
straightforward relationship between status and power (Lowi, 1964), and for overlooking 
the “passion and pandemonium” of the political process (Geary, 1992). Additionally, it is 
criticized for not offering the analyst the opportunity to peer inside the system’s “black 
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box” so as to understand the process by which demands and supports are converted into 
policy decisions (Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976; Dye, 1978). 
 In short, some frameworks turn our attention to the power that emanates from 
institutional authority while other frameworks search for expressions of power within 
human interactions. Concerning these approaches, Gamson (1968) writes: “These two 
disparate perspectives… are concerned with the same relationship although they ask 
different questions about it. This fact gives them a natural unity – each a partial view but 
together they form a whole” (p. 18). Thus, the analyst’s challenge is to discover a 
framework that allows for the integration of both perspectives; one that focuses on actor 
roles and relationships yet is also sensitive to the impact of institutional and 
environmental forces upon human interactions. For as Eliot (1959) notes, “although 
political power is centered in groups and individuals, its effectiveness and use are shaped 
by institutions” (p. 1046). 
State Education Policymaking Frameworks 
Over the last several decades, policy scholars have responded to this challenge 
with a variety of models seeking to fuse the strengths of both the social control and actor-
influence approaches. In the area of state education policymaking, Campbell and 
Mazzoni (1976) sought to combine aspects from both traditions to develop a theoretical 
framework on the use of power in politics. Influenced by the works of Easton (1965) and 
Allison (1971), their model highlights the primacy of human interaction, while at the 
same time situates this interaction within a structural system. They describe this approach 
in the following manner: 
Education policymaking was assumed to be a competitive process, the 
dynamic of which resides in the interplay of influence. The explanation for 
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policy decisions, based on this perspective, comes from revealing patterns 
of accommodation among competing actors who differ greatly as to 
resources, intention, and skill. These patterns are organized through a 
governmental structure as well as being channeled and constrained by 
other systematic features. (p. 13) 
 
From the systems, or social control perspective, Campbell and Mazzoni incorporated the 
concepts of policy decisions, system actors, and functional relationships. From the 
allocative or actor-influence perspective they incorporated the concepts of power, 
influence, and resources. In this respect, Campbell and Mazzoni see power as a function 
of institutional structure as well as the individuals and groups operating within those 
structures. 
 Over the years, this integrative approach to political theory building has been 
tested and found to be useful in a number of educational issue domains, including school 
choice (Malen, 1983), special education (Geary, 1992), and higher education (de Give, 
1995). However, its reliance upon a linear approach to policymaking defined by 
functional stages, including issue definition, proposal formulation, support mobilization, 
and decision enactment (Mazzoni & Campbell, 1976) has been critiqued (Kingdon, 1995; 
Cibulka, 1994; Sabatier, 1991). For example, while Kingdon (1995) acknowledges that 
policymaking is, indeed, comprised of stages, he believes that they “do not necessarily 
follow one another through time in any regular pattern” (p. 78). Noting these 
shortcomings, policy scholars are now advocating for the use of policy frameworks that 
seek to overcome the artificiality of distinct, linear stages. Sabatier (1991) writes:  
Political scientists and policy scholars share a common interest in 
developing better theories of the policy process than the stages heuristic. 
Such theories should integrate many of the contributions of policy scholars 
with political scientists’ traditional focus on the preferences, interests, and 
resources of various actors, institutional rules, and background 




Within the realm of state education policymaking, Mazzoni (1991) has confronted 
this issue with the development of his arena model. The arena concept is grounded in the 
systems approach because each decisionmaking arena legitimates a certain set of 
participants and establishes the institutional and social context of policy formation. This 
model acknowledges that governance structures not only impact the rules of the game but 
also the relevant players, the relative value of their resources, and their strategies for 
wielding influence. As a result, policymaking shifts to different government arenas can 
lead to starkly different policy outcomes. Mazzoni (1991) notes: “Moving an issue to a 
new arena can change the key actors, relevant resources, incentives for action, influence 
relationships, and governing rules—and hence winners and losers—in policy struggles” 
(p. 117). 
In a nod to the concerns of actor-influence approach, the model acknowledges 
that it is up to political strategists to determine which arena is most likely to provide the 
most favorable outcome given available resources and strategies. This critical dimension 
of political strategy is referred to as “venue shopping” (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). In 
the arena model, policy development does not move through the political system in a 
linear fashion, but, rather, is subject to arena shifts which may expedite, derail, or mutate 
policy proposals as they travel from one decisionmaking forum to another. Thus the arena 
model reflects the spontaneity and serendipity of the policy process highlighted in 
Kingdon’s (1995) critique of the stages heuristic and highlights the consequential 
character of arena shifts. 
 The concept of an arena shift has been used in a number of theoretical 
frameworks to help explain how non-incremental policy innovation occurs. For example, 
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in Kingdon’s (1995) policy streams model, substantive policy change is most likely to 
occur when the politics, policy, and problems streams are coupled together. As Kingdon 
explains: “The separate streams come together at critical times. A problem is recognized, 
a solution is developed and available in the policy community, a political change makes it 
the right time for policy change, and potential constraints are not too severe” (p. 165). 
This coupling brings the issue out of the policy subsystem and into the macro arena 
where it is most likely to receive the attention of high profile policymakers. 
 Similarly, Baumgartner and Jones’ (2009) punctuated equilibrium theory posits 
that long periods of equilibrium in a policy domain (marked by incremental policy 
change) are punctuated by critical periods of major policy innovation when the issue is 
shifted from subsystem politics to the macro-political system. The heightened attention of 
political leaders and the public makes the associated subsystem more susceptible to 
reform as new ideas, actors, and practices are interjected into it. These new ideas, actors, 
and practices become institutionalized in the policy subsystem when a state of 
equilibrium returns. 
 Finally, Polsby’s (1984) model of policy innovation highlights two processes by 
which non-incremental policy change occurs: The first by “meeting opposition head on 
and overcoming it;” and the second by “slipping an innovation by as a side issue or as a 
nonissue” (p. 159). The first type of policy innovation, known as incubated change, 
occurs once an issue has been passed from the subsystem to the macro arena due to 
building pressure for change. Here, policy alternatives are openly debated and frequently 
become highly politicized. Conversely, in the second type of policy innovation, known as 
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acute change, motivated policy actors maneuver behind the scenes to “slip by” a major 
policy change without attracting the attention of relevant actors or the broader public. 
 Like Mazzoni’s (1991) arena model, each of these well-known models 
incorporates the key concept of arena shift into its framework for explaining how non-
incremental policy change occurs. While any of these frameworks could be deemed 
appropriate for use in this study, the Mazzoni model stands out because it is grounded in 
and derived from research on state education policymaking, specifically the passage of 
innovative public school choice legislation in the state of Minnesota. The model also 
stands out because it does not simply acknowledge the importance of a change in venue; 
it also attempts to unpack how arena shifts occur. For these reasons, Mazzoni’s arena 
model has been selected for use in this study. The intellectual roots and key components 
of this framework are described below. 
Mazzoni’s Arena Model 
 Mazzoni’s (1991) theoretical framework was based on readings from relevant 
political science literature that highlighted the central concept of the arena 
(Schattschneider, 1960; Lowi, 1964; Redford, 1969; Chandler, Chandler & Vogel, 1974; 
Thurber, 1991). While this term can be defined in a variety of ways (see Hilgartner & 
Bosk, 1988; Allison & Zelikow, 1999; and Ostrom, 1999), Mazzoni defines an arena as 
“a middle-range term, referring to the political interactions characterizing particular 
decision sites through which power is exercised to initiate, formulate, and enact public 
policy” (p. 116).  
The arena model, as initially articulated by Mazzoni, included two key policy 
arenas: the subsystem arena and the macro arena. A policy subsystem is generally 
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comprised of a relatively stable cadre of legislative committee members, bureaucratic 
specialists, interest groups, and academics involved with a specific policy issue. These 
subsystem members possess specific policy expertise and develop ongoing relationships 
with one another in their particular area of interest (Thurber, 1991). Once viewed as 
ideologically aligned “iron triangles,” policy subsystems are now more likely to be 
conceived as looser agglomerations of interested parties (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). 
Kingdon (1995) refers to these groupings as “policy communities” while Heclo (1978) 
terms them “issue networks.” In the realm of state education policymaking, relevant 
actors at the subsystem level generally include bureaucrats from the state department of 
education, members of legislative committees dealing with education issues, and 
educational interest groups such as the PTA, administrative organizations, and teachers’ 
unions (Marshall, Mitchell & Wirt, 1989). According to Fowler (2000), these actors 
comprise the “Education Policy Planning and Research Community” (in Malen, 2001, p. 
174). 
 Within the subsystem, this stable group of interested parties tends to engage in 
pluralistic bargaining to help accommodate as many interests as possible (Mazzoni, 1991; 
Fowler, 1994). This bargaining is often conducted in an orderly fashion away from public 
scrutiny. While conflict may be present, it tends to be short lived and mediated through 
pragmatic logrolling and calculated negotiation. Because the subsystem is already biased 
in favor of the interests represented in the policy subsystem, there is little impetus to 
contemplate any major policy reform that may change the existing balance of power 
between competing interests (Redford, 1969). As a result, policy change tends to be 
incremental in nature. 
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 Politics at the level of the macro arena provides a stark contrast to the low profile 
incremental accommodation found within the subsystem arena. Here “…policymaking is 
much more visible, accessible, ideological, and contentious…” (Mazzoni, 1991, p. 117). 
Within the macro arena high-level executives and elected officials replace bureaucrats 
and technical specialists in the policymaking process. Seeking to make an impact with 
constituents, these leaders actively search for issues to champion and utilize their high 
profile and a variety of media strategies to attract attention to their cause. These strategies 
often rely on creating a sense of drama and crisis to have their issue heard over the din of 
multiple competing issues (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). 
Those issues “forced upward out of the subsystems are normally matters that raise 
broader issues and concern wider interests than can be determined within them” 
(Redford, 1969, p. 107). Thus they tend to expose the basic philosophical divisions 
within a society. The contentious nature of these core social issues opens up the macro 
arena to a wide array of public voices. However, by widening the scope of conflict, 
policymakers run the risk of losing control over the policy process as newly energized 
stakeholders enter the decision arena (Schattschneider, 1960; Redford, 1969). Ultimately, 
this emphasis on widespread participation “creates a political momentum and a ratio of 
power that gives non-incremental and redistributive policy a real chance for enactment” 
(Mazzoni, 1991, p. 117).  
Based on his reading of the politics literature, Mazzoni theorized that an arena 
shift from the policy subsystem to the macro arena may be a necessary precursor for 
policy innovation in education. External forces pressing for change upon the subsystem 
help to produce such a shift by persuading government actors to “break away from 
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subsystem politics in order to advocate innovative policy initiatives” (Fowler, 1994, p. 
336). According to Redford (1969), such macropolitics “input factors” may include: 
pressure groups, public discussion, ballots, demonstrations, civil disobedience, 
administrative agencies, individual contacts (Redford, 1969, p. 108). In his review of 
state education policymaking in the 1980s, Mazzoni (1994) refers to larger, more diffuse 
environmental “enabling forces” and “energizing factors” as additional sources of 
momentum for substantive policy change. 
Similarly, Cobb and Elder (1983) posit that “triggering devices” such as natural 
catastrophes, unanticipated events, technological change, biases in resource distribution, 
and ecological change may call attention to a particular problem. However, they also 
acknowledge the important role that individuals play in focusing attention in the macro 
arena. By using these triggering devices to their advantage, a politically minded 
“initiator” is able to convert the problem into an urgent political issue requiring 
widespread public attention. This heightened attention, in turn, places pressure for change 
upon the policy system. 
Kingdon’s (1995) “policy entrepreneurs” play an analogous role in effecting arena 
shifts. These highly motivated change agents call innovative proposals to the attention of 
policy leaders, seek to inform the public about the benefits of policy change, and “soften 
up” their own policy community in order to bring an issue out of subsystem obscurity and 
into the public glare of the macro policy arena. Most importantly, however, they attempt 
to “hook solutions to problems, proposals to political momentum, and political events to 
policy problems” (p. 182) to overcome subsystem dominance.  
	  
 50 
 Mazzoni (1991) and others also cite additional resources as another means by 
which issues can move from the policy subsystem to the macro arena. This motivation for 
an arena shift posits that politicians, once liberated from zero sum programmatic 
tradeoffs, are more likely to risk funding innovative policy proposals. He, however, 
cautions that, unless accompanied by external pressures for change, additional revenue is 
likely to continue to flow directly to the policy subsystem where it is used “to lubricate 
the bargaining process, expand allocations to issue beneficiaries, and accommodate 
influential new claimants” (p. 118). 
 Mazzoni’s initial model, derived from relevant political science literature, posits 
that outside forces place demands for change upon the subsystem. When the subsystem 
does not respond to these demands, elected officials may seize the issue as a means to 
connect with a potential constituency group. Using the media to attract widespread 
attention, they shift the issue to the macro arena. These actions, in turn, trigger resistance 
from threatened stakeholders. Competing coalitions are mobilized and ideological 
conflict ensues. In the highly volatile macro arena, non-incremental policy innovation is 
dependent upon the ability of policy actors to skillfully deploy their resources so as to 
build winning coalitions. Here, winning hinges on “the relative power and leadership of 
the competing coalitions and on the responsiveness of institutional arrangements to the 
mass-based demands that these coalitions can generate” (p. 118).  
Findings from Mazzoni’s empirical application of the initial model to the passage 
of Minnesota’s school choice policies highlighted certain shortcomings of the original 
theoretically-driven framework. Mazzoni noticed that the initial model’s emphasis on 
outside pressure to effect policy change underestimated the role of elite pressure for 
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change, proactive governmental leadership, and idea champions in the policymaking 
process and ignored two relevant decision sites: the commission arena and the leadership 
arena. These theoretical oversights motivated Mazzoni to revise the model. Specifically, 
he added two arenas—the commission arena and the leadership arena. The addition of 
these two decision arenas underscores Mazzoni’s finding that elite policy entrepreneurs 
and political idea champions can influence policy outcomes by instigating arena shifts. 
According to Mazzoni, a commission arena is typically comprised of a relatively 
small group of individuals representing diverse interests on an issue of concern. In this 
arena, commission membership is generally stable although temporary and contingent 
upon appointment. Actors engage in pluralistic bargaining as a means to persuade group 
members to a particular point of view. Because the commission arena is not burdened by 
the “overwhelming establishment bias of the subsystem,” it does have the capacity to “do 
more than incrementally extend existing legislation” (Mazzoni, 1991, p. 130). In 
Mazzoni’s analysis, the major strength of commission arenas is their ability to legitimate, 
consolidate, and extend new policy ideas.  However, the commission arena’s emphasis on 
consensual bargaining among competing interests ultimately makes it an unlikely site for 
major policy overhauls.  
While the commission arena played a role in the development of innovative 
school choice legislation in Minnesota, Mazzoni found the leadership arena to be a 
particularly relevant decision site. Within the leadership arena, the state’s top leaders 
engage in elite bargaining to develop and implement innovative policy proposals. These 
elites utilize their formidable stores of positional and personal resources to obtain 
favorable decision outcomes. Using Froman and Ripley’s (1965) typology, Mazzoni 
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identifies four optimal conditions for successful policy innovation in the leadership arena: 
1) unity among top-level officials; 2) a willingness to commit influence resources; 3) an 
issue’s lack of public visibility; and 4) weak countervailing pressure from interest groups 
and grassroots constituencies (p. 125). While Mazzoni argues that leadership arenas 
provide the most promising setting for obtaining sweeping policy change, he cautions 
that: “Decision outcomes from this arena are likely to be unusually vulnerable to 
unforeseen problems, doubts about legitimacy, and superficial compliance” (p. 131).    
Incorporating these new additions to the arena model, Mazzoni’s revised theory 
highlights the role of powerful individuals, particularly politicians, in engendering arena 
shifts. Acting as idea champions inside the political system:  
…politicians do more than just pick up, package, and promote ideas 
developed for them by others. Top officials, in particular, can recast these 
ideas, heighten their saliency, and inject them into a policymaking arena. 
As shown in the model, these lawmakers function as switchers in the 
legislative system, channeling issues to arenas. (p. 131) 
 
While constrained by “institutional arrangements, resource availability, group and 
constituency pressures, public moods, and cultural expectations” (p. 132), these skilled 
high-ranking officials can utilize their positional authority and personal influence to 
impact events in multiple policy arenas.  
Grounded in empirical research as well as theoretical literature, the Mazzoni 
model appears to provide a strong framework for the examination of education policy 
innovation at the state level. However, Mazzoni himself acknowledges that the model 
warrants additional examination so that it may be refined, refuted, or, if appropriate, 
extended to other areas of state education policymaking. To date, this model has been 
utilized to analyze educational policies in other states such as Ohio (Fowler, 1994) and 
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Connecticut (Freedman & Hughes, 1998) as well as in the province of Newfoundland, 
Canada (Cody, 1994).  
Fowler (1994) utilized the arena model to explain the passage of an innovative 
open enrollment policy in Ohio. Her findings confirmed many of Mazzoni’s basic 
conclusions. For example, she corroborated Mazzoni’s assertions that the observed arena 
shift out of the policy subsystem did not come as a result of pressure from the macro 
arena. Rather, she noted the work of the governor in bringing pressure to bear on the 
policy subsystem. As in Mazzoni’s case, this pressure resulted in a shift to the 
commission and leadership arenas. In particular, Fowler’s case highlighted the 
importance of the leadership arena and maintained Mazzoni’s supposition that leadership 
unity and commitment combined with issue invisibility and weak countervailing pressure 
groups increase the likelihood of policy innovation within the leadership arena. 
However, the study detected some weaknesses in the framework. First, Fowler’s 
research suggests that the commission arena should not automatically be treated as an 
autonomous decisionmaking forum because members of the leadership arena may 
possess undue influence within it. Second, citing Ohio’s experience with national reform 
networks at the governor’s level, she suggests that the conceptualization of the leadership 
arena as just policy-oriented interactions among top-level officials may be too narrow in 
that it does not account for the “national dimension of the state leadership arena” 
(Fowler, 1994, p. 348). Finally, the Ohio case challenges the hypothesis that policy 
innovation is unlikely in the absence of revenue surplus. 
Freedman and Hughes (1998) utilized the arena model to examine education 
policy innovation at the state level in Connecticut. Their research sought to compare and 
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contrast policy change over the course of two decades. Like Fowler’s findings, Freedman 
and Hughes’ conclusions support the basic tenets of Mazzoni’s revised arena model. In 
particular, their research affirmed the role of resources and strong political leadership 
from top officials in producing arena shifts that lead to policy innovation. In this case, 
innovation occurred within the commission arena. However, like Fowler they cite the 
confounding relationship between the leadership and commission arenas and note that 
political officials “not only directly appoint members to the commissions, but also often 
participate themselves as members of commissions” (p. 2). 
Cody (1994) utilized the arena model to understand the role and function of a 
Royal Commission in educational decisionmaking in the province of Newfoundland, 
Canada. Specifically, the Royal Commission sought to develop a plan to restructure the 
province’s relationship with churches as direct providers of public education. In her 
study, Cody noted the presence of all four arenas in the decisionmaking process as well 
as the presence of important governmental idea champions working to facilitate arena 
shifts. However, like Fowler (1994) and Freedman and Hughes (1998), she questioned 
the independence of the arenas by noting the simultaneous membership of some leaders 
in multiple arenas. In her assessment of the policymaking process under examination, she 
found that the boundaries between arenas “…were often as flexible as they were discrete” 
(p. 157). In her opinion, these commonalities confounded the idea that policy might have 
developed differently in different arenas.  
In short, subsequent empirical testing has found the Mazzoni model to be 
generally helpful in explaining policy innovation, although the independence of the 
individual arenas has been questioned.  These substantive critiques help to refine the 
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theoretical underpinnings of the arena model and serve as useful points of departure for 
researchers seeking to extend the arena model into other areas of state education 
policymaking such as school finance reform.  
Conceptual Framework for This Study 
For this study, relevant literature on the politics of school finance reform has been 
examined in conjunction with the relevant literature on state education policymaking to 
derive an appropriate conceptual framework through which to examine the passage of 
Vermont’s Act 60. A conceptual framework is an ordering device that helps to make 
sense of patterns of behavior that are difficult to observe directly (Cody, 1994). The 
literature on school finance reform reveals a process that is both conflict-laden and highly 
contextual. These attributes require the use of a conceptual model that focuses on actor 
roles and relationships yet is also sensitive to the impact of institutional and 
environmental forces upon human interaction.  
The literature on school finance reform also highlights the incremental nature of 
policy change due to the need to build large statewide coalitions. However, Vermont’s 
Act 60 stands out as an example of non-incremental policy change in that it sought to 
redistribute funds from property-rich school districts to property-poor school districts 
through the use of a statewide property tax and a local property tax recapture provision. 
The attributes of the policy issue under examination require the use of a conceptual 
framework that can help explain the circumstances under which non-incremental policy 
innovation occurs. 
The conceptual model guiding this case study is derived from Mazzoni’s (1991) 
arena model (Appendix A). Mazzoni’s model rests on three key assumptions that are vital 
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to understanding how Act 60 came into being: 1) that arenas structure not only the 
institutional and social context of policy formation, but also the relevant players, the 
relative value of their resources, and their strategies for wielding influence; 2) that 
politically skillful policy actors utilize their positional and personal power to instigate 
arena shifts to arenas that they believe are likely to produce favorable outcomes; and 3) 
that the concept of an arena shift to these favorable policy venues can help to explain 
large-scale policy change.  
 This conceptual framework situates the analysis of education policymaking within 
a broader external policy environment shaped by the state and nation. This policy 
environment is influenced by cultural norms, social values, and political traditions. 
Within this broader context, the conceptual framework highlights four overlapping policy 
arenas where court-mandated school finance reform is mediated: 1) the policy subsystem; 
2) the macro arena; 3) the leadership arena; and 4) the commission arena.  
 Each arena possesses its own customs, rules, and operating procedures that 
structure the pluralistic power-based policy formation that takes place within. Here, 
actors with diverse goals strategically deploy resources to influence policy outcomes. 
Because the arena model does not assume that a clear-cut decisionmaking process exists 
(Cody, 1994), the role of individual initiative, particularly among elite policy 
entrepreneurs and political idea champions, is highlighted. Strategically placed 
individuals utilize their positional and personal resources to instigate arena shifts by 
“functioning as switchers in the legislative system, channeling issues to arenas” 
(Mazzoni, 1991, p. 131) that are most likely to produce favorable outcomes. Because 
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each arena differs with regard to scope of participation, decisionmaking process, and 
visibility, potential policy interactions and outcomes would be expected to vary widely. 
The Mazzoni (1991) model recognizes that power is distributed differentially 
throughout various policy arenas in that the structure of each arena dictates the relative 
utility of various resources. For the purposes of this conceptual framework, the 
overarching concept of power is characterized as purposeful, relational, and contextual 
(Mazzoni, 1991). It is purposeful in that it involves persons attempting to overcome 
resistance to obtain a desired outcome. It is relational in that, as Pfeffer (1981) writes, “a 
person is not ‘powerful’ or ‘powerless’ in general, but only with respect to other social 
actors in a specific social relationship” (p. 5). Finally, it is contextual in that the “scope” 
of one’s power may not necessarily penetrate multiple domains (Dahl, 1984) and the 
opportunity to exercise influence is conditioned by social, institutional, and 
environmental factors. 
One definition that embodies these multiple dimensions of power was developed 
by the noted leadership scholar James MacGregor Burns (1978): 
The power process is one in which powerholders (P), possessing certain 
motives and goals, have the capacity to secure changes in the behavior of a 
respondent (R)… and in the environment, by utilizing resources in their 
power base, including factors of skill, relative to the targets of their power 
wielding and necessary to secure such changes. (p. 13) 
 
Importantly, Burns’ definition conceives of power as the “capacity to secure changes,” 
rather than the actual act of securing changes. Consistent with this definition is the idea 
that power is subsequently converted into influence and authority through the skillful 
deployment of resources. Influence involves the use of resources by political partisans to 
affect the decisionmaking outcomes of officials (Gamson, 1968). On the other hand, 
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social control, or authority, involves the employment of resources by officials to quell 
disturbances and maintain control of the decisionmaking process (Gamson, 1968; Dahl, 
1984; Pfeffer, 1981). In this respect, influence and authority can be viewed as the “active 
expressions of power” (Geary, 1992, p. 16).  
For the purposes of this study, an actor’s power and influence within the context 
of each arena is analyzed through an examination of: 1) the decision outcome method; 2) 
the reputational assessment method; 3) the resource assessment method; and 4) the 
analysis of non-decisions. This multiple measurement strategy allows the analyst to 
discover a “convergence of power indicators” (Pfeffer, 1981, p. 59).  
The decision outcome method examines policy outcomes to assess power 
(Pfeffer, 1981; Gamson, 1968). In this approach, power is gauged through an analysis of 
winners and losers with the presumption that those who consistently win wield more 
power. However, Dahl (1957) cautions that such a power index can be problematic. For 
instance, it may be difficult to distinguish between a true wielder of power and someone 
who is adept at guessing how the political winds are blowing. Such a person might 
always seem to be on the winning side of an outcome and yet not exert any real influence. 
Dahl terms such a person a “chameleon.” Related to the chameleon is the “satellite,” a 
decision maker who consistently follows the lead of a powerful colleague but who exerts 
no actual influence. Thus, while appearing to exercise influence, such a person only 
reflects it through association (Gamson, 1968). Conversely, those political actors with 
true power may attempt to understate their ability to influence so as to avoid gaining the 
attention of rivals or having additional demands placed upon them (Pfeffer, 1981). While 
being attentive to the possible existence of “chameleons” and “satellites,” for the 
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purposes of this study a “win” constitutes a policy outcome that aligns with policy actors’ 
goals. 
The reputational method for assessing power eschews the tallying of 
decisionmaking outcomes in favor of tapping people’s perceptions of patterns of 
influence and authority in their own communities. This method of assessing power rests 
upon three assumptions (Pfeffer, 1981): 1) actors have knowledge about power in their 
communities; 2) these actors are willing to reveal what they know about how power is 
distributed; and 3) questioning actors about power elites does not predispose them to 
confirm concentrations of power where they do not exist (p. 55). While critics (i.e. 
Polsby, 1960) charge that this model builds in too many assumptions, Pfeffer’s study of 
power and resource allocation at the University of Illinois discovered a consistency of 
power attributions across departments. According to Pfeffer, “this consensus and 
consistency in power ratings provide some evidence for at least a shared social definition 
of the distribution of power” (p. 57). For the purposes of this study, reputational power is 
assessed by informant interview data. It is anticipated that this alternative approach to 
measuring power helps to substantiate or refute initial power assessments derived from 
the decision analysis approach.  
  The resource assessment method gauges power through an examination of those 
resources available to actors that could be used to influence policy decisions (Pfeffer, 
1981; Gamson, 1968). This technique assumes that because influence is exercised 
through the strategic deployment of resources, potential power can be gauged by 
estimating the type and amount of resources available to a particular actor or group. 
Above all, this approach broaches the question of plausibility and leads the investigator to 
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ask the question: Given these resources and strategies, is it conceivable that a certain 
policy actor would be influential? Gamson (1968) terms this approach an “end run” in the 
study of power in that it measures the capability and willingness to influence rather than 
actual acts of influence. As such, it helps to shore up preliminary findings on power by 
adding the consideration of plausibility. Data used to measure resource availability is 
drawn from and corroborated by informant and documentary sources.  
 The final measurement technique relies on the analysis of non-decision to detect 
instances of issue suppression (Geary, 1992). It is closely allied with proponents of the 
neo-elitist perspective such as Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and Lukes (1974) who 
“advocate for research outside of the formal decisionmaking arena to unveil the ingrained 
values, biases, and myths that favor the interests of certain groups over others…” (Geary, 
1992, p. 32). This approach expands the scope of inquiry into the surrounding social and 
political culture to uncover instances where elites may have exerted influence and 
authority to suppress issues that might compromise their interests and position in society. 
While some scholars have challenged this approach on methodological grounds (see 
Ledyaev, 1997), others hold that instances of issue suppression are indeed detectable. 
This study is sensitive to how Vermont’s broader socio-political traditions may subtly 
shape the definition of issues and the dynamics of the policymaking process in favor of 
social and economic elites.  
While there are multiple methodological vantage points from which to observe 
and measure power, each is not without its own shortcomings. Pfeffer’s (1981) multiple 
method approach seeks to overcome the weaknesses of any individual approach by 
creating a composite portrait of power at work in the decisionmaking process. A 
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convergence of power indicators helps to give a strong vote of confidence to a 
researcher’s findings concerning the power of key actors or groups. Conversely, little or 
no convergence among power indicators not only prevents the researcher from making 
exaggerated claims based on the findings from one approach but also reveals a more 
complex portrait of the decisionmaking arena in which power is widely dispersed, 
unorganized, or covert.  
Research Questions Derived from the Conceptual Framework 
 As noted earlier, the purpose of this research is twofold: 1) to explain a case of 
non-incremental policy change within the realm of school finance reform; and 2) to test 
the utility of Mazzoni’s (1991) arena model for explaining state-level school finance 
policymaking. In testing the model, this research develops a thick descriptive account of 
political developments relating to the passage of Act 60 and analyzes information derived 
from the account in light of the tenets of the arena model so as to render a judgment with 
regard to the model’s ability to account for the policymaking process under study. This 
approach, which seeks to test and refine mid-range theory through empirical research, is 
consistent with that advocated by scholars in field of political science (Allison,1971; 
Shapiro, 2004).   
To this end, this study will seek to answer two central research questions: How 
did contextual forces and actor relations interact to bring about a non-incremental 
school finance reform policy in Vermont? and In what ways does Mazzoni’s (1991) arena 
model account for or fail to account for these policy dynamics? The following supporting 
questions, derived from the conceptual framework, provide the basis for addressing the 
overarching research questions: 
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• What are the key features of the policy context? What are the historic social, 
political, and economic issues impacting the financing of schools in Vermont? 
What are the institutional structures that oversee and facilitate the development of 
school finance policy in Vermont? 
 
• Who were the major participants in the policymaking process? 
• Why did these participants seek to influence the policymaking process? 
• How did these participants utilize power derived from positional authority and 
personal influence to shift policy decisions to favorable policy arenas? What 
resources and strategies did they employ in doing so? 
 




 Like all studies, this research endeavor has its limitations (Marshall & Rossman, 
1999). First and foremost, it is limited by the assumptions of the analytic constructs 
utilized to frame the research. As Allison and Zelikow (1999) note, “conceptual models 
not only fix the mesh of the nets that the analyst drags through the material in order to 
explain a particular action; they also direct him [or her] to cast his [or her] nets in select 
ponds, at certain depths, in order to catch the fish he [or she] is after” (p. 4). While this 
framework has been designed to at least, in part, overcome various shortcomings inherent 
in the systems/social control and actor-influence perspectives (Gamson, 1968; Bolman & 
Deal, 1993), no one analytic framework is ever able to reveal all the information relevant 
to a particular case. Each framework contains its own assumptions, and as such, its 
findings simultaneously highlight and obscure potentially relevant data. Thus, 
conclusions drawn from the application of an analytic framework must be taken as one of 
several potential explanations. 
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 In particular, this framework assumes that political decisionmaking is a 
potentially pluralistic, value-laden process structured by the decision arena in which it 
operates. Theoretical frameworks that emphasize the pluralistic aspect of the policy 
process8 have been accused of downplaying the role of rationality and overemphasizing 
the inevitability of conflict in the decisionmaking process. They have also been faulted 
for being overly cynical with regard to the ability of groups to work collaboratively 
(Bolman & Deal, 1993) and for ignoring the relationship between political and economic 
power (Schattschneider, 1960; Carnoy and Levin, 1985). However, with these caveats 
noted, a pluralistic political framework not only remains an appropriate mechanism for 
providing insight into the “interest-driven, power-based interactions” (Malen & Knapp, 
1997, p. 428) that so frequently play a key role in determining the outcomes of policy 
decisions such as Act 60, but also allows for the potential discovery of alternative 
patterns of influence operating within the policy arena. 
 The study is further limited by the length of time that elapsed between the events 
described in the study and the data collection period. Such an extensive time lapse can 
serve to cloud and distort the memory of informants. However, various steps were taken 
to mitigate this limitation. First, informants were provided with a legislative chronology 
(Appendix D) to review before interviews were conducted to help enhance recall. 
Second, the researcher conducted an extensive review of primary and secondary source 
documents relating to the case prior to conducting semi-structured interviews. This 
document review enabled the researcher to both jar informant memories during the 
interview process and to assess the accuracy and candor of informant accounts following 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Particularly as compared to rational actor models of policy analysis. 
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the interviews (see Appendix G). Third, efforts were made through the informant 
selection process to ensure that informants represented a wide variety of positions within 
the policymaking process. Finally, singular assertions that could not be corroborated by 
other data sources were not included in research findings.   
Definition of Key Components of the Conceptual Framework 
Arena – A locus of pluralistic political interaction in which influence is deployed in the 
decisionmaking process to impact policy outcomes (Cody, 1994; Mazzoni, 1991). 
 
Subsystem Arena – A policy arena comprised of various policy actors involved with a 
specific policy issue. Subsystem members possess specific policy issue expertise and 
develop ongoing relationships with one another in their particular area of interest 
(Thurber, 1991). This stable group of interested parties typically engages in orderly and 
discrete pluralistic bargaining to help accommodate as many interests as possible 
(Fowler, 1994; Mazzoni, 1991). 
  
Macro Arena – A policy arena in which highly visible policy actors engage in public 
debate about hot button issues that are not able to be decided quietly among subsystem 
actors. As issues rise out of the subsystem and into the macro arena, policymaking 
becomes “…more visible, accessible, ideological, and contentious” (Mazzoni, 1991, p. 
117). The contentious nature of the issues opens up the macro arena to a wide array of 
public voices. 
 
Commission Arena – A policy arena comprised of a relatively small group of individuals 
representing diverse interests on an issue of concern. Membership is generally stable, 
although temporary, and contingent upon appointment. Those within this arena typically 
engage in consensual bargaining to persuade members to a particular point of view. 
 
Leadership Arena – Within the leadership arena, top leaders tend to engage in elite 
bargaining to develop and implement innovative policy proposals. In doing so, they 
deploy formidable stores of positional and personal resources to obtain favorable decision 
outcomes. 
 
Arena Shift – The movement of a policy issue from one arena to another. External forces 
pressing for change upon the subsystem may help to produce an arena shift by persuading 
government actors to “break away from subsystem politics in order to advocate 
innovative policy initiatives” (Fowler, 1994, p. 336). Policy entrepreneurs and idea 
champions also may utilize their influence to shift the issue into the arena they believe 
will produce the outcomes they desire. 
 
Policy Entrepreneur – A highly motivated change agent that takes advantage of favorable 
political conditions to push his/her preferred policies with unusual determination and skill 
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(Kingdon, 1995). Mazzoni (1991) perceives policy entrepreneurs to be working from 
outside the formal government. 
 
Idea Champion – A high-level lawmaker who influences policy outcomes by instigating 
shifts to favorable policy arenas. While constrained by “institutional arrangements, 
resource availability, group and constituency pressures, public moods, and cultural 
expectations” (Mazzoni, 1991, p. 132), these skilled high-ranking public officials can 
utilize their positional authority and personal influence to impact policy outcomes. 
 
Actors – An individual or group that is involved in the policy process. Actors wield 
influence through the strategic deployment of resources in an effort to impact policy 
outcomes (Mazzoni, 1991).  
 
Goals – The desired ends actors seek to achieve by becoming involved with a certain 
issue or decision (Blalock, 1989; Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976).  
 
Motivations – The reasons why actors are willing to deploy resources in an attempt to 
achieve their policy goals. Policy analysts chart actor motivation on a scale ranging from 
apathy to activism and cite issue saliency as a key reason for actor engagement 
(Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976).  
 
Resources – Sources of power that can be utilized by policy actors to affect the outcome 
of decisions. Resources are potential power that can be converted into actual power 
through a combination of circumstance, capacity and motivation (Campbell & Mazzoni, 
1976). 
 
Influence Strategies – Mechanisms by which a policy actor’s resources are used to 
influence the decisionmaking process. Influence strategies include, but are not confined 
to: coalition building (Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976); control of the policy agenda (Cobb & 
Elder, 1983; Kingdon, 1995); managing the scope of conflict (Schattschneider, 1960); 
exercising voice/exit strategies (Hirschman, 1970); use of social/political/cultural 
symbols (Edelman, 1964); and arena shifts (Mazzoni, 1991). 
 
Power – As noted earlier, the definition of power selected for this case study was 
developed by James MacGregor Burns (1978). It reads as follows: “The power process is 
one in which powerholders (P), possessing certain motives and goals, have the capacity 
to secure changes in the behavior of a respondent (R)… and in the environment, by 
utilizing resources in their power base, including factors of skill, relative to the targets of 
their power wielding and necessary to secure such changes” (p. 13). For the purposes of 
this study, an actor’s power and influence will be analyzed through an examination of: 1) 
decision outcomes; 2) reputational assessments; 3) resource assessments; and 4) analyses 
of non-decisions. 
 
Windows of Opportunity – Kingdon (1995) describes policy windows as fortuitous 
“opportunities for action on given initiatives” (p. 166). These windows of opportunity 
occur infrequently and stay open for only a short while. If policy actors do not take 
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appropriate advantage of these opportunities, they must wait until the next time the policy 
window opens. Mazzoni (1991) incorporates this concept into his arena model to 
highlight the power of individuals to affect policy innovation. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 The purpose of this chapter was to describe the literature that guides this case 
study research. The review encompassed literature in two central areas: the issue area – 
the politics of school finance reform; and the theoretical framework – the process of state 
education policymaking. This chapter also detailed the conceptual framework derived 
from this literature, outlined the study’s research questions derived from the conceptual 
framework, discussed the potential limitations of the study under consideration, and 
provided a definition of key concepts and terms. The next chapter attends to this study’s 





 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
This research employed case study methodology: 1) to add to the existing body of 
literature surrounding the politics of school finance reform; and 2) to help refine and 
advance theory on state education policymaking. This chapter outlines the research 
methods that were used. The first section describes the case selection process. The second 
section provides a rationale for the use of qualitative case study to answer the research 
questions. The third section of this chapter describes the data gathering methods that were 
employed, including data sources, procedures for data collection, and analysis methods. 
The fourth section explains how the study addressed issues of validity and sought to 
control for bias and error. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the researcher’s 
ethical considerations. 
Site Selection Rationale 
 The policy decision selected for this study is the Vermont state legislature’s 1997 
passage of Act 60, a non-incremental school finance reform measure which supplanted 
Vermont’s longstanding use of local property taxes as the primary source of school 
funding in favor of two new funding mechanisms that redistributed property wealth from 
property-rich schools to property-poor schools. This case spans the period between May 
1992, when Governor Howard Dean appointed his Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission 
on Educational and Municipal Financing Reform, and June 1997, when Governor Dean 
signed Act 60 into law. The appropriateness of this case is based upon the importance of 
the issue area, the analytic value of the Vermont setting, and the compatibility of the case 
with the analytic framework. 
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Importance of the Issue Area 
 More than ever, a quality education is viewed as an essential component of a 
successful and productive adult life. Yet, structural impediments frequently prevent 
equitable access to education among America’s students. School finance reform is often 
perceived as one front in the push for eliminating those structural impediments and is 
predicated on the belief that improved access to education funding can improve 
educational outcomes for disadvantaged students (Rebell, 1998). Much energy has gone 
into putting the issue of school finance reform before the courts in an effort to have 
systems of school finance declared unconstitutional. But school finance reform is as 
much a political issue as it is a legal one. Faced with a mandate for change, lawmakers 
are asked to reconceptualize their state’s school funding mechanisms so as to correspond 
with the equity parameters set forth by the court. Historically, these equity parameters 
have been outlined in financial terms and entail the implementation of measures that 
attempt to close the gap between high spending and low spending school districts. Such 
measures might include the levying of additional general fund taxes, the levying of higher 
local property taxes for high-wealth districts, recapture provisions which seek to directly 
redistribute funds from high-wealth to low-wealth districts, state-imposed spending limits 
for high-wealth districts and statewide property taxes that even the tax effort required of 
all property owners. 
 However, due to a lack of research in the field, educational policymakers have 
little current understanding with regard to how state government officials actually 
respond to these court-ordered mandates for reform. Further, they have even less 
information concerning how state legislatures are able to successfully blend court 
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directives for equity with political realities that resist the redistribution of funds from 
property-rich school districts to property-poor school districts. Given that legal 
challenges to existing state systems of school finance are expected to continue, the 
pursuit of this knowledge seems to be both appropriate and timely.   
Analytic Value of the Vermont Setting 
Vermont is just one of several states to have had its system of school finance 
declared unconstitutional by a state supreme court. In fact, it was one of three states, 
along with Ohio and New Hampshire, to have its school funding system nullified in 1997. 
However, unlike most other states (Ohio and New Hampshire included), the Vermont 
state legislature responded to the court’s reform mandate by swiftly implementing a far-
reaching reform package designed to reduce funding disparities among school districts 
through the redistribution of state and local property tax dollars from property-wealthy 
school districts to property-poor school districts (Proulx & Jimerson, 1998; Picus, 1998). 
Shelley (2011) highlights the distinctive nature of Vermont’s legislative response to its 
school finance reform court mandate as follows: 
The state’s response to the Brigham decision was quick, sweeping, and, to 
those with knowledge of finance reform movements in other states, almost 
unbelievable. In most instances of school finance litigation where 
plaintiffs have received a favorable verdict, the elected branches of state 
government have complied reluctantly and tried to design a remedy that 
disturbed the finance system as little as possible. On June 27, 1997, 
Vermont Governor Howard Dean signed Act 60, a law that would have 
made school funding as equitable as any system in the country if fully 
implemented. (pp. 48-49) 
 
Conversely, the school finance reform process in both New Hampshire and Ohio 
reflected the more typical pattern of a protracted legal struggle brought about by a 
recalcitrant legislature unwilling to enact the reforms stipulated in court decrees. After 
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obtaining their initial victory in DeRolph v. State (1997), school finance reform advocates 
in Ohio returned to the court three more times seeking to compel the Ohio legislature to 
devise a more equitable system of school finance. In 2003, thanks to judicial turnover, a 
more conservative Supreme Court agreed to the state’s request to close the case without 
having fully resolved the plaintiff’s complaints (National Education Access Network, 
2011a). Similarly, New Hampshire is still struggling to resolve school finance issues 
relating to its Supreme Court’s ruling in Claremont v. Governor (1997). After 
implementing modest reform measures, the legislature is currently pursuing a 
constitutional amendment that would preclude further judicial involvement in matters of 
school funding (National Education Access Network, 2011b).  
As the cases of New Hampshire and Ohio demonstrate, because court-mandated 
school finance reform is often forced upon a reluctant legislature, the resulting policy 
tends to be both contested and incremental (Elmore & McLaughlin, 1982; Nelson, 1997). 
As creatures of state legislatures, school funding systems seek to satisfy as many state 
interests as possible so as to obtain the broad coalition of legislative support needed for 
passage. In order to gain broad based support for a school finance measure, lawmakers 
are likely to implement funding mechanisms in which no district has its education 
funding cut (Wong, 1999). However, the legislative impulse to hold harmless property-
rich communities serves to diminish the ability of state aid to close funding gaps between 
property-rich and property-poor school districts (Nelson, 1997). 
 Vermont serves as a stark contrast to the standard legislative operating procedures 
exhibited in Ohio, New Hampshire and other states. Just four months after the Brigham 
decision, the Vermont legislature  replaced its existing system of school finance that 
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relied upon the use of local property taxes to fund schools with a reallocation program 
that not only resulted in significantly more equitable distribution of education resources, 
but also resulted in 43 wealthy towns paying increased property taxes (“Robin Hood,” 
1998). 
School finance scholars increasingly understand that winning a legal challenge is 
just the beginning of the path to fiscal equity. As Dayton and Dupre (2007) note: 
“Judicial involvement may serve as a catalyst for change, but reform advocacy must 
extend more broadly to encompass the political realm” (p. 485). The speed at which the 
Vermont legislature enacted Act 60 provides an indication that a reform-friendly policy 
environment may have been in place at the time of the court’s ruling in the Brigham case. 
The study of a state such as Vermont may help researchers to understand those political 
factors that create an environment that is conducive to passing non-incremental school 
finance reform legislation. Thus, given its distinctive and innovative policy treatment of 
school funding structures, Vermont is considered an especially “revelatory” (Yin, 1994) 
case for the study of school finance reform. 
 While school finance reform has become a high profile issue in state legislatures, 
little scholarly attention has been paid to the politics of school finance reform in recent 
years. Those studies that have been conducted generally focus upon states with protracted 
legislative/judicial battles such as California, Texas, New Jersey, New Hampshire and 
Ohio (see Elmore & McLaughlin, 1982; Lehne, 1978; Olabisi, 2006; Pittner, Carleton & 
Casto, 2010). However, comparatively little has been written about states where school 
finance reform has been achieved relatively peacefully following a court decision, as was 
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the case in Vermont.9 This omission creates a potential bias in our understanding of the 
processes involved in legislating these reform initiatives by highlighting conflict at the 
expense of consensus. Given this slant, the study of the passage of Vermont’s Act 60 is 
particularly helpful in adding to our knowledge of school finance reform policymaking at 
the state level. 
Compatibility with the Analytic Framework 
 Mazzoni (1991) developed his arena model to explain the process of state 
education policymaking in Minnesota. The arena model is based on the assumption that 
policymaking is a highly pluralistic process whereby “…people, interests and ideas 
contend for agenda status and policy preference” (p. 116). Vermont, with its highly 
engaged citizenry (Smallwood, 1984; Proulx & Jimerson, 1998) frequently divided 
legislatures and low bar to political office holding (Graff, 1999; Smallwood, 1984) is the 
embodiment of a pluralistic policy environment. 
Mazzoni’s empirical application of the arena model to school choice issues in 
Minnesota yielded positive results in terms of the model’s ability to capture the 
complexities of the state policymaking process as policy entrepreneurs worked to shift 
issues to the most favorable policy arena available. Subsequent empirical applications in 
Ohio (Fowler, 1994), Connecticut (Freedman & Hughes, 1998), and the province of 
Newfoundland, Canada (Cody, 1994) found the model to be useful in other 
state/provincial education policy areas.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 One exception to this statement is the notice paid to Kentucky’s Rose v. Council for 
Better Education (1989) decision. Even so, the general thrust of the attention has centered 
upon the educational reforms mandated by the court rather than the finance reforms 
mandated by the court. 
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 Within Vermont, state-level political actors skillfully shifted the school finance 
reform issue out of the policy subsystem and into a variety of other policy arenas in an 
effort to pass Act 60. This examination of the passage of Act 60 provides a fruitful 
opportunity to explore the dynamics and consequences of arena shifts in a manner that 
further tests the assumptions and expectations of Mazzoni’s model. 
Case Study Rationale 
 Merriam (1998) describes case study research as “an intensive, holistic 
description and analysis of a bounded phenomenon such as a program, an institution, a 
person, a process, or a social unit” (p. xiii). Case studies are particularly noted for their 
ability to offer detailed descriptions of events or processes (Yin, 1994; Merriam, 1998). 
The arena model’s reliance on detailed, site-specific information to describe and then 
explain a complex phenomenon makes case study an appropriate methodology for this 
research endeavor. Pieces of school finance reform such as Act 60 are not only legally 
complicated but also value laden (Ward & Camp, 1988). The benefit of case study in 
such situations is that it helps the analyst to untangle the vast array of competing actors, 
goals, resources, and strategies inherent in the policy process.  
In addition to their ability to provide detailed description, case studies have been 
found to be helpful in instances where the phenomenon under study is particularly 
context-bound (Yin, 1994; Bogdan & Biklen, 1998). Van Mannen (1983) notes that the 
qualitative data captured through case study research can “enlighten... without disfiguring 
the social life that is described” (in Geary, 1992, p. 61). Because the arena model relies in 
part on the systems perspective of policy analysis, which emphasizes the impact structure 
and setting have on political decisionmaking, a case study’s ability to capture context-
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specific data make it a particularly attractive method for use with the research proposed 
here. Given that the politics of school finance reform has been judged as particularly 
context driven (i.e. Brown & Elmore, 1982; Siegel, 1976; Fuhrman, Berke & Usdan, 
1979), the use of case study is deemed appropriate for this reason as well. 
Case studies are well suited for answering “how” and “why” questions because 
“such questions deal with operational links needing to be traced over time” (Yin, 1994, p. 
6). In that this case study research seeks to understand “how” and “why” power and 
influence were brought to bear on the Vermont state legislature to impact school finance 
legislation, case study’s ability to track the policymaking process throughout its various 
phases allows the researcher to detect “the causal links between actor interventions and 
policy outcomes” (Geary, 1992, p. 61). 
Finally, case study’s use of multiple data sources to understand phenomena under 
study contributes to the nuanced and multifaceted portrait of the policy process required 
to test the arena model. Yin (1994) remarks that “[t]he use of multiple sources of 
evidence in case studies allows an investigator to address a broader range of historical, 
attitudinal, and behavioral issues” (p. 92). This research study utilized interviews as well 
as a wide variety documentary data as a means to understand the political decisionmaking 
involved in the passage of Vermont’s Act 60. 
Despite the several advantages of case study noted above, the method is not 
without its criticisms. Yet as Geary (1992) notes, “even the most persistent indictments, 
however, may be viewed not as endemic flaws in the method, but as useful precautions 
for the investigator” (p. 62).  Three prevalent case study criticisms are discussed here 
(Yin, 1994). First, case study critics argue that the method does not provide the rigor 
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necessary for scientific inquiry in part because the investigator, as the primary data 
collection instrument, may introduce an unacceptable level of bias into the research 
process (Merriam, 1998). To counter this argument, qualitative methodologists such as 
Guba and Lincoln (1987) and Goetz and LeCompte (1984) have developed procedures to 
engender rigor in naturalistic investigations. These procedures for promoting validity and 
reliability demand that attention is paid to the credibility of both researchers and their 
data sources as well as to the consistency of data collection and analysis procedures 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1987; Goetz & LeCompte, 1984). These procedures (to be elaborated 
in subsequent sections) have been incorporated into the research’s data collection and 
analysis methods. 
The second objection levied against case study is that, given its traditionally small 
sample size, case study research findings are anecdotal and, thus, not generalizable to any 
general population (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998). For Yin (1994), the use of a theoretical 
framework is the primary means by which to achieve generalizable findings in case study 
research. He argues that the case study researcher must aim for analytic generalization 
whereby the researcher strives “to generalize a particular set of results to some broader 
theory” (Yin, 1994, p. 36). With regard to this particular research project, Mazzoni’s 
arena model served as an established template against which study findings were 
compared so as to help refine and advance theory on state education policymaking.  
The third major criticism leveled by case study critics is that case studies are 
unduly time-consuming and result in unmanageably long reports. While case study does 
require the use of “thick description” in the case write up, this requirement does not mean 
that the report must be unreadable. The effective use of descriptive text can actually serve 
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as a means by which to engage and maintain the reader’s attention throughout the length 
of the entire document.  According to Geary (1992), the use of an analytic framework is 
another means by which to effectively organize and present data findings. She comments: 
“The likelihood that the data will become unreasonably cumbersome is eased... when the 
research is harnessed by an analytic framework that defines and directs the precise and 
productive search for categorically relevant data” (p. 63). As noted above, this research 
benefitted from the use of an established heuristic device as a means to focus both the 
research inquiry as well as the research report. 
Data Sources, Data Gathering Methods and Data Analysis 
 This section reviews the data sources, data collection strategies and methods of 
data analysis utilized in developing case study findings for this research project.  
Data Sources 
 A hallmark of the case study design is its reliance on multiple data sources to 
inform the research process (Creswell, 1998; Yin, 1994). Information for this 
investigation was obtained through a variety of sources, including official documents 
such as court rulings, pieces of legislation and legislative calendars and journals; other 
primary source documents such as internal memos, correspondence, draft legislation and 
legislative reports; secondary source materials such as newspaper reports and scholarly 
articles; and, finally, interviews with policy actors and proximate observers. The 
following sections describe the general purpose of these data sources and their 





Primary Source Documentary Data 
Examples of official primary source documents used for this study included the 
Brigham v. State of Vermont (1997) court decision, various versions of school finance 
legislation including 1994’s H.541, 1995’s H.351 and 1997’s H.527, Vermont House and 
Senate journals, minutes from pertinent legislative committee meetings, particularly the 
House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, and state agency 
reports. Utilization of official primary source documents such as those mentioned above 
provided the investigator with valuable information concerning the chronology of events, 
the involvement of relevant actors, the rules governing the decisionmaking process, and 
the action channels10 selected for use by policymakers (Murphy, 1980). Although these 
official documents offer valuable insights into the policy process, they are often formal 
and “polished.” In these instances, they limit the reader’s knowledge of the informal 
exchanges, adjustments, and backroom “politicking” that are a part of a legislative 
decision. Given the incomplete story that official documents tell, the use of 
complementary sources which allow the researcher to get at what Allison and Zelikow 
(1999) term the “pulling and hauling” of policymaking was required. 
Documentary sources also included primary source materials that one would not 
always consider official government documents. These included personal memos, letters, 
draft reports, position papers, meeting agendas and personal notes. When arranged 
chronologically, these documents offered greater insights into the policy formation 
process because they both revealed individuals’ thoughts about various policy initiatives 
and helped chart policy actors’ courses of action. For the purposes of this research 
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project, approximately 300 primary source documents were collected and analyzed. 
However, these materials, while helpful in building understanding, do not by themselves 
offer analysis. Secondary source data such as newspapers and scholarly journals help to 
contextualize data derived from the primary source documents.   
Secondary Source Data 
Materials such as books, professional journal articles, and newspaper and 
magazine articles comprised this investigation’s secondary source data. In particular, 
newspaper accounts from Vermont’s two major dailies, The Burlington Free Press and 
The Rutland Herald, accounted for the bulk of secondary source data.  For this study, the 
researcher collected approximately 600 newspaper articles from these and other Vermont 
newspapers covering the period between January 1992 and June 1997.  
 These secondary sources served three major purposes (Geary, 1992). First, they 
helped to contextualize the policymaking process by highlighting Vermont’s cultural 
norms, political values, and social traditions. Second, they provided background 
information on the policy issue at both the state and national levels. Finally, they offered 
interpretations of events, which helped to provide insight into the goals and strategies 
employed by participant groups seeking to influence the policy process. Before initiating 
the interview process, a wide variety of secondary source information was collected and 
reviewed to assist in the development of a working knowledge of case events and a 
preliminary list of relevant actors such as bill sponsors, committee members, agency 
employees, and members of key pressure groups.  
Like other documentary sources, secondary materials can only tell part of the 
story when it comes to understanding the policymaking process. For example, while 
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newspaper articles may do a good job of chronicling events and highlighting various 
actors involved in any given decision, people who know they are “on the record” may be 
more guarded with their statements. Therefore, they may be less likely to say what is 
really on their mind, especially if it differs from the views of their colleagues, 
constituents or friends. In addition, although secondary source documents are helpful for 
obtaining background information, they provide only abbreviated explanations of events 
and do not yield information concerning the informal back and forth that is so much a 
part of the political decisionmaking process.  
Semi-Structured Interviews 
In his landmark piece on political decisionmaking, Allison (1971) quotes a noted 
policy analyst as stating: “If I were forced to choose between the documents on the one 
hand, and late, limited, partial interviews with some of the principal participants on the 
other, I would be forced to discard the documents” (p. 181). Interviews provide critical 
windows into decisionmaking processes that might not otherwise be revealed through 
other data sources. Information obtained through in-depth interviewing typically provides 
the data needed to reconstruct the complex and multifaceted process of policymaking 
(Murphy, 1980; Allison & Zelikow, 1999). When conducted with the promise of 
confidentiality, such interviews may also yield the data needed to capture the private as 
well as the public goals, strategies, and horse-trading tactics of relevant politicians and 
interest groups involved in the course of political decisionmaking (Murphy, 1980; Patton, 
1990). Given this strong endorsement, semi-structured interviews served as the primary 
source of data for this investigation. This research project included a total of 21 
confidential interviews with policy actors and proximate observers. Interview informants 
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were drawn from a pool of eight legislators, four state agency staffers, six interest group 
leaders and three newspaper reporters. Table 3.1 summarizes the various data sources 
utilized for this research project:  
Table 3.1 Summary of Data Sources 
Data Source Description 
Primary Source Documents Approximately 300 documents including court 
rulings, legislation, commission reports, memos and 
personal notes. 
Secondary Source Documents Approximately 600 articles culled from the Burlington 
Free Press, Rutland Herald and other Vermont 
newspapers. Articles date from the period January 
1992 to June 1997. 
Semi-Structured Interviews 21 semi-structured interviews conducted in May and 
June of 2010. Interviewees included 8 legislators, 4 
agency staffers, 6 interest group leaders and 3 
reporters. 
 
Procedures for Data Gathering 
 Allison and Zelikow (1999) write that “[t]he use of public documents, 
newspapers, interviews of participants, and discussion with close observers of 
participants to piece together the bits of information is an art” (p. 312). These “little bits 
of information” will be pursued by collecting data that fall into two general categories: 
documents and interviews.  
Obtaining Documentary Evidence 
Documents are a necessary component of any case study researcher’s data 
collection strategy (Merriam, 1998; Yin, 1994). As noted earlier, this study relied upon a 
wide variety of documentary source materials, including House and Senate bills, 
committee minutes, personal letters and memos, and newspapers. The majority of the 
official documents required for this study were obtained on-line through the Vermont 
State Legislature’s web site. Primary source documents that were not available on-line 
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were obtained during two multi-day visits to the Vermont state archives in Barre, 
Vermont. The state archives possessed a comprehensive “property tax reform” collection 
that proved enormously helpful in obtaining approximately 1,100 pages of primary 
source documents relating to the years’ long process of passing school finance reform 
legislation in Vermont. 
In terms of obtaining secondary source materials, a Vermont newspaper database 
supplied by Middlebury College allowed the investigator to enter pertinent search terms 
including “property tax reform” and “school finance reform” to obtain a list of relevant 
news articles from the state’s two major news dailies, the Burlington Free Press and the 
Rutland Herald. Hard copies of these articles were obtained at the Library of Congress in 
Washington, D.C. As noted earlier, approximately 600 newspaper articles covering the 
period from 1992 to 1997 were collected and reviewed. Information gleaned from these 
articles was entered into a detailed 30-page case chronology database that included the 
following analytic components by date: 1) key events, 2) key actors; 3) analysis of 
events; and 4) information source. 
Yin (1994) gives a useful warning about the potential for bias and inaccuracy in 
documentary evidence when he notes that “...documents must be carefully used and 
should not be accepted as literal recordings of events that have taken place” (p. 81). To 
help ensure the reliability and validity of primary source documents used in this research, 
a series of questions suggested by Merriam (1998) were used to evaluate all primary 
source documents for their accuracy and authenticity. Merriam’s questions included the 
following: 
• What is the history of the document? 
• Is the document complete, as originally constructed? 
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• Has it been tampered with or edited? 
• If the document is genuine, under what circumstances and for what purpose was it 
produced? 
 
Answers to these questions, along with key information such as a document’s date, title, 
summary, and relevance rating were compiled in a database that comprised 283 primary 
source documents. The use of Merriam’s analytic device allowed the documents to be 
systematically inspected so as to help detect bias and error. 
 While documentary materials are particularly helpful to case study researchers 
because they “ground an investigation in the context of the problem being investigated,” 
these documents are generally produced for reasons other than the research underway 
(Merriam, 1998, p. 126). As a result, they may not specifically address the research 
question at hand. Given this shortcoming, we turn to interviewing as another important 
source of data collection. 
Obtaining Interview Data 
 Bogdan and Biklen (1998) describe interviewing as “a purposeful conversation… 
that is directed by one in order to get information from the other” (p. 93). Because 
interviews generated a large portion of the data for this study, specific details relating to 
sample selection, procedures for soliciting informants, instrumentation, interview 
recording and data storage, and confidentiality are outlined in the following sections. 
Sample Selection 
 A combination of purposeful and snowball sampling (Patton, 1990) was utilized 
for this research study. Purposeful sampling refers to the selection of “information-rich” 
participants as key informants. According to Patton (1990), “information rich” settings 
“are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the 
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purpose of the research” (p. 169). An initial interview pool of potentially “information 
rich” participants was derived from primary and secondary source document reviews. 
During these initial interviews, participants were asked to identify other potentially 
knowledgeable informants for possible inclusion in the study (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998; 
Merriam, 1998). This “snowball” approach helped to unearth knowledgeable “behind the 
scenes” informants such as legislative assistants and state agency staffers who were 
neither publicized in newspaper reports nor noted in government documents. 
 Following Geary’s (1992) approach, this study employed five criteria to select 
study informants. The first criterion was proximity to or involvement in the 
decisionmaking process. Murphy (1980) recommends that potential informants be 
grouped into two broad categories: “key informants,” who are reliable and central to the 
process; and “regular interviews,” who may be more secondary to the process but provide 
a useful perspective on the issue at hand. To this end, criteria for the selection of 
informants emphasized centrality to the policy process without discounting Allison’s 
(1971) notion that interviews with those occupying various positions across the 
policymaking system provide depth and perspective to a case study. 
The second criterion was diversity of perspectives. Building on the premise that 
policymaking is a pluralistic process where competing interests vie for advantage, 
informants who can “portray competing stands, disparate goals, and varied vantage 
points” (Geary, 1992, p. 74) were sought for this research study. Key to this sampling 
approach was the ability to obtain confirming and disconfirming data from a variety of 
policy stakeholders. Confirming and disconfirming data are sources of “rival 
interpretations as well as a way of placing boundaries around confirmed findings” 
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(Patton, 1990, p. 178). Given the provocative and politically charged nature of the topic 
under study, it was important to pursue interviews with people representing a variety of 
stances with regard to the school funding issue. To that end, 21 interviews were 
conducted with legislators, legislative staff members and consultants, state agency 
staffers, newspaper reporters, governor’s cabinet members and representatives from key 
lobbying groups occupying a variety of positions and stances within the political system 
so as to gain a multi-faceted impression of the policymaking process that led to the 
passage of Act 60. 
The third selection standard was reputation for knowledge and candor. During 
initial interviews, recommendations were sought for additional knowledgeable 
informants who were willing to speak candidly about their involvement in and knowledge 
of the Act 60 policymaking process. This fruitful process yielded interviews with at least 
eight informants not previously identified through prior research.    
The fourth and fifth standards were accessibility and willingness to participate. 
Marshall and Rossman (1999) recognize that not all policy actors are able or willing to 
make themselves available for research inquiries. In such instances, the authors 
recommend that the researcher “move on,” but account for any potential gaps in data 
collection. Vermont’s unique political traditions, especially its low legislator to citizen 
ratio, means that the state’s politicians are used to frequent, informal encounters with 
their constituents. They are expected to be highly accessible and, overall, proved quite 
amenable to requests for interviews. However, not all informants contacted agreed to 
participation. Requests for interviews were sent to 30 informants from a variety of 
positions within the policy system ranging from advocacy group members to politicians 
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to reporters. Of the 30 informants contacted, nine either declined the request or never 
responded to the request. Out of those nine, three would be considered “key” informants, 
including one member of an advocacy organization, one Senate member and one House 
member.  
Interviews for this research study were conducted in two phases during two trips 
to Vermont in May and June of 2010. Nineteen of the interviews were conducted in 
person and two were conducted over the telephone because of geographical 
considerations. Interviews generally lasted between 60 and 90 minutes and utilized a 
semi-structured interview format. 
Procedures for Soliciting Informants 
Potential informants were contacted via e-mail to solicit their participation and to 
briefly introduce them to the study. If the informant proved receptive to being 
interviewed, this initial contact was followed up with a subsequent email or telephone 
call asking to establish a time and place for an interview. Once the interview details were 
set, informants were emailed a packet containing additional information about the study. 
The packet included an informed consent form, a description of the case study, and a case 
chronology developed from primary and secondary document sources (see Appendices B, 
C and D).  
Due to the “elite” nature of many of the study’s informants, access was a 
particularly salient issue. While elite respondents often possess a wealth of knowledge, 
the researcher must often be persistent and flexible in getting them to agree to sit for an 
interview (Marshall & Rossman, 1999; Aberbach & Rockman, 2002). As noted above, 
Vermont’s political culture significantly facilitated entry into the research site. Low key 
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and highly approachable, informants generally proved more than willing to offer their 
recollections and insights into the policymaking process that produced Act 60. However, 
flexibility proved to be a critical asset in garnering interviews. To facilitate the busy 
schedules of “elite” informants, interviews were conducted in a wide variety of locations 
and settings. Over the course of two visits to Vermont in the spring of 2010, the 
researcher conducted interviews in nine towns across the state. Depending on the 
availability and preferences of informants, these interviews were conducted in a variety 
of settings, including cafes, backyards, restaurants, offices and personal homes. 
Instrumentation: Construction of Interview Guides 
The passage of Act 60 was a culmination of many years worth of work for 
advocates of school finance reform in Vermont. As such, many actors moved in and out 
of the decisionmaking process over time. Some of these actors may be described as key 
participants, while others may have possessed valuable, yet limited or second-hand 
knowledge of the process and decisions leading up to Act 60’s approval. In light of this 
varying range of involvement, construction of the interview guide followed both 
Murphy’s (1980) and Geary’s (1992) recommendations regarding the use of formal and 
informal interviewees. 
Interviews with informal or less proximate policy actors were conducted utilizing 
an open-ended, more broadly constructed interview guide (see Appendix E). This 
interview guide was designed to recognize interviewees’ “varying experiences and 
proximity to the policymaking process” (McCarthy, 2003, p. 53). These interviews 
helped to situate the policy issue within the larger context of state education 
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policymaking in Vermont and assisted with the identification of key policy actors, their 
goals, and coalitions. 
Interviews with those policy actors identified as key informants were conducted 
utilizing a more formal, semi-structured interview guide. This interview guide was 
comprised of a detailed series of questions that were derived from the overarching 
research question and subquestions outlined in Chapter Two (see Appendix F). The 
instrument was sufficiently structured to focus the conversation across informants, but 
was also flexible enough to allow informants the opportunity to “express their own 
understandings in their own terms” (Patton, 1990, p. 205).  
Leech (2002) recommends the use of both planned and informal follow-up 
questions (known interchangeably as prompts or probes) when conducting interviews. In 
her opinion, prompts serve two important purposes. First, they help to elicit more detailed 
data by “keeping people talking” after an initial response; and second, they help to 
refocus the interviewee when their answers start to “turn to mush” by becoming too 
vague (p. 667). A variety of planned prompts, derived from the arena model’s analytic 
categories, were included on the interview guides and were employed as needed given the 
breadth and detail of the informants’ initial responses.   
Unlike planned prompts, informal prompts are utilized spontaneously throughout 
the course of the interview. These prompts not only solicit additional information but also 
facilitate a smoother conversation between the interviewer and his or her respondent. 
Murphy (1980) outlines four specific types of interview probes. The first probe seeks 
clarification by asking informants to repeat or restate their responses. The second probe 
encourages elaboration by seeking further examples of the topic at hand. A third probe 
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seeks to provide encouragement through subtle verbal cues such as “yes” and “uh-huh” 
inserted into the dialogue. These cues keep the respondent talking by demonstrating the 
interviewer’s engagement. Murphy’s final probe is silence. Murphy maintains that small 
periods of silence allow the informant to gather thoughts and elaborate on previous 
statements. Such information might have been missed if the interviewer rushed to fill the 
void with another question. Informal prompts were added where appropriate as a means 
to elicit richer responses. 
The instruments were piloted with knowledgeable, yet not necessarily key, actors 
identified through primary and secondary document review to help assess the quality of 
the interview guides as data collection instruments (Merriam, 1998). Instrument quality 
was assessed by asking the following questions: Do the instruments elicit detailed 
descriptive data? Does the question sequence make sense? Do questions seem to be 
missing? Are questions worded to obtain good data? (Merriam, 1998). The pilot 
interviews were deemed successful because they: 1) elicited rich, original data not 
previously obtained through document review; 2) provided contacts for additional 
informant interviews; and 3) allowed the researcher to hone her interviewing skills. 
Recording and Data Storage 
With the permission of the informant, interviews were digitally recorded. In 
addition, researcher notes were taken while the interviews were being conducted. These 
notes served as the basis for an interview debriefing memo completed after each 
interview and as an emergency backup in the event that the tape recorder malfunctioned. 
All informants were informed of their right to turn off the tape recorder at any point 
during the interview session. However, none requested that the researcher do so.  
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All audio recordings of informant interviews were transcribed in their entirety. 
Both the digital audio recordings and transcripts were maintained in a password-protected 
computer. Researcher notes and debriefing memos corresponding to informant interviews 
were stored under lock and key in traditional filing cabinets. A backup set of digital 
interview recordings were downloaded to a memory stick and kept in a secure location to 
serve as an emergency backup. In addition, to help ensure informant confidentiality, data 
files were labeled using a coding system known only to the researcher.  
Informant Confidentiality 
 Yin (1994) argues that informant anonymity and confidentiality are commonly 
justified when a case study topic is controversial. Indeed, the issue of school finance 
reform in Vermont had been a particularly heated topic for many years leading up to the 
passage of Act 60 (and for many years after as well). To promote candor and accuracy, 
assurances of confidentiality were granted to study informants. In the case report, 
informant identities were concealed. Policy actor identities, however, were a matter of 
public record. Thus, actors were identified by name in the case report. However, the 
names of informants who agreed to be interviewed for this study were not disclosed and 
their quotations are referenced by numeric code, not by name or identifying trait. 
Procedures for Data Analysis 
According to Marshall and Rossman (1999), “data analysis is the process of 
bringing order, structure, and interpretation to the mass of collected data” (p. 150). In 
qualitative research, the process of data analysis often occurs concurrently with data 
collection in a reflexive, iterative manner. In this process, each piece of data is assessed 
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individually and then as part of an aggregate collection. Creswell (1998) refers to the 
process as a “data analysis spiral” (p. 142). 
Maxwell (1996) divides data analysis into three major processes: memoing, 
categorizing, and contextualizing (p. 78). Memoing both captures and stimulates analytic 
insights by forcing the researcher to sit down and reflect upon emergent findings and how 
they relate to larger substantive and theoretical issues (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998). Two 
types of memos were written for this research project. First, memos were written after the 
review of pertinent background documents to develop a case chronology and to identify 
key actors and events. Second, debriefing memos were written immediately following 
each interview to capture the content of the interview and to record appraisals of the 
quality of the interviewee’s responses (e.g. clarity, detail, consistency, and plausibility), 
potential contribution to conceptual framework, statements of interest and future research 
leads. 
 Coding is the main process for categorizing data in qualitative analysis. 
According to Maxwell (1996), the goal of coding is to “‘fracture’ the data and rearrange 
it into categories that (a) facilitate the comparison of data within and between these 
categories; and (b) aid in the development of theoretical concepts” (p. 79). Coding 
categories were derived from a variety of sources, including the conceptual framework 
and related research questions, recurrent themes found in interviews, and the theoretical 
perspectives which undergird the model guiding this study (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998). The 
researcher utilized the NVivo 9 computer program to code both interview data as well as 
primary source documents. As suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994), coding memos 
were written to justify and explain the creation of various codes. This strategy helped to 
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avoid what Maxwell (1996) refers to as “context stripping” (p. 79) whereby the 
researcher forgets the significance of the codes that have been applied to the research 
data. 
 Rather than “fracturing” data as is done throughout the coding process, 
contextualizing seeks to embed data in a larger context of understanding. For the 
purposes of this research study, the main contextualizing strategy was the writing of the 
case study narrative. Writing the case narrative required the researcher to look across the 
constructs of the conceptual framework to make sense of, or to contextualize, the data. 
The ultimate goal of this process was to present a “holistic picture” of the case at hand 
(Merriam, 1998, p. 194). To this end, the case narrative comprised the following 
elements: 1) an initial characterization of the policy setting and context for the issue 
debate; 2) a discussion of relevant actors, their goals, motivations, resources, and 
influence strategies; 3) an explanation of the policymaking process utilizing the revised 
arena model; and 4) a discussion of the model’s utility with regard to the issue of court-
mandated school finance reform. Importantly, contextualizing allowed the researcher to 
aggregate data in search of confirming and disconfirming data to derive case findings. 
Through this process, for every emergent theme, confirming and disconfirming evidence 
was sought until the researcher was satisfied with the merit of a particular conclusion. As 
themes came together to form wider accounts and interpretations, the process was 
repeated. Any and all disconfirming data, rival interpretations, and insights beyond the 
conceptual framework were noted and accounted for in the case study narrative through 




Validity: Checks for Bias and Error 
 This research project employed several processes endorsed by noted qualitative 
researchers to help ensure that the research meets established standards for rigor. Chief 
among these are credibility, transferability and dependability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, in 
Creswell, 1998). 
Credibility 
 Traditionally, internal validity has attempted to assess whether a study’s findings 
are consistent with reality. Guba and Lincoln (1987) note that within the scientific 
paradigm, internal validity depends on “the degree of isomorphism between the study 
data and the phenomenon to which they relate” (pp. 104-05). However, because of their 
epistemological views that reality is dependent upon the perceptions of individuals, this 
traditional definition has proven problematic to naturalistic researchers. As a result, for 
many scholars, evaluating internal validity in the qualitative realm has come to mean 
assessing the credibility of both informant accounts and researcher interpretations. The 
literature on qualitative research suggests a number of strategies for determining 
credibility. The strategies employed for this research included: triangulation, 
disconfirming case analysis, member checks, peer review, assessing subject credibility, 
and acknowledgement of researcher orientation (Creswell, 1998; Yin, 1994; Merriam, 
1998; Guba & Lincoln, 1987, Goetz & LeCompte, 1984). 
Triangulation is the process whereby multiple data sources are used to develop 
“converging lines of inquiry” (Yin, 1994, p. 92). By using multiple sources to confirm a 
finding, the researcher seeks to avoid bias and distortion (Maxwell, 1996). This study 
employed triangulation through the collection of data from a wide variety sources. In 
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terms of triangulation methodology, corroboration was sought both among interview 
informants and across data sources (Geary, 1992). Extensive primary and secondary 
source data greatly facilitated the triangulation of informant data. On repeated occasions, 
the researcher could corroborate informant accounts with both secondary source 
newspaper accounts as well as the actual primary source document referenced by both the 
informant and the newspaper. In terms of triangulation among interview informants, 
reviewing informant statements grouped by code allowed the researcher to assess the 
consistency of informant statements with regard to any one data point.  
 Disconfirming case analysis requires the search for rival explanations or 
disconfirming evidence. According to Maxwell, (1996), the basic principle behind 
disconfirming case analysis lies in the examination of “both the supporting and discrepant 
data to assess whether it is more plausible to retain or modify the conclusion…” (p. 93). 
In short, the researcher must resist the temptation to ignore data that does not fit with 
inferences being developed. For this study the search for disconfirming evidence and 
rival interpretations was conducted through an iterative approach to data analysis. This 
process meant returning again and again to the body of original data to ensure that 
tentative assertions continued to hold and that the strength of the research assertions 
coincided with the strength of the research data. For this study, tentative assertions were 
logged into a researcher journal and reviewed repeatedly to ensure they maintained their 
veracity in the face of additional data and subsequent analyses.  
 Member checks require that the researcher verify data content and interpretations 
with the source, particularly if data are obtained through interviews or observations. This 
verification step builds in yet another method for catching missed or misconstrued 
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perspectives by both the researcher and the data source throughout the duration of the 
study. 
 Peer review, also known as collegial review, is yet another strategy for enhancing 
internal validity. Peer review acts as a helpful check against what Goetz and LeCompte 
(1984) term “observer effects” where the researcher’s findings become distorted as a 
result of either too much or too little time in the field. As Murphy notes, “[t]he fresh eye 
of a neutral colleague… can identify problems with the data and interpretations that 
someone knee-deep in the analysis cannot see” (p. 71). For this research, the dissertation 
committee has been relied upon to serve in the capacity of both a “fresh eye” to check the 
basis for inferences and as a “devil’s advocate” (Lincoln & Guba, 1995, in Creswell, 
1998) to test the strength of rival interpretations and to provide feedback regarding the 
construction and interpretation of the case narrative. 
 Just as researcher credibility must be verified through processes such as member 
checks and peer reviews, so too must participant credibility be evaluated. Goetz and 
LeCompte (1984) caution that “informants may lie, omit relevant data, or misrepresent 
their claims” (p. 224). In highly politically charged situations, this concern is particularly 
relevant. Given the potential unreliability of participant information, the researcher must 
establish criteria by which to examine its credibility. In conducting this study, several 
steps were taken to help minimize “informant effects.” First, the purposeful sampling 
procedure allowed the researcher to focus on those informants reputed to be most 
knowledgeable about the policymaking process that led to the enactment of Act 60. 
Second, assurances of confidentiality to study participants were employed in an effort to 
promote candor. Third, written post-interview assessments of informant data were 
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conducted (see Appendix G). Murphy (1980) suggests applying a number of tests to 
interviewee data so as to “gauge the level of confidence that can be placed in each 
account or observation” (p. 69). Specifically, he recommends testing for: 1) the 
plausibility of the data; 2) the consistency of the data; 3) the level of certainty present in 
the data; 4) the level of detail present in the data; 5) the interconnectedness of facts, 
actors, meanings, and contexts; 6) the proximity of the informant; and 7) the informant’s 
overall reliability as a data source. Informant assessments were completed as soon after 
concluding the interview as possible so as to ensure that recollections and appraisals were 
as fresh and accurate as possible. 
 According to Hess (personal communication, in Maxwell, 1996), “validity in 
qualitative research is not the result of indifference, but of integrity” (p. 91).  
Acknowledgement of researcher orientation is the final strategy cited by the literature for 
promoting credibility in a study. To Merriam (1998), acknowledging researcher 
orientation means “clarifying the researcher’s assumptions, worldview, and theoretical 
orientation at the outset of the study” (p. 205). This study’s conceptual framework 
outlined in Chapter Two helps to familiarize the reader with the study’s theoretical 
orientation, including its assumptions and shortcomings as an analytic tool.  
Transferability 
 Transferability, adapted from the scientific paradigm’s notion of external validity, 
relates to a study’s generalizability, or “the extent to which the findings of one study can 
be applied to other situations” (Merriam, 1998, p. 207). Traditional notions of external 
validity have proven problematic for naturalistic researchers who do not use statistical 
sampling or set a priori conditions for comparability (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). As a 
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result, the concept of external validity has been reconceptualized in qualitative inquiry. 
Although various terms have been coined, transferability generally relies on the use of 
“thick description” and conceptual frameworks as the basis for generalizing findings 
(Creswell, 1998; Yin, 1994). 
 Stake (1995) notes that “thick description” conveys to the reader “what 
experience itself would convey” (p. 39). It is theorized that given sufficient description, 
“critical readers” can determine for themselves to what extent the conditions involved in 
the case under study can be compared to their particular circumstances (Schofield, 1990). 
This study endeavored to utilize “thick description” not only to describe the setting of the 
case under review but also to describe the theoretical framework employed in the study to 
contextualize and substantiate analytic claims. 
 Yin (1994) notes that case study’s inability to generalize in conventional terms 
has served as a “major barrier” to the acceptance of its findings within the traditional 
research community (p. 36). However, he attributes this “barrier” to a generally incorrect 
understanding of external validity as it relates to case study. He argues that, rather than 
statistical generalization, case study researchers must aim for analytic generalization 
where the researcher strives “to generalize a particular set of results to some broader 
theory” (Yin, 1994, p. 36). By employing Mazzoni’s arena model as a structuring 
heuristic, this research study provides the reader with detailed, in-depth information that 







 Dependability, traditionally referred to as reliability in the positivist paradigm, 
relates to the extent to which a study’s findings can be replicated (Marshall & Rossman, 
1999). Because qualitative research seeks to examine phenomena in their natural 
environment, the control necessary for strict experimental replication is impossible to 
impose. Given this situation, reliability in the qualitative realm has become associated 
with dependability and consistency. Researchers aim for consistency in the data 
collection and analysis process through the use of specified data collection instruments 
(Yin, 1994) and established analytic constructs such as conceptual frameworks or coding 
categories (Goetz & LeCompte, 1984).  
 The ultimate goal of consistency is the ability of another researcher to arrive at 
similar conclusions given the data collected and the analytic framework applied. Guba 
and Lincoln (1987) refer to this goal as “auditability” and comment that it “requires 
simply that the work of one evaluator (or team) be tested for consistency by a second 
evaluator or team, which after examining the work of the first can conclude, ‘Yes, given 
that perspective and those data, I would probably have reached the same conclusion’” 
(pp. 123-34). This study helped to ensure dependability through the announcement of the 
investigator’s position vis a vis her study, triangulation, and the use of an audit trail 
(Merriam, 1998; Yin, 1994; Marshall & Rossman, 1999; Maxwell, 1996).  
 Merriam (1998) believes that investigators should be up front about their position 
or general orientation towards their study. This process entails revealing the basic 
assumptions and principles upon which the study is based. Given that the qualitative 
researcher serves as the primary instrument through which data are secured, analyzed, 
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and interpreted, an understanding of a researcher’s orientation towards the topic is 
particularly important. Goetz and LeCompte (1984) offer five strategies for making 
researcher assumptions known. These strategies include pronouncements of “researcher 
status position, informant choices, social situations and conditions, analytic constructs 
and premises, and methods of data collection and analysis” (p. 214). This dissertation 
contains essential information concerning: 1) the involvement and the orientation of the 
researcher; 2) the rationale for selecting the informant pool; 3) the literature and 
associated assumptions upon which the study’s theoretical framework is based; and 4) a 
detailed description of how study data were collected and analyzed.  
 As with credibility, triangulation is also an integral part of ensuring dependability 
in that the use of multiple data sources helps to ensure consistency of findings across data 
types (Maxwell, 1996). That triangulation is an essential component of both credibility 
and dependability speaks to the importance of a sound internal design whereby 
conclusions may be drawn from what Yin (1994) terms the “chain of evidence.” A chain 
of evidence allows a reviewer “to follow the derivation of any evidence from initial 
research questions to ultimate case study conclusions” (p. 98) through clear cross-
referencing from the case study data base to the case study report.  
 A third strategy for promoting reliability is the maintenance of an audit trail. To 
create an audit trail, this study followed Yin’s (1994) suggestion that the investigator 
create a case study database. For the purpose of this study, three case study databases 
were constructed. The first database included primary source documents retrieved from 
the Vermont state archives. Notes on 283 documents deemed relevant to the case study 
were compiled into a 300-plus page Microsoft Word file. This file was subsequently 
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imported into the NVivo 9 data analysis program where all primary source document 
notes were coded in accordance with a coding system derived from the study’s 
conceptual framework. Written transcripts from the study’s 21 interviews were also 
imported into the NVivo 9 data analysis program and were also coded using the same 
coding system utilized for the primary source documents. Finally, information gleaned 
from the review of approximately 600 newspaper articles covering the time period 
between January 1992 and June 1997 was compiled into a detailed 30-page case 
chronology that highlighted relevant actors, key issues and analyses of events. 
Regarding the utility of such a case study database, Marshall and Rossman (1999) 
comment “by planning to keep all collected data in well-organized, retrievable form, 
researchers can make them available easily if the findings are challenged or if another 
researcher wants to reanalyze the data” (p. 195). Thus, this data aggregation not only 
makes the verification of analytic interpretations easier, but also provides easy access to 
those seeking to scrutinize case study findings.  
Ethical Considerations 
Given the importance of ethics in research generally and the case study approach 
more specifically, a number of safeguards were built into this research design to promote 
an ethical and even-handed approach to the study of a value-laden policy issue. While 
many of these safeguards have already been mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, their 
centrality to the research process makes them worth reiterating. First, the researcher 
obtained informed consent from all study participants. Second, the researcher provided 
informants with the opportunity to decline participation at any time during the research 
process. Third, the researcher honored assurances of confidentiality at all times. Fourth, 
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the researcher provided informants the opportunity to decline audio recording. If in the 
course of an interview an informant requested that a comment be “off the record,” these 
statements were not reported in the study’s findings or included in the case analysis. 
Finally, informants were offered the opportunity to review interview transcripts and case 
accounts emanating from this project.  
In terms of personal conduct, the researcher endeavored to uphold a high level of 
integrity throughout all phases of the research process. She maintained confidences and 
provided a complete account of all steps undertaken in the course of developing research 
conclusions. In that respect, she followed Merriam’s (1998) recommendations of 
clarifying and describing her own limits and level of familiarity with the case. In 
addition, when uncertainty arose with regard to substantive aspects of this study, she 
consulted the committee chair guiding this research project. 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter, focusing on research design and methods, first justified the use of 
case study as an appropriate research strategy and established its applicability to the 
Vermont setting. It then explained how research for the case would be carried out and 
included information on data gathering and analysis measures. Next, the chapter 
discussed the steps that were taken to ensure rigor in the research process through 
procedures that foster credibility, transferability and dependability. The chapter 
concluded with a discussion of the important ethical safeguards built into the study’s 






POLICYMAKING CONTEXT AND ISSUE BACKGROUND 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a general description of the 
policymaking context and the issue background that shaped the development and 
subsequent adoption of Act 60 in Vermont.11 This chapter is organized into four sections. 
The first section describes the general cultural norms, values and traditions, economic 
forces, and political culture of the policy environment. The second section describes the 
institutional features of Vermont’s policymaking system, including its structure, 
composition and rules. This chapter’s third section identifies the relevant interest groups 
that typically seek to influence school finance policy in Vermont. Finally, the fourth 
section of this chapter presents background information on the history of school finance 
reform at both the federal and state levels to help explain and contextualize the 
environmental pressures for change placed upon the policy subsystem in the years 
preceding the case analysis’ period of study. 
Cultural, Economic and Political Features of the Vermont Policy Environment 
According to Easton (1965), the political system is embedded within a society’s 
larger socioeconomic and political environment. Within this larger environment, citizens 
identify problems and seek political solutions. However, as Geary (1992) notes, 
“[b]ecause any political system is designed and confined by its host environment, the 
state legislative system is understood only in context” (p. 94). This section provides 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Data for this chapter were derived from scholarly works relating to Vermont’s political, 




information on Vermont’s cultural, economic and political heritage as a means to 
understand its unique political institutions and traditions.  
Cultural Norms, Values and Traditions 
Renowned for its physical beauty and storybook villages, Vermont is the 
embodiment of rustic charm. Located in the northeast corner of the United States, much 
of Vermont’s sparse population clusters in approximately 240 rural towns nestled 
throughout the state’s mountainous terrain. With just 609,00012 people scattered over 
9,614 square miles, Vermont is the 43rd largest state in terms of land area and 48th largest 
state by population. It is the only New England state that does not border the Atlantic 
Ocean. The Green Mountains run virtually unbroken up the middle of the state from its 
southern border with Massachusetts to its northern border with Quebec, Canada. They 
once formed a significant barrier to travel between eastern and western Vermont.    
In terms of demographics, Vermont is one of the nation’s most homogeneous 
states. According to the 2000 census, over 96 percent of the state’s citizenry categorizes 
itself as white, a significantly higher percentage than the national average of 75 percent. 
A full quarter of the state’s residents claim French Canadian heritage. As a whole, 
Vermonters are better educated than the national average, with 86.4 percent of adults 
having obtained a high school diploma versus the national average of 80.4 percent and 
29.4 percent of adults having earned a bachelor’s degree versus the U.S. average of 24.4 
percent. Despite their higher educational attainment, Vermonters’ median household 
income of $40,856 is $1,000 less than the national average. Approximately 25 percent of 
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Vermonter adults are employed in the education health and service sectors. The 
manufacturing sector is the second largest provider of employment and accounts for 15 
percent of Vermont’s workforce. The retail sector is a close third and employs 12 percent 
of the state’s workers. Interestingly, agriculture, a former mainstay of the Vermont 
economy, now employs just three percent of Vermont workers. 
Approximately three quarters of Vermonters live in communities of less than 
2,500. This fact makes Vermont the nation’s most rural state. In the days before the 
interstate highway system these small mountain towns were largely cut off from one 
another, particularly during the state’s notoriously harsh winters. This geographic 
isolation bred a spirit of independent self-reliance and made towns the focal point for the 
delivery of government services such as education, road construction, welfare, fire and 
police (Jain, 2000). Today, Vermonters still rely heavily on local government and revere 
the ideals of local control and direct democracy that are epitomized by Town Meeting 
Day (the first Tuesday of March) when local elections are held, laws are passed and 
budgets are decided by a show of hands (Shelly, 2011).   
In particular, Vermonters strongly defend their right to the local control of 
education. To this end, the state’s 105,000 students are distributed among 251 local 
school districts. Most towns have at least one school – some with as few as ten students. 
Each school board is given broad discretion in making decisions about budgets, 
curriculum, staffing, schedules, class size and salaries (Jimerson, 2001). Per Jimerson 
(2001), “[l]ocal schools are, in fact, authentically governed by community members and, 
therefore, are emotionally perceived as true community institutions” (p. 1).  
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Multiple interview informants echoed Jimerson’s sentiments concerning 
Vermonters’ particular attachment to their local schools. One informant commented: “I 
remember Edgar May [former senator from Windsor County] saying to me: ‘You lose 
that school and your town will dry up.’ And that’s pretty much true. It’s the center of the 
community” (Informant 10). Another noted:  
I think in a small rural town your school is the cohesive piece of that 
village or town. Where do you go for Town Meeting? Go to the school, 
that’s where. Where do you go for the Christmas concert? You go to your 
school. If you have a wedding in town, you use the school gym. If you 
have a funeral in town and you need a place to feed a bunch of people, you 
go to the school. I think it is the center of the town. (Informant 04) 
 
Indeed, Vermonters care deeply about their local schools and consider them the focal 
point around which town life revolves.  
The state’s tradition of local control is reflected in the high proportion of local 
taxes used to fund schools. For example, in 1994 local funding accounted for over 62 
percent of school district budgets, the third highest in the nation (Monk & Brent, 1997). 
Since 1864, Vermonters have relied almost exclusively on the property tax to fund the 
local portion of their school bill. Vermont’s citizens embrace the use of the property tax 
because it is the only tax that is set locally (Governor’s Special Commission on Property 
Taxation, 1989). 
While fiercely independent and self-reliant, Vermonters have a progressive streak 
as well. The state’s history of tolerance and progressive thought date to its Constitution of 
1777, which was the first in the nation to ban slavery, provide universal male suffrage 
and require support for public education (Smallwood, 1984). This constitution was 
written during Vermont’s brief period of independence from 1777 until 1791 when it was 
subsequently admitted to the union as the 14th U.S. state. 
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Vermont’s longstanding attachment to the Republican Party is rooted in the 
party’s abolitionist heritage (Doyle, 2005). The Democratic Party lost the support of 
Vermonters for the next century when it backed the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, which 
allowed people in the territories of Kansas and Nebraska to decide for themselves 
whether or not to allow slavery within their borders. Strong Republican identity, 
reinforced by the notion that Republican philosophy meshed well with small-town rural 
life lasted well into the 20th century when Vermont was just one of two states – Maine 
being the other – that voted against Franklin Roosevelt in all four of his presidential 
elections (Graff, 1999). 
In the period following World War II, Vermont experienced rapid population 
growth as high-tech firms such as IBM moved in and the interstate highway system 
opened up Vermont to people seeking its natural beauty and unspoiled wilderness 
(Smallwood, 1984). Many of these new citizens arrived from more liberal neighboring 
states such as New York and Massachusetts. This infusion of liberalism strengthened 
Vermont’s commitment to progressive social causes such as the environment, poverty 
alleviation, universal healthcare and child welfare (Smallwood, 1984). Today, Vermont is 
considered among the most liberal states in the nation (Jain, 2000; Slayton, 2003; Gray, 
2004). 
In keeping with the state’s twin embrace of small-town conservatism and social 
progressivism, Vermonters value civility, respect and tolerance for other points of view. 
Its emphasis on civility is also born of the state’s diminutive size and population. 
Vermont’s U.S. Congressman Peter Welch once noted: “There is a certain intimacy in a 
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small state. You respect the people you disagree with. You expect to see them down the 
road. And you do” (Graff, 2006, p. 85). 
More than 200 years after Vermont was founded, Vermont life still embodies the 
values expressed in its state motto “Freedom and Unity.” Its citizens continue to prize the 
traditions of freedom and self-reliance born of the necessities of rural, small-town living. 
At the same time they are willing to join together to ensure that the most vulnerable 
among them are taken care of and that their unique way of life is protected for future 
generations. 
Economic Forces 
Vermont’s demographic homogeneity and rural character are a reflection of its 
historic economic development (Smallwood, 1984). Unlike most of its New England 
counterparts, Vermont was largely untouched by the industrial revolution of the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries. According to Nuquist and Nuquist (1966), Vermont’s 
mountainous topography, inadequate infrastructure, high operating expenses and distance 
from key markets made it unsuitable for large scale manufacturing. As a result, Vermont 
neither experienced the rapid industrial growth nor the influx of immigrants that other 
New England and Mid-Atlantic states did. As recently as the 1950s, Vermont’s economy 
was still technologically simple and heavily reliant on agriculture and natural resource-
based industries such as dairy farming, marble quarrying and forestry. These labor-
intensive, low-skill jobs left Vermont one of the poorest states in the nation (Jain, 2000).  
When Vermont awoke from its economic “slumber” in the 1960s through the 
construction of highways linking it to other northeastern population centers, the state was 
transported almost immediately from a pre- to post-industrial economy. The state 
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received its first large-scale manufacturing operation in 1957 when IBM located its data 
processing division in Essex Junction; but by the 1980s, Vermont had already begun to 
feel the pinch of regional and international competition for manufacturing jobs (Vermont 
Business Roundtable, 1993a). 
To compensate for its relative lack of industrial base, Vermont adopted a strategy 
of niche marketing and traded on the state’s natural beauty and rural charm. Its 
“Beckoning Country” advertising campaign emphasized the state’s unspoiled wilderness 
to attract new residents and businesses. The tourism and vacation home industry boomed 
and Vermont achieved rapid population growth (Smallwood, 1984).  
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Vermont economy experienced a dramatic 
upswing thanks in large part to growth in the tourism, computer, defense, construction 
and financial services sectors. The incomes of Vermonters grew and employment surged. 
By 1988, Vermont’s per capita income rose to 95.3 percent of the U.S. average, a record 
high for the state (Vermont Business Roundtable, 1993a).  
This job and income growth produced a “bonanza” in state tax receipts. Most of 
these new tax revenues were spent on investments in social sector programs such as 
education, welfare and the environment. During the period between FY 1986 and FY 
1990, state aid to education alone increased by more than $58 million, an average annual 
increase of nearly 20 percent (Vermont Business Roundtable, 1993a). These state aid 
increases were in large measure due to the legislature’s passage of a new school funding 
formula, known as the Foundation Plan, that sought to boost the spending of high-tax, 
low-property wealth school districts in the state. As a result, Vermont per pupil 
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expenditure rose from 23rd in the nation in 1981 to 13th in the nation by 1991 (Vermont 
Business Roundtable, 1993a). 
However, Vermont was hit hard by the recession of the early 1990s – the state’s 
worst economic downturn since the Great Depression (Graff, 2006). In the five years 
between 1989 and 1993, the state shed 20,000 jobs (Vermont Business Roundtable, 
1993a). Tax receipts plummeted and the state was no longer able to fund its commitments 
to education outlined in the Foundation Plan developed under the administration of 
Governor Madeline Kunin. As a result, local property taxes began to swell as municipal 
governments were forced to make up for the state’s shortfall. The government shortfall 
proved particularly difficult for small towns lacking a commercial base such as a ski 
resort or a manufacturing plant. In these towns, homeowners were forced to make up 
almost all of the lost state funds through increases to residential property taxes. 
  During this period, former Governor Richard Snelling came out of retirement to 
run on a platform of fiscal restraint. He won the gubernatorial election of 1990 but died 
just seven months into his term. Lieutenant Governor Howard Dean succeeded Snelling 
and continued his focus of fiscal austerity (Informants 01, 15). Under his watchful eye, 
annual budget increases slowed dramatically (Informant 15). Gradually, throughout the 
1990s the Vermont economy staged a fragile recovery. Increasingly, Vermont relied on 
the production of specialty goods such as ice cream, maple syrup and cheese marketed in 
conjunction with the state’s progressive reputation to strengthen its economic bases (Jain, 
2000). However, any and all government interventions, including school finance reform 





In his seminal work on American federalism, Elazar (1984) defines a state’s 
political culture as “the particular pattern of orientation to political action in which each 
political system is embedded” (p. 109). Thus, state political cultures are born of the 
complex interactions of history, social culture, economics and governance structures.  
 Noting its strong ties to early Colonial America and Puritan political culture, 
Elazar characterizes Vermont as a last bastion of original “Yankeedom” that has been 
self-consciously preserved through its history. According to Elazar, Vermont’s enduring 
connection to its Puritan past gives it a moralistic political culture. Vermont historians 
Bryan and Hallowell (1993) agree, noting that “[w]ith its citizen legislature, town 
meetings, and low-keyed and personalized politics, Vermont has remained the 
quintessential ‘M,’ or moralistic culture state” (p. 323). They claim that the same rural 
isolation that precluded the state’s entrance into the industrial revolution also precluded 
the development of an “I” or “individualistic” political culture that dominates the 
majority of American states. 
According to Elazar, three features of political culture are “particularly influential 
in shaping the operations of the state political systems within the context of American 
federalism” (p. 112). They are: 1) citizens’ expectations of government; 2) the kinds of 
citizens that become active in government; and 3) the manner in which governance is 
practiced. 
Citizens’ Expectations of Government 
 In a moralistic culture government is generally viewed as an instrument of the 
people to promote the common good. Citizens expect government officials to work 
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earnestly on their behalf to solve issues that are of general concern. Therefore, 
government is judged on its ability to effect positive change in their standard of living. 
Politicians are expected to enter politics out of a sense of duty rather than out of a desire 
for personal gain. Voters place a strong emphasis on politicians’ honesty, selflessness and 
commitment to public welfare. Political corruption is neither expected nor tolerated. 
 Vermont’s record of social progressivism in areas such as education, welfare and 
the environment demonstrates its interest in acting on behalf of its citizens when it comes 
to quality of life issues. Jain (2000) argues that this emphasis on social wellbeing results 
from the preponderance of New Political Culture (NPC) legislators in the state 
legislature. According to Jain, members of the NPC have a “post-materialist” worldview 
and emphasize quality of life issues over economic interests. Jain specifically attributes 
the passage of Act 60 to NPC legislators responding to the educational equity issue. 
This view that the government is a force for social good reflects a high level of 
cultural cohesion. Indeed, Vermont is 96 percent white and almost entirely U.S.-born 
(U.S. Census, 2000). Those newcomers who have settled in Vermont are consciously 
attracted to the state’s unique social and political culture. Therefore, these citizens 
reinforce the status quo by tasking the legislature with preserving the things that make 
Vermont “Vermont” (Jain, 2000). 
Vermonters generally assume that most politicians enter politics to make a 
positive difference in the lives of their fellow citizens (Gillies, 1999). Widespread 
participation in the political process by the state’s citizens has bred a begrudging respect 
for the work of politicians. Per Smallwood (1984), “…the state’s basic political ethos 
places a high priority on political involvement as a civic duty…” (p. 300). While both the 
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Republican and Democratic parties are competitive in the state, party identification tends 
to be relatively weak because personal qualities tend to trump party affiliation in the 
minds of Vermont’s voters. Independent candidates flourish and, once in office, 
legislators generally chart their own political course (Smallwood, 1984). For example, 
Vermont’s junior United States Senator, Bernie Sanders, is the nation’s only self-
identifying Socialist holding office at the national level. 
Although moralistic cultures emphasize a trust in the basic utility of government, 
they can demonstrate an ambivalence with regard to the level of government that is best 
able to promote the common good (Geary, 1992). Indeed, Vermonters have historically 
placed their trust in local government to solve their problems. Since World War II, 
however, governance has been increasingly consolidated at the state level (Bryan & 
Hallowell, 1993). This centralization has been met with a decided ambivalence with 
regard to the ability of “Montpelier” to fix the state’s problems (Informant 01). For 
example, a preference for local governance of schools remains strong and efforts to 
consolidate school districts to achieve cost savings through streamlined management 
structures have repeatedly been met with resistance in communities throughout the state. 
Writing in 2006, Vermont Commissioner of Education, Richard Cate, highlighted the 
state’s longstanding preference for the local governance of its public schools: 
People often express concern about local control when they hear talk of 
changing our current system of school districts. These fears have 
overcome concerns about efficiency and student outcomes in prior debates 
over the past 25 years. There have been a number of study commissions 
and reports that have recommended modifications to our system, but none 
of them has managed to convince a majority of the people of this state that 






Citizens’ Participation in the Political Process 
According to Elazar, moralistic political cultures are prevalent in localities with 
widespread amateur political participation. Vermont’s 246 autonomous towns and 251 
independent school districts allow for a vast network of political participation at the local 
level through positions on town selectboards13 and school boards. Consistent with the 
view that public office is a civic responsibility, this work is frequently voluntary in nature 
and is generally considered a steppingstone to statewide office.  
At the state level, Vermont has a part-time, citizen legislature (Hamm & 
Moncrief, 2004). With an annual salary of just $11,000, virtually all lawmakers continue 
in their regular occupations while serving as legislators (Rosenthal, 2004). One informant 
described the legislature in the following way: 
They are a part time legislature. They are all representative of their 
community. They don’t have any staff. They get paid, but only when they 
are meeting so nobody makes money on it. If you’re a legislator, you 
actually lose money, you don’t really know much about the issues, [and 
you] rely heavily on the lobbyists or the Legislative Council. (Informant 
01) 
 
An extremely low citizen-to-legislator ratio makes public officials highly 
accountable to individual voters and instantly recognizable within the community 
(Informants 13, 01, 02). Regarding this fact, one informant noted: “Our governor needs to 
be absolutely approachable. Our governor’s phone number is in the phone book” 
(Informant 01). There is a “friends and neighbors” sense about Vermont’s legislators that 
is lacking in larger states where citizen-to-legislator ratios can be significantly higher.14 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 A selectboard is Vermont’s term for a town council. 
14 For example, the citizen-to-legislator ratio in the Vermont House of Representatives is 
approximately 4,000 to 1 while the citizen-to-legislator ratio in the California House of 
Representatives is approximately 425,000 to 1 (Rosenthal, 2004).  
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With elected positions plentiful at both the local and state levels, the political arena is 
highly accessible to those seeking public office (Informants 13, 03, 7, 21).  
Patterns of Citizen Participation 
Elazar’s third aspect of political culture relates to the manner in which governing 
is actually conducted. Vermont’s governance style is often referred to as “personalized” 
(Smallwood, 1984; Bryan & Hallowell, 1993; Gray, 2004). Proulx and Jimerson (1998) 
note that “Vermont’s small size has uniquely enabled its citizens to have direct access to 
elected officials and the ability to make their opinions known loudly and clearly” (p. 10).  
At the state level, Vermont’s relatively large legislature and concomitant low legislator-
to-citizen ratios engender highly personalized relationships with average citizens. One 
legislator highlighted this aspect of legislative life:  “I only represent 4,000 people. I 
knock on every door in my district every two years. Even though I have no staff, I am 
very responsive. It is part of the job.” (Informant 13).  This level of constituent attention 
is the expected norm among Vermont’s electorate.  
At the local level, Vermont’s use of town meetings provides its citizens with 
unparalleled opportunities for direct participation in the political process. At these 
meetings they have the opportunity to vote on local issues and make town budgeting 
decisions through a show of hands. This heightened interest in municipal politics extends 
to education where more than 1,300 Vermonters serve on the state’s 254 school boards 
(Proulx & Jimerson, 1998).  
Institutional Features of the Vermont Legislative System 
Vermont’s current policymaking system is a creature of the state’s unique 
cultural, economic and political heritage. The specific decisionmaking site for this study 
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is the Vermont legislature, in which the Vermont Constitution places the lawmaking 
powers of the state, including those for education and taxation. As such, formal 
responsibility for the development of state school funding formulae lies with the 
legislature. The legislature’s task in this regard is twofold: First, it must devise the 
formula used to deliver state aid and, second, it must also determine the type and amount 
of taxes to be levied to fund the formula This section will describe the institutional 
features of the various branches of state government that play leading roles in Vermont’s 
school finance policymaking process.  
The Legislature: Composition 
Vermont’s bicameral legislative body is comprised of 30 senators and 150 
representatives, most of whom are employed full time in business and professional 
occupations. Members of both the House and Senate are elected to two-year terms. 
Elections for both chambers take place in even-numbered years. Dominated by the 
Republican Party for the century between 1860 and 1960, Vermont has more recently 
emerged as a competitive two-party system with a proclivity for independents as well.  
Vermont operated a unicameral legislature until 1836 when a governor’s council 
of twelve men was replaced with a 30-person Senate apportioned by county population 
(Hand, 2003). Under the state’s original constitution, the 246 members of the House of 
Representatives were apportioned using a one-vote, one-town representation scheme. The 
one-town, one-vote structure meant that the state’s largest cities had the same voting 
representation in the legislature as towns with just a few hundred residents. It created an 
assembly that was disproportionately rural in its representation. According to Sanford and 
Doyle (1999), less than 12 percent of Vermont’s population could elect a legislative 
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majority. Conversely, 50 percent of the state’s population could only elect nine percent of 
the House. Not surprisingly, many residents of urban centers believed their interests were 
shortchanged in favor of the interests of their rural counterparts. 
In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Baker v. Carr (1962), the 
Vermont legislature was reapportioned so that it would meet the one-person, one-vote 
standard mandated by the court. Under the new reapportionment structure, the legislature 
maintained the same number of senators but reduced the number of representatives from 
246 to 150. Even after the elimination of 96 seats, Vermont still possessed the second 
lowest legislator-to-resident ratio in the country.   
In total, the 180-member general assembly provides a legislator for approximately 
every 3,100 Vermonters (Sanford & Doyle, 1999). As a result of these low ratios, 
Vermonters have become used to a very personalized style of politics (Informants 13, 21, 
07, 01). Smallwood (1984) describes it as “a sort of one-on-one approach where local 
officials, state legislators, and even the governor are approached in village stores and post 
offices to hear citizen complaints and to receive advice on pending public issues” (p. 
300). 
Vermont’s legislative reapportionment occurred at a time of huge demographic 
change for the state. Working in concert, these phenomena served to increase the number 
of young, liberal, well-educated Vermonters serving in the legislature; many in this group 
were born out of state (Sanford & Doyle, 1999). Between 1970 and 1990, the number of 
legislators born out of state increased from 35 percent to 46 percent. By 1998 – just one 
year following Act 60’s passage – 66 percent of senators and 51 percent of 
representatives were born out of state (Jain, 2000). From 1970 to 1990, the number of 
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college-educated legislators increased from 41 percent to 67 percent in the House and 
from 66 percent to 87 percent in the Senate. By 1998, 86 percent of all legislators 
possessed a college degree (Jain, 2000). These non-native born, college-educated 
legislators proved to be disproportionately Democratic in their political affiliation (Jain, 
2000).  
Indeed, Democrats took control of the Senate for the first time in 1984 with an 18 
to 12 edge. Not coincidentally, that Senate class was the first to have a majority of 
senators born out of state. Democrats held a majority until the 1990 election when the 
Senate split evenly at 15 to 15.  The Republicans were able to regain control of the Senate 
in the 1992 election and took an 18 to 12 majority in the 1994 election. Eventually, 
Democrats retook the upper chamber in the 1996 election where they held a 17 to 13 
majority.15 
In the House, the Democrats did not achieve a majority until the 1986 election 
when they took a 77 to 73 advantage. After this brief stint in the majority, the 
Republicans regained control of the House. However, by 1992, under the leadership of 
Speaker Ralph Wright, the Democrats began to produce sizable majorities. In the 1992 
election, Democrats held 86 seats to the Republican’s 57, with four independents and two 
progressives. In 1994, the Democrats maintained their 86 seats while the Republicans 
increased their holdings to 61, with two independents and one progressive. In the all-
important election of 1996, the Democrats increased their majority to 89 with 57 
Republicans, three progressives and one independent rounding out the 150-member 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The legislature elected in 1996 and seated in January of 1997 was the legislature 
responsible for the passage of Act 60.  
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chamber. This pivotal election produced Democratic control of both chambers for the 
first time in ten years and only the second time in the state’s history.  
The Legislature: Structure 
In Slayton’s (2003) opinion, Vermont’s fundamental belief in open, accessible 
governance is embodied in the very structure of the statehouse itself in that the building 
contains very few private offices. In fact, most legislators are provided no more than a 
desk. Common sitting and committee rooms are almost always unlocked and open to the 
public. As Slayton notes, “There is no place for [legislators] to hide (should they want 
to); the building forces them to do their business in the open” (p. xi).  
The 150-member House of Representatives is presided over by the Speaker of the 
House – the most powerful legislator in the state according to Hand (2003). The Speaker 
is elected the first day of each new biennial session. He or she is voted into office by the 
entire House and can be from any party, not just the majority party. In recent history, 
Democratic Speaker Ralph Wright presided over multiple Republican-majority biennia. 
The Speaker appoints members to the House’s 15 standing committees. The ability to 
appoint members to standing committees is a key source of the speaker’s power in that 
these appointments will shape the entire tenor of the upcoming legislative session 
(Rosenthal, 1998; Hamm & Moncrief, 2004).  
The 30-member Senate is presided over by the President Pro Tempore. On the 
first day of each new session the Senate elects the President Pro Tempore, a secretary and 
a third member of the Committee on Committees. The Committee on Committees, which 
also counts the lieutenant governor as a member, is responsible for apportioning members 
to each of the Senate’s 12 standing committees. As in the House, the ability to appoint 
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standing committees is also a key source of institutional power for the members of the 
Senate’s Committee on Committees. 
The emergence of competitive political parties in the 1960s and 1970s led to the 
creation of the majority and minority party leadership positions in both the House and 
Senate. These positions are elected by their respective party caucuses and play key roles 
in marshaling support and counting potential votes for their party’s legislative agendas. 
Vermont’s legislative caucuses are unusual in that their meetings, where they discuss 
policy positions and party strategies for managing bills, are open to the public (Sanford & 
Doyle, 1999).  
The legislature is in session each year from early January through mid-April, 
although sessions can run into June. Committee assignments are given out the first week 
of the biennium’s first session. Because the Vermont legislature relies heavily on its 
committees to consider the merits of bills, legislative leaders make efforts to align a 
legislator’s committee assignments with his or her areas of interest and expertise. In 
addition, legislative leaders make a point of naming key allies to powerful committees 
such as the Ways and Means, Finance and Appropriations Committees (Francis, 1989). 
Early in each legislative session, sponsors introduce bills into the legislature. With 
the exception of spending bills, which must start in the House, bills may originate in 
either the House or Senate. A bill is introduced through a first reading that entails the 
bill’s title being read into the legislative record. The bill is then assigned to the 
appropriate committee by either the Speaker of the House or the Senate’s Committee on 
Committees, depending on the chamber in which the bill originated. The power to assign 
bills to various committees is another key source of positional power for the Speaker of 
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the House and members of the Committee on Committees in the Senate (Rosenthal, 
1998).  
Once a bill arrives in committee, the committee may decide to hold hearings 
where they invite lobbyists and members of the public to provide information and express 
opinions. The committee members listen and then make their desired changes to the bill 
through the mark up process. Once that task is completed, the committee may pass the 
bill out of committee favorably, unfavorably or without recommendation. Generally, just 
a fraction of the bills that are assigned to a committee each year are considered for further 
action. Committees wield vast discretion with regard to the bills they choose to review. 
According to Francis (1989), the chair’s agenda-setting ability is a key source of 
positional power. In this capacity, the committee chairperson not only controls which 
bills will come up for discussion but also the order in which they will be dispatched. 
Important bills get taken up first while bills not on the chair’s agenda can languish. In a 
legislative session with limited time, the ability to prioritize key pieces of legislation is a 
powerful asset for committee chairpersons.  
After the bill has passed through all the necessary committees, it is placed on the 
notice calendar and sent to the floor for a second reading. After the second reading, the 
bill is debated and amendments are introduced. When a legislator decides there has been 
sufficient debate, he or she can call for a vote.  If the bill passes, it is put on the notice 
calendar for a third reading. After the third reading, additional debate may occur but no 
amendments can be made. At the conclusion of debate, the bill is voted on for a second 
time. If it passes, it is sent either to the governor or to the other legislative chamber for 
further action. Because school finance reform bills outline plans for government financial 
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aid to education, they always originate in the House where they are assigned to the Ways 
and Means Committee, move to the Senate where they are taken up by the Senate 
Finance Committee, and then finally make their way to the governor for his or her 
approval or veto.  Legislators interested in matters of school finance often seek out 
positions on these powerful committees.  
Because they are considered “citizen-legislators,” Vermont’s representatives and 
senators do not possess their own professional staffs. Rather, the entire legislature shares 
a small staff of legal and financial experts to assist with the legislative process. The 
Legislative Council was established in 1965. Its 15 professional staffers assist legislators 
with legal research, policy analysis, and legislative drafting. The Joint Legislative 
Committee, comprised of the Senate President Pro Tempore, the Speaker of the House 
and three appointed members from each legislative chamber, supervises the work of the 
Legislative Council. 
The seven-member Joint Fiscal Office, established in 1974, has three basic 
functions: 1) to furnish financial research and secretarial services to the House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees, the Senate Committee on Finance, and the House Ways and 
Means Committee; 2) to review the fiscal operations of the state; and 3) to project state 
revenues. The Joint Fiscal Committee, comprised of the chairs of the Senate and House 
Appropriations Committee, the Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, the 
chair of the Senate Finance Committee and three appointed members from each 
legislative chamber, supervise the work of the Joint Fiscal Office. According to Sanford 
and Doyle (1999), the information provided by the legal and financial experts of the 
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Legislative Council and the Joint Fiscal Office “…provide a counterpoise to the technical 
information traditionally supplied by lobbyists and special interests” (p. 45). 
Mathis (1999) comments that the Vermont legislature is the “key player” in 
education policymaking at the state level and school finance is an area of special interest. 
The number of school finance-related bills being introduced by lawmakers has increased 
over the last several decades. Legislators interested in matters of school finance reform 
are eager to be placed on House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance 
Committee which are each respective chamber’s legislative committee responsible for 
devising the taxing structures and distribution formulas used in state aid to education 
programs.  
The Governor 
Like all statewide elected officials, the governor is elected to two-year terms in 
even year elections. Vermont is only one of two states with a two-year term governor. 
There are no term limits (Hand, 2003). The governor presides over a cabinet with 
representatives from eight agencies: administration, environment, human services, 
development, transportation, public protection, education and agriculture. With all of 
these agency heads and many of their staff serving at the pleasure of the executive, the 
governor has access to a significantly larger staff than his or her legislative counterparts. 
Although only serving two-year terms, the governor’s extended tenure potential 
means that any individual office-holder can remain in office long enough to inaugurate 
organizational change and install policy preferences. For example, Governor Howard 
Dean served six consecutive terms as Vermont’s governor. By the time he signed Act 60 
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into office, he had already been governor for five years and would remain in office for an 
additional six years. 
The constitutional powers of the governor are enumerated in Chapter 2 Article 20 
of the Vermont Constitution and have been essentially unchanged since 1835. The 
governor may commission officers and fill vacancies, represent the state outside of 
Vermont, introduce business before the General Assembly, grant pardons, mitigate fines, 
and implement the laws enacted by the legislature. The governor also has the power to 
veto legislation, call special sessions and develop the annual state budget. Additionally, 
he or she serves as commander in chief of the state’s National Guard.  
As with governor’s of other states, Vermont’s governor sits at the top of the 
state’s political and governmental hierarchy. He or she is generally viewed as the state’s 
most powerful single politician. Governors possess both personal and institutional powers 
that assist them in carrying out their gubernatorial responsibilities. According to Beyle 
(2004), “[r]easons for strength can derive variously from personality, personal wealth, 
electoral mandate, party or interest group structure, state statute, or the formal powers of 
the office itself” (p. 205).  
While a governor’s personal powers are bound to vary from officeholder to 
officeholder, the institutional powers of Vermont’s governors are consistently rated as 
among the nation’s weakest (Beyle, 2008). Vermont’s governor is hindered by state rules 
that call for the separate election of the lieutenant governor, two-year terms of office for 
all statewide elected officials, the legislature’s unlimited ability to change the governor’s 
annual budget, and the lack of a gubernatorial line item veto. However, despite these 
institutional weaknesses, Vermont’s governors have traditionally derived a substantial 
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amount of power from the personal relationships they cultivate with their citizenry 
(Informant 01). In Smallwood’s (1984) opinion, “…the key ingredient that has shaped the 
course of Vermont’s postwar politics is to be found in the leadership qualities that 
individual governors have brought to their office” (p. 304). 
The governor’s placement atop the apex of Vermont’s political structure is a 
relatively new phenomenon. Prior to the 1960s, the position of governor was generally 
considered to be ceremonial and without significant powers. In a tradition known as the 
Mountain Rule, established Republicans from either side of the Green Mountains took 
turns as governor as an honorarium for their years of public service (Fitzhugh, 1999; 
Graff, 2006). The change from this traditional executive model was spurred by three 
mutually reinforcing factors: 1) legislative reapportionment; 2) regional immigration; and 
3) the arrival of competitive two-party politics.    
Before reapportionment, localism was reinforced through the one town, one vote 
system that allocated a representative to each of Vermont’s 246 towns and cities, 
regardless of population. As a result, citizens expected very little from state-level 
government (Smallwood, 1984). In the wake of reapportionment, however, citizens from 
cities and larger towns gained a greater voice in the state legislature. In Gillies’ view 
(1999), “[t]he natural conservatism of small places gave way to the liberalism of urban 
and suburban places, and the political character of the legislature and Vermont changed 
significantly” (p. 565). In keeping with liberal political traditions, citizens increasingly 
looked to the state for assistance with important social and economic issues.  
Power and expectations for state government also increased throughout the1960s 
as Vermont experienced an influx of citizens from other localities more amenable to 
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proactive state governance. According to Smallwood (1984), while these newcomers paid 
homage to small town values, “…they really viewed state government as the vehicle that 
could protect and preserve Vermont’s natural beauty and provide modern, efficient, 
streamlined programs to replace and enhance the more limited town services” (p. 299). 
These new Vermonters spurred a fundamental shift in the state’s underlying political 
values. 
Finally, the election of the state’s first Democratic governor helped to put an end 
to laissez faire state governance in Vermont. Declaring a break from Vermont’s 
Republican past, Philip Hoff aligned himself with the popular Democratic President John 
F. Kennedy to eek out a narrow victory in 1962 (Graf, 2006). During his time in office, 
Hoff relied on plentiful state tax revenues and a cadre of progressive appointees to carve 
out an expanded role for state government that continues to the present day (Smallwood, 
1984).  
In the realm of education, Vermont’s governors have historically played a limited 
role. However, mirroring a national trend, they are increasingly willing to insert 
themselves in education debates, particularly those focusing on education governance 
structures and school finance (Mathis, 1999). Governor Madeline Kunin (1985 – 1990) is 
perhaps the Vermont governor most closely associated with education reform. 
Throughout her term as government Madeleine Kunin had been an ardent supporter of 
education reform. In her 1987 inaugural speech she proclaimed school finance reform the 
most significant economic and social issue facing the state (Journal of the Vermont Joint 
Assembly, 1987). The legislature’s passage of the Foundation Plan was a victory for her 
administration. To bolster support among legislators she added funds to the state 
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education budget. This increased funding was reflected in a 17 percent increase in the 
state’s general budget for FY 1989.16 This significant annual increase came on the heels 
of a six percent increase in FY 1986, a 12 percent increase in FY 1987, a 13 percent 
increase in FY 1988. According to multiple informants, these annual budget increases 
were unprecedented and, ultimately, unsustainable (Informants 12, 15, 02, 15). The 
failure of the Foundation Plan’s funding formula to keep pace with real education 
spending led to the filing of the Brigham v. State lawsuit and the subsequent passage of 
Act 60 (Informants 19, 17). 
The Lieutenant Governor 
 Vermont, like approximately one-third of U.S. states, has a separately elected 
lieutenant governor. Elections for the lieutenant governor’s two-year term are held at the 
same time as the gubernatorial elections. The state constitution assigns just two specific 
duties to the position of lieutenant governor: acting for the governor in the governor’s 
absence and servicing as president of the Senate. As president of the Senate, the 
lieutenant governor is a member of the influential Committee on Committees that is 
responsible for appointing individuals to committees and assigning bills. Beyond these 
responsibilities, the lieutenant governor may become involved in policy issues that are of 
personal significance.  
As a separately elected statewide official, the lieutenant governor has his or her 
own base of political support. Consequently, the lieutenant governor’s policy priorities 
may not perfectly align with those of the governor (Beyle, 2004). Friction between the 
two may arise, particularly when they come from opposing political parties. Since the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The first year of implementation for the Foundation Plan. 
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1980s, Vermont has had a governor from one party and a lieutenant governor from 
another party approximately one-third of the time. When this situation occurs, the 
lieutenant governor becomes the standard bearer for the opposition party and can serve as 
a considerable counterweight to the power of the governor (Beyle, 2004). 
During the legislative battles that preceded the passage of Act 60, pro-reform 
Democrats in the state legislature faced a formidable opponent in Republican Lieutenant 
Governor Barbara Snelling. She rallied Republican opposition through her leadership role 
in the Senate and utilized the bully pulpit to generate media attention aimed at blocking 
school finance reform measures generated in the House of Representatives.  
The State Board of Education 
The Vermont State Board of Education supervises and manages the Department 
of Education and the public school system. It is also responsible for appointing and 
supervising the Commissioner of Education whose job it is to oversee the day-to-day 
operations of the Department of Education. Appointed by the governor with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, the Board is comprised of seven members serving staggered 
six-year terms. Before Act 60, as part of its oversight responsibilities, the State Board of 
Education, under the auspices of the Commissioner of Education, developed and 
submitted an annual recommended state aid to education budget to the governor that 
allowed for the provision of a “sound basic education” for all Vermont students. In 
reality, the governor and the legislature routinely ignored the State Board’s budget 





The State Department of Education 
The Vermont Department of Education is the state agency tasked with supervising 
and assisting local school districts with regard to the provision education services to 
Vermont’s students. With regard to the issue of school finance, the State Department of 
Education’s Department of Finance is responsible for distributing aid to education in 
accordance with the formula established by the legislature. It is also responsible for 
collecting school finance data, reporting on the status of school funding and serving as a 
resource for anyone who might require information with regard to how the state system 
of school finance operates. The Commissioner of Education, who is appointed by the 
State Board of Education, oversees the Department of Education Finance, along with the 
rest of the State Department of Education. 
The Judiciary 
The Vermont judicial system is comprised of three major trial courts and one 
court of appeals. In the trial courts, the superior court manages civil matters, the district 
court handles criminal cases and the family court oversees cases relating to children and 
marriage. The Supreme Court acts as the state’s lone court of appeals and is comprised of 
one chief justice and four associate justices. Judges are appointed to six-year terms by the 
governor who selects from a list of applicants recommended by the state’s Judicial 
Nominating Board. This process is known as “merit selection” and is designed to reduce 
partisan politics in the judicial selection process (Glick, 2004).  Once nominated by the 
governor, judges are confirmed by the Senate and are retained every six years by a 
legislative vote (Hand, 2003). 
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Mirroring the larger federal system, the Vermont judiciary is one of three co-
equal parts of the political system. Despite efforts to insulate the courts from partisan 
politics through practices such as merit selection, judges are often viewed as participants 
in the political process (Kirp, 1977; Kuo, 1998; Glick, 2004; Dayton & Dupre, 2007) and 
their rulings can be seen as the result of a complex set of political factors including: 
“…the social and political context in which the courts are embedded, the structure and 
operating rules of court systems, judicial selection and judges’ personal backgrounds, 
experiences, and political attitudes” (Glick, 2004, p. 249). 
Of particular relevance to matters of school finance reform is a judge’s attitude 
with regard to the concept of judicial activism. According to Dayton (1996), “judicial 
activism occurs when the court moves from the realm of interpretation of laws to creation 
or administration of laws” (p. 22). The willingness of judges to venture into what some 
conservative legal scholars believe is the exclusive territory of the legislature by 
mandating certain reform measures has proven to be quite controversial. Yet, it has had 
an undeniable impact on the manner in which states fund their school systems (Dinan, 
2009).  
If so inclined, a judge’s ability to impact policy is derived largely from the 
positional authority granted to him or her as an agent of the court. As such, the courts 
have helped to spur reform among state legislatures. Judicial rulings can compel an issue 
to rise on the political agenda and can set the parameters for subsequent legislation. For 
example, the Vermont Supreme Court’s ruling in the Brigham case not only forced the 
legislature to come together to pass a piece of reform legislation after years of 
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disagreement but also constrained the legislature’s acceptable policy options (Picus, 
1998). 
Local Government 
According to State Archivist Gregory Sanford (1998), “Vermonters have long 
celebrated municipal governments as the cornerstone of participatory democracy” (p. 13). 
Two hundred thirty-seven chartered towns and nine cities constitute the 246 primary units 
of local government in Vermont. These local governments once operated with such 
autonomy that they were referred to as “little republics” (Hand, 2003). Although their 
independence from the state has waned (Bryan & Hallowell, 1993), local governments 
still play an enormous role in the day-to-day lives of Vermonters. Generally, towns have 
responsibility for a wide variety of local services ranging from maintaining roads and 
taxing property to licensing junkyards and providing animal control services. 
Additionally, if at town meeting the voters so decide, a town may provide services such 
as police protection, fire protection, ambulance service, water, sewer, electricity, planning 
and zoning, recreation and libraries (Vermont League of Cities and Towns, 2011). 
State law stipulates that each town be governed by a number of elected officials. 
These officials include: a three- to five-member selectboard that manages town services, 
a town moderator who oversees town meetings, a town clerk who keeps public records, a 
treasurer, a lister who decides the value of local land, and an auditor. Approximately 
9,000 Vermonters serve in some official town governance capacity at any given time 
(Hand, 2003). 
These officials are elected to their positions by their fellow townspeople each year 
at Town Meeting Day (generally the first Tuesday of March). In addition to electing town 
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officers, citizens utilize Town Meeting Day to vote on matters such as budgets, tax rates 
and bond issues. Vermont’s first town meeting was held in 1762, predating its admission 
into the Union by several decades (Vermont Secretary of State, 2005). Gillies (1999) 
sums up the unique nature of this longstanding and cherished tradition when he 
comments: “On Town Meeting Day, local government runs as a direct democracy, and 
every citizen is a legislator – voting to elect a selectperson, amend a zoning bylaw, or 
adopt a budget” (p. 572).  
 In addition to deciding municipal matters, townspeople also vote on school 
budgets at town meeting. As noted earlier, local towns play a key role in supervising and 
paying for education in Vermont. Each town generally maintains at least one school. A 
separate local school board runs these schools with a budget approved by the town. 
Approximately 1,400 citizens serve on 251 local school boards.17 These school boards 
wield vast discretion over issues such as class size, staffing, curriculum and scheduling. 
If these school board members are added together with the 9,000 citizens serving 
in municipal government, almost one in 60 state residents participates in local 
governance in one capacity or another. This high level of involvement in town 
governance matters reflects Vermonters’ intense desire to foster and preserve local 
autonomy. Jimerson (2001) remarks: “Local town cultures and traditions matter a great 
deal to Vermonters and they strongly resist efforts that diminish the characteristic sense 
of one’s own small-town community” (p. 12). Thus, the concept of local control serves as 
a powerful cultural symbol to Vermonters. Municipal governments are known to invoke 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Interestingly, Vermont has five more school districts than towns because some towns 
join together to provide supervisory union high schools for their older students. These 
supervisory union high schools maintain their own separate school boards. 
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the specter of its loss as a tool to generate public opposition to perceived state 
encroachment into their affairs. 
The desire to maintain local control has, at times, brought towns into conflict with 
the state. Disagreements arise over what level of government is best suited to provide 
services and who should fund them. According to Gillies (1999), “[t]he state sometimes 
regards towns and cities as petulant and demanding, while to towns, the state appears 
overreaching and disrespectful of municipal government” (p. 567). As an example, for 
almost 30 years various politicians sought to create a statewide property tax to fund 
education. This idea was touted by scholars and politicians, alike, as a means to more 
equitably spread property tax revenues across the state. However, municipal governments 
jealously guarded their sole right to tax local property and worried about the slippery 
slope of “Montpelier” taking their money. Their defense of “local control” wielded 
sufficient influence such that only in the wake of the Brigham decision did the legislature 
garner enough votes to make a statewide property tax a reality. 
School Finance Interest Groups in Vermont 
 The previous section described the institutional features of Vermont’s legislative 
system and the corresponding official government actors who operate within these 
institutions. This section highlights those actors and organizations operating outside of 
government who seek to influence the policymaking with regard to matters of school 
finance reform.  
A part of the American political scene since James Madison cautioned against 
their undue influence in the Federalist Papers, interest groups have steadily increased 
their presence in state legislatures over the last several decades as the scope of state 
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governance has widened and more and more interests have demanded a seat at the 
political bargaining table (Rosenthal, 1998; Thomas & Hrebenar, 2004). Thomas and 
Hrebenar (2004) define an interest group as “an association of individuals or 
organizations or a public or private institution that, on the basis of one or more shared 
concerns, attempts to influence public policy in its favor” (p. 102). Their concerns are 
represented by lobbyists “who represent an interest group in an effort to influence 
government decisions in that group’s favor” (Thomas & Hrebenar, 2004, p. 103). 
Interest groups rely on a wide variety of resources to advance their cause in both 
the executive and legislative arenas. These resources may include one or more of the 
following: money for campaign contributions and operational expenses, information 
helpful to political decisionmakers, a large and geographically diverse membership, a 
long lasting dedication to a particular issue or set of issues, a cohesive membership, a 
capacity to build coalitions with other interest groups, and a narrow agenda that allows 
for a tight focus on key issues and goals. According to Rosenthal (1998), “[t]hese very 
varied bases of power suggest that almost any group has resources with which to exercise 
influence in the legislature” (p. 213).  
 Although condemned at times for their undue influence upon the legislative 
process, lobbyists are generally considered by legislators to be an essential part of the 
policymaking process (Rosenthal, 1998). For states such as Vermont that rely on part-
time citizen legislators and small professional staffs, lobbyists serve an even more 
important role in facilitating the policymaking process. They do so by helping to draft 
legislation, providing information and expertise on issues before the state, giving 
campaign contributions and assistance to political campaigns, developing media 
	  
 133 
campaigns to highlight key issues, and assisting with grassroots organizing (Rosenthal, 
1998). Given the limited time, expertise and financial resources of Vermont’s legislators 
and state officials, such tasks would be hard to undertake without the outside assistance 
provided by lobbyists and special interest groups. 
Just as a state’s socioeconomic and political factors influence its institutional 
structure, so too do these factors shape a state’s interest group system (Thomas & 
Hrebenar, 2004). As Vermont transitioned from a rural, municipally-focused state to an 
increasingly urban, centralized state, the number of registered lobbyists in the state 
increased steadily. Bryan and Hallowell (1993) cite three key reasons for the growth in 
Vermont’s lobbying sector. First, a consolidation of power and increased responsibility 
for social services at the state level broadened state governance. Second, the rise of a 
competitive multi-party system in the second half of the 20th century provided an opening 
for liberal interests to gain a hearing in Montpelier. With an active two-party system, 
liberal interests now had legislators and bureaucrats sympathetic to their causes where 
previously the dominance of Republican legislators shut them out. Third, an increase in 
the diversity of economic interests as Vermont became less agriculturally oriented meant 
that new businesses and economic interests such as the ski industry needed representation 
at the state level.  
By 1997, approximately 300 lobbying organizations were registered with the 
Vermont Secretary of State (2011). This number increased from 149 in 1977 and 231 in 
1987 (Bryan & Hallowell, 1993). These lobbyists represent a wide variety of interests 
ranging from the environment to business to education to health. Chapter Two’s review 
of the politics of school finance reform literature suggests that education associations, 
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business groups, anti-tax groups and municipal organizations have historically played key 
roles in influencing policy outcomes with regard to matters of school finance reform. As 
such, this section will turn to an examination of Vermont’s analogous non-governmental 
organizations to explore their motivations and capacity to influence the state aid to 
education policymaking process.  
The Education Lobby 
Vermont’s education lobby is comprised of four major organizations representing 
the state’s teachers, principals, administrators and school boards. While previously 
unified, these organizations evolved into separate entities to meet the specialized 
demands of their constituents. Over the years since their founding, these groups have 
become increasingly organized, more capable of producing substantive issue analyses 
and, as a result, better able to exert greater influence on the policymaking process 
(Mathis, 1999).  
Vermont-National Education Association 
According to Rosenthal (1998) teachers’ groups are perennially rated among the 
most powerful lobbies in the nation. Their size and geographic distribution, coupled with 
linkages to their national parent organizations, give them a powerful voice in issues of 
importance to their memberships. Indeed, this perception holds true for Vermont where in 
the early 1990s the state teachers’ association – the Vermont-National Education 
Association (Vermont-NEA) – was rated as the fourth most powerful interest group in the 
state by Republican legislators and the sixth most powerful interest group in the state by 
Democratic legislators (Bryan & Hallowell, 1993).  
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Founded in 1851, the Vermont-NEA is the state’s oldest education organization 
(Mathis, 1999) and represents the interests of the state’s (approximately 7,800 in 1997) 
teachers (National Center for Education Statistics, 2000). A regular presence at the 
statehouse, their legislative agenda typically includes the promotion of improved working 
conditions and increased compensation for teachers. While willing to affirm support for 
the general principles of “equal educational opportunity” and “state support for 
education” the Vermont-NEA has not historically thrown the full weight of its sizable 
support behind any one piece of school finance reform legislation due to the potentially 
divisive nature of the issue within its membership (Mathis, 2000). Multiple informants 
recollected the Vermont-NEA’s relative absence from the school funding policymaking 
process. One informant noted: “I think they had to be very careful so I don’t remember 
them lining up strongly because there were teachers from property-wealthy towns…” 
(Informant 13). Another informant commented: “There was no strong message from the 
education lobby about what we should do that I ever heard that I remember” (Informant 
10).  
However, the Vermont-NEA did play a leading role in defeating a comprehensive 
school finance reform measure passed by the House of Representatives in 1994. Included 
in H.541 was a provision that sought to create a statewide teachers employment contract 
as a cost-containment measure. In the face of a perceived threat to their collective 
bargaining rights, the organization’s membership came together to challenge the 
provision sponsored by the powerful Democratic Speaker of the House Ralph Wright. 
The Vermont-NEA’s well-organized opposition to the statewide teachers contract, 
coupled with the Senate’s opposition to the bill’s tax provisions, stalled its passage. 
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Vermont Principals’ Association 
Originally formed in 1915 as an independent branch of the Vermont Education 
Association, the Vermont Headmaster’s Club, later renamed the Vermont Principals’ 
Association, became its own independent organization in 1978. The Vermont Principals’ 
Association is primarily involved with the regulation of athletics and other student 
activities. According to Mathis (1999), “[w]hile members are frequent participants in 
policy issues with the state board, they do not hold educational policy issues at the center 
of their purpose” (p. 326). As such, the Vermont Principals’ Association did not interject 
itself in the school finance debate (Mathis, 2000). 
Vermont Superintendents’ Association 
 Until Vermont’s teachers gained collective bargaining rights in 1969, the 
Vermont Superintendents’ Association (VSA) was organized as a branch of the Vermont 
Education Association. After the advent of collective bargaining, the VSA became its 
own independent organization representing the state’s approximately 300 school district 
superintendents on issues such as education quality, governance and leadership. The 
organization focuses much of its work on non-partisan policy research but is also 
considered to have a strong presence in the State House (Informants 12, 01, 13). Like the 
Vermont-NEA, the VSA draws its membership from both property-wealthy and property-
poor school districts and, in general, did not take a position on any plans that sought to 
redistribute tax dollars from property-wealthy towns to property-poor towns. 
However, the association was willing to take a stand on school finance issues that 
were held to be either widely helpful or widely detrimental to their interests. For 
example, the VSA supported 1994’s H.541 because it included a statewide teachers 
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contract that the organization believed would help control local education costs (VSA, 
organizational communication, January 19, 1994). Conversely, the VSA opposed 
Governor Dean’s 1994 school finance reform plan because it cut aid to a large number of 
schools (VSA, organizational communication, January 17, 1995).  
Vermont School Boards Association 
Founded in 1936 as the Vermont State School Directors Association, the Vermont 
School Boards Association (VSBA) represents the estimated 1,300 Vermont citizens who 
serve on the state’s 254 local school boards. The association serves as a resource for its 
members and offers them guidance and training on issues such as school operations, 
governance, and accountability. The VSBA also serves as an advocacy voice for local 
school officials at the state level. Unlike other education associations in the state, the 
VSBA actively waded into the property tax sharing debate through its financial support 
of the Brigham plaintiffs’ legal team as well as through its active support for various 
pieces of school finance reform legislation such as 1994’s H. 541 coupling of a local 
income tax with a statewide teachers contract. 
Although speaking specifically about the VSBA and the VSA, this informant’s 
statement sums up the general approach used by all of Vermont’s education interest 
groups in their lobbying practices: 
They have an association. They have an Executive Director. The 
Executive Director represents them. Yes, it’s a different kind of lobby. It’s 
very different from the people who are hired guns to represent the utility 
companies or the health care industry. But for the committees that work on 
education, [they] are a very real presence in those committee rooms. 
People depend on their advice. But they represent really big constituencies 
so in my experience they’ve always tried to base their positions based on 
resolutions that have been passed by the associations as groups and/or 
they’ve done some surveying. So they’ve tried to be really careful about 
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only representing as positions something that the organization has agreed 
on. (Informant 13)  
 
In short, the education lobby tends to be a visible presence in the statehouse but cautious 
in terms of avoiding potentially divisive issues that may test membership cohesion such 
as property tax sharing schemes associated with school finance reform. 
Municipal Government Lobby 
The major lobby for Vermont’s 246 municipalities is the Vermont League of 
Cities and Towns (VLCT). Founded in 1967, the VLCT educates state and federal 
officials about the impact of their actions on local governments and informs them of 
municipal needs (VLCT, 2011). Consistently rated as one of Vermont’s most powerful 
interest groups (Bryan & Hallowell, 1993; Informants 01, 21), its main policy priorities 
with regard to school finance reform were: 1) reducing the reliance on local property 
taxes to fund schools; and 2) ensuring that the state did not usurp the property tax as a 
revenue stream (Informants 09, 16). In general, the League concerns itself with school 
finance only inasmuch as it impacted property tax issues. Their narrow interest does not 
extend to matters of financial equity for students and taxpayers. 
Business Organizations 
Because education is the single largest public expenditure at the state level, school 
finance policy has major implications for tax policy and economic development. 
Therefore, it is a perennial issue for a state’s business community. The three major 
organizations that represent Vermont’s business interests are the Vermont Chamber of 
Commerce (VCC), Associated Industries of Vermont (AIV) and the Vermont Business 
Roundtable (VBR). Founded in 1912, the Vermont Chamber of Commerce is the oldest 
and largest of these organizations. It represents 1,500 Vermont businesses employing 
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45,000 people from a wide variety of economic sectors. The VCC serves as an active 
lobby for the business community and is concerned with issues such as taxation, 
healthcare, tourism and workforce training. Begun in 1920, Associated Industries of 
Vermont represents Vermont’s manufacturing, mining and forestry interests. Legislators 
consider AIV, along with the VCC, to be formidable lobbying presences in the state 
capitol given their large and influential membership rolls and willingness to spend 
lobbying dollars (Bryan & Hallowell, 1993). The third and youngest of these business 
associations is the Vermont Business Roundtable. The VBR was founded in 1987 and 
counts as its members CEOs from 120 of Vermont’s leading non-profit and for-profit 
employers. The VBR does not consider itself a lobbying organization in the traditional 
sense but rather sees itself as an advocate for public policies that are consistent with the 
worldview of Vermont’s business leaders. 
With regard to school finance reform legislation, all three organizations generally 
opposed the implementation of any new income tax or property tax sharing plan on the 
basis that these taxes would harm Vermont’s fragile economy. Throughout the period 
under study, these business groups commissioned and disseminated multiple economic 
analyses that bolstered their anti-tax claims.  
Gold Towns/Ski Resort Lobby 
Most of Vermont’s ski resorts are located in Vermont’s “gold towns” – a 
colloquial term used to describe the state’s wealthiest communities. Before the enactment 
of Act 60, gold towns enjoyed both unusually high property values and unusually low 
property tax rates. This juxtaposition was no coincidence as the presence of ski resorts 
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enhanced the desirability of these towns, which, in turn, promoted the growth of 
commercial development and second home communities.  
The property taxes derived from valuable non-residential property sources 
subsidized residential property taxpayers and allowed for generous per-pupil 
expenditures in gold town schools. For example, in FY 1993, the ski town of Sherburne 
paid just $0.17 per $1,000 of property value. A home of average value in Sherburne paid 
$306 in annual local property taxes.  However, other towns lacking a strong commercial 
base paid significantly higher rates. That same year, the residents of Essex Town paid 
$1.65 per $1,000 of property value and a home of average value in that town paid $2,067 
in annual property taxes (J. Freidin, personal communication, December 22, 1993). With 
regard to education spending, Sherburne spent an average of $8,375 per pupil in FY 
1993. That same year, Essex Town spent just $6,834 per pupil, even though it had a 
taxing rate almost ten times higher than Sherburne’s (J. Freidin, personal communication, 
December 22, 1993). 
As the economic engines of the state, gold towns and ski resorts historically 
enjoyed a privileged seat atop Vermont’s economy. Ski area associations such as the 
Vermont Ski Areas Association (VSAA) and the Killington Pico Areas Association 
(KPAA) fought to maintain their privileged status by highlighting the potential economic 
damage school finance reform plans could have on the state’s economy. For example, 
one VSAA lobbyist charged that a statewide property tax would create an “… anti-
development and anti-economic growth environment” that could “…very easily result in 
a mass-liquidation of second home properties” (Rice, 1997, p. 3). Many legislators, 
particularly those in the Senate, took these predictions of economic decline seriously and 
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resisted school tax sharing schemes that imposed additional taxes on these towns. One 
informant’s quote exemplified their point of view: 
Tourism is Vermont’s biggest industry. Without the winter recreation 
industry, we would be in deep doo-doo. It is critically important to the 
economic wellbeing of the state. Gold towns contribute a lot to state 
revenues as well. They generate money from the sales tax, the rooms and 
meals tax, the booze tax and they do this the entire year. (Informant 11) 
 
Pro-School Finance Reform Advocacy Groups 
Pro-school finance reform groups become energized by the periodic emergence of 
large discrepancies in both per-pupil expenditures and taxing efforts between property-
rich and property-poor towns when state aid contributions to education are cut back. 
Lacking a core statewide advocacy coalition, Mathis (2000) characterizes the pro-school 
finance reform movement as “diffuse” and “unsustained.” This lack of a consistent push 
for reform may be attributed to fact that the Vermont legislature has historically been 
somewhat responsive to constituents’ demands for school finance reform (Informant 12). 
Each time state aid to education dipped to a level that strained local property tax 
contributions, the state responded with “a new state aid formula and a dollop of new 
money” (Mathis, 2000, p. 4).  According to Mathis (2000), “[w]hile such small increases 
would not achieve equity by any of the commonly used educational finance measures, it 
was sufficient to achieve the political end and quiet things for a while” (p. 4). In the 50 
years between 1935 and 1987, the legislature passed six different school funding 
formulas (Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission, 1993; Mathis, 1999). 
Rather than developing a statewide advocacy apparatus, many pro-reform 
advocates sought election to the state legislature as a means by which to bring change to 
the state’s school funding system. Frequently, these individuals had become involved in 
	  
 142 
matters of school finance while serving on their town’s select board or school board 
(Informants 03, 07, 21, 16, 13). Their heightened awareness of education funding 
discrepancies prompted them to run for legislative office to “solve” the problem. The 
following is a quote from a legislator who became aware of school finance reform while 
serving on his town’s select board:  
I was new on the select board and we were looking at the tax rates and 
saying, “You know, we can’t raise taxes. The taxes are already too high.” I 
said, “Well, what are they relative to other communities?” So we 
contacted the League of Cities and Towns or somehow we got information 
on the other communities. I definitely got, based on the survey, that other 
communities were paying a lot less. Their tax rates were a lot lower. I just 
didn’t understand why that was true. It just didn’t seem fair. Then I started 
looking at spending per pupil. Are they spending less per pupil? No, 
they’re spending more per pupil but they’re paying lower taxes. Why is 
that fair? And so it just fundamentally seemed unfair to me. I ran for the 
legislature in 1988 – two years later – and my main campaign issue was 
the unfairness of the school funding system. (Informant 03) 
 
Another similarly motivated legislator commented:  
I’ve been involved with this whole issue almost from the beginning of the 
time I got on the school board because it became clear so quickly that 
there would never be art in our school, there would never be a quality 
kindergarten program, kids wouldn’t get the hours they needed, kids 
wouldn’t get the remedial help they needed until we had a different way of 
funding education. (Informant 13) 
 
 As these legislators demonstrate, school finance reform advocates were inspired to act by 
the perceived unfairness of fundamental inequities between property-poor and property-
wealthy communities built into the tax system. Seeking institutional change, these highly 
motivated reform advocates won election to the legislature and sought positions on 
committees working on school funding issues. This approach reflects both Vermonters’ 




School Finance Issue Background 
The previous section described the non-governmental players active in the school 
funding debate during this case study research’s period of interest. This section now 
offers a broader perspective by charting the significant national policy events that created 
the United State’s current patchwork system of school finance to help situate the 
experience of Vermont within a larger national setting. It will be followed by a discussion 
of Vermont’s own significant policy events that served to create its unique system of 
school finance. This discussion will help to contextualize and explain the environmental 
pressures for change placed upon the school finance policy subsystem in the years 
leading up to this case analysis’ period of study. 
School Finance on the National Scene 
Education has been a public concern in America since colonial times (Guthrie et 
al, 2007; Ward, 1998). In New England, colonial towns were required to establish 
schools as early as the mid 17th century. The Massachusetts Colony’s Ye Olde Deluder 
Satan Act of 1647 mandated that towns with at least 50 families appoint a teacher of 
reading and writing, required towns with at least 100 families to establish a grammar 
school and stipulated that these schools be supported by parents and local community 
members; “thereby establishing one of the first systems of financing schools through 
local taxation” (Odden & Picus, 2008, p. 9).  
By the late 18th century, a handful of states including Vermont (1777), North 
Carolina (1776), Pennsylvania (1776) and Georgia (1777) had drafted constitutional 
provisions calling upon legislatures to establish permanent endowments for education. 
Throughout the early 1800s, other states began to rewrite their constitutions to formally 
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establish government responsibility for financing schools (Brimley & Garfield, 2002). By 
1820, 13 of the nation’s 23 states had provisions for education in their state constitutions 
(Odden & Picus, 2008).  
While states were technically responsible for education per their constitutional 
guarantees, in reality education in early America was almost exclusively funded and 
managed at the local level (Morse, 2007; Guthrie et al., 2007; Odden & Picus, 2008). In 
the words of Brimley and Garfield (2002), “…the states seemed content to accept 
responsibility for education but were reluctant to assume major responsibility for 
financing it” (p. 76). In short, as long as parents were sending their children to some kind 
of school and weren’t asking the state to fund it, state governments were willing to let 
educational issues be decided on a local basis. As a result, local education took a wide 
variety of forms—sometimes private or philanthropic, sometimes church-sponsored and 
sometimes public. 
Guthrie et al. (2007) has deemed the time between America’s colonial era and the 
post-Civil War Reconstruction era the first of the U.S.’s three phases of education 
finance. This period was marked by almost exclusive local control and funding of 
schools. Quality varied widely in part because both the willingness and ability of towns 
to fund education differed by locality. Phase two emerged at the turn of the 20th century, 
when states began to more rigorously enforce their laws stipulating the availability of 
free, public education. Towns turned to local property taxes as a means to fund this 
school expansion. By 1890, every state in the nation offered some form of tax-supported 
public education (Brimley & Garfield, 2002). To help defray rising local education 
expenses, towns sought financial assistance from their state governments. States often 
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responded by providing flat grants to local school districts. These flat grants could be 
provided on a per-pupil, per-teacher or per-school basis depending on the state and were 
primarily considered taxpayer relief rather than educational assistance. While these state 
funds allowed the poorest towns to establish local schools for the first time, they did 
nothing to reduce spending disparities between rich and poor school districts (Odden & 
Picus, 2008).  
During this period, the work of Ellwood Cubberley highlighted the shortcomings 
of flat grant programs. Known as the scholarly “father” of school finance, Cubberley was 
“the pioneer and foremost figure in the serious consideration of state apportionments of 
funds to local school districts” (Brimley & Garfield, 2002, p. 172; Ward, 1998). His work 
helped to foster the search for a funding formula that would allow state funds to better 
serve needy school districts through a more targeted distribution of education aid.  
Building on Cubberley’s scholarship, Columbia University professors George 
Strayer and Roger Haig developed the concept of the foundation grant in the 1920s. 
Foundation grants, as designed by Strayer and Haig, account for differences in local 
ability to raise educational revenue and have the objective of elevating each school 
district to a minimum level of funding (Ward, 1998). The foundation grant approach 
would go on to become the dominant method of distributing state aid to local school 
districts throughout the 20th century (Wong, 1999; Odden & Picus, 2008). Although the 
foundation formula has many variants, at its core it stipulates both a minimum dollar 
value to be spent on education and a minimum local taxing effort required to receive state 
aid. Thus, “[s]tate aid per pupil is the difference between the foundation per-pupil 
revenue level and the local per-pupil revenues raised by the required local tax rate” 
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(Odden & Picus, 2008, p. 283). Given that state aid is inversely related to local property 
wealth, low-property wealth school districts receive more state aid than their high-
property wealth counterparts. 
  As the 20th century progressed, first the Depression and later the post-World War 
II baby boom increased the demand for state aid to education. By the early 1980s, most 
states had become the primary funders of public education (Wong, 1999). As this aid 
increased, the local property tax became just one of a variety of revenue sources used to 
fund school systems. State income taxes, state sales taxes and lotteries also became 
favored means by which to generate educational resources (Baker, Green & Richards, 
2008). The economic, political and cultural conditions of a particular state determined the 
exact manner in which these taxes were combined.18 For example, Hawaii has historically 
relied on state taxes while New Hampshire has steadfastly held on to local property 
taxation as the primary means by which to fund its schools. 
While targeted state aid helped to mitigate the spending differences between 
property-rich and property-poor school districts, disparities remained. These disparities 
were – and still are – the product of the political bargaining that is inherent in the 
legislative process. Legislatures wield vast discretion in devising the manner in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Each taxing method has its own strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, each state 
utilizes its own particular combination according to the cultural, economic and political 
preferences of its citizens: 1) Property tax: lauded as a stable funding source, it is 
criticized for not being as fair a measurement of personal wealth as it used to be. 
Additionally, unequal assessment practices and tax bases mean that some citizens are 
unduly burdened while others are taxed too lightly; 2) Income tax: this tax is lauded for 
its progressivity but it can be an unreliable revenue source due to its volatility from year 
to year; 3) Sales tax: this tax is attractive in that it is a small tax whose burden is widely 
distributed. However, it is widely considered a regressive tax; 4) Lotteries: this funding 
source is favored by states because it is a “voluntary” tax. However, its use is criticized as 
the poor disproportionately play the lottery (Baker, Green & Richards, 2008).   
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educational resources are to be distributed across a state (Odden & Picus, 2008). They 
determine not only the dollar values to be allocated but also the formulas by which the 
funding is distributed and the combination of taxes to be utilized in the generation of 
education funds. As creatures of state legislatures, school funding systems attempt to 
satisfy as many state interests as possible in order to obtain the broad-based legislative 
support needed for passage. Wong (1999) notes: “To attain the legislative coalition 
needed to pass a school finance package, lawmakers are likely to adopt territorial 
strategies in which no district suffers a reduction in state support. This leveling-up 
strategy is consistent with the electoral concerns of legislators” (p. 82). The legislative 
impulse for inclusivity has the effect of watering down the ability of state aid to close 
funding gaps between property-rich and property-poor school districts (Nelson, 1997). 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, funding disparities (which have existed since 
the inception of publicly- funded education in the United States) received heightened 
attention from citizens and policymakers, alike, as school budgets began to be cut in the 
face of declining enrollments, economic downturn and local property tax revolts. Guthrie, 
Garms and Pierce (1988) note that:  
As long as all school district budgets were growing, most parents and 
school officials were satisfied with the resources available to them. When 
resources became tight, however, educators began to ask if all districts 
were experiencing similar shortages. They discovered that there was a 
wide range of tax rates and expenditure levels among school districts in 
most states. (p. 196) 
 
This wide range of tax rates and expenditure levels allowed school districts in 
property-wealthy localities to raise large sums of money with relatively light 
taxing burdens, while at the same time many low-property wealth localities were 
forced to shoulder heavy taxing burdens to sustain modest per-pupil expenditures. 
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A focus on poverty and social justice issues in the wake of Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954) cast these disparities in a new, more detrimental light (McUsic, 1999). 
As education increasingly came to be viewed as a vehicle for poverty alleviation, reform 
advocates sought funding equity as means by which to “level the playing field” for poor 
children (Morse, 2007). Stymied by legislative inaction, advocates of school finance 
reform turned to the courts for relief (Colwell, 1998; Rebell, 1998). The philosophical 
arguments for the school finance reform movement reflected two influential works: 
Arthur Wise’s Rich Schools, Poor Schools, published in 1968, and Coons, Clune and 
Sugarman’s Private Wealth and Public Education, published in 1970 (Ward, 1998; 
Roellke, Green & Zielewski, 2004). Their ideas, which tie school funding discrepancies 
to the constitutional concept of equal protection, have served as the basis for the 
education finance reform litigation that has affected 46 states over the last four decades 
(Dinan, 2009). According to Guthrie et al. (2007), the pioneering work of these authors 
helped to usher in the third phase of school finance in the United States. 
California’s Serrano v. Priest (1971) is generally noted as the landmark case that 
initiated judicial reform of state education finance systems. In Serrano, the California 
Supreme Court held that California’s state system of school finance was unconstitutional 
in that it violated the U.S. Constitution’s 14th Amendment guarantee of equal protection. 
Importantly, the Serrano court adopted Coons, Clune and Sugarman’s concept of fiscal 
neutrality as an ideal for providing equal protection under the law (Guthrie et al., 2007; 
Ward, 1998).  Fiscal neutrality – the lack of a correlation between education spending 
and local district property wealth – subsequently became the standard for challenging the 
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constitutionality of school finance schemes at both the federal and state levels 
(Vandersall, 1998; Roellke, Green & Zielewski, 2004). 
Shortly after the plaintiff victory in the Serrano case, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled in Texas’ San Antonio v. Rodriguez (1973) that education was not a “fundamental 
right” provided under the U.S. Constitution and thus ineligible for consideration under 
the federal equal protection doctrine of the 14th Amendment. This Supreme Court 
decision effectively shut down education finance challenges based on the U.S. 
Constitution and brought to a close the first wave of school finance litigation (Rebell, 
2001).  
After the Supreme Court ended the first wave of school finance litigation with its 
ruling in the Rodriguez case, plaintiffs responded by bringing equity challenges under 
state constitution equal protection and education clauses (Baker, Green & Richards, 
2008). Robinson v. Cahill (1973), decided just five weeks after the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in the Rodriguez case, deemed New Jersey’s school funding distribution formula to 
be in violation of the state constitution’s education clause. It proved to be a landmark 
case in that it demonstrated the ability of the second wave approach to succeed in state 
court. However, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, efforts to declare state finance systems 
unconstitutional met with mixed results. During this time period, equity advocates won 
judgments in six states, while the constitutionality of state financing systems was upheld 
in 10 others (Vandersall, 1998).  
A 1989 Kentucky Supreme Court ruling in Rose v. Council for Better Education 
marked the beginning of the third wave of litigation challenging the adequacy of state 
systems of school finance on the basis of state education clauses (Rebell, 2001; Roellke, 
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Green & Zielewski, 2004). Since 1989, plaintiffs have won whole or partial judgments in 
22 school funding cases brought before state courts including Vermont (Hunter, 2011a). 
School finance scholars attribute this dramatic turnaround to two factors: 1) a new 
strategy employed by plaintiffs focusing on the “adequacy” of a school finance system to 
meet the educational requirements stipulated in a state constitution’s education clause; 
and 2) the emergence of the standards-based reform movement that has provided 
plaintiffs in adequacy suits with “state-sanctioned” performance benchmarks (Rebell, 
1998; Roellke, Green & Zielewski, 2004).  
 The impact of these court cases upon state school funding practices is far-
reaching. Research demonstrates that over the last four decades, court-mandated school 
finance reform increased state aid to poor school districts (Evans, Murray & Schwab, 
1997; Card & Payne, 2002; Dee & Levine, 2004), prompted states to follow a more 
aggressive redistribution policy (Evans, Murray & Schwab, 1997; Nelson, 2007) and led 
to modest educational improvements for students in property-poor school districts (Card 
& Payne, 2002; Jimerson, 2001; Jimerson, 2002).  
 This section has served as a broad overview of school finance in the United 
States. It details how over the last 100 years, school funding has been transformed from a 
local to a statewide concern. This transformation is the result of our nation’s changing 
view of not only the importance of education but also the responsibility of the state in 
providing educational services. The next section turns to an in-depth examination of 





School Finance in Vermont 
 
According to education finance expert Kenneth Wong (2008), “…school finance 
policy has always been shaped by political structure and process” (p. 41). While the 
history of school finance reform in Vermont broadly reflects the national pattern 
described in the previous section, its particular cultural values and corresponding political 
structures place unusual emphasize on the local control of schools. This attachment to 
local control is manifested in the state’s heavy reliance on local property taxes to pay for 
its schools and, in part, accounts for the number of years it took reform activists to move 
forward with school finance litigation against the state. 
For Vermonters, “local control” of education means education funding and 
decisionmaking rooted at the town level. A statute passed in 1782 mandated that towns 
create either a single school district or divide the town into several smaller districts to 
“enable Vermonters to instruct youth at low prices” (Williams, 1965, as cited in Sautter, 
2008, p. 3). Most towns opted for the multiple district option. As a result, it was not 
uncommon for one small town to have seven or eight independent school districts 
operating within its boundaries (Cate, 2006). By 1860, Vermont had 2,591 school 
districts operating in 239 towns. 
To help fund this multiplicity of common schools, the legislature made the 
payment of local property taxes to school districts compulsory in 1864 (Sautter, 2008). 
However, even with the compulsory property tax, many schools struggled financially. 
The exceptionally narrow tax bases of these school districts created huge taxing and 
funding disparities among schools. In 1890, Governor William P. Dillingham’s farewell 
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address highlighted the persistent issue of these funding disparities. In a statement that 
would still ring true a century later, the governor commented:  
[W]hile there are towns in the state in which the average rate of taxation 
for school purposes amounts to only 17 cents on the dollar of the grand 
list, there are others where it amounts to 75 cents, and one in which such 
average rate is 130 cents…. In the villages where the grand list is large, 
the taxes are light; while in the hill districts where the grand list is small, 
they are almost uniformly burdensome. (Sanford, 2006, p. 6) 
 
Citing a report from the State Superintendent of Education, Dillingham was “convinced 
that a great wrong had been done to the poorer classes of towns and the smaller districts 
in the failure to provide an adequate system of equalized taxation for the maintenance of 
common schools” (Sanford, 2006, p. 6). To correct this wrong, he recommended the 
implementation of a statewide property tax “to equalize taxation for school purposes 
among the towns” (Sanford, 2006, p. 6).  
The legislature responded by levying a statewide property tax of five cents per 
dollar of value in addition to the local property tax. The revenue from this statewide 
property tax was allocated back to towns on a per-school basis to help pay for teacher and 
administrator salaries (Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission, 1993; Mathis, 1999). In his 
review of the history of school funding in Vermont, Sautter (2008) pronounced the law 
notable in several respects, including the fact that it “represented a great advancement in 
progressive taxation that redistributed money from wealthier urban areas to poorer rural 
communities” (p. 2). However, because the revenue was distributed back to towns on a 
per-school basis, rural towns with a large number of very small schools were net winners 
while urban areas with higher property values and larger schools were net losers.  
Perhaps as a means to rectify a system that was encouraging small towns to create 
even more schools (Sautter, 2008), the state subsequently mandated that school districts 
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be consolidated at the town level. This mandate reduced the number of school districts 
from approximately 2,100 to just under 300 (Cate, 2006). By consolidating the tax base at 
the town level, the state hoped to ease the funding burden for poor, mostly rural schools 
(Sautter, 2008). Instead, however, localities strongly resisted the change on the basis of a 
loss of local control and referred to the consolidation mandate as the Vicious Acts of 
1892 (McClaughry, 2010).  
Vermont’s statewide property tax remained in effect until 1931, when it was 
replaced by a statewide income tax  (Governor’s Office, 1985; Governor’s Blue Ribbon 
Commission, 1993, Mathis, 1999; Sanford, 2006). Policymakers of the time perceived the 
implementation of the statewide income tax as freeing up local property taxes for the 
funding of municipal services and local education needs. However, according to Sanford 
(2006), it did not take long for the usual inequities between property-rich and property-
poor school districts to reappear. The legislature responded in 1935 with the development 
of the state’s first needs-based formula to distribute state aid to economically 
disadvantaged schools. This formula established several precedents that endured for most 
of the 20th century: 1) it based state aid to schools on financial need; 2) it weighted the 
student count to reflect different pupil costs; and 3) it defined wealth in terms of property 
wealth (Mathis, 1999). 
Since 1935, Vermonters have relied on a combination of local property taxes and 
state general fund dollars to pay for schools. Since Vermonters have historically relied so 
heavily on local property taxes to fund their schools, the terms “school finance reform” 
and “property tax reform” are generally used interchangeably. Political reporter Jack 
Hoffman (1996b), who followed Vermont’s school funding debates throughout the 
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tumultuous period leading up to the passage of Act 60 in Vermont elaborates on the 
terminology used to discuss the issue of school finance reform in Vermont: 
Political leaders have been talking about property tax reform and 
education financing reform for so long the two terms have almost become 
interchangeable. They also seem to be one in the same because Vermont 
relies so heavily on the property tax to pay for education. Talk about 
property taxes and you’re mostly talking about the way Vermont pays for 
schools. (p. C1)  
 
Over the years, the formulas for distributing state tax dollars to needy school 
districts have changed multiple times. Before the passage of Act 60 in 1997, school 
finance reform legislation had been passed in 1947, 1964 (the Hunt-Simpson Plan), 1969 
(the Miller Formula), 1982 (the Morse-Giuliani Plan), and 1987 (Foundation Plan). While 
each of these plans sought to create a more equitable distribution of state aid to needy 
districts, they all continued to rely heavily on local property taxes generated at the town 
level and to to fund schools with state aid raised through general fund taxes used to 
supplement those districts that could not generate sufficient funds by way of the local 
property tax. In essence, while each plan was hailed as a “breakthrough” or “historic” in 
terms of its ability to inject increased equity into the funding system, these plans never 
adequately addressed two systemic problems facing Vermont’s approach to school 
finance: 1) the continued heavy reliance on local property tax to fund schools despite vast 
differences in the abilities of school districts to raise money; and 2) the chronic failure of 
state aid to effectively bridge these disparities in periods of fiscal decline (Mathis, 1999). 
The Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Educational and Municipal Financing 
Reform (1993) summed up Vermont’s general approach to school funding matters 
throughout much of the 20th century:  
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In order to attract enough legislative support to enact a new state aid 
formula, additional state funds are contributed so few school districts 
suffer a reduction in state aid. General state aid contributes a greater 
percent of local revenue whenever a new state aid formula is first enacted, 
but its proportion then declines as state revenues fail to keep pace with 
school spending. When the proportion contributed by general state aid 
falls, property taxpayers express sufficient anger that legislators devise a 
new general state aid formula and contribute additional funds to bring 
general state aid back up to around 30 percent, or higher. (p. 11) 
 
An informant similarly noted: 
I’ve got a chart that I will share with you that has the adoption dates of 
Morse-Giuliani, Foundation, etc. where you will see this big influx of state 
aid and then you will see it flat line and then another big influx of state aid 
and then you see it flat line and meanwhile the property taxes are going 
up. (Informant 09) 
 
That this state of affairs persisted was not for lack of trying on the part of reform-
minded individuals in state policy circles. Since at least the 1950s, policymakers sought 
to reform the tax side of the state aid system so that school funding tax burdens could be 
more evenly spread across the state. In the 1950s, Senator Herbert Ogden began 
advocating for the implementation of a local school income tax. The major idea 
supporting the use of a progressive local income tax was that it allowed heavier tax 
burdens to fall on those most able to pay. Following his lead, Representatives Ralph 
Baker and Barbara Grimes introduced a bill in 1987 that utilized the income tax in lieu of 
the property tax to fund schools. Similar bills were introduced in several successive 
biennia but to no avail (Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission, 1993).  
In 1979, then-Governor Snelling made a strong push for the implementation of a 
statewide nonresidential property tax (Informant 09; Governor’s Office, 1980). In his 
position paper outlining the justification for the use of a statewide property tax on 
businesses and second homes, Governor Snelling argued: “We have not demanded the 
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uniformity or equality of property taxes which has already been achieved for income or 
sales tax systems” (Governor’s Office, 1980, p. 4). His “Vermont Plan” viewed the 
inclusion of all non-residential property as part of the state tax base as the key to a more 
equal distribution of school funds. However, the legislature rejected his proposal and 
subsequently passed the Morse-Giuliani Plan in 1982, which sought to better equalize 
funding across districts by accounting for local income wealth as well as property wealth 
when distributing state aid to education (Sass, 2007).  
Eight years later in 1987, then-Governor Kunin attached a local property tax 
sharing proposal to the bill that ultimately became the Foundation Plan. This proposal 
would have required high-wealth districts to share some of their locally generated 
property tax dollars with low-wealth districts through a recapture provision. The Vermont 
House of Representatives soundly defeated this proposal, which received just 18 of 150 
votes (Mitchell, 1993). One informant remarked that citizens’ fear of one day having 
their town become a “sharing” town doomed the Foundation Plan’s recapture provision: 
If you follow the Foundation Plan, it started off with a recapture 
[provision]. It did not in the final version, it did not get put in. But when 
Governor Kunin proposed it and possibly when the House passed it, there 
was recapture in it. It may have gotten down to as few as 17 towns that 
were recaptured but then we used the “camels nose under the tent” and the 
“slippery slope” and as soon as they put out a print out that showed maybe 
it was 23 towns [that would have to share], that was perfect for us to be 
able to instill fear. (Informant 09) 
 
 In short, despite persistent efforts on the part of reform-minded government 
officials, the legislature repeatedly rejected multiple alternatives to the use of the local 
property tax, supplemented by state general fund tax revenues, to pay for education in the 
state of Vermont. While Vermonters bemoaned the fiscal inequities inherent in the 
system, reform advocates could not achieve a critical mass of support for any one 
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particular policy alternative. One informant characterized the inability of the legislature 
to pass a piece of non-incremental school finance reform legislation as a lack of political 
will: 
[The Windham Foundation] used to put on three or four public policy 
conferences every year. Education was probably the subject two or three 
times. I can remember there was one, must have been in the late 1980s. I 
guess that was during Kunin’s term. These conferences were all off the 
record. I mean one of the benefits of them was that people could come and 
actually have honest discussions without having to worry about political 
posturing and I can remember in those meetings, there was recognition 
from all kinds of people that we had to go to some form of state property 
tax to support education. We couldn’t allow… it was just too unfair. But 
people just didn’t have the political will to do that. (Informant 18)   
 
The school aid formula in place at the time of the Brigham decision – the 
Foundation Plan – exemplifies Vermont’s persistent problems with education funding. 
The Foundation Plan passed the Vermont legislature in 1987. As noted earlier, that year 
powerful interest groups including the Vermont League of Cities and Towns successfully 
beat back an effort by then-Governor Madeleine Kunin to add a local property tax sharing 
component to the Foundation Plan. Instead, as with earlier school funding plans, the final 
version of the Foundation Plan relied on an infusion of state general fund tax revenues to 
help equalize local spending between property-poor and property-rich school districts. 
One legislator remembers the process in the following way: 
We passed what we thought was a good solution at the time, the 
Foundation Formula. Put more money into it. Mathematically it works. 
You equalize the tax bases. What does a school need per-pupil? How 
much can they raise per-pupil? You give them the difference. It did have a 
sharing piece to it in the early version but that didn’t pass. That was 
stripped out of it so it was all up to the state’s general fund to give enough 
money to try to equalize taxes. (Informant 16) 
 
Once the sharing provision had been removed, the Foundation Plan was generally 
welcome legislation – mostly for its large cash infusion into the education subsystem. 
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One informant highlighted the Foundation Plan’s positive reception as such: “For a few 
years it [the Foundation Plan] worked well. Everybody seemed to be happy. The state aid 
went up for towns” (Informant 16). Before the passage of the Foundation Plan, state aid 
to education had again dropped to painfully low levels (Governor’s Blue Ribbon 
Commission, 1992; Mathis, 1999). This low rate of state aid placed upward pressure on 
local property taxes and disproportionately impacted residents of property-poor towns. At 
the same time, school districts were stinging from the State Board of Education’s recent 
adoption of the Vermont Public School Approval Standards (PSAs) that had increased 
minimum course requirements for all students across the state, a change that was 
considered by many districts to be an unfunded mandate (Mathis, 1999). The additional 
state aid provided by the Foundation Plan not only served to reduce property taxes but 
also helped to ameliorate misgivings about the implementation of the standards program.  
Under the terms of the Foundation Plan, the Commissioner of Education was 
charged with recommending to the legislature a minimum per-pupil expenditure19 that 
would allow for a “good, basic education” as outlined by the PSAs. Tied to the 
implementation of new statewide educational standards, the formula was designed to 
ensure that each school district had enough money to meet the state standards at a fair tax 
rate.  
The legislature would take this number and develop a reasonable property tax rate 
for each school district given its income and property wealth. If a district set its property 
tax at this reasonable rate but still could not generate enough revenue to meet the 
Commissioner’s base per-pupil expenditure, the state would provide the difference 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This figure was weighted for secondary students, students and poverty and students 
with high transportation costs (Vermont Department of Education, 1989).  
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(Rebell & Metzler, 2002). According to multiple respondents (Informants 09, 12, 19, 16), 
Vermonters viewed the Foundation Plan as a sensible policy response to Vermont’s 
school funding problems of the 1980s. As one informant noted: 
Vermont is a property tax state and it was a property tax back then… 
There was an inequity because one town had to tax harder than another 
town for the same level of spending. So a number of people all would say, 
“Well, what’s up with that? That’s not fair”... It had come up again in the 
campaign in 1986. There had been a consultant, Augenblick. He did a 
report that recommended Vermont go to a foundation-type formula so in 
the 1987 legislature we adopted that and found some money to put in 
because, ultimately, in the old state aid system it was a matter of could the 
state find enough money to fund the formula. Revenue was up so we could 
actually put more money into the formula. (Informant 16) 
 
During the Foundation Plan’s first year of implementation, the state sharply 
increased its state aid contribution from $88.6 million to $111.9 million (Mathis, 1999). 
That year the state contributed 37 percent of general education funds, a historic high 
(Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission, 1992). However, despite the large infusion of 
general fund dollars into the school aid program, the state’s recommended per-pupil 
expenditure was set low from the start. Vermont’s ensuing economic decline in the early 
1990s turned the Foundation Plan’s intent to allocate sufficient dollars for a sound basic 
education into a charade as the State Board of Education led by the Commissioner of 
Education began to regularly recommend base per-pupil expenditures that were well 
below their internal cost estimates for meeting the PSAs (Mathis, 1999).  
In the face of fiscal constraint, the legislatively-set minimum property tax effort 
used to determine those school districts eligible for aid also began to be manipulated to fit 
available budget appropriations. One informant described the legislator’s procedures in 
the following way: 
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The whole idea [of the Foundation Plan] was that the legislature would 
establish a reasonable tax rate [based on the Education Commissioner’s 
recommendation] and, as a consequence of that, the state would know how 
much money it needed to appropriate for state aid to education. But after a 
while the legislature started to do it exactly backwards. You talk to a 
legislator and he says, “Well, we want to appropriate this amount of 
money and in order to appropriate this amount of money, the tax rate and 
local level [share] ought to be this so that’s what we say the tax rate ought 
to be.” (Informant 19) 
 
With the base per-pupil expenditure set artificially low and the taxing effort needed to 
obtain state aid raised to suit the amount available, more and more school districts were 
unable to meet the criteria for receiving state aid. Indeed, for each successive year 
following the Foundation Plan’s initial implementation in FY 1989 fewer and fewer 
towns received state education aid. Just one year into implementation the number of 
towns said to be “on the formula20” dropped from 185 to 151. The next year that number 
declined to 138 (Vermont Department of Education, 1992). School districts, once again, 
compensated for this loss of state aid to education by raising local property taxes. This 
increased reliance upon local taxes to fund education, in turn, increased the taxing and 
spending disparities between property-rich and property-poor school districts.  
For many Vermonters, the failure of the Foundation Plan revealed yet again the 
weakness of an overreliance upon local property taxes to fund schools (Informants 16, 
07, 03, 20, 21; Rebell & Metzler, 2002). Despite having a state-funded safety net in 
place, property-poor school districts were forced to raise taxes in the face of state budget 
shortfalls. Yet residents of property-rich towns who did not receive money from the 
Foundation Plan remained unharmed by the state’s financial woes. Thus, the failure of 
the Foundation Plan to improve fiscal equity for students and taxpayers in the manner in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




which it was intended proved to many that it was fundamentally flawed and galvanized 
concerned individuals to look for policy alternatives (Informants 12, 07, 03, 06, 20, 13, 
21, 09).  
 On a final note, for a state with such persistently wide discrepancies in school 
district per-pupil expenditures, it seems surprising that Vermont’s first legal challenge to 
the constitutionality of the state’s system of school finance was not filed until 1995. In 
contrast, reform advocates from many other states with similar school funding 
discrepancies filed cases during the “first wave” of school finance litigation in the 1970s. 
Vermont’s delay can be attributed to a variety of reasons, including: 1) an attachment to 
local control and a tradition of self-reliance that trumped the desire for fiscal equity; 2) a 
state legislature just responsive enough to quell periodic unrest among property-poor 
school districts; and 3) a sense that the state’s vaguely worded constitution was 
unfriendly to school finance challenges (Hoffman, 1993g).  
Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter sought to explain the policy context for the passage of Vermont’s 
landmark school funding legislation, Act 60. In doing so, it highlighted the value 
Vermonters place in the cultural ideas of local control and progressivism, the state’s 
moralistic political culture, and the state’s faltering economy in the early years of the 
1990s. The chapter also provided information regarding the structure, composition and 
rules of the state institutions that run Vermont and emphasized the important role of local 
towns in the provision of governmental services such as education. It then outlined the 
numerous non-governmental organizations active in school finance reform policy and 
concluded with a review of the school funding issue area at both the national and state 
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levels to help understand the pressures for change building in the subsystem as this case 
study’s period of study commenced. In that regard, the chapter highlighted Vermont’s 
continued reliance on the local property tax to fund schools well past the time other states 
had assumed greater responsibility for school funding. It also noted that this approach 
disproportionately burdened property-poor school districts, particularly during times of 






CASE FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
 
This chapter presents the findings of the case study of the policymaking process 
resulting in the passage of Vermont’s Act 60 and attempts to answer this study’s first 
research question: How did contextual forces and actor relations interact to bring about 
a non-incremental school finance reform policy in Vermont? Building on the contextual 
factors that shaped the policymaking landscape described in Chapter Four, this chapter 
first summarizes the Brigham v. State of Vermont legal decision and its resulting 
legislative action. It then examines the policymaking dynamics at work within and across 
the four decisionmaking arenas outlined in Mazzoni’s revised model. Within each arena, 
the analysis highlights the actors who operated in that arena along with their goals, 
motivations, resources, influence strategies, interactions and outcomes in an effort to 
understand the non-incremental policymaking process that created Act 60. Finally, this 
chapter will conclude with an interpretation of actor influence on policy outcomes based 
on study data as presented in the case findings.  
Synopsis of Judicial Action 
 On February 5, 1997, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled the state’s system of 
school finance to be in violation of both the state’s Education and Common Benefits 
clauses (Vermont Constitution Chapter I, Article 7 and Chapter II, Section 68) of the state 
constitution. To this end, the justices ruled: 
In this appeal, we decide that the current system for funding public 
education in Vermont, with its substantial dependence on local property 
taxes and resultant wide disparities in revenues available to local school 
districts, deprives children of an equal educational opportunity in violation 




Further, the Court argued that “[t]he distribution of a resource as precious as educational 
opportunity may not have as its determining force the mere fortuity of a child’s 
residence” (Brigham, 1997, p. 15) and mandated that the state ensure that school funding 
was a function of state wealth, not just the wealth of the town where the school was 
located. Importantly, the ruling did not call for exact equality of funding. Rather, the 
court emphasized that: 
…absolute equality of funding is neither a necessary nor practical 
requirement to satisfy the constitutional command of equal educational 
opportunity… Equal opportunity does not necessarily prohibit cities and 
towns from spending more on education if they choose, but it does not 
allow a system in which educational opportunity is necessarily a function 
of district wealth. (Brigham, 1997, p. 17) 
 
In its ruling the Court made it clear that it was the state’s responsibility to design a new 
system that provided every school child access to education funding that was 
substantially equal to that which all of the students in the state had and charged the 
legislature to design a new state aid formula consistent with its findings. 
Synopsis of Legislative Response 
In a rapid response to the Supreme Court’s Brigham decision, the Vermont State 
Legislature approved legislation revising the state’s system of school finance on June 5, 
1997. Known formally as the Equal Education Opportunity Act, Act 60 dramatically 
reduced the state’s long-standing reliance on local property taxes to fund schools in favor 
of two new funding mechanisms that redistributed property wealth from property-rich 
school districts to property-poor school districts: 1) a statewide property tax used to 
provide a $5,000 per-pupil block grant; and 2) a guaranteed yield second tier local 
	  
 165 
property tax for those districts wishing to spend above the block grant. Act 6021 is 
comprised of four key financial components: the block grant, categorical grants, the local 
share property tax and the income sensitivity provision (Proulx & Jimerson, 1998).  
Under the terms of the legislation, the majority of state aid to education is funded 
by a uniform statewide property tax of $1.10 per $100 of property wealth. Approximately 
six percent of the block grant is funded by new general fund state taxes including a one 
cent increase in the rooms and meals tax, the maintenance of the sales tax at five 
percent,22 an increase in the gasoline tax to 19 cents and various adjustments to corporate 
income, bank franchise, telecommunications, brokerage and lottery revenues. 
The bill guarantees that all students will be supported by a per-pupil block grant 
expenditure that is adjusted annually for inflation.23 Additional categorical funding is 
provided for special education, school construction debt service and small schools. Under 
the terms of Act 60, state funding for special education increases from 38 percent to 60 
percent of total district expenditures. Technical education students, high schoolers, and 
students living in poverty receive a block grant worth an additional 25 percent in 
weighted funding. For example, with a block grant of $5,000, schools with students in 
these categories would receive $6,250 in per-pupil funding. Limited English proficient 
students receive a block grant worth an additional 20 percent in weighted funding and 
small schools receive additional money on a sliding scale based on their size.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Act 60 also contains various education quality measures but these portions of the bill 
are not analyzed in this case study because they were neither the focus of the Supreme 
Court’s ruling nor deemed particularly controversial or innovative (Shelly, 2011).  
22 Rather than letting it sunset as planned. 
23 At the time of the bill’s passage, this amount was approximately $5,000 per student. 
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The local share property tax allows school districts the opportunity to levy 
additional local property taxes to supplement the block grant. This component of the bill 
is important because approximately 89 percent of school districts spent above the $5,000 
block grant during the 1996/97 school year (Picus, 1998). However, these additional 
funds are equalized through a guaranteed yield formula that recaptures local property 
taxes at the state level and redistributes them back to local school districts based upon 
local tax effort. This mechanism ensures that all towns that levy property tax at the same 
rate, regardless of local property wealth, receive the same financial yield from that 
property tax.  
Finally, the income sensitivity provision caps homestead property tax liability at 
two percent of income for those households with “modified adjusted gross income” under 
$75,000. A “homestead” is defined as a primary residence and two acres and is meant to 
prevent vacation homes and additional acreage from being subsidized. If a resident’s 
income is $47,000 or less, the combined municipal and educational tax cannot exceed 
five percent of the homeowner’s annual income. As of 1996, an estimated 88 percent of 
Vermont households had incomes below $75,000. According to school finance expert 
Lawrence Picus (1998), the income sensitivity component allowing the vast majority of 
Vermonters to pay for schools based on income is Act 60’s most unique provision in that 
it affords substantial vertical equity24 as well as horizontal equity.25 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 According to Odden and Picus (2008), vertical equity “is the principle used to describe 
how a tax treats individuals in different economic situations” (p. 331). In the case of 
Vermont, the income sensitivity component made property taxes more progressive, thus 
promoting vertical equity.  
25 Odden and Picus (2008) define horizontal equity as “equal treatment of individuals in 
the same, ore equal, circumstance” (p. 331).  
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Designed to comply with the court’s requirements and to dramatically improve 
the fiscal equity of Vermont’s system of school finance, Act 60 represented sweeping 
change to Vermont’s school finance landscape by completely reversing the state’s 
traditional reliance upon local revenue sources. Under the new law, school funding went 
from a combination of approximately 70 percent local funds and 30 percent state/federal 
funds to a combination of approximately 30 percent local funds and 70 percent 
state/federal funds. Reflecting on this change, Proulx and Jimerson (1998) commented: 
“Act 60 will radically increase the proportion of state money designated for public 
education, and will change forever the manner in which taxes are calculated and 
collected, state money distributed, school expenditures and revenues reported, and to 
some extent, how money is spent” (p. 9). 
 In addition to these sweeping fiscal changes, Act 60 forced Vermonters to 
relinquish the traditionally held notion that a citizen’s responsibility for funding schools 
did not extend beyond the town of his or her residence. As Jimerson (2001) notes: 
“Accepting Act 60 entails making a shift from defining community as a particular town 
to thinking of community as the entire state of Vermont” (p. 12) These psychic changes 
have proven to be as sweeping as the financial ones. 
Enacting Act 60 
While the legislative response to the Brigham decision took just four months, the 
passage of Act 60 in 1997 was the culmination of a long process dating back to the early 
1990s (Rebell & Metzler, 2002; Mathis, 2000). Act 60 represents a major policy 
innovation in that it is a break from several decades’ worth of state aid funding formulae 
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that combined limited state general fund tax dollars with a preponderance of local 
property tax revenues to pay for schools. 
This section describes this non-incremental policy formation process and utilizes 
the Mazzoni (1991) framework as an orienting structure. It traces the progression of the 
impetus for reform from the subsystem arena to the commission arena to the macro arena 
and, finally, to the leadership arena. In the arena model, power is mediated by arenas. 
Each arena legitimates a set of participants, establishes the rules of engagement and 
shapes the potency of actor resources and strategies. Each subsequent section will outline 
the arena under study, the actors operating in that arena and their goals, motivations, 
resources and influence strategies as they sought to influence policy outcomes with 
regard to the issue of school finance reform in Vermont.  
Subsystem Arena 
According to Mazzoni (1991), a policy subsystem is comprised of a relatively 
stable cadre of legislative committee members, bureaucratic specialists and interest 
groups involved with a specific policy issue. Within the subsystem, this stable group of 
interested parties tends to engage in pluralistic bargaining to help accommodate as many 
interests as possible (Fowler, 1994). This bargaining is often conducted in an orderly 
manner away from the glare of the public spotlight. While conflict may be present, it 
tends to be short lived and resolved through negotiation.  
A review of primary and secondary source data reveals that the subsystem as 
described by Mazzoni was only partially reflected in Vermont with regard to the issue of 
school finance. First, neither informant nor documentary data indicated that members of 
the state education agency were involved with influencing school funding decisions. In 
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fact, informant data indicate that the State Commissioner of Education’s funding 
recommendations were routinely ignored by the legislature. Rather than basing funding 
decisions on the amount of money required to provide a “sound basic education,” 
legislators, instead, set the school aid funding levels based on available state revenue. 
Regarding this fact, one informant commented: 
The legislature would decide how much it wanted to appropriate, figure 
out what the reasonable tax that would generate that sum of money would 
be and that’s what they would call the reasonable tax rate. As a 
consequence they manipulated the Foundation Formula so that it stopped 
working the way it was intended. (Informant 19) 
 
Second, neither informant interviews nor document reviews revealed existence of 
state-level school finance reform advocacy organizations. As noted in Chapter Four, 
traditional state education organizations such as the Vermont-NEA and the Vermont 
Superintendent’s Association were, indeed, a lobbying presence in Montpelier. However, 
because their memberships were internally divided on the issue of school finance, they 
did not exert particular influence for fear of testing member cohesion. 
This lack of any meaningful state-level school finance reform advocacy coalitions 
may be attributed to four contextual features of Vermont’s school funding policy system. 
First, as noted in the previous chapter, Vermont’s tradition of relying upon school 
districts to provide the vast majority of its school funding through the levying of local 
property taxes meant that state aid to education contributed a relatively small amount to 
total education spending. Jeff Wennberg, mayor of the town of Rutland in southern 
Vermont, argued that because school spending was viewed as a local issue it received 
scarce attention in state policy circles. In a commentary for the Rutland Herald, 
Wennberg (1995) noted: 
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The reason we have a property tax crisis, the reason local taxpayers are in 
this hole, is because education spending has never been a priority in 
Montpelier. Only about twice a decade does education bubble near the top 
of the legislature’s agenda. For the remaining eight years money for 
schools is cut. Taxpayer relief is underfunded. Mandates are applied with 
little concern for how they will be financed. (p. 16) 
 
Thus, only when the school funding issue achieved “crisis” status did Vermonters look to 
the state to address the issue. For the remainder of the time, state education aid 
languished as an afterthought. 
A second contributing factor to the lack of a state education reform lobby may be 
attributed to the fact that the state legislature had historically been somewhat responsive 
to voter concerns on the school funding issue. This intermittent attention by the 
legislature resulted in the passage of numerous school finance reform mechanisms over 
the years. While the fiscal equalizing aspects of these reforms waned after a few years, 
they did succeeded in periodically appeasing voter anger through reduced property taxes. 
As one interviewee noted: “The various formulas did tamp down the unfairness because 
at the beginning the legislature always appropriated the amount of money they were 
supposed to” (Informant 19). Each time the issue fell on the political agenda, the impetus 
for advocacy diminished. As a result, Mathis (2000) deemed reform efforts “usustained.” 
A third aspect was the fact that various types of state education aid were budgeted 
as separate line items rather than as part of a combined state aid package. An informant 
outlined the negative impact this budgeting strategy had on advocacy formation:  
[There was] all sorts of eating away around the edges of school funding 
because it was a line item, it wasn’t a [combined] formula. There was a 
line item for state aid, there was a line item for special ed, there was a line 
item for reimbursing towns for current use property, and there was a line 
item for the low-income [property tax] rebate…. [Each cut to a budget 
line] only affected a minority. Each one had its own little constituency…. 




Whether purposeful or an accident of history, the separate budget lines hindered the 
development of a critical mass of school finance advocates who coalesced around a 
single reform agenda. 
Finally, the very low bar to enter public office in Vermont meant that particularly 
motivated individuals could choose to directly join the legislature to influence school 
finance policy rather than attempt to exert influence through advocacy organizations. For 
example, two informants noted how their intense personal interest in the issue of school 
finance reform launched their political careers: 
Education finance reform was the major reason that I ran for office. It was 
because I realized it was the only place that I could change what I thought 
was harming the children of our community. (Informant 13) 
 
I remember very vividly I was gardening and I just was pissed off. I totally 
messed up what I was doing. I was planting potatoes and I was shoveling 
and arguing to the world as I was shoveling and I ended up planting a row 
of potatoes right over the potatoes I had just planted. I realized there’s a 
more constructive way to take out my frustrations on the legislature. So I 
largely ran for the legislature wanting to be involved in the [school finance 
reform] discussion. (Informant 21) 
 
Mathis (2000) confirmed the lack of distinction between advocacy work and political life 
in Vermont when he noted: “With a highly localized and informal structure, the lines 
between civil society and politicians were blurred. Elected representatives often sat with 
groups pressing for reform. Reform energy flowed most strongly from the House of 
Representatives…” (p. 7). 
Taken together, these four contextual forces can help to explain the noticeable 
absence of a state-level school finance lobbying apparatus. Based on a review of primary 
and secondary source data, it appears that the school finance policy subsystem was 
comprised largely of the governor and state legislators. The following sections will turn 
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to an appraisal of their goals, motives, resources and influence strategies at work within 
the school finance policy subsystem.  
Subsystem Arena: Actors, Goals and Motives 
This section outlines the goals and motives of the policy actors operating in the 
Vermont school finance policy subsystem. As noted above, Vermont’s school finance 
policy subsystem primarily consisted of the governor and members of the state 
legislature. Within the policy subsystem, those actors negotiated the allocation of state 
aid to education within the broader framework of the annual state budgeting process.  
Governor Howard Dean 
Having served as Vermont’s lieutenant governor since 1987, Howard Dean 
became Vermont’s 79th governor in 1991 upon the death of Governor Richard Snelling. 
Snelling, a Republican from Shelburne, had won the 1990 gubernatorial election on his 
promise to help restore Vermont to fiscal health. At the time of his election, the state was 
mired in recession and facing a $65 million deficit. Soon after his inauguration, Snelling 
orchestrated a series of tax increases with the powerful Democratic Speaker of the House 
Ralph Wright to help arrest the debt. One informant remembers the governor’s deficit 
plan consuming almost the entire 1991 legislative session: 
In 1991, the big issue was the deficit. We had a huge deficit because of the 
recession. 1991 is when Ralph [Wright] and the governor put together 
their deal. They put in place a temporary progressive income tax to solve 
the problem and raise $82 million in taxes. (Informant 03) 
 
However, Snelling died in office shortly thereafter. When Howard Dean assumed office, 
even though he was a Democrat, he continued Snelling’s focus on fiscal restraint. Three 
respondents remember Dean’s commitment to cost containment in his early years as 
governor in the following way: 
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We had had the first Snelling administration and then six Kunin years. The 
economy was in a very different place. Snelling was elected a second time 
to come back in to try to guide the ship through. Then he died after several 
months. Howard was a very accidental governor. He kept a lot of 
Snelling’s people around him…. Howard was absolutely adamant about 
balancing the budget. He was as tight as anybody I have ever been around. 
(Informant 02) 
 
Well you’ve got to remember that [Dean] came in in the middle of the 
worst economic recession that we’d had since the depression. And he 
came in with Dick Snelling having died and him being responsible for 
implementing a plan that Snelling worked out with Ralph Wright in the 
previous legislative session. Somebody gave him religion because he stuck 
to that tone during his entire tenure. (Informant 09) 
 
So then Snelling dies but he had made a promise – and people still talk 
about it today – about sustainable spending. He had agreed to raise taxes 
but there were already sunsets in the law so Howard Dean came in and he 
said, “I am going to keep that promise to sunset those taxes.” So 
essentially from 1991 through 1994 it [the budget] was level funded. 
(Informant 15) 
 
Dean’s laser focus on debt reduction and controlled spending in the face of 
declining state revenue trumped his interest in maintaining the state’s share of aide to 
education. As one informant noted: 
Much to the surprise of many Democrats and many Republicans, [fiscal 
constraint] was his top priority almost all the time. I mean certainly 
healthcare and some other things were up there but he really did seem to 
be focused on cost containment. He didn’t seem to be interested in 
education funding. (Informant 09) 
 
Indeed, one legislator recalled Democrats’ frustration with Dean’s fiscal restraint: 
[Dean] didn’t even feel like [school funding] was an issue…. We used to 
go into Ralph Wright and complain about Howard, we liberals, because 
[Dean] wanted to control expenses and keep taxes down. We didn’t want 
to sunset the income tax. [Dean] wanted to be sure we allowed the [tax] 
sunsets to go through on the tiered income taxes. Ralph used to say to us, 





To keep state expenses as low as possible, Dean sought to level fund26 the education 
budget and had a variety of reasons for doing so. First, state aid to education was the 
biggest line in the state’s budget and had risen dramatically during the Kunin 
administration. In light of the large increases throughout the late 1980s and the state’s 
current fiscal difficulties, Dean argued that it was time for school districts to implement 
cost containment or cost reduction measures at the local level rather than receive 
additional state funding (Hoffman, 1993a). As one informant noted: 
All of the spending in the Kunin administration flopped over onto the 
property tax when this kind of spending couldn’t be supported by the 
general fund because the general fund all of a sudden had higher welfare 
case loads, higher Medicaid case loads. (Informant 15) 
 
Second, as the previous quote indicated, cuts in education freed up money for other 
policy priorities. An informant recalled his perception of the governor’s line of thought 
on this issue:  
He needed to pay for things that state governments paid for and he figured, 
“If we put pressure on schools to keep their costs down, I can keep doing 
programs for young children and the elderly and the disabled and the other 
things that state government does.” (Informant 13) 
 
As a physician, Dean possessed a particular interest in expanding medical coverage for 
children. One informant detailed how this policy priority impacted education funding: 
Quite frankly, education funding was not a top priority [for Dean]. His 
claim to fame was healthcare. So this is the period that we started Healthy 
Babies, Success by Six, The Vermont Health Access Plan, which was a 
major expansion of Medicaid up to 300 percent of the poverty rate. 
(Informant 15) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Given that education expenses such as salaries and retirement payments rise annually, 
level funding effectively serves as a cut to state aid. 
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Third, he looked for budget cuts that could be offloaded to other funding sources. In the 
case of K-12 education, Dean knew that reductions in state aid would largely be made up 
through increases in local property taxes. Regarding this fact, an informant noted: 
We were going through a period when the economy was bad and the 
governor’s strategy in that time was to starve any place where general 
fund dollars were spent. He started at the universities and colleges by 
raising tuition. He starved [K-12] education because property taxes could 
be raised [to compensate]. (Informant 13) 
 
Finally, not living up to state aid to education obligations in times of financial decline 
was a time-tested approach for Vermont’s state leaders (Mathis, 2000; Hoffman, 1993c). 
Although in 1969 the Vermont legislature had passed a law setting state spending for 
education at no less than 40 percent of total education expenditures (Rebell & Metzler, 
2002), it did not include any provision for ensuring that the state legislature met this level 
of financial obligation. Indeed, state funding of schools never exceeded 37 percent of 
general education expenditures and at one point in the early 1980s even dropped to 17 
percent of total education expenditures (Vermont Department of Education, 1993).  
House and Senate Legislators 
Given Dean’s budgeting constraints, legislators faced tough choices in their 
annual appropriations. On the one hand, under the terms of the Foundation Plan, they had 
been charged with maintaining “…the foundation cost per pupil at the level which will 
allow a typical school district to provide its elementary pupils with an education meeting 
the requirements of the State Board for approval of public schools” (Vermont Department 
of Education, 1992, p. 1). On the other hand, they needed to fund a variety of other state 
programs in a climate of scarce resources.  
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According to one House member, it was neither the very rich nor the very poor 
school districts that suffered the most under Dean’s efforts to level fund the budget 
during the early 1990s. “The majority of towns weren’t hurt by it until it started to get 
really underfunded…. But it dramatically affected towns, especially those marginal 
towns. That’s where the hit really took” (Informant 21). For legislators from these 
districts, school funding was a priority. However, they were a minority of the legislature. 
Legislators from higher property wealth towns had sufficient slack in their property 
taxation rate and could absorb the state reductions while legislators from exceptionally 
poor school districts still received their state aid under Dean’s level funding plan. 
Legislators from these districts didn’t want to see their general fund taxes raised to pay 
for additional state education aid to these marginal districts. As one informant put it: 
“Why do I want to raise my people’s income tax so that your town can get state aid?” 
(Informant 15) 
Importantly, during this period, support for a wholesale school funding formula 
change was not present among the majority of Vermont’s legislators. One informant 
spoke of his experience as an advocate for school finance reform in the legislature during 
this time: 
For a few years it [the Foundation Plan] worked well. Everybody seemed 
to be happy. The state aid went up for towns but it wore off after a while, 
especially when the economy went down and the legislature couldn’t raise 
enough money to keep the funding levels high. I went to the Ways and 
Means Committee to try to tackle the problem on that side and we were 
also trying to make it more income based so there were a few ways that 
we were looking to do that but none of them were really getting any 
momentum. (Informant 16) 
 
During the 1991 legislative session, Representatives Paul Cillo and John Freidin 
introduced H. 556, the first of several school finance reforms bills they would introduce. 
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H.556 sought to impose a statewide minimum education property tax rate. However, the 
debate over income and sales tax increases dominated the 1991 session. With the Ways 
and Means committee focusing almost exclusively on this issue, their reform bill received 
little attention (Informants 03, 07). The subsequent year, the chair of the powerful House 
Ways and Means Committee, Oreste Valsangiacomo, introduced H. 907, a bill proposing 
the implementation of a uniform statewide property tax to fund schools up to half of the 
aggregated per-pupil foundation cost. Even with the power afforded a committee chair, 
his bill did not garner sufficient support to be reported out of the committee. An 
informant attributed the lack of enthusiasm for formula change among legislators to the 
fact that the legislature had just passed the Snelling/Wright tax increases of 1991: “We 
had already raised $82 million in taxes so raising the statewide property tax on top of 
that, it just wasn’t going anywhere then” (Informant 03). 
However, at the same time, this legislator saw the merit in introducing bills that 
perhaps weren’t ready for full consideration by the House: “You never know. You just 
try to get your name on it. You start a conversation” (Informant 03). In doing so, 
legislators attempt to “soften up”27 the legislative subsystem. For as Kingdon (1995), 
notes: “Without this preliminary work, a proposal sprung even at a propitious time is 
likely to fall on deaf ears” (p. 128). 
Subsystem Arena: Actors’ Resources and Strategies 
This section highlights the resources and strategies utilized in Vermont’s school 
finance policy subsystem. In this arena, Governor Dean utilized his positional authority to 
continue his policy of fiscal austerity. In the face of this fiscal restraint, legislators turned 
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to negotiating spending tradeoffs across a variety of competing policy interests as a 
means to satisfy constituents. 
Governor Howard Dean  
 As governor, Dean possessed three key resources that allowed him to follow 
through on his promise to continue the fiscal conservatism of Governor Snelling despite 
the objection of liberal Democrats in the House. First, Governor Snelling’s tax increase 
package had been negotiated in a bipartisan manner with the support of Democratic 
House Speaker, Ralph Wright. Sufficient political will existed on both sides of the aisle 
to ensure that the debt was retired and that the new taxes were sunset on time. On 
informant recalled that Dean relied on a group of moderate House Democrats to hold the 
line against liberal Democrats’ push for budget increases: 
The House was trying to pass budgets that relied on these taxes and then 
put people in the position of in the position of saying, “Oh, well, we’ve 
already passed the budget, now we have to keep the taxes.” Dean was 
trying to get the taxes cut first so that the budget process had to face that 
economic reality. And it was with the Blue Dog [Democrats] that he was 
able to do that. This is in the House. The Senate was Republican so the 
Senate was a little bit more of an easier venue [for Dean]. (Informant 15) 
 
Second, state aid to education funding laws did not penalize the governor or the 
legislature for underfunding its commitment. One informant succinctly noted: “…given 
the constructs of the Foundation Formula, you could say, ‘This is all education is going to 
get.’” (Informant 15). Third, Dean’s veto power over the legislature’s budget gave him 
security in moving forward on a fiscally conservative path, particularly given support 
from Blue Dog Democrats in the House and Republicans in the Senate. With these 
resources in hand, he successfully oversaw the passage of state budgets with only 
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minimal annual funding increases between FY 1992 and FY 1994 (Vermont Department 
of Education, 1993). 
House and Senate Legislators 
 When faced with budget shortfalls, legislators have the option of increasing taxes 
to raise revenue. However, this option did not appeal to Vermont legislators for two 
reasons. First, they had just passed a substantial tax increase to help retire the state debt. 
Second, Governor Dean and Senate Republicans strongly opposed the implementation of 
additional taxes, particularly income taxes. As one informant noted, the governor 
“wanted income taxes to go down, down. He didn’t want any kind of income tax 
increase” (Informant 07). Another informant remarked: “The Senate was Republican 
controlled and they were very concerned that the income tax would be harmful to 
business” (Informant 13). Lacking the political will to increase tax revenue in a time of 
economic decline, legislators turned to the battle of divvying up the austere budget 
presented by Governor Dean.       
According to Mazzoni (1991), revenue shortfalls “make protectionist turf-
guarding even more the operating strategy among established interests and fuel 
adversarial zero-sum bargaining in the subsystem arena” (p. 119). Indeed, as general fund 
dollars tightened, spending tradeoffs heightened friction between representatives from 
property-poor and property-rich districts (Informant 13). Legislators from high property 
wealth districts increasingly voted down education aid packages because they knew that 
under the terms of the Foundation Plan aid money would not be destined for their schools 
(Rebell & Metzler, 2002; Curtis, 2002; Informants 16, 08, 06). Two state employees 
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described the process used by legislators to determine their vote on school aid 
appropriations under the Foundation Plan in the following way: 
When I first got here, the funding formula was level funded for several 
years. If you look at the Foundation Formula, it’s because gold towns were 
not getting any money from state aid. There were several other towns that 
were getting minimum aid so it didn’t matter how much money went into 
it, they got x dollars. There were very few towns that were affected by the 
actual funding of state aid, so when times were tough it was very easy to 
cut it. (Informant 08) 
 
And so what always happened was there would be whatever formula we 
had. It was the Foundation Formula at the time. And there’d be state aid 
going into it and there would be some towns that got state aid and others 
who didn’t. And the argument was basically how much state aid do I get 
this year? That was the debate you know. You look at the spreadsheet. 
Look at your towns. You see how much state aid you were going to get. 
(Informant 06) 
 
 In the end, consideration for constituents overruled concern for the integrity of 
the Foundation Plan because many legislators preferred allocating funds to other policy 
areas that would return benefits to their voters. As Mazzoni (1991) notes: “The 
predominant bias of the subsystem is toward interests already represented [in this case the 
legislators’ constituents] at the bargaining table, interests accepted by lawmakers as 
having a legitimate and substantial claim to favorable treatment. The inevitable 
consequence is that unstated, self-serving, self-protective defensive considerations shape 
public policy” (p. 117). Thus, the legislators’ self-serving approach, while 
understandable, served to create a cycle whereby reduced funding to state aid led to fewer 
towns “on the formula.” In turn, this cycle meant that in subsequent years, even fewer 
legislators had an incentive to prop up the education aid budget and even more towns fell 
off the formula. One proximate observer commented that this phenomenon was a 
persistent issue in the Vermont legislature that dated from the inception of the Hunt-
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Simpson formula in the 1960s: “…the problem with every single plan was that the 
legislature had too much discretion about how much money they were going to allocate 
to state aid to education. When times are tough they always appropriate less and less and 
less.” (Informant 19)  
Reductions in legislative appropriations served to render the equalizing functions 
of the Foundation Plan increasingly ineffectual (Vermont Department of Education, 
1993). As the state share to education dropped, towns were forced to raise property taxes 
to generate the funds once provided by the state. However, extreme differences in district 
property wealth meant that some districts could more easily replace their state funding 
than others. Disparities in property wealth, in turn, exacerbated disparities in education 
spending among towns. According to the Vermont Department of Education (1993), “[i]n 
terms of equity in per pupil spending, a pattern of improvement in student equity was 
shown from 1987 through 1991, but has shown a reversal since…. Equity in spending 
became worse with level funding and rescission of state aid” (p. 11). This growing 
inequity was accompanied by “… a significant and strengthening relationship between 
spending and property wealth of a district” (p. 12).  
Subsystem Arena: Concluding Interactions and Shift to the Commission Arena 
A review of the primary and secondary source data relating to the school finance 
policymaking subsystem in Vermont substantiates Mazzoni’s position that innovation is 
not destined to emerge from the policy subsystem. Study data indicate that Governor 
Dean was preoccupied with keeping state spending as low as possible to arrest the state’s 
debt. Mazzoni notes that policy innovation is unlikely in a period of budget shortfall such 
as the one experienced by Vermont in the early 1990s. In addition, school finance reform 
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simply did not figure prominently on Governor Dean’s policy agenda. As a result, he was 
not motivated to utilize his substantial resources to effect policy change. In this climate of 
scarce resources and gubernatorial indifference, state legislators became preoccupied 
with appropriating limited state dollars across a wide spectrum of state programs to 
satisfy as many constituents as possible. This effort to spread dollars across policy areas 
limited the state’s ability to reform its education aid program and served to create a 
negative cycle whereby more and more school districts received fewer and fewer state aid 
dollars with each successive legislative session. This account of the policymaking process 
in Vermont’s school funding subsystem substantially accords with Mazzoni’s (1991) 
expectations for subsystem politics where: 
Pragmatic accommodation among a domain-specific elite through 
logrolling and bargaining is the modus operandi in the allocation of stakes 
[in the policy subsystem]. Such processes yield incremental outcomes: for 
system maintenance decisions realize interests, express conventions, and 
facilitate harmony among participants. (p. 117) 
 
The arena model posits that an arena shift from the policy subsystem into another 
policy arena is a necessary precursor for policy innovation. Mazzoni cites three key 
forces that help to produce a shift out of the subsystem arena. These include: 1) external 
pressures such as interest groups, crises, and skilled political outsiders known as policy 
entrepreneurs who press the subsystem for change; 2) available financial resources (or 
conversely severe fiscal crisis); and 3) idea champions – governmental insiders adept at 
pulling levers of government to achieve desired goals. Any one of these instigating forces 
can help an issue break out of the subsystem arena and into another policy arena where 
the chance for non-incremental policy change is substantially higher.  
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Between the years 1988 and 1992, the issue of school finance reform declined on 
the state’s political agenda as the Foundation Plan was hailed as the solution to 
Vermont’s school finance woes (Rothman, 1987; Hoffman, 1993c). However, as state aid 
to education declined in the face of economic recession and government belt tightening, 
the issue began to rise on the public’s agenda once again as more and more towns 
compensated for state funding shortfalls by increasing local property taxes. One 
administration official describes the situation in the state during this time in the following 
way: “Everyone… was saying, ‘We’ve got to do something about property taxes. 
Property taxes are bad’” (Informant 15). 
For years, residents of the state tolerated wide disparities in education spending 
and property tax rates that were the result of vastly differing property values from one 
town to another. While the Foundation Plan helped to mitigate these disparities by 
providing aid to property-poor school districts, spending differences remained significant 
(Vermont Department of Education, 1993). Cobb and Elder (1983) argue that resource 
imbalances, in and of themselves, do not create an issue worthy of government attention 
(Cobb & Elder, 1983). Rather, an issue is created when a particular group perceives the 
imbalance to be somehow unfair or damaging. In this instance, citizens from marginal 
and property-poor school districts began to believe that they were paying more than their 
“fair share” of property taxes while still not being able to afford basic educational 
necessities in the face of state funding retrenchments (Informants 13, 20, 03, 07, 16, 21, 
04, 12). 
The economic recession of the early 1990s brought the issue of school finance 
reform back to prominence as the state decreased its share of assistance to needy districts. 
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The pressure to raise local property taxes to offset state shortfalls intensified taxing 
disparities between property-rich and property-poor school districts and heightened 
political tensions. Residents of property-poor towns began to resent having to take what 
they perceived to be inordinate taxing measures just to fund basic educational necessities 
while their property rich-counterparts could afford “extras” such as second language 
instruction, computers in classrooms and up-to-date libraries with a relatively light taxing 
effort. Brandon Town School Board Chair Bruce Bove voiced his frustration to the 
Rutland Herald: 
…we had to consistently raise the tax rates for the Brandon voters to 
provide what we thought was just an adequate education and had to defer 
maintenance to keep the taxes at what we thought was a reasonable level. 
(Anderson, 1997, p. 12) 
 
Study informants detailed similar frustrations at the taxing and education funding 
disparities between property-wealthy and property-poor school districts: 
So in communities like mine that had no business, no commercial, no 
manufacturing tax base, it was killing us. I mean we would talk about $50 
items in the school budget and a couple of times… community groups got 
together to raise money for extracurricular activities so that taxpayers 
wouldn’t have to pay. It was awful. So it became more and more divisive 
between the property-wealthy communities and the rest. (Informant 13) 
 
…our town’s ability to raise even a small amount of money to build basic 
stuff like a library and a kitchen where meals could be prepared and 
adequate conference space for kids and teachers was incredibly small 
compared to other towns. The largest taxpayer in our town is the telephone 
company for the poles that line the roads and that is literally true. We have 
no other taxable commercial property to speak of except for a general 
store…. You’re left with an incredibly thin property tax base from which 
to raise money. (Informant 20) 
 
In early 1992, newspapers began to write stories about groups of citizens charging 
that the governor was balancing the state budget “on the backs of the local property 
taxpayer” (Graff, 1992a, p. 10) and printed predictions of “school tax revolts” (Mitchell, 
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1992a). According to informants, citizen pressure was mounting for Dean to address the 
school finance issue:  
When [school funding] reached crisis proportions and school budgets were 
being voted down then it became something that [Dean] couldn’t ignore 
anymore. (Informant 17) 
 
I think it was starting to be headline news. [High property tax rates] were 
becoming a problem for people in a way that was unavoidable so it 
became a political problem. (Informant 03) 
 
As a means to manage the growing pressure for property tax relief, Dean utilized 
the authority of his office to shift the issue to the commission arena when he appointed 
the Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Educational and Municipal Financing 
Reform via Executive Order 06-92 in May of 1992. One informant explained Dean’s 
reason for forming the Blue Ribbon Commission: 
Property taxes were a big issue but Dean couldn’t solve it because his 
priority was paying of the state’s $65 million deficit. The commission was 
a way to engage the people on the issue without costing money, which we 
didn’t have at the time. (Informant 15) 
 
According to Sulzner (1971), a study commission such as the Governor’s Blue Ribbon 
Commission can be regarded not only as “symbols of official concern” but also as 
“vehicles for political pacification” (p. 445).    
Indeed, Howard Dean was aware of the growing discontent among certain 
segments of Vermont’s citizenry. Not coincidentally, Dean announced his plans for the 
formation of his Blue Ribbon Commission at a day-long forum arranged by the Vermont 
League of Cities and Towns, a powerful lobbying organization well known for its efforts 
to reduce the state’s reliance on the property tax as a means to fund education 
(Informants 01, 09). In his address to the group, Dean acknowledged the pain some 
residents were experiencing due to increases in local property taxes and informed forum 
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participants of his intent to have the Blue Ribbon Commission ready a concrete plan of 
action in time for the 1993 legislative session (Graff, 1992a). Dean further commented 
that this commission would not be “a theoretical task force” but rather that he was asking 
for a “specific plan of action to get a bill through the legislature” (Graff, 1992a p. 10). 
Four months later on May 12, 1992, Governor Dean signed Executive Order 6-92 
appointing the Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Educational and Municipal 
Financing Reform. The Commission was charged with: 1) describing the current status of 
and recent trends in the cost and financing of elementary and secondary education; 2) 
examining the state’s current system of property tax and property tax relief with regard to 
education; and 3) submitting legislation for improving the cost and financing structure of 
education services (Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission, 1993). 
Commission Arena 
In Mazzoni’s (1991) model, commission arenas are comprised of relatively small 
groups of individuals representing a variety of points of view on a particular issue of 
concern. In the commission arena, appointed members engage in pluralistic bargaining in 
an effort to persuade group members to endorse a particular course of action. This arena 
offers a location for consensus building in a highly structured environment. While 
Mazzoni cautions that the commission arena’s emphasis on consensual decisionmaking 
can lead to “lowest common denominator” policy solutions, he also notes that the 
commission arena’s freedom from the “overwhelmingly establishment bias of the 





Commission Arena: Actors, Goals and Motives 
 According to document and informant data, the Blue Ribbon Commission was 
comprised of 20 members appointed by Governor Dean. These members represented 
various stakeholder groups including legislators, education professionals, municipal 
government officials, the governor’s administration, the business community and tax 
experts. Given the nature of the arena, the actors represented a wide variety of 
perspectives on the issue of education funding and property tax reform. Many of the 
members were well known figures in state policymaking circles. 
The chair, David Wolk, a former superintendent of schools in Rutland City, had 
recently retired from the Senate to run for lieutenant governor on the Democratic ticket. 
On the campaign trail he expressed his support for various reform measures including 
regional tax sharing (Mitchell, 1992a, p. 13). Paul Cillo, a House member from Hardwick 
and an ardent advocate of school finance reform served as vice chair. Other notable 
members included Senator John Carroll, a conservative Republican from Windsor who 
would soon become the Senate Majority Leader, Richard Cate, Executive Director of the 
Vermont Superintendents’ Association, Deb Brighton, a longtime consultant on land use 
and tax policy issues, Douglas Hyde, CEO of Green Mountain Power and Tom Pelham, 
the governor’s Deputy Commissioner for Finance and Management.  
  Chair David Wolk was an active supporter of school finance and property tax 
reform. In campaign speeches, he readily acknowledged that the education funding 
system in Vermont was “broken and needs to be fixed” and noted that he would make 
school finance reform a “top priority” if elected (Mitchell, 1992a, p. 13). A former 
teacher and superintendent from Rutland City, his hometown was among those hardest 
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hit by recent declines in state education funds. Having witnessed what he termed 
“draconian cuts” to his local school budget, Wolk was concerned about the impact of 
reduced funding on the quality of education received by local school children. He also 
characterized the state’s high reliance on local property taxes as regressive and unfair to 
local taxpayers. In addition to supporting regional taxes, Wolk also supported the ability 
of towns and municipalities to levy local option taxes. As a state senator, he had 
introduced a bill in 1991 authorizing local alternatives to the property tax, including a 
meals and rooms tax, a tobacco products tax, an alcoholic beverages tax and a sales tax. 
 As a member of the Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission, Vice Chair Paul Cillo 
strongly supported school finance reform in Vermont. A student of the issue, Cillo had 
served on previous school finance study committees and was the founder of an informal 
study group known as the Little Tax Group that sought to bring opposing stakeholder 
groups together to discuss remedies to Vermont’s persistent school finance funding 
problems. He advocated an income-based taxing system that the Little Tax Group had 
devised in their meetings (Informants 06, 03, 09, 07). Cillo’s use of the income tax in lieu 
of the property tax was predicated on his belief that income taxes were less regressive 
and offered a better representation of a taxpayer’s ability to pay (Informant 03). This idea 
had recently gained currency in Vermont as policymakers involved in taxation issues 
increasingly questioned whether property holdings were an accurate gauge of a person’s 
wealth. As one informant remarked: “…I think the whole conversation around the fact 
that property was no longer a measure of your wealth was happening all across Vermont. 
I mean it started in my community in the early 1980s” (Informant 13). Another informant 
provided a good example as to why the connection between income wealth and property 
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wealth was, at times, tenuous in a state like Vermont where many have inherited farms 
and vacation properties: 
If my grandparents left me a very nice summer home here on the lake… 
just because I own this home, it doesn’t mean I am a wealthy person. It 
means it was in the family for years and years and I have been willed this 
property. (Informant 04) 
 
Commission member Deb Brighton, another member of the Little Tax Group, 
aligned herself philosophically with Cillo and the income-based approach (Informants 06, 
03, 09, 15; Hoffman, 1992b). Brighton began her career as a land preservationist but soon 
resigned her job with the state’s forestry department to study tax policy issues from a 
broader perspective (Informant 06). Described by the Rutland Herald as “an expert on the 
property tax system,” (Hoffman, 1992b) Brighton’s knowledge and facility with number 
crunching made her a sought-after witness and consultant for numerous legislative 
committee hearings and state commissions dealing with tax policy issues (Informants 03, 
10, 06). Regarding Deb Brighton, Mathis (2000) notes: “Deborah Brighton was an 
exceptional analyst… Her highly credible skills and objectivity resulted in her work 
being accepted as base data by both proponents and opponents [of school finance 
reform]” (p. 8). For the Blue Ribbon Commission, she prepared a document entitled An 
Overview of Vermont’s Property Tax that served as a policy primer for Commission 
members.  
 Douglas Hyde represented the business community on the Commission. Hyde 
served as the President and CEO of Green Mountain Power. At the time, he also served 
on the Vermont Business Roundtable’s Education and Training Study Committee. Since 
its founding in 1987, the Vermont Business Roundtable had taken an interest in various 
education matters including workforce training and educational accountability (Vermont 
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Business Roundtable, 1992). Like most of the business community, the Vermont 
Business Roundtable opposed the use of income taxes to fund schools on the basis that 
high income taxes made Vermont appear unattractive to business investment and high 
wealth individuals (Vermont Business Roundtable, 1993b). The Vermont Business 
Roundtable’s 1993 publication, entitled Restructuring Public Education in Vermont, 
considered the use of income taxes to fund schools a “radical restructuring of education 
finance” (p. 20) that would “…give Vermont the highest marginal tax rate in the nation” 
(p. 18). According to the Rutland Herald, Hyde disliked the idea of paying for schools 
through income taxes and urged the Commission to support his own proposal which 
focused on: 1) enhancing the existing Foundation Plan through expanded property tax 
rebates to low-income residents; and 2) ensuring that state aid was directed to high tax 
burden school districts (Hoffman, 1992a; Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission, 1992).  
 Republican Senator John Carroll, described as a “free market conservative” 
(Informant 08), contested the notion that a property tax crisis existed in the state. Rather, 
he argued that local school budgets were simply growing too rapidly. To bolster his 
stance, he pointed to the fact that education spending had grown at twice the rate of 
inflation over the last 10 years. Like many Republicans in Vermont, his solution for 
reducing property taxes was to cut education spending at both the state and local levels. 
To the Rutland Herald he noted: “The most powerful form of property tax relief we could 
achieve would be to flatten off (education) spending” (Hoffman, 1992b p. 5). However, 
the immediate plan he brought forward for consideration by fellow Commission members 
was a $75 million infusion into the existing state education funding formula coupled with 
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additional financial assistance to the state’s low income property tax rebate program  
(Allen, 1992). 
Several commission members opposed the approach of simply adding additional 
funds to the existing formula on the basis that it didn’t actually fix the broken funding 
system (Allen, 1992). Among them was Burlington Mayor Peter Clavelle. As he 
commented to the Rutland Herald: “It’s time to trade in the jalopy” (Allen, 1992, p. 10). 
While willing to entertain more sweeping proposals, he advocated that the Commission 
focus on a modest plan for immediate short-term relief to property tax owners. According 
to the Rutland Herald: “…Clavelle urged the Commission to seek a compromise and to 
propose some reform that the Legislature was likely to pass in the coming session” 
(Hoffman, 1992a, p. 12). In particular, Clavelle, described as “an ardent proponent of 
local option taxes,” wanted the state to relinquish its sole taxing authority on sales, rooms 
and meals and income taxes so that towns could levy their own local versions of these 
taxes (Hoffman, 1992a, p. 12). Clavelle’s views on the benefits of local option taxes 
closely tracked those of the Vermont League of Cities and Towns. This philosophical 
alignment was no coincidence. Clavelle was a past president of VLCT. The VLCT, 
considered a powerful lobbying organization in Vermont (Informant 21; Bryan & 
Hallowell, 1993), had advocated for local option taxes for several decades (Informants 
01, 09). 
 Richard Cate of the Vermont Superintendents Association offered a plan that 
increased state aid to education by $60 million and allowed property tax sharing among 
the state’s 60 supervisory unions. Under his proposal, property taxes would be collected 
at the supervisory union level. Excess funds would then be redistributed back to school 
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districts in accordance with the distribution mechanisms established under the Foundation 
Plan (Hoffman, 1992a; Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission, 1992). Commission 
member Jeb Spaulding, Chair of the Senate Education Committee, also “…urged the 
group to consider more consolidated tax districts” because it would “provide more equity 
for taxpayers” (Hoffman, 1992b, p. 5).  
 Tom Pelham represented the interests of the Dean administration on the 
Commission. In his position as Deputy Commissioner for Taxation and Management, 
Pelham knew that the state’s finances were in dire condition and that Governor Dean was 
deeply committed to putting Vermont’s financial house in order by retiring the debt 
accumulated under the Kunin administration. According to one informant: 
Tom Pelham was put on the commission to make sure that Dean was not 
put in a position to get hurt…. The hard reality was that the state had a $65 
million deficit. Snelling had raised taxes to pay it off and Dean was 
committed to sunsetting those taxes. This all needed to be done before 
property tax reform. (Informant 15) 
 
In his capacity as a representative of the Dean administration, Pelham rejected plans that 
he thought would threaten the state’s fragile economy, including the use of an income tax 
to fund schools (Allen, 1992).  
In sum, the Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission was comprised of an eclectic 
and potentially contentious group of individuals representing a wide variety of policy 
positions on school finance reform ranging from those that advocated for minor 
adjustments to the existing Foundation Plan such as Douglas Hyde and John Carroll to 
those that desired a complete overhaul of the state’s system of school finance such as 
Paul Cillo and Deb Brighton. A November 1992 article in the Rutland Herald 
characterized the Commission’s diversity opinion with regard to how to best address the 
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state’s school funding and property tax problems: “Some members argued for sweeping, 
radical property tax reform, while others said the panel had to consider political realities 
and proposed something the Legislature was likely to pass” (Hoffman, 1992a, p. 12). 
As noted in its final report, the Blue Ribbon Commission met 14 different times 
between June 1992 and February 1993. These meetings included public hearings at the 
Vermont League of Cities and Towns’ annual meeting and the annual meeting of the 
Vermont School Boards Association. In addition, the Commission invited national 
experts from the Education Commission of the States and the National Conference of 
State Legislatures to give presentations on national trends in education funding and tax 
policy. 
The Commission’s initial meetings surveyed current research and interviewed 
experts about criteria that would define an ideal tax system. After numerous discussions 
with tax expert Deb Brighton, the Commission endorsed five principles that would be 
used to evaluate various policy proposals.  These principles included: 1) administrative 
efficiency (a tax system that is easy to administer); 2) economic efficiency (a tax system 
that minimizes unanticipated economic consequences); 3) horizontal equity (a tax system 
that treats people in equal situations equally); 4) structural integrity (a tax system that is 
diversified, stable and responsive to changes in economic activity); and 5) vertical equity 
(a tax system that treats people with unequal means differently). One informant described 
the Commission’s process with respect to the development of its policy evaluation 
criteria: 
Deb Brighton was doing some staff work for the Commission. She worked 
out this decision grid, just a matrix that basically said, “These are the 
qualities you want in a fiscal funding system, the five qualities: efficiency, 
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horizontal equity, vertical equity, administrative efficiency and structural 
integrity.”…. We were using this as an [evaluation] tool. (Informant 03)  
 
After the Commission established its evaluation criteria, it heard testimony on 
various property tax reform and state aid to education proposals that had been advanced 
in Vermont in recent years. These proposals included a statewide property tax, a local 
income tax, resident state aid and local/regional option taxes. Commission members 
evaluated these plans, along with those that had been proposed by Commission members, 
against their ability to meet the five quality criteria they had established in previous 
meetings. The informant continued explaining the Commission’s policy development 
process as follows:  
I remember going through this list and just circling the characteristics I 
though were the best from the various plans and said, “These are really the 
things that we want, I think, from what people are saying. And that 
became known as the “Composite Plan;” the composite of elements from 
the various proposals. (Informant 03) 
 
Specifically, the Composite Plan coupled the idea of a statewide property tax on 
nonresidential property with a local income tax. Discussion of the Composite plan 
dominated the Commission’s meetings throughout the fall (Hoffman, 1992e). However, 
while the Commission’s final report speculated that the Composite Plan could well be the 
ideal plan of the future, it noted that Commission members could not agree to advocate 
for such a “radical departure” from the status quo because it was not politically feasible at 
the current time (Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission, 1993). 
During the Commission’s final two meetings, members forged a consensus 
compromise where they agreed to recommend immediate legislative consideration of 
local option taxes and a minimum property tax on vacation homes coupled with a long-
term study of the implications of the Composite Plan. As one informant noted: “They 
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didn’t’ say no. They just said, “Deserves more study” (Informant 03). The group 
estimated that such a study would take at least a year to complete (Wolk, 1993).  
Commission Arena: Actors’ Resources and Strategies 
While David Wolk was technically the Commission’s Chair, he also was running 
for lieutenant governor and his campaign responsibilities took him away from the day-to-
day work of the commission. Conversely, Paul Cillo happened to be running unopposed 
in his upcoming election. As a result, he had ample time to devote to the Commission’s 
work. Cillo’s position as Vice Chair afforded him the opportunity to direct the 
Commission in accordance with his policy priorities. One informant highlighted the 
advantages of Cillo’s substantial positional authority: “Somehow Paul Cillo got Vice 
Chair and then Dave [Wolk] didn’t come to the meetings. So Paul is setting the agenda, 
getting the witnesses, he’s setting the process, he’s there just doing the whole thing” 
(Informant 03). 
As noted earlier, school finance reform topped Cillo’s own personal political 
agenda. He viewed his position on the Commission as an opportunity to formulate 
substantive policy reform recommendations (Informants 06, 03). In particular, Cillo 
believed that the Commission could serve as an attractive vehicle for “debuting” a policy 
proposal he had been developing over the last year with individuals from various 
education and tax stakeholder groups (Informants 03, 06, 09). While group members 
were leaders of key interest groups, they had been meeting over the course of 1991 as 
private citizens to brainstorm and debate school finance policy issues in a freewheeling 
and off the record environment. Earlier that year, Cillo had observed the success of the 
Democratic Speaker of the House Ralph Wright and Republican Governor Richard 
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Snelling coming together to tackle the state’s debt problem in a bipartisan manner and he 
sought to emulate their success in harnessing “the power of two opposing positions 
coming together” to tackle the school finance issue (Informant 03).  
Key members of this private group included Richard Cate of the Vermont 
Superintendents’ Association, Ellen David Friedman of the Vermont-NEA, Deb 
Brighton, Steven Jeffrey of the Vermont League of Cities and Towns and Paul Cillo 
(Informants 09, 07, 06, 03). This group, which came to be known as the Little Tax Group, 
met monthly for the better part of a year and sought to develop an ideal system of school 
finance for Vermont away from the glare of partisan politics. Four informants described 
how the Little Tax Group operated: 
It was just “check your guns at the door.” We weren’t talking about this to 
other people. It was more thinking together about what was a sensible 
system. (Informant 03) 
 
So we said, “Let’s not start from where we are now and tackle little 
problems. Let’s just throw it out the window and think about what would 
be a system that worked”…. We tried all sorts of different things and we 
just let it go wide open. People weren’t really protecting their turf because 
it wasn’t public or anything. We were just thinking it through. (Informant 
06) 
 
We all sat around and we talked about, “Well, what would the best bill 
look like?” So we started to formulate clear and very precise goals. 
(Informant 07) 
 
It was great. I still get goose bumps thinking about it. As far as the 
development of public policy, it was great. It was not clandestine but it 
was out of the total limelight. Nobody was seeing it. It wasn’t a blue 
ribbon panel where everybody had to stake out their interests from the 
very beginning. It really let us explore a lot of different options that might 
not otherwise have been explored. I think what we did was we started off 
trying to create THE perfect system. (Informant 09) 
 
The Little Tax Group members clearly relished the freedom to speak frankly and put a 
wide variety of policy options on the table in an environment that wouldn’t punish lack of 
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conformity to well-established party and organizational lines. Along the way, some Little 
Tax Group members began to ask about the ultimate purpose of their meetings. One of 
the group’s members spoke about the political value of being prepared with a policy 
option before the need arrives: 
…I said (at that point I’d already learned that when the political 
opportunity arrives, you need to have a plan), “If we have a plan, the 
political opportunity will come and so we’re just working on the plan now 
for when… and I don’t know when the opportunity is going to come… It 
may never come… but this thinking will be something that we can use. 
(Informant 03)  
 
What emerged from the Little Tax Group was initial formulation of the Composite Plan. 
Its centerpiece was the use of a local income tax in lieu of a local residential property tax 
to fund schools (Informants 06, 09, 03).  
Cillo’s membership on the Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission afforded him the 
opportunity to “debut” the Little Tax Group’s “thinking” (Informant 03) Importantly, his 
positional authority as the de facto chair allowed him to include the Composite Plan as a 
viable policy option on par with other more established ideas that had been floating in the 
policy subsystem for many years (Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission, 1993). One 
Commission member describes how this goal was accomplished during Commission 
brainstorming sessions: 
It is hard for me to remember, there have been so many of these 
[commissions], but this one scene I DO remember which is people were 
throwing out their different goals and stuff like that and for some reason I 
was assigned the task... so anyway I was supposed to take all of the ideas 
that people had thrown around and put them in a matrix with the goals… 
What it really was was putting the Little Tax Group’s thinking up there 
front and center. I was a nervous wreck. It’s true that when you get a 
bunch of people in a room and they all talk about this [i.e. school finance 
reform], a lot of the goals are very common. So they [commission 
members] had the same goals. It’s just the pieces to make the goals work 




Throughout the policy formation process, Cillo and key allies such as Deb Brighton 
guided Commission members through a discussion of how the Composite Plan was the 
plan that best allowed them to meet the five goals that the group had established at the 
Commission’s outset (Informants 03, 06). Cillo’s use of his positional authority kept the 
Composite Plan on the table until December when it was finally voted down in December 
(Hoffman, 1992e) because it was not considered politically viable by a majority of 
Commission members. 
While Cillo’s political and positional resources were successfully utilized to 
further the Composite Plan, they were countered by the array of political resources 
available to the Dean camp. Although not a commission member himself, Howard 
Dean’s influence was a presence throughout the Commission’s duration. Initially, he 
utilized his positional authority as governor and Commission convener to make key 
appointments. His appointment power assisted him strategically in two ways.  
First, he appointed a diverse group of interests. In theory, such diverse 
appointments would seem necessary to achieve the broad political consensus Dean 
sought. However, because these same factions had been working at cross points for 
decades, there was no reason to hope that anything but incremental policy changes would 
be adopted by the body as a whole. As one commission member noted: “It was a smart 
group of people from a wide variety of organizations tasked with obtaining a unanimous 
vote. That means the policies are not going to go too far off the reservation. The politics 
were too muted” (Informant 15).  
In addition to appointing diverse interests, Dean also appointed a number of key 
friends and political allies to the commission. First among them was Commission Chair 
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David Wolk. According to multiple informants, Wolk and Howard Dean were good 
friends. In the mind of one Commission member this appointment meant: “…that the 
commission wouldn’t go anywhere that Howard didn’t want it to go” (Informant 15). 
Further, other members had connections to Dean or his administration. For example, Tom 
Pelham was Dean’s Deputy Commissioner for Budget and Management, the daughter of 
Commission member Martha O’Connor, Kate O’Connor, worked in the Dean 
administration and Senator John Carroll was a personal friend of Dean’s. 
As Cillo steered the Commission towards an earnest discussion of the use of 
income tax to fund schools, Dean let it be known to his surrogates that this policy option 
was unacceptable. One commission member explains it this way: 
We had heard from a tax analyst who regularly came to the meetings. We 
asked the question, “Could the tax department implement an income-based 
system?” He said, “Yes.” Somebody was at the meeting and went back 
and told the governor and the governor flipped out…. That actually scared 
the Commission that the governor was paying attention at that level. There 
were other people on the Commission like Dick Cate that were lobbyists. 
They didn’t want to upset the governor so everybody started to get 
nervous after that. The conversations became a lot less freewheeling after 
that. (Informant 03) 
 
At the same time, Dean utilized the bully pulpit to spread the word that he did not 
support the income tax option because he thought that it would make Vermont appear 
unfriendly to business interests (Hoffman, 1992b). His press conference pronouncements 
on the issue made their way into Vermont’s major dailies throughout 1992 (Hoffman, 
1992c; Hoffman, 1992d). For example, Rutland Herald reporter Jack Hoffman (1992d) 
wrote: 
Although Dean had said over the summer and fall that he did not want to 
interfere with the work of the Commission, he made it known recently that 
he did not like the idea of replacing the property tax with an income tax. 
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He said he feared high income tax rates – even if offset with lower 
property taxes – would hurt economic development in the state. (p. 6) 
 
In public announcements, Dean also stated his desire for a unanimous or near unanimous 
decision by the Commission (Hoffman, 1992a; Hoffman, 1992c). In these speeches, he 
made forthright proclamations that he would not expend his political capital on 
Commission recommendations that were not consensual. For example in his November 
24, 1992 news conference, he emphatically stated: “I’m not going to waste any political 
capital on this unless all the other groups who have something at stake in the property tax 
debate are willing to be flexible, take a stand and commit to a given plan” (Hoffman, 
1992c, p. 12). 
Dean’s strong stance on income tax and demand for unanimity bolstered the 
position of those Commission members such as David Hyde and Richard Cate who were 
already unenthusiastic about the use of income tax to fund education and made moderates 
such as Peter Clavelle and David Wolk waver in their support for more radical reform 
measures (Hoffman, 1992a; Hoffman, 1992b; Hoffman, 1992e). According to the 
Rutland Herald, while Clavelle had originally supported the Composite Plan, he backed 
away and claimed that “the more radical plan needed study and did not have much 
support among commission members” (Hoffman, 1992e, p. 12).  
By December 1992, Dean was confident that, despite its dalliance with Composite 
Plan, the Blue Ribbon Commission would return recommendations to his liking. Such a 
prediction was not terribly risky given his strong public statements regarding his policy 
preferences and the composition of a Commission that had been stacked in his favor. 
Regarding this sense of confidence, Dean commented to the Rutland Herald:  
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I don’t think that I am going to have to compromise. Judging from what I 
know about where all the players are, I think the compromise, if they 
reach a compromise at all, … will be very acceptable to me. Which is why 
I don’t want to play the what-if game, because I don’t’ think it’s very 
likely that I’m going to get something that I can’t support. (Hoffman, 
1992d, p. 6) 
 
Not surprisingly, Dean’s prediction proved correct. Late into deliberations, 
Burlington Mayor Peter Clavelle struck a winning compromise. His compromise plan 
offered: 1) short-term relief in the form of local option taxes and a minimum property tax 
on vacation homes; and 2) a promise to study the Composite Plan as a possible long-term 
policy solution to Vermont’s perennial school finance woes. The offer to study the 
viability of the Composite Plan served as an appeasement to gain as many votes as 
possible for Clavelle’s limited reforms (Hoffman 1993a; Informant 15). Justifying his 
compromise, Clavelle (1992) wrote in a newspaper commentary: 
I acknowledge that the Commission’s recommendations for immediate 
action don’t solve the problem – we need to recommit ourselves to a tax 
system that is based on the “ability to pay” principle. But to me, these 
recommendations are important steps forward in the fight for fair taxes. (p. 
19) 
 
 Although Clavelle’s compromise position did appear modest in light of the Composite 
Plan, it represented the type of incremental concessions Dean sought from both state and 
municipal governments in that it gave municipal governments access to taxing sources 
that were historically the sole purview of the state and mandated a statewide minimum 
property tax on vacation homes, something previously anathema to municipal 
governments. It also happened to be a win from the perspective of the Vermont League of 
Cities and Towns which had advocated for municipal access to sales, income and rooms 
and meals taxes since the 1970s (Informant 09). Clavelle’s compromise 
recommendations passed by a final vote of 15-1 in January of 1993 (Hoffman, 1993a; 
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Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission, 1993). Senator John Carroll cast the lone 
dissenting vote due to his strong opposition to the inclusion of the recommendation to 
levy a minimum property tax on vacation homes.   
 Reactions to the Commission’s final recommendations were mixed. One 
commission member deemed them “pathetic,” (Informant 03) another termed them a 
“Band-Aid” (Hoffman, 1993a) while still another called them “baby steps” (Informant 
15). Governor Dean, for his part, enthusiastically embraced the recommendations. He 
proclaimed them “a huge start” and noted to the press that he would add property tax 
reform to his list of major priorities for 1993 legislative session (Hoffman, 1993b). 
Whether viewed positively or negatively, participants generally acknowledged that the 
Commission’s recommendations would only provide incremental change to Vermont’s 
existing system of school finance. 
Commission Arena: Concluding Interactions 
The principle policy innovation to emerge from the Blue Ribbon Commission was 
the development of a school finance reform plan that came to be known as the Composite 
Plan. Informants and press reports, alike, described the Composite Plan as a “radical” 
departure from the existing funding formula (Informant 06; Graff, 1992b; Hoffman, 
1992e). As such, it faced almost no chance of becoming the consensus pick of such a 
diverse group of Commission members. However, the plan was still in contention late 
into 1992 thanks to the combined positional authority and political skill of Commission 
Vice Chair Paul Cillo (Informants 03, 06). In the face of Dean’s consensus mandate, his 
admonitions against the use of income taxes and the Commission’s diverse composition, 
the Blue Ribbon Commission produced what Mazzoni has termed a “lowest-common-
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denominator solution” (p. 124). However, it might be argued that the Commission 
delivered exactly the politically realistic recommendations originally envisioned by Dean 
when he asked for the Commission to return a “specific plan of action to get a bill 
through the legislature” (Graff, 1992a, p. 10). 
Despite the incremental nature of its final recommendations, the Commission did 
serve as a useful forum for the debut of the Little Tax Group’s school finance policy 
proposal. Thus the value of the arena may not be so much in its immediate outcomes but 
rather in its ability to familiarize a new idea to a wide variety of stakeholder groups. The 
Blue Ribbon Commission’s extensive consideration of the Composite Plan confirmed 
Mazzoni’s supposition that commission arenas can help to legitimate, consolidate and 
expand the scope of new policies. In this way, the commission arena might be viewed as 
a locus for “softening up”28 the policy system as evidenced by the fact that those 
elements included in the Composite Plan would eventually go on to form the basis of H. 
527, the House Ways and Means Committee bill introduced in response to the Supreme 
Court’s 1997 ruling in Brigham v. State (Informants 09, 06, 03). 
Macro Arena 
Politics in the macro arena provides a stark contrast to the incremental 
accommodation that takes place in the subsystem and the persuasive bargaining of the 
commission arena. In this arena, “…policymaking is much more visible, accessible, 
ideological and contentious…” (Mazzoni, 1991, p. 117). Within the macro arena, elite 
citizens and elected officials seek to connect with constituents by searching for issues to 
champion. In doing so, they utilize their high profile and a sense of drama or crisis to 
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attract attention to their cause. Not surprisingly, issues that take root in the macro arena 
tend to be issues of broad concern to the general public and reveal society’s basic 
philosophical fault lines. The contentious nature of these core social issues opens up the 
macro arena to a wide array of public voices and media coverage. According to Mazzoni 
(1991), it is this emphasis on widespread participation that gives non-incremental policy 
a chance for enactment. However, this widespread participation can also lead to 
“inflexible and protracted issue conflict” that paralyzes decisionmaking and produces 
legislative gridlock.  
In January of 1993, just as the Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission was busy 
preparing its final recommendations, the Democratic Speaker of the House, Ralph 
Wright, suddenly announced that his number one goal for the upcoming legislative 
session would be to pass a school finance reform bill containing a statewide teachers 
contract. Two proximate observers conveyed their surprised reaction to Speaker Wright’s 
announcement: 
I don’t know where Ralph got the idea, the Speaker of the House. I 
remember him saying to a group of us, “I know what we’ll do. We’ll do a 
statewide teachers’ contract.” I’m going, “Jesus Christ, are you kidding 
me? That’s a fight and a half.” But we went down that road. (Informant 
16) 
 
I remember Ralph Wright giving [the interview] to the Burlington Free 
Press… He was the Speaker of the House at the time. It was the first thing 
he did. It was opening day of the session. He said he’s going to do a 
statewide teachers contract. He was a teacher, a retired teacher I think by 
that point. At any rate, he was a friend of the teacher’s union and this 
wasn’t something that the teacher’s union particularly cared for so it was a 
pretty dramatic thing for the speaker to be doing this. It was clear that he 
was going to make the push and he was a very powerful speaker so that 




Thanks to a combination of Wright’s positional authority and a cadre of interested 
legislators such as Oreste Valsangiacomo and Paul Cillo who were well positioned as 
members of the House Ways and Means Committee to advance the issue, school finance 
reform catapulted to the top of that year’s legislative agenda.  
As noted earlier, informants expressed surprise at Wright’s sudden push for 
school finance reform. Documentary and interview data reveal that a strategic decision 
made by Democratic Representative Paul Cillo a number of days prior to the Speaker’s 
announcement contributed to Wright’s sudden interest in passing a school finance reform 
bill during the 1993 legislative session. Acting as an idea champion, Cillo saw another 
opportunity to advocate for school finance reform – this time before a meeting of the 
Democratic caucus. Before the meeting began, Cillo asked House Majority Leader Sean 
Campbell if he could give a brief report on his recent work as a member of the 
Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission. Campbell agreed and Cillo proceeded to describe 
the Commission’s recommendations. At the very end of his presentation, Cillo asked for 
a quick show of hands regarding how many members of the caucus thought that property 
taxes were the biggest issue facing Vermont that year. Virtually all of the members raised 
their hands. Informants indicate that Cillo engineered this stunt primarily because he 
knew that Speaker Wright would be present and paying attention to the caucus’s 
legislative priorities (Informants 07, 03; Rebell & Metzler, 2002). One informant recalled 
the event: 
I think it was in the Democratic organizational meeting which takes place 
in December of even years right after the election. It was customary to poll 
the Democratic caucus and ask them to write down on a piece of paper 
what were their top issues. I think Paul said something to put education 





According to the informant, Cillo’s presentation to the Democratic caucus was intended 
to “get [Ralph Wright] really excited about the issue” (Informant 07). According to 
informant accounts, Cillo’s attempt to influence Wright succeeded. As another informant 
noted, thanks to Cillo’s presentation: “[Wright] changed his agenda. He definitely 
changed his agenda” (Informant 03). 
That informant further revealed that a few days later at the legislature’s annual 
pre-session dinner, Wright purposefully sought Cillo out to discuss a proposal to use a 
statewide teacher’s contract as a means to reduce property taxes: 
We’re sitting in this restaurant and Ralph is making the rounds… and he 
looks at Paul and goes, “Hey Cillo, I got a great idea. We’ll pay for all the 
teachers. The state will pay for all the teachers”… He rattled off this 
whole plan and said, “What do you think?” (Informant 03) 
 
According to the informant, Cillo bluntly informed Wright that his proposal was wildly 
off the mark in terms of the general fund dollars required to pay for such a plan and 
Wright stormed off in a huff. That preliminary discussion ended poorly but the seed for 
meaningful school finance reform for the 1993 legislative session had been planted in 
both gentlemen’s minds (Informants 03, 07).  
The speaker of the Vermont House of Representatives is widely considered to be 
the most powerful legislator in the state. Among Vermont’s Speakers, Wright was a 
living legend. As one informant commented: “There has never been another like him” 
(Informant 01). Described as “very smart” (Informant 03), “powerful” (Informant 17) and 
“remarkable” (Informant 01), Wright was a highly partisan and frequently combative 
Massachusetts native who had presided over the House since 1985 and was credited for 
helping to transform the state Democratic Party from political also-ran to political 
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powerhouse (Sanford & Doyle, 1999; Graff, 1999; Graff, 2006). Wright’s announcement 
that he would make education finance/property tax reform his signature issue for the 
session catapulted the issue out of the commission arena and squarely in to the macro 
arena. Upon reflection, one informant drew a direct line between the passage of Act 60 in 
1997 and Wright’s decision to engage the issue in a high profile manner during the 1993 
legislative session. As the informant commented: “It couldn’t have happened without 
Ralph… Ralph had set it up and made it his issue for several years” (Informant 01). 
Mazzoni (1991) and Fowler’s (1994) case studies of state education policymaking 
in Minnesota and Ohio, respectively, demonstrate that a political leader’s signature issue 
need not take root in the macro arena to succeed. However, school finance reform had 
been a hot button issue in Vermont for years as generations of politicians struggled with 
how best to finance the state’s public schools (Graff, 2006; Mathis, 2000; Governor’s 
Blue Ribbon Commission, 1993). As Vermont Public Radio newscaster Jane Lindholm 
(2009) commented: “Education funding may not be the spiciest water cooler talk but it is 
an issue that generates a huge amount of debate, discussion and consternation in 
Vermont.” Wright’s provocative plan set off two biennia (four legislative sessions) of 
fiery debate between Republicans and Democrats and drew some of Vermont’s most 
powerful lobbying entities into the school finance macro arena, including the state 
teachers’ union, the Vermont League of Cities and Towns, the business lobby and the 
gold town/ski area lobby.  
Macro Arena  
1993/94 Biennium: Actors, Goals and Motives 
 
This section outlines those actors participating in the macro arena during the 
1993/94 legislative biennium. It also outlines their motivations for entering the macro 
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arena along with the policy goals they wished to achieve through their participation. 
Consistent with Mazzoni’s (1991) expectations for the macro arena, the issue of school 
finance reform generated a high level of interest among a wide variety of interested 
parties both inside and outside of the state government. 
Speaker of the House Ralph Wright 
While Wright’s interest in the use of a statewide teacher’s contract seemed to 
come from out of the blue to most informants, archival research uncovered a small article 
that ran in the October 8, 1992 issue of the Rutland Herald detailing Wright’s visit with 
local educators from the town of Castleton (Mitchell, 1992b). Castleton had been hit hard 
by state aid to education funding cutbacks and Wright was musing on the various ways 
that the property tax problem could be resolved. Almost as an aside, he commented that 
he wished that legislators would revive his idea of a statewide teachers contract whereby 
the state would negotiate and pay for teacher salaries out of the state aid to education 
budget. The article goes on to note that Wright had unsuccessfully attempted to pass such 
a measure five years earlier (Mitchell, 1992b). 
It seems that Wright had been considering the merits of a statewide teachers’ 
contract for a considerable period of time. The result of the Democratic caucus’ poll 
allowed him to link his desire for a statewide teachers’ contract with the House’s growing 
willingness to enact school finance reform (Informants 03, 07; Rebell & Metzler, 2002). 
In this regard his goals were twofold. First, he sought to relieve local school boards and 
teachers from the acrimony of contract negotiations. Second, he sought to ease property 
taxes by having the state assume payment for teacher salaries and benefits through the 
general funds. In the words of one informant: 
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[Wright’s] concept was to do a statewide teachers’ contract [because] it 
was such a big part of what we pay for; the fact that money could be saved 
by not having every district negotiate its own contract. He was a former 
teacher and he felt the animosity that was built up during contract 
negotiations was harmful to education. (Informant 13) 
 
Mathis (2000) concurred with this informant’s statement: 
Speaker Wright, in the 1993 legislative session, proposed that reform 
could be achieved if the state funded all teachers’ salaries. Since salaries 
were 53 percent of costs, a high state share would be guaranteed. All 
towns would have a stake in state aid and the state share would not erode. 
After all, it was a guaranteed and contractual agreement with the union. 
The state would also take over the nasty business of teacher negotiations 
and thus free local boards and teachers to concentrate on education. (p. 12) 
 
To pay for this initiative, Wright planned to raise a number of broad-based state taxes to 
help “spread the burden” of paying for schools through state assumption of teacher 
salaries and fringe benefits (Pfeiffer, 1993; Hoffman, 1993). The announcement of Ralph 
Wright’s new policy priority set off a flurry of activity among Vermont legislators and 
interest groups concerned with education and tax policy issues. 
House Ways and Means Committee Leadership 
Cillo and his new Ways and Means ally, John Freidin, were more than willing to 
support Wright’s initiative and saw it as a promising means for implementing a new 
education funding measure such as the one Cillo had developed while working on the 
Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission. According to one informant: “[The statewide 
teachers’ contract] was one of Ralph’s brainstorms. It wasn’t necessarily essential to the 
bill [but] there was a certain logic to it since a large percent of your expenses are 
teachers” (Informant 07). Cillo and Freidin were not alone. During this time period, the 
House of Representatives served as a locus of pro-school finance reform energy in the 
state. Freidin and Cillo were just two of many legislators who had run for the General 
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Assembly so they could work on the school funding issue. Various legislators 
commented on their motivations for seeking office as follows: 
My main campaign issue was the unfairness of the school funding system. 
(Informant 03) 
 
I had some concern and interest in education and actually before I even 
took my seat, with the help of the Legislative Council, I did have a bill 
drafted that involved sharing money from the property-wealthy towns and 
giving some of that money to the property-poor towns. (Informant 07) 
 
Education finance reform was the major reason that I ran for office. 
(Informant 13) 
 
[The school funding system] was really hurting our local school and I 
could see that in a very direct way. In the town next door they were 
spending more per pupil… Our spending was lower and our tax rate was 
higher and how is that fair? It is a very sort of parochial view that pulled 
me in [to the legislature]. (Informant 21) 
 
Once elected, these motivated legislators frequently hoped for appointments to the 
Ways and Means Committee. In 1993, Freidin had only just gained his appointment to 
Ways and Means, but he was familiar with Cillo’s work through his prior attendance at 
some of the Little Tax Group meetings (Informants 07, 06, 09). Freidin, like Cillo, was 
motivated to address student funding disparities because it was a topic of concern in his 
legislative district.  
Together on the Ways and Means Committee, they developed five overarching 
goals by which to judge the merit of all school funding proposals: 1) reduce property 
taxes; 2) equalize the ability of all towns to raise money for public school; 3) base the 
education tax on ability to pay; 4) tax farm and forest land at current use rate (instead of 
market rate); and 5) ensure that all towns – not just poor ones – have a stake in the plan’s 
long-term viability (Informants 07, 08). With those goals in mind, the two set out to 
“redesign the Composite Plan for it to fit the train that’s moving” (Informant 03). Cillo 
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and Freidin spent the better part of 1993 developing and refining the revenue and 
distribution package that would underwrite Wright’s statewide teacher’s contract (Mathis, 
2000). The bill, known as H.541, entailed two main school funding components: 1) a 
local progressive income tax set annually by each town based on its school budget; and 2) 
a statewide property tax on non-residential property initially set at $1.20 per $100 of 
property value. Money from these taxes would be pooled and redistributed back to towns 
based on a guaranteed yield formula so that all towns with equal taxing effort would 
receive the same tax yield per pupil. (H.541, 1993).  
Senate Leadership 
Like just about everyone else at the statehouse, members of the Senate were taken 
off guard by Wright’s sudden push for school finance reform. While Republicans only 
narrowly controlled the Senate by a 16-14 margin, their leadership was decidedly 
ambivalent about embracing major changes to the Foundation Plan. Concerned about the 
financial health of the state, they feared the cost of a new school aid plan and the 
potential negative repercussions for business (Informants 10, 02, 18, 13). In fact, Senate 
Majority Leader John Carroll had just spent several months championing education cost 
cutting measures as a member of the Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission (Governor’s 
Blue Ribbon Commission, 1993). 
While ambivalent about the issue of school finance, itself, the Senate leadership 
strongly opposed inclusion of the local income tax in any school finance reform 
legislation. In a statement to the Rutland Herald, Senate Majority Leader Carroll 
proclaimed: “The Senate will never support the local income tax” (Hoffman, 1994c, p. 1). 
According to one informant, Republican senators “…were very concerned that the 
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income tax would be harmful to business” (Informant 13). Another informant noted: 
“There was all this Republican talk that [an income tax] was killing the economy” 
(Informant 07). In addition to their opposition to the local income tax, party stalwarts 
such as Lieutenant Governor Barbara Snelling and Senate Pro Tempore John Bloomer 
also opposed any notion of a statewide property tax to fund schools on the basis that it 
robbed towns of local control and gave “Montpelier” access to a new funding source that 
they might misuse. As one informant commented: “This whole concept of income 
redistribution totally guts the concept of local control” (Informant 15). As quoted in the 
Rutland Herald, Senate President Pro Tempore Bloomer did not support any plan where 
money could “…get into the hands of the bureaucrats in Montpelier” (Hoffman, 1994d, p. 
12). These views typified a general antipathy for “big government” initiatives among 
Vermont Republicans. 
However, in truth, very few senators, including liberal Democrats, embraced the 
idea of paying for schools through the use of income taxes (Informants 10, 02, 04). As 
one informant remarked: “I didn’t like the House’s local income tax at all and I knew the 
governor wasn’t going to sign it” (Informant 10). This senator also found Speaker 
Wright’s statewide teachers’ contract: “…deeply offending to the teachers in a way that I 
did not want to do” (Informant 10). 
One proximate observer described the Republican-led Senate’s resistance to 
reform in the following manner: “The Republicans particularly didn’t want to go the 
income tax route. They wanted to rely on the system that we had…. I think that they were 
conservative not so much in the way we think of politics now – the ideology – but 
conservative in resistant to change….” (Informant 17). Another informant affirmed this 
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sentiment when commenting: “They didn’t want to do anything, the Republicans” 
(Informant 10). 
The larger geographic area of Senate districts also played a hand in the Senate’s 
more moderate view of the property tax and school funding issue (Informants 01, 08). 
According to one state employee: “…the Senate represents a much broader spectrum. 
When you have a county, you have rich towns, you have poor towns; you have a better 
policy sense of the big picture” (Informant 08). The presence of both property-wealthy 
and property-poor towns in senators’ districts promoted a cautious approach to reform 
that emphasized minimal financial harm to any one constituency. 
Despite the Senate leadership’s objections to school finance reform, some 
senators advocated change and had been active in recent discussions on the issue. For 
example, Jeb Spaulding, a Democrat from Washington County and Chair the Senate 
Education Committee had also served on the Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission 
where he charted a moderate course by advocating for a regional approach to property tax 
sharing. Aware that Democrats in the House were on the move, the Senate leadership 
approved examination of Spaulding’s plan, among others, for Senate consideration. 
Senate Resolution 15 of 1993 charged the Senate Committee on Education 
Finance/Property Tax Reform to “review various education finance/property tax reform 
proposals and to report its recommendations for change to the Senate…”(Senate 
Committee on Education Finance/Property Tax Reform, 1994). The Committee’s final 
report recommended that a uniform property tax be levied at the “supervisory union” 
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level to achieve regional tax sharing.29 Committee members deemed this approach as an 
“acceptable compromise” between the current practice of levying property taxes at the 
local level and the more radical step of statewide property taxation (Senate Committee on 
Education Finance/ Property Tax Reform, 1994, p. 6).  
Governor Howard Dean 
Governor Howard Dean embraced Wright’s plan for a statewide teacher’s 
contract from the outset on the basis that it served as a cost containment measure.30 In 
Vermont, each of the state’s approximately 250 school districts engaged in independent 
contract negotiations with its own teachers. Towns with large amounts of property wealth 
paid significantly higher wages than their low property wealth neighbors. These higher 
wages placed upward pressure on the wages paid in less well off school districts. 
Teachers from those districts used the threat of departure as a bargaining chip in their 
own negotiations. In his FY 1994 budget address, Dean expressed concern about 
Vermont’s high per-pupil expenditure. Noting that the state was first in the nation in per-
pupil expenditures but only 24th in the nation in income, he sought to implement 
“efficiencies that will allow us to bring education expenditures in line with our income” 
(Dean, 1993, p. 12). Dean demurred, though, when it came to supporting any one specific 
education aid finance package, noting: “I have seen what happens when governors 
suggest plans to be implemented from the top down. Many able chief executives have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  In Vermont, supervisory unions are regional education units that perform 
administrative services for more than one school district through a common 
superintendent. Each of Vermont’s school districts is assigned to one of 60 supervisory 
unions.  
	  
30 As noted in previous sections, cost containment was a priority for the Dean 
administration as it sought to clear up the state’s $65 million deficit. 
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taken that route and it has not succeeded” (Dean, 1993, p. 12). However, he was on the 
record as opposing the use of an income tax to fund a new school funding plan because 
he believed increased income taxes would hurt the state’s business climate (Informants 
15, 16). As one informant put it: “Howard Dean would have no part…. Governors don’t 
like to hit the income tax. They say, ‘It will kill business. We already have a high 
marginal tax rate already. People will leave the state’” (Informant 16). According to one 
proximate observer, the income tax was Dean’s  “line in the sand” (Informant 01).  
Vermont-NEA 
When school finance reform rises up the political agenda in Vermont, powerful 
lobbying groups are energized to advocate for their policy preferences and to defend their 
prerogatives. The Vermont-NEA led the opposition to Speaker Wright’s plan for a 
statewide teachers’ contract. According to one Democratic informant: “Politically, [the 
statewide teachers’ contract] lost us the NEA. They didn’t want it. One of our most 
natural and best-organized advocacy groups was against the bill” (Informant 07). 
According to Mathis (2000), the Vermont-NEA “…found the plan unacceptable and 
excoriated their fellow teacher and union member Ralph Wright” (p. 13). First and 
foremost, the Vermont-NEA strenuously objected to the statewide teacher’s contract on 
the grounds that it was an infringement of their collective bargaining rights. In a press 
conference, Vermont-NEA President Marlene Burke proclaimed the bill “the end of 
collective bargaining as we know it” (Pfeiffer, 1993, p. 5). Further the Vermont-NEA 
feared that if the state took control of paying teachers, it would level-down salaries and 
benefits, impose mandatory student-teacher ratios and underfund the annual appropriation 
for teacher salaries and fringe benefits (not an altogether unwarranted fear considering 
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the state’s track record with underfunding its past education aid formulas). As Burke 
observed: “He who pays the piper, calls the song” (Hoffman, 1993e, p. 3). Finally, 
according to a January 1993 Vermont-NEA bulletin, teachers viewed the measure as an 
attempt to “scapegoat teachers and collective bargaining to divert attention away from 
long-overdue property tax reform” (Pfeiffer, 1993, p. 12).  
Conversely, the Vermont-NEA signaled its strong support for Representative 
Cillo’s Composite Plan (Hoffman, 1993e; Hoffman, 1992d). A few months earlier, Burke 
had even lobbied the Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission on its behalf. The Composite 
Plan appealed to the teacher’s union because its income-based approach was not as 
divisive as the property tax. In a news conference held to show support for The 
Composite Plan, Burke commented: “The property tax situation is a crisis so old in 
Vermont that some say it’s lost its allure. But the commission must not forget that people 
are still hurting, that the property tax as the major source of funds for our public schools 
is dividing our communities, rich from poor” (Hoffman, 1992d, p. 6). 
Gold Towns/Ski Areas 
Because gold towns enjoyed well-funded schools at exceptionally low property 
tax rates thanks to the presence of commercial development and vacation communities, 
they did not receive state aid under the Foundation Plan. Their main interest in school 
finance reform focused on protecting their property tax dollars from claims made upon 
them by the state. As one informant remarked:  
Opposition I remember as coming from the property wealthy 
communities. That’s what I remember. It was the ski towns and the 
commercial and industrialized communities that just had very high 





Another informant summed up gold town opposition to school finance reform plans as 
follows: “The gold towns knew they had it good and they didn’t want to change it” 
(Informant 17). Ski association members and gold town residents vehemently opposed 
the implementation of any school finance reform that called for either a statewide 
property tax or a local property tax sharing scheme (Informants 16, 18, 07, 13). 
Informants described gold towns’ attitudes towards property tax sharing in the following 
way: 
People have a strong attachment to [local control] and this has always 
been the way: local monies raised locally. So people started thinking this 
is our money why should we have to pay somebody else, you know, pay 
for somebody else’s kids to go to school? (Informant 18)  
 
[Gold town residents] are saying, “They are taking our local property tax 
money. It is our money. It is our tax base and they are taking it away and 
doing a Robin Hood act and giving it to the poor folks.” (Informant 12) 
 
Apart from ideological reasons, gold towns and ski areas also opposed property 
tax measures such as those touted by both the House and Senate on the premise that 
significant tax sharing was already happening throughout Vermont thanks to gold towns’ 
disproportionate contribution of income, sales, and rooms and meals taxes to the state’s 
general fund (Barna, 1994). Finally, they expressed a typically Vermont view that 
commercial development is a net negative and claimed that gold town residents should be 
allowed to retain their local property taxes to “help mitigate the burden that is inherent 
with development” (Rice, 1997, p. 2). From their perspective, property taxes served as 
compensation for having to “put up” with tourists and their associated demands. One 
informant commented on this issue: 
The rich communities talked about some of the burden of having to endure 
all these tourists coming in and taking over our town every year and just 
the fact that we chose to do this, we wanted to develop, though there were 
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some people that made good arguments against that, you know. It’s just 
luck that Stowe is where Stowe is and thanks to nature you’re next to a 
nice mountain. This isn’t all your doing and you’re getting to use state 
lands for your ski area. Some towns got to develop, some didn’t, so it 
wasn’t all your hard work that allowed you to be a wealthy community. 
(Informant 18) 
 
Vermont League of Cities and Towns 
Since the late 1970s when then-Governor Snelling proposed “a sum to be raised 
by a uniform statewide property tax assessed on nonresidential property” to fund schools, 
the Vermont League of Cities and Towns (VLCT) had been a vocal opponent of state 
efforts to assume a role in raising education dollars from the property tax (VLCT, 1997, 
p. 1). Because the local property tax served as the sole municipal revenue source, towns 
were highly protective of it and suspicious of the state’s ability to limit use of property 
tax dollars to education funding alone. Informants explained the League’s position vis a 
vis the state’s appropriation of property tax dollars in the following ways:  
You’re going to create a statewide grand list and you know you’re going 
to overuse it... and put more and more pressure on the property tax rate 
and that will leave less room for us to pay for our municipal services. 
(Informant 21)  
 
…the towns really did think that the property tax revenue was theirs and 
“let the state have some of it, they’ll take all of it.” (Informant 01) 
 
Once the state gets its hands on the property tax, they are going to use it 
for everything. (Informant 09) 
 
In short, municipal governments viewed state use of local property tax funds to pay for 
schools as the “camel’s nose under the tent” (Informant 16) and as such rejected the 
House plan’s effort to implement a statewide property tax on nonresidential property 
(Graff, 1993).  
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Instead, the League favored school funding plans that reduced reliance on any 
form of property tax whatsoever such as those that paid for education through the 
increased use of broad-based state tax revenues or those that allowed local governments 
to levy their own local option taxes.31 In a frank moment, an informant expressed the 
League’s position with regard to the debate over school funding sources in the following 
passage: 
If we can get the schools onto somebody else’s funding source, then we 
get the property tax for ourselves. It’s very selfish. It’s not out of any 
sense of needing to produce, fund education better or to reduce inequities 
among towns. It was not the driving force as to why VLCT got involved. 
VLCT got involved in it because we get the dregs of whatever is left over 
from the school tax. (Informant 09) 
 
Such a plan would allow local governments to free up education dollars for other 
municipal services or to cut property taxes should they so desire. 
Business Organizations 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, Vermont’s leading business lobbies included the 
Vermont Chamber of Commerce, the Vermont Business Roundtable and Associated 
Industries of Vermont. All three maintained a generally uniform stance on the issue of 
school finance reform in that they were concerned with the negative impact that tax 
policy changes would have on Vermont’s economy (Heaps & Woolf, 1997; Lake 
Champlain Regional Chamber of Commerce et al., business correspondence, January 11, 
1995). According to a financial analysis conducted by the consulting firm KPMG Peat 
Marwick for a coalition of Vermont business and municipal organizations, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Local option taxes are taxes that may be levied by cities or towns on top of existing 
state taxes. Such taxes might include local sales taxes, local rooms and meals taxes or 
local income taxes. At the time of the period under study, municipal governments were 
prohibited by the state from levying any taxes other than the property tax so they were 
highly protective of this sole funding source.  
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Snelling/Wright tax increases of 1991 placed Vermont 14th in state-local taxes per capita 
and seventh in state-local taxes per $1,000 of personal income (KPMG Peat Marwick, 
1994). Since the passage of those tax increases, the business community had become 
sensitive to any legislative initiative that sought to raise state taxes even further. In its 
view, these additional taxes would harm Vermont’s already fragile economy by 
suppressing job creation and new business development (Informants 07, 18, 08, 11, 01; 
KPMG Peat Marwick, 1994). 
Additionally, the business community viewed the increasingly liberal composition 
of the state legislature with some consternation and guarded against legislation that 
sought to shift tax burdens to wealthy individuals and business entities (Freyne, 1996; 
Informants 11, 15). An informant expressed this opinion: “You’ve got folks to the left, 
you know, saying, ‘Well, we’re just going to cost shift the property tax on you guys’” 
(Informant 15). 
In terms of specifics, these organizations opposed proposals to use local income 
taxes in lieu of local property taxes as a means to fund schools. One informant 
commented: 
We fought long and hard against paying for education through income tax. 
Our tax burden was among the highest in the country…. We had a tough 
recession in the early 1990s. Howard Dean used an income tax surcharge 
over a certain level of income to help retire our debt. The state income tax 
in Vermont is visible. There was fear that we were among the states with 
the highest income taxes. There was a fear that our taxes would not allow 
us to attract people with resources. There is a high number of wealthy 
Vermonters who spend six months and one day in Florida to avoid paying 
income tax. We were afraid that the use of an income tax would 
exacerbate situations like this. (Informant 11)   
 
The business community also opposed property tax sharing proposals that pooled taxes 
across a region or state to better equalize tax burdens. Specifically, these proposals were 
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condemned as “an attempt to redistribute wealth” (Informant 11). Further, because tax 
sharing would mean tax increases in lightly taxed towns, business leaders decried its 
negative “implications for businesses in those communities in terms of increasing taxes” 
(Informant 11). This aspect of the business community’s opposition to tax sharing was 
highlighted in a “Dear Legislator” letter signed by many of the state’s leading business 
organizations. In it they note that “[t]he hotel and lodging industry is especially sensitive 
to large increases in business property taxes due to imposition of a statewide property tax 
or a minimum school property tax” (Lake Champlain Regional Chamber of Commerce et 
al., business correspondence, January 11, 1995, p. 2). For these reasons, the business 
community opposed both the House and the Senate measures, although they definitely 
viewed the House measure as the bigger threat to their financial interests (Vermont 
Business Roundtable, 1993b). Instead of a property tax overhaul, representatives of the 
business community such as the Vermont Business Roundtable stressed making 
Vermont’s education funding more efficient through school consolidation measures and 
the implementation of higher teacher-to-student ratios (Hoffman, 1993f; Vermont 
Business Roundtable, 1993b).  
Pro-School Finance Reform Groups 
As noted above, many of Vermont’s most powerful lobbying organizations 
opposed the various school finance reform measures proposed during the 1993/94 
biennium. Regarding this fact, one informant noted that “every [lobbying organization] 
from the for-profit sector, from the ski areas to the accountants, every single one of them 
was against this” (Informant 07). In contrast, those that took up the cause of school 
finance reform could best be described in classic David versus Goliath terms. Pro-
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advocacy organizations tended to be small, highly localized groups who worked on the 
issue in relative isolation. Mathis (2000) described the pro-reform coalition in the 
following terms: “…the core of reform agents was small. [These groups] were diffuse, 
localized and typically not registered as lobbying groups” (p. 6). 
Small pockets of pro-reform advocacy could be found throughout the state. The 
Essex Town Finance Committee exemplified the locally based approach to school 
finance reform advocacy. Their January 1994 “Dear Representative” letter highlighted 
how its seven member organization conducted its own nine-month study of Vermont’s 
education reform initiatives and endorsed the House’s proposal for a statewide teachers’ 
contract (P. N. Gray et al., organizational communication, January 6, 1994). One 
informant described his experience as a pro-school finance reform advocate during this 
time period: 
… my story is driving across the state with a handful of transparency 
slides to put on the overhead projector in the snow to talk to three people 
who called themselves an organization. There were a few of us that were 
out there, and hey, we’d give ourselves titles. The [pro-reform] coalition 
after Brigham was passed was a stronger organization than had existed 
before. Basically, it was two or three people with a holy cause that would 
go around and talk to PTAs and school boards and things like that. It was 
wandering around in the wilderness a great deal. (Informant 12) 
 
One informant provided a possible explanation for why a large pro-school finance reform 
movement had never gathered momentum in the state: 
In the 1980s and 1990s, when a number of lawsuits around school 
financing were being filed, I know that people in Vermont had talked 
about it and a couple of people had approached law firms about filing suit 
but the conventional wisdom was that a suit in Vermont would not 







Another informant expressed a similar sentiment, noting: 
I don’t think any of us dreamed in our wildest dreams that… Because 
most of the states where the constitutional questions have been successful, 
they had very specific language in the constitution that made it possible 
for the judges to rule the way they did and we just didn’t have anything 
like that so I think most of us thought it was futile. (Informant 13) 
 
Reform advocates were generally motivated by a sense of fairness towards 
students and taxpayers and a worry that some of the state’s children were not being 
provided with adequate resources to achieve at high levels. As one reform advocate 
noted: 
…equity issues were right there in front of my face. I’d stand in the 
playground at Whiting school, which is a very poor dairy farming town 
and look out at Killington. I’d see the ski slopes which had immense 
property wealth and they were spending, you know, twice as much at half 
the rate. (Informant 12) 
 
In general, reformers aimed to reduce local property taxes for towns with high tax 
burdens by taxing across wider geographic areas in order to better equalize the tax base. 
They also generally supported plans that called for paying school taxes based on a 
person’s ability to pay (Mathis, 2000; Norwich Committee on Fairness in Funding 
Education (FIFE), organizational communication, January 1997; P. N. Gray et al., 
organizational communication, January 6, 1994; Informants 07, 03, 12). These groups 
comprised part of a larger “silent majority” of Vermonters in support of education 
reform. A January 1994 University of Vermont poll that found a full 65 percent of 
registered voters supported the use of the income tax to pay for schools (Dillon, 1994). 
Macro Arena 
1993/94 Biennium: Actor Resources and Strategies 
 
 This section describes the resources and strategies utilized by those actors 
participating in the macro arena. As predicted by Mazzoni (1991), the tone of participant 
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interactions was highly partisan and reflected key differences in worldview. In the macro 
arena, actors relied on the media, the use of powerful symbols and dire predictions for 
Vermont’s future to help win votes for their side.  
Speaker of the House Ralph Wright 
As Speaker of the House of Representatives, Ralph Wright wielded considerable 
institutional authority and possessed many key resources that enabled him to set the 
legislative agenda, control the legislative calendar, make committee appointments, attract 
significant media attention and hire members of the Legislative Council and Joint Fiscal 
Office – two key legislative advisory bodies. His reputation as a fierce politician and his 
status as a political patron to many House Democrats also afforded him a substantial 
quantity of personal political power.  
Throughout the 1993/94 biennium, Wright served alternately as power broker, 
facilitator, and advocate in service to his goal of passing a statewide teacher’s contract. 
Early in the legislative process, he defused a looming power struggle between two 
competing school funding plans in the Ways and Means committee (Informant 03). Both 
the Chair, Oreste Valsangiacomo, and the Vice Chair, Paul Cillo  (along with his new 
working partner, John Freidin), had submitted bills that session. Cillo and Freidin 
submitted the Composite Plan and Valsangiacomo entered a bill that called for a 
combination of broad based taxes coupled with a statewide property tax to fund state aid 
to education (Joint Fiscal Office, 1993). The competing bills placed the Ways and Means 
committee in the uncomfortable position of having to debate the merits of its leaders’ 
plans. To resolve this situation, the two agreed to have Wright select the bill the 
Committee would support. With assistance provided by key Cillo allies in the Education 
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Committee, Wright selected Cillo and Freidin’s plan. His willingness and ability to take 
control of the situation prevented a time-consuming and potentially divisive debate 
within Ways and Means and cleared the way for committee work to begin in earnest. 
With Wright’s blessing, the House leadership placed the Cillo/Freidin plan on the fast 
track. 
Once he had given his seal of approval to the Composite Plan, Wright knew that 
the fate of his statewide teacher’s contract was now tied to Cillo and Freidin’s success in 
refining their funding formula to support it. At that point, Wright stepped in as a key 
facilitator of their work. At the request of Paul Cillo, he authorized the hiring of 
additional employees and consultants for the Legislative Council and the Joint Fiscal 
Office. One informant detailed the series of events between Wright and Cillo that led to 
the hiring of property tax expert Deb Brighton to support Cillo in the development of a 
school finance reform plan: 
Ralph said, “What do you need?” Paul said, “I need to hire Deb Brighton 
for the Ways and Means Committee. I need her to work for the Ways and 
Means Committee.” Ralph said, “How much do you need?”…. Paul said, 
“I need $5,000.” Ralph said, “OK, fine.” So he gave Paul $5,000 for Deb. 
Deb is just brilliant. She’s just amazing. So Paul was able to start to 
formulate the pieces he was interested in and Deb could do the [computer] 
runs. (Informant 03) 
 
These employees were brought on specifically to sift through raw property tax 
and school funding data provided by the Department of Education in order to develop 
spreadsheets detailing equalized property tax lists, town income, tax rates, per-pupil 
expenditures and other data needed to build a funding formula (Informants 07, 06, 08, 
03). One informant described the process used to develop the data required to formulate a 
new school funding proposal: 
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We had to build spreadsheets. [The raw data] was in a lot of disarray…. 
We would spend a lot of time going through the town-by-town 
information, grand list information, you know, they had to equalize it to 
fair market value across the state (they have a way of doing that). It was in 
disarray and we spent a lot of time doing a lot of that work. (Informant 08) 
 
The databases built from this information proved vital for legislators to be able to “bring 
‘what ifs’ to life” (Informant 03). Using these databases, the legislators could tweak their 
formula’s various tax rates or yields or per pupil expenditures to have the school district 
“winners” and “losers” revealed immediately. Based on this information, they could 
adjust the various aspects of the plan so that it included the maximum number of 
“winners” possible, something that would be important when persuading their fellow 
legislators to vote for the reform measure. In another show of support for Cillo and 
Freidin’s work, Wright, at considerable taxpayer expense, arranged for members of the 
Ways and Means Committee to work through the summer and into the fall on their plan 
so that it would be ready for the beginning of the 1994 legislative session (Hoffman, 
1994a). 
Finally as an advocate, Wright became the public face of the House’s reform 
proposal, where he served equal parts policy persuader and policy defender. He traveled 
the state talking to groups large and small about Vermont’s need for a statewide teacher’s 
contract (Ways and Means Committee, 1994; Graff, 1994) and was not afraid to spar with 
detractors. For example, he called the Vermont-NEA’s opposition to the statewide 
teacher’s contract a quest for “money and power” and explained that the business 
community opposed the plan because they preferred “profits, not people” (Pfeiffer, 1993; 
Freyne, 1994). In each confrontation, Wright made it clear that he wasn’t going to back 
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away from his goal. With Wright running interference, Cillo and Freidin continued to 
focus on developing the Ways and Means proposal. 
House Ways and Means Committee Leadership 
With Wright’s marching orders in hand, Representatives Cillo and Freidin spent 
much of the 1993 session refining the Composite Plan into what would subsequently 
become H.541. In an interesting aside, just after Wright announced his plan in January 
1993 a newspaper reporter challenged Cillo as to why he though the Composite Plan 
would fare any better in the legislature than it had in the Blue Ribbon Commission. 
Speaking as the idea champion that he was, Cillo responded that he thought the 
Legislature had a better grasp on public attitude toward property taxes: “The Legislature 
is not the (Blue Ribbon) Commission. People here know it is a problem. I definitely see 
the opportunity that Ralph (Wright) sees” (Hoffman, 1993d p. 12). 
He was correct in that the legislative macro arena afforded him several 
opportunities not available to him in the commission arena. Chief among them was his 
positional authority as the Vice Chair of the Ways and Means Committee and his new 
alliance with the Speaker of the House. As Vice Chair and Clerk of the Committee, Cillo 
was responsible for determining the committee’s agenda, selecting the bills to be brought 
up for discussion by the committee, scheduling votes, selecting witnesses to testify before 
the committee and scheduling their appearances before the committee. This authority 
cleared the way for the school funding issue to take primacy over all other bills being 
considered by the Committee that session. 
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In a clever stroke designed to manage the “scope of conflict,”32 Cillo and Freidin 
decided to schedule witness testimony in small groups comprised of both reform 
advocates and reform opponents. In this way, it would more difficult for one reform 
opponent after another to simply read prepared statements railing against the bill. One 
legislator commented that this process produced “a much softer conversation. It was 
more reasonable. It wasn’t just, ‘I’m opposed to this’ because it was harder for the 
opponents to be opposed when they were in a dialogue” (Informant 03).     
In addition to their sizable institutional resources, Cillo and Freidin also proved to 
be cagey politicians with exceptional political skills. Key personal resources included 
deep technical knowledge about a notoriously complex issue, a clear vision of what they 
wanted a school finance plan to accomplish, remarkable persistence, and keen media 
skills. With these resources they employed numerous creative strategies on behalf of their 
plan.  
In terms of technical knowledge, Cillo, and Freidin were students of the issue. 
According to one proximate observer: “They really understood this issue at a very deep 
level” (Informant 01). Both had taken the time to learn about school finance on the 
national level and had reached out to experienced legislators both in Vermont and beyond 
so that they could understand the complex funding formulas undergirding the distribution 
of state aid. They, therefore, could be counted as two of the “six people who could 
explain it” in the state (Informants 01, 17, 18, 08). This deep understanding allowed the 
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two to pursue and manipulate the data needed to create the complex and unique33 
proposal they undertook in H.541: 
Paul had this little war room in the speaker’s office. You always knew 
where to find him, unless they were off in a secret conference. He would 
be in there with all these stacks of paper and he could rattle [statistics] off. 
Probably still can tell you how version x affects Stowe and Greensboro. 
(Informant 17) 
 
They also were among the first legislators to carry laptops (Informant 07). This 
portability enabled them to bring the datasets to meetings so that they could share their 
information on the go.  
Perhaps because of their deep knowledge of how school aid formulae function, 
the two understood that “fully funding” the existing Foundation Plan as some legislators 
advocated would never solve the state’s school finance equity issue. They recognized that 
the state’s general fund taxes could not generate sufficient revenue to fund the state aid 
formula in times of economic difficulty. They knew that, as in the past, if the state were 
to once again fall on financial hard times, then the result would be the familiar pattern of 
local property tax increases in the face of state retrenchment. Thus, they sought a plan 
whereby all towns, rich or poor, had an equal stake in keeping the state aid formula 
funded. This guiding principle focused their work and provided them with a vision for 
what their desired policy solution would look like. Two colleagues laud Cillo and 
Freidin’s focus on policy outcomes as follows:  
…what they were both good at is… they had five goals, they had a process 
and a way of measuring their success. I don’t even remember what the five 
goals were but I remember the one sheet of paper where they had the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The idea of a local income tax in lieu of property tax was novel and was designed to 
address the unique taxing issues the state faced given its small size, rural nature and 
proximity to New Hampshire, a state with no sales tax.  
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bullets. This is our goal – how do we do it? This is our goal – how do we 
do it? (Informant 08) 
 
[Paul] had a big vision but was willing to talk about the stupid details. 
He’s unique in the sense that people either could see the big picture or see 
the small things. He could actually go back and forth and he had a policy 
objective in his mind. Not everybody was always that clear. He was really 
gifted in that way I find. (Informant 08) 
 
Paul was really good at getting people to start thinking about what people 
should be paying, what’s a fair amount for people to pay for school. 
(Informant 06) 
 
The ability to focus on policy outcomes allowed the two to chart a coherent plan for 
achieving these desired goals. In times of political setback, a focus on broad policy goals 
enabled them to regroup and develop alternate means towards those ends. Referring to 
this ability, one informant commented: “Of course, every time the politics changed…, 
they had to go back and rejigger the numbers. Come up with a new way of doing it” 
(Informant 12). 
With regard to marketing their vision for school finance, the two exhibited 
remarkable persistence in terms of their willingness to reach out to citizens from all four 
corners of the state to discuss their plans. One House Ways and Means Committee 
member recollected: “Of course the Senate didn’t like it and the governor is speaking out 
against it so we decided to go on the road…. We started talking individually to anybody 
who would have us” (Informant 07). Internal documents reveal that during the 1993/94 
biennium, the House Education Committee held 47 meetings and the Ways and Means 
Committee held 89 meetings on the issue of school finance/property tax reform (Ways 
and Means Committee, 1994). One legislator estimated that the Ways and Means 
committee spoke to 2,000 citizens during their fall 1993 speaking tour (Informant 07). In 
these meetings they took testimony and held roundtable discussions. They also gave 
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presentations on their plan for which they prepared individualized, detailed data packets 
that specified the beneficial tax impact for the particular group with whom they were 
meeting (Vermont House of Representatives, 1994, Informant 08). When opponents of 
the legislation criticized that H.541 was being rushed through the General Assembly, 
House Education Committee Chair David Larsen (l994) responded that “[n]o bill has ever 
received more testimony, analysis, publicity, study and scrutiny than H.541” (p. 5).  
To reach even more citizens beyond their speaking tours, Cillo and Freidin took 
the unusual step of registering themselves as an anonymous lobbying organization known 
as Vermonters for Property Tax Reform. This “organization” distributed 20,000 
brochures to legislators for use on Town Meeting Day 1994. Each brochure included a 
school tax computation worksheet designed to allow residents to see how much the 
average citizen would save under the House plan. Designed to put pressure on Senate 
deliberations during the spring of 1994, the brochure included a sentence stating: “Call 
your senators now and tell them how you feel about property taxes” and the telephone 
numbers of all state senators (Vermonters for Property Tax Reform, 1994).  
The two, along with their political allies in the Ways and Means and Education 
Committees, also actively courted media attention as a means to garner public support 
and place pressure on fellow legislators to act on behalf of reform. They utilized the 
media both proactively to frame the issue and reactively to counter criticisms. To this 
end, they wrote op-ed pieces in newspapers across the state and persuaded friendly 
surrogates to do so as well. They also took advantage of local radio and television 
opportunities. One legislator described one of their media outreach strategies: 
One of the things we did, once we passed [the bill] in January we were 
trying to get the Senate to act on it that year so instead of going [to 
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committee], I would go over to the Majority Leader’s office and get on the 
phone and call up radio stations, just talking live. “Hi… we passed the 
property tax bill in January. I was wondering if we could just talk about it 
on the radio,” and they’d just put you on live back then. They would just 
say, “Sure. Hang on. We’ll do it right now. We have [redacted] on the 
line.” We would just do these things, station after station; every 
opportunity to get on the radio. (Informant 03) 
 
The other thing is a program called About This Week, which is like 
Washington Week in Review. So three of us… would find out every week 
who the reporters were that were going to be on and we’d make sure to 
visit them the morning of so that the reports of what had happened were 
fresh in their minds. (Informant 03) 
 
In their media campaigns Cillo and Freidin and their allies employed the symbol 
of fairness. For example, Ways and Means Chair Oreste Valsangiacomo touted his 
committee’s bill in populist terms saying: “You’ve got to look at this as a bill for the 
people. It levels the support for education. It eliminates disparities between towns” 
(Allen, 1994a). They also emphasized that the House bill was not adding new money to 
the education budget (S. Campbell & P. Mallary 1994, personal communication, January 
25, 1994; Larsen, 1994) but rather spreading it around the state more fairly by shifting the 
tax burden from highly unequal local property taxes to other more broad based and 
equitably distributed taxes.  
With powerful advocates in top positions of authority in the House and a bill that 
would lower property taxes for citizens in most towns, any opposition to H.541 had little 
chance of succeeding. The bill passed the House on January 13, 1994 by a comfortable 
margin of 83 to 62. Regarding this victory, one informant commented:  
Now we knew and had known for a long time that the printouts would 
show that the vast majority of towns, and therefore voters within those 
towns, were going to benefit. It was something like 80 percent to 20 
percent… that’s why it wasn’t hard to go up to a Republican and say, 
“Look, the house of average value in your town is – we’ll take a 
reasonable income which is $40,000 – that kind of a voter is going to save 
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$600 in your district. So if you don’t want to vote for this, that’s fine. 
You’ll hear about it at election time.” (Informant 07)  
 
The pro-reform advocates’ victory in the House depended in large part upon the manner 
in which House legislative seats are configured. In the House, districts are small and 
frequently coterminous with towns. If each legislator voted strictly upon its town’s 
interest, victory was assured because under the school funding formula used in H.541 
most towns would pay less in property taxes than they had under the Foundation Plan. 
This situation highlights that property wealth was disproportionately amassed in the 
relatively few gold towns that generated tax revenue through commercial industry and 
tourism. 
However, the bill faced a far tougher hurdle in the Senate where legislative 
districts were significantly larger and almost always included at least one gold town 
(Informant 21). Therefore, senators would be aware that H.541 would raise taxes among 
some constituents. That “gold towns tended to be more conservative, tended to be more 
Republican” reinforced opposition in the Republican-controlled Senate. Throughout the 
biennium, Republicans had made their antipathy for both an income tax and a statewide 
property tax well known. Their traditional alliance with the business community and 
concern for local control allied them with very influential pressure groups such as the 
Vermont Chamber of Commerce, the Vermont Business Roundtable and the Vermont 
League of Cities and Towns.  
Senate Leadership 
 After winning approval in the House, H.541 moved to the Senate for 
consideration where Senate Majority Leader John Carroll immediately branded the bill 
“radical” and declared several of its provisions, including the local income tax, 
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unworkable. This reaction did not surprise House Democrats, one of whom noted: 
“[H.541] just didn’t fly in the Senate. We knew it wouldn’t fly but we thought we could 
put political pressure on them” (Informant 16). As in the House, the Senate leadership – 
comprised of Majority Leader Carroll, Senate President Pro Tempore John Bloomer and 
Lieutenant Governor Barbara Snelling – possessed significant amounts of positional 
authority. These Senate leaders were generally opposed to any significant change to the 
existing system of school finance. Had they so desired, they could have prevented H.541 
from coming up for Senate consideration during the 1993/94 biennium. However, they 
were under a fair amount of external pressure from an increasingly restive electorate to 
“do something” about education funding and property taxes (Hoffman, 1994c). 
Therefore, such an approach carried with it the danger of alienating voters. As one 
informant noted: “They couldn’t say, ‘Oh, well, the system we’ve got is dynamite. They 
weren’t that foolish. They had to do something” (Informant 07). To that end, they sought 
to enact modest reform that left as much of the status quo intact as possible.  
Many of the rank and file Republicans shared the leadership’s perspective. For 
example, one Republican senator noted that he was “very dubious about the tax sharing” 
due to its potential negative impact on “local control” (Informant 02). Indeed, the defense 
of local control was a common refrain utilized by reform opponents, including Lieutenant 
Governor Barbara Snelling.  
However, the Senate was not a monolith. For example, Education Committee 
Chair Jeb Spaulding had been quietly working to advance the cause of school finance 
reform in his committee since early the previous year. He had served on the Governor’s 
Blue Ribbon Commission on Educational and Municipal Financial Reform in 1992 and 
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was the Co-Chair of the Senate Committee on Education Finance/Property Tax Reform 
that had recently returned a recommendation for a regional property tax sharing proposal. 
Acknowledging reality, Spaulding commented: 
The current system for funding education is very unfair to taxpayers, 
students, homeowners and owners of open land. We need to take some 
action. But nothing can pass the legislature without the support of both the 
House and Senate. With 30 in the Senate, we need the strength to convince 
16 people to vote for change. (Russell, 1994, p. 3) 
 
As a result, he staked out a compromise position with his regional property tax sharing 
proposal. This position allowed for some tax sharing but avoided the state intervention 
that so many Republican senators opposed as well as the income tax that the governor 
and most of the Senate opposed.  
In May 1994, the Senate Education and Finance Committees successfully voted 
out a regional sharing plan that called for the levying of unified tax rates for school 
districts within supervisory unions. Under the plan, taxes would be levied at the 
supervisory union level and then redistributed back to districts on a per-pupil basis. These 
regional tax sharing funds were supplemented by an additional $60 million in new 
general fund taxes. Importantly, the Education committee decided to remove the 
statewide teachers contract from the bill on the basis that it was considered too 
controversial (Allen, 1994c). The Senate response to H.541 also included education 
quality and accountability components such as school choice and charter school 
provisions. With these measures, the bill’s supporters sought to broaden their reform 
coalition by making the bill more appealing to Republicans and business organizations 
such as the Vermont Business Roundtable (Hoffman, 1994c) which had been calling for 
the legislature to reform the education system before it reformed the funding system. For 
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example in its 1993 publication, entitled Restructuring Education in Vermont: 
Fundamentals and Funding, the Vermont Business Roundtable concluded with the 
following recommendation: “We need to determine how the system should be changed 
and then we need to deal with an uneven funding system and alternative means of 
funding public education.” (p. 23). 
However, in the waning days of the 1994 session the bill ran into trouble in the 
Senate Appropriation’s Committee. Despite having sufficient votes in the Committee, 
Appropriations Chair (and Majority Leader) John Carroll used his positional authority to 
strike all of the Education and Finance Committees’ provisions in favor of a universal 
homestead deduction. Carroll’s plan, which the Appropriations Committee approved 6-1, 
would phase in over two years a 20 percent reimbursement of the school taxes paid by 
each resident homeowner up to a maximum payment equal to 20 percent of the median 
home value in a given town. To fund this plan, the bill called for $31 million in general 
fund dollars for FY 1995 and $42 million the following year. Carroll justified his scaling 
back of the reform plan on the basis of unfavorable revenue reports for the state 
(Hoffman, 1994f). His bill passed a preliminary vote in the Senate by a slim party line 
margin of 16-14. 
Senate Democrats and some Senate Republicans immediately denounced the bill 
as a giveaway to the rich. Senate Democrats further assailed the bill because it did 
nothing to address the state’s persistent property tax inequities by evening out property 
tax burdens. They noted that Carroll could have chosen to add the general fund dollars 
attached to the bill to bolster the state’s Foundation Plan or its low-income property tax 
rebate fund. The Rutland Daily Herald ran an editorial calling Carroll’s maneuver a 
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“mockery of property tax reform” and went on to say that “[t]he Vermont Senate has 
taken the idea of property tax reform and turned it into an assault on the state treasury 
that will give the biggest dose of relief to the richest taxpayers” (“Tax Reform Travesty,” 
1994, p. 16). It did not go unnoticed in the press that Carroll’s hometown of Norwich 
received the highest average reimbursement in the state (Hoffman, 1994g). Chastened by 
the public outcry and loss of much-needed Republican support, Carroll reversed himself 
the very next day and replaced the homestead deduction with the original regional tax 
sharing plan, albeit with a reduced state contribution of $46 million. This version passed 
the Senate 20-10 with strong bipartisan support. 
Carroll’s ploy highlights the limits of positional authority in the macro arena 
where legislative actions are closely monitored by a wide variety of policy actors. 
Although the Senate leadership resisted the passage of reform measures, its ability to 
dismiss reform all together was constrained by public opinion and its impact upon the 
votes of rank and file legislators.  
Governor Howard Dean 
By dint of his positional authority, Governor Dean possessed many resources with 
which to influence the school finance debate occurring during the 1993/94 biennium. For 
example, as governor, Dean had ample access to the media through regular press 
conferences and other official appearances. Remarkably, however, Dean acceded to a gag 
order requested by Speaker Wright that prevented him from commenting on the issue 
until after the House had passed a bill. Dean stayed true to his word even though the 
House version of H.541 included a local income tax provision, a measure Dean had 
repeatedly deemed unacceptable (Hoffman, 1994b; Hoffman, 1994i). One informant 
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found Dean’s actions to be in keeping with his general approach to governing throughout 
the early years of his administration: “In those years he was governor, there were a lot of 
issues he sat on the sidelines…. He was very cautious” (Informant 02). In the end, 
however, Dean opposed both the House and Senate measures. He opposed the House bill 
for its use of a local income tax to fund state aid (Hoffman, 1994h) and the Senate bill for 
its lack of cost controls (Hoffman, 1994e).  
Vermont-NEA 
As a large statewide organization, the Vermont-NEA possessed several key 
resources that allowed it to conduct a fierce lobbying campaign against the statewide 
teacher’s contract. First and foremost, their sizable membership allowed them to 
repeatedly contact their representatives through phone calls and letters and in person 
during “NEA day” at the capitol to convey their views on the House bill. The 
organization also employed a media outreach strategy comprised of radio advertisements 
and op-ed pieces in local newspapers that challenged Wright’s justification for a 
statewide teacher’s contract. In these forums, the Vermont-NEA sought to generate 
opposition to the bill among average citizens outside of the teaching profession by 
portraying the statewide teacher’s contract as a loss of local control for their communities 
(Hoffman, 1993d). The organization’s president, Marlene Burke, became the public face 
of the Vermont-NEA’s resistance and sparred with House Speaker Ralph Wright both in 
person and in print. In classic Wright form, the Speaker characterized the Vermont-
NEA’s intense lobbying campaign as “guerilla warfare,” “obnoxious,” “filled with 




Despite its best efforts, the Vermont-NEA’s campaign failed when the House 
passed H.541 in January 1994. According to one informant, the Vermont-NEA’s 
campaign had little impact on legislator’s votes. Instead, legislators concerned themselves 
with the taxation aspects of the bill. As the informant noted: “The ‘no’ votes in the House 
were more based on what was going on on the finance side and the communities who had 
a good deal didn’t want that good deal to change” (Informant 13).  Fortunately for the 
organization, members of the Senate did not favor the inclusion of a statewide teacher’s 
contract and the measure was stripped from the Senate bill early in that body’s 
deliberative process. The Vermont-NEA seized on the Senate’s action as a “win” and 
subsequently receded from the spotlight (Informant 07; Allen, 1994c). They did, 
however, remember their friends and enemies later that fall when they actively 
campaigned against House members, including Ralph Wright, who had voted “yes” on 
H.541 (Informant 03). 
Business Organizations 
Business organizations possessed ample stores of resources that helped them to 
campaign against the implementation of school finance reform measures during the 
1993/94 biennium. Such resources included money, large and well-organized 
memberships and an established lobbying presence at the capitol. In their opposition, 
these groups sought to block the passage of reform legislation – H.541 in particular – due 
to its potentially negative impact upon Vermont’s business sector. For example a 
coalition of the state’s leading business organizations, including the Vermont Chamber of 
Commerce, the Vermont Lodging and Restaurant Association and the Vermont 
Association of Realtors, claimed that “[t]he increase in corporate income taxes, business 
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and sales taxes and business property taxes (in some towns) under H.541 would adversely 
affect Vermont’s competitive position for attracting job-creating capital investment” 
(Lake Champlain Regional Chamber of Commerce et al., business correspondence, 
January 11, 1995, p. 2). Business organizations actively opposed school finance reform 
measures by speaking out against them in public forums such as legislative 
subcommittees, forming coalitions with like-minded business organizations, conducting 
membership education sessions, and actively lobbying individual legislators. As a rule, 
they generally did not attempt to develop alternate school finance reform proposals (C. 
Benham, personal correspondence, January 23, 1995). A member of the Vermont 
Chamber of Commerce described his organization’s strategy to oppose school finance 
reform measures this way: 
Our strategies were: 1) testifying before legislative committees; 2) 
energizing our membership and encouraging them to contact their 
legislators; and 3) visiting directly with legislators. It is a small state. We 
knew all the legislators. We also formed coalitions with other business 
groups including the Associated Industries of Vermont, the Retail 
Association, realtors, and contractors. All of the business groups were 
pretty much opposed... (Informant 11) 
 
Consistent with its stated interest in public policy, the Vermont Business 
Roundtable took a slightly different tack and spent considerable time and effort 
conducting economic analyses of the reform proposals under discussion that session 
(Vermont Business Roundtable, 1993b; Vermont Business Roundtable, 1994). A former 
state economist by the name of Arthur Woolf undertook these analyses on behalf of the 
VBR. Regarding his process, one House legislator commented: 
We had released an early draft in the summer and you will find 
somewhere in there Art Woolf did a review or something. He wrote it and 
he never talked to us. He just read the document, which was the legislative 
council’s first draft before we even reviewed it… He never talked to us. 
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He clearly wanted to start to nip this in the bud. He could see what as 
happening. He wanted it to go away. (Informant 03) 
 
Woolf’s analyses were sent to legislators and media outlets where they received 
considerable press coverage across the state.  
A key strategy for these analyses was to dispute the predicted taxpayer cost 
savings of the various reform proposals, particularly the House version because it was 
more fully conceived and considerably more radical than the Senate’s proposal. For 
example, in critiquing the House’s bill, Vermont Business Roundtable president Maxine 
Brandenberg (business correspondence, March 30, 1994) noted that “the savings to most 
Vermonters as a result of eliminating the local property tax on a house are significantly 
smaller than they appear…” (p. 1). Another strategy involved frightening citizens about 
the potential economic harm that additional taxes might bring to the state. Again, 
Brandenberg (business correspondence, March 30, 1994) warned that “…the top 
Vermont marginal tax rate for an upper income taxpayer living in a town with an average 
local income tax rate would be higher than the rate in New York City” (p. 1). If such a 
tax policy were to be implemented, top earners would be more likely to move 
(Informants 15, 16, 18) and companies would shun the state as a potential site for new 
business development (Informants 08, 11).  
Gold Towns/Ski Areas  
Counting no more than 50 in number, gold towns derived their influence not from 
size but rather from their substantial financial resources and position as the economic 
engine of the state. As one informant commented: “The ski areas, you know, those towns 
do exert a fair amount of influence because skiing is so important to the economy” 
(Informant 18). In their opposition to school finance reform efforts, gold towns and ski 
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resort areas utilized many of the same strategies employed by the business community. 
First and foremost, they highlighted the potential negative impact of school finance 
reform proposals upon the local economy to generate opposition both among the general 
public and in legislative circles. They focused on these negative ramifications in 
legislative testimony, in media publications and as they lobbied individual legislators. 
For example, The Killington Pico Areas Association34 charged that the House 
proposal was shifting the property tax burden from primary home residents to businesses 
and second home owners. An association official commented that the dramatic increase 
in property taxes these towns would experience would “…really devastate the tourist 
industry in the state of Vermont. Those are the towns that are going to get hit the most – 
the ski towns and the towns that are around them” (Bandler, 1994, p. 13). Ski area 
representatives charged that as taxes increased in their towns, those costs would be 
passed on to tourists who, in turn, would choose to vacation elsewhere. This loss of 
tourism dollars would endanger the jobs of some 10,000 Vermont residents employed in 
the ski industry. While the ski areas never embraced either the House or the Senate 
versions of H.541, they reserved most of their ire for the House plan because it provided 
for considerably more property tax sharing. 
Vermont League of Cities and Towns  
Vermont’s municipal lobby, known as the Vermont League of Cities and Towns, 
possessed a reputation as one of the state’s most savvy and powerful lobbying entities 
(Informants 21, 01). This influence was a consequence of its statewide membership and 
the important role it played in providing training and day-to-day assistance to those 
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for businesses located in and around the ski resort community of Killington. 
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Vermonters tasked with managing the state’s 246 municipalities. Because it was 
comprised of both property-poor and property-wealthy towns, the VLCT had to carefully 
balance its stance on the issue of school finance reform. It negotiated this potentially 
rocky terrain by developing and disseminating school funding plans that emphasized the 
state’s role in paying for schools through general fund taxes. With the state assuming 
responsibility for a larger portion of education expenses, towns – both rich and poor – 
would be relieved of some of the burden that school funding placed on the local property 
tax. As a municipal informant put it: “It wasn’t that we were just saying no to the 
statewide property tax. We were saying this is better for towns” (Informant 09). 
In fending off state encroachment upon local property tax dollars, the Vermont 
League of Cities and Towns employed a “slippery slope” approach to keep its coalition of 
have and have-nots together. To this end, the League appealed to the future economic 
self-interests of all towns. One informant outlined the organization’s effort as follows:  
…we may not be a gold town this year, but all of a sudden the state is 
going to be using the property tax for this and this and we’re going to 
become a quote ‘gold town’ collecting more property taxes and we’ll lose 
for our own school because there is a new pig at the trough which is the 
state. So I think that was the key to our being able to have the coalition 
that continued to oppose the statewide property tax (Informant 09).  
 
The League also played on many Vermonters’ fear of the loss of local control as a 
means to prevent the state from appropriating local property tax dollars (Informant 09). 
Vermonters’ attachment to local control is deeply rooted in historical circumstances that 
necessitated self-reliance and had remained a point of pride for many citizens, 
particularly those with longstanding Vermont roots. However, by the period under study, 
local governance was on the wane as the state increasingly assumed responsibility for 
more and more government functions and services. Therefore, for many townspeople, 
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municipal control of schools served as an important last bastion of local autonomy with 
which they were reluctant to part (Informants 16, 10, 04, 12, 18, 08). Three informants 
commented on the ideological justification for some Vermonters’ opposition to school 
finance reform as such: 
I think in most rural towns, when you came up with the word of local 
control or losing some local control, it was a devastating blow to these 
people and they just absolutely said no. (Informant 04) 
 
…they felt there would be strings attached and they wouldn’t be able to 
make decisions about [schools] if the money was coming from Montpelier 
or if this was a state system then the state would want to exert more 
control over what went on in the schools. (Informant 18) 
 
It’s the only thing they can have control over. They feel the bite of other 
things but they don’t get to vote on it. I don’t know if you’ve ever been to 
a town meeting. It’s pretty extraordinary. You know, you engage with 
people you know and like who have very different opinions and it’s a very 
interesting process to go through and to have the debate.... I feel like this is 
the one thing people get to vote on. They vote on it at the town level. You 
can vote the [school] budget down. You can’t vote down the sales tax. 
You can’t vote down the state budget. (Informant 08) 
 
While citizens of property-poor towns complained vehemently about their rising property 
taxes, many rejected any reform proposal that was perceived to be an encroachment upon 
the local control of educational matters. This ideological opposition served as an 
impediment to reform advocates and a boon for reform opponents such as the Vermont 
League of Cities and Towns. As one anti-reform informant remarked: “We were able to 
continue to have a rather substantial majority of municipal officers who were opposed to 
a statewide property tax. I think it was the emphasis on the local control issue and the 
state’s insertion into the property tax that was the key thing” to their ability to influence 




Pro-School Finance Reform Groups 
Without a statewide apparatus, reform advocates often operated on a highly 
localized basis and lacked most of the basic resources common to the typical lobbying 
organization. They were small in number, working in isolation and lacking financial 
resources. However, they took their work seriously and considered themselves to be 
students of the issue. Community groups such as Norwich’s Fairness in Financing 
Education (FIFE) and central Vermont’s Vermonters Organized for Tax Equity (VOTE) 
organized informational meetings, engaged politicians, coordinated petition drives, and 
managed local “get out the vote” campaigns (Mathis, 2000). Through these efforts, they 
pushed for policy change that focused on the redistribution of funds to better equalize 
per-pupil expenditures throughout the state and supported ideas such as a local income 
tax, a statewide property tax, and recapture provisions aimed at sharing revenue from 
property-rich towns (P. N. Gray et al., organizational communication, January 6, 1994; 
Norwich Committee on Fairness in Funding Education (FIFE), organizational 
communication, January 1997; Mathis, 2000). However, these groups generally operated 
alone and tended to not generate much statewide attention. While the growth in pro-
reform organizations signaled increased interest in and attention to the issue of school 
finance reform, they possessed limited influence due in part to their lack of coordination. 
In fact, a lack of a statewide coalition was one of the reasons Paul Cillo and John Freidin 
took the extraordinary step of registering themselves as a lobbying entity (Informants 20, 
07). Such an organization would not have been necessary had more of a coordinated pro-





1993/94 Biennium: Concluding Interactions and Outcomes 
 
By late May of 1994, after two years of legislative effort and intense interest 
group advocacy, the House and Senate passed two significantly different education 
finance reform packages. The House bill reflected a strong pro-reform influence that had 
been shaped by a powerful advocacy coalition located inside the chamber’s leadership. 
The Senate measure’s regional property tax sharing plan reflected that body’s 
ambivalence towards the school finance reform issue. As one informant noted:  “[The 
Republicans] wanted to rely on the system that we had” (Informant 17). However, 
because the Democrats had engaged the issue with H.541, they were forced to respond 
with their own proposal lest they appear unsympathetic to an issue that had recently 
bubbled to the top of the Vermont public’s political agenda. 
Immediately following the Senate’s approval of its school funding bill, both sides 
began to determine which of their members would sit on the six-person Conference 
Committee designated to negotiate a compromise measure. Not surprisingly, Speaker 
Wright nominated the architects of the House version, Paul Cillo and John Freidin, along 
with Carl Powden of the House Education Committee to serve on the conference panel. 
In the Senate, the Committee on Committees is responsible for selecting 
Conference Committee members. That biennium, the Committee on Committees was 
comprised of Lieutenant Governor Barbara Snelling, President Pro Tempore John 
Bloomer and Senator John Doyle, all three Republicans on the record as opposing a 
statewide property tax (Pfeiffer, 1994). Together they nominated Senator Matt Krauss of 
the Senate Finance Committee, Senate Majority Leader John Carroll of the 
Appropriations Committee and Bloomer. Their choice of committee members was 
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particularly important because those members would be negotiating on behalf of the 
entire Senate and would bring back a bill that would require an up or down vote by the 
full body. If the Conference Committee approved a more progressive plan than the 
leadership desired, they would not have any mechanisms at their disposal to block or 
modify the bill. In the interest of preventing this scenario, President Pro Tempore 
Bloomer utilized his positional authority to nominate himself to participate in the 
Conference Committee negotiations. One participant describes Bloomer’s approach to 
negotiations in the opening session of the Conference Committee: 
So we got there the first meeting. We both explained our plan and then 
Bloomer looks across the table and says, “I just want to let you know that 
we’re not going to accept a bill with the local income tax, we’re not going 
to accept a bill with any new statewide revenues, and we’re not going to 
accept a bill with a statewide property tax.” (Informant 03) 
 
One House member called the conference committee a “charade” given the strong 
ideological differences between the two groups (Informant 07). An informant noted: 
I remember tensions running very high in the legislature that year, 
especially towards the end of the year when there was the Conference 
Committee. It was just clear from everybody observing outside, it wasn’t 
going to go anywhere. Everybody was kind of going through the motions, 
but Democrats did seem to think that they could shame the Republicans 
into [voting for] it. (Informant 17) 
 
In response, to Bloomer’s defiant approach, Majority Leader Ralph Wright 
instructed his conferees to call the Senate’s bluff and offer to approve its regional tax 
sharing bill, which he believed they did not genuinely support. The Senate leadership 
accepted his offer and, in the end, held the Republican coalition together to pass the 
Conference bill in the Senate. A senator remembers this vote: 
When it came time to pass a Committee of Conference report, I did vote 
for it and my arm was twisted a little bit. Bloomer essentially said to me 
that it would never become law but it was a great political football and the 
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headline in the Free Press would read that “School Finance Reform Blows 
up in the House,” and that’s just about what the headline read. (Informant 
02) 
 
Back in the House, the Conference bill was resoundingly defeated as Senator Bloomer 
had predicted and the longest session of the Vermont General Assembly since 1965 came 
to an end without the passage of school finance reform. Mathis (2000) summed up the 
legislative biennium in the following way: 
H.541 was politically impossible with a Republican Senate and an irate 
teachers’ union…. The House reform plan fell to a strange coalition of 
local autonomy protectors, a Republican controlled Senate, palace 
intrigue35 within the Democratic Party and the influence of the teachers’ 
union. (p. 13). 
 
According to Kingdon (1995), the survivability of a policy proposal is enhanced if 
it is technically feasible, congruent with the values of the policy community and in line 
with budgetary constraints. Although championed by powerful forces in the House, H. 
541 could not survive the opposition by Governor Howard Dean, powerful lobbying 
entities and the Senate Republican leadership to its radically different school finance plan 
which included an income tax, a statewide property tax and general fund tax increases. 
Mazzoni (1991) notes: “The macro arena expands and intensifies competition among 
contending interests, particularly if a redistributive issue is at stake” (p. 130). The 
House’s attempt to redistribute tax dollars from property wealthy towns to property poor 
towns through a statewide property tax and a guaranteed yield mechanism funded by a 
statewide property tax and an income tax galvanized opposition among a variety of well-
funded and powerful lobbying groups benefitting from the status quo and allowed these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 This comment refers to Wright’s plan to force the Senate Republican’s hand on passing 
their own regional tax sharing plan. The Republicans stood firm and forced House 
Democrats to cast the deciding vote against property tax reform that biennium. 
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groups to mobilize against reform plans. As one might expect of politics in the macro 
arena, the defense of the status quo relied upon dramatic predictions of economic doom 
and social dislocation should the House reform plan be enacted. These predictions 
resonated with legislators in the Senate and the 1993/94 biennium came to a close 
without the enactment of school finance reform legislation. 
Later that year, Governor Dean won an easy reelection contest by besting his 
Republican opponent, David Kelly, by approximately 50 percentage points (Pfeiffer, 
1994b). In the Legislature, the House maintained its large Democratic majority and the 
Senate picked up two additional Republican seats. Throughout that period, the property 
tax issue remained firmly situated in the macro arena. An October 1994 newspaper article 
profiling the upcoming state elections characterized high property taxes as “…the one 
overarching issue that seems to be resonating in campaigns for every office from state 
representative to governor” (Sneyd, 1994). Following the elections, a December 1994 
Rutland Herald poll found reducing property taxes to be the number one issue registered 
voters wanted the Legislature to tackle during the 1995 session (Hoffman, 1994k).  
This desire among voters was not terribly surprising given that FY 1995 saw 
general state aid to education drop yet again to 28.9 percent of total education funding, 
down from a high of 36.7 percent in FY 1988, the year the Foundation Plan went into 
effect36 (Benham, Klein & Williams, 1996). The decline in state aid continued to 
negatively impact many local school districts as “education spending was cost-shifted 
onto the property tax” (Informant 15). For example, the seven towns comprising the 
Addison Central Supervisory Union in central Vermont saw a combined 14 percent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




reduction in general state aid for the 1995/96 school (J. Lombardo, personal 
communication, April 28, 1994). To make up for the state shortfall, towns continued to 
increase local property taxes. In a memo to its members, the Vermont League of Cities 
and Towns highlighted that for the first time since the introduction of the income tax in 
the 1930s, the amount of property taxes collected in Vermont for FY 1995 exceeded the 
amount of general fund taxes collected. For that fiscal year, local municipalities collected 
$635 million in local property taxes versus $628 million in general fund taxes (R. Bast, 
VLCT, personal communication, October 6, 1995). The state’s practice of shifting 
education expenses on to the local property tax further exacerbated taxing disparities 
between property wealthy and property-poor communities (Vermont Department of 
Education, 1994; Informants 12, 13) and forced property taxes “to escalate at a rate that 
was not sustainable” (Informant 04).  
Macro Arena 
1995/1996 Biennium: Actors, Goals and Motives 
 
This section outlines those actors participating in the macro arena during the 
1995/96 legislative biennium. It also outlines their motivations for continuing to 
participate in the macro arena along with the policy goals they wished to achieve through 
their participation. Once again, consistent with Mazzoni’s (1991) expectations for the 
macro arena, the issue of school finance reform generated a high level of interest among a 
wide variety of interested parties both inside and outside of the state government during 
the 1995/96 legislative biennium. 
Governor Howard Dean 
As noted above, Howard Dean easily won his 1994 bid for reelection. One 
informant quipped that in the wake of his reelection “[t]he governor was more popular 
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than I ever hoped to be popular at home. Everyone thought he was just dandy.” 
(Informant 07). Dean took his huge victory to signal that his moderate course was 
popular with voters (Pfeiffer, 1994b) and commenced the 1995 session by proposing a 
“doable” agenda that included property tax reform as “…his top priority in the next 
session of the Legislature” (Hoffman, 1994k, p. 1).  
Sizing up Dean’s motivation to enter the school finance reform debate with his 
own proposal, two political analysts for the Vermont Press Bureau noted:  
Like any astute politician, Gov. Howard B. Dean knows how to sail with 
the political winds. One year ago Dean pushed the promise of health 
insurance for every Vermonter. After that fizzled in the Legislature, Dean 
took up property tax reform and made it a central issue of his re-election 
campaign. Now Vermont’s Democratic governor, entering his second full 
term, brings to the new year a new property tax plan…(Derby & Pfeiffer, 
1995, p.1)  
 
The two further noted that Dean’s approach to school finance reform would remain 
within the broader context of maintaining “a Republican-like vise on state spending” (p. 
1).  
Primary and secondary source documentary evidence reveals that Dean supported 
the passage of a moderate property tax reform bill at the onset of the 1995/96 biennium 
(Hoffman, 1994k; H. Dean, personal communication, October 10, 1994; Joint Fiscal 
Office, 1994). His bill – H.74, introduced by Representative Sean Campbell – sought to 
reduce property taxes for most residents by adding $25.7 million to the state aid for 
education budget. This additional $25.7 million would come from maintaining the fifth 
penny on the sales tax as well as the levying of a minimum $0.67 local property tax. This 
minimum property tax was designed to compel residents of towns with exceedingly low 
property tax rates to contribute to the state aid formula. Those towns that could afford to 
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fund their school budgets below the $0.67 minimum local property tax would have the 
difference collected by the state and added into the state coffers for redistribution through 
the Foundation Formula. The governor’s plan estimated that the minimum property tax 
would yield approximately $10 million in tax sharing dollars. In addition, the governor’s 
proposal reduced the state income tax from 25 percent to 24 percent, provided a $100.00 
tax credit to Vermont taxpayers earning less than $15,000, made local school districts 
responsible for funding teacher retirement plans, and imposed school district spending 
caps to ensure that the state aid went to property tax relief instead of larger local school 
budgets (H. 74, 1995). 
In a January 3, 1995 letter to Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee 
Oreste Valsangiacomo, Dean outlined four goals for his school finance proposal. They 
were: 1) to achieve greater equity in the property tax by reducing overall reliance on the 
property tax to fund education costs; 2) to exert downward pressure on education 
spending by denying state funding for spending above spending caps; 3) to make state 
funding for education more progressive by funneling money previously spent for 
teacher’s retirement through the state aid formula and by increasing the weight of the 
income factor in the Foundation Plan formula; and 4) to stimulate the economy and 
encourage the creation of jobs by reducing the income tax rate and granting a credit for 
low-income taxpayers (H. Dean, personal communication, January 3, 1995). Dean 
viewed his plan as both “affordable” and “equitable” (H. Dean, personal communication, 
October 10, 1994, p. 1). By supporting such a measure, he banked on the bill’s ability to 
provide a modicum of relief to property taxpayers without unduly harming the state’s 
economy. Characterizing Dean’s modest approach to school finance reform, one 
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informant remarked: “He thought at first, I think, that it could be solved in a less 
comprehensive way. As governor, he was incredibly conservative” (Informant 01).  
House Leadership 
 The House of Representatives returned for the start of the 1995/96 biennium with 
a significantly different leadership team at the helm. In an unanticipated upset, Speaker of 
the House Ralph Wright lost his bid for reelection in November 1994. Wright had seen 
his support erode in the face of his advocacy for the statewide teacher’s contract 
(Informants 02, 03). Rep. Michael Obuchowski, a long-term Democratic representative 
from the town of Bellows Falls captured the Speaker’s position. Although a strong 
liberal, Obuchowski signaled a break with the Wright era by promising a more 
conciliatory and less ideological approach to House leadership (Allen, 1994d.). School 
finance reform advocate, Paul Cillo, received a promotion to House Majority Leader. His 
school finance ally, John Freidin, took Cillo’s old position as the Vice Chair of the House 
Ways and Means Committee. 
Confirming the issue’s presence in the macro arena, the session began with 
several representatives introducing school finance reform bills for consideration during 
the 1995/96 biennium. In total, eight different pieces of school funding legislation were 
referred to the Ways and Means Committee. These bills ranged from structural overhauls 
of the system (e.g. John Freidin and Oreste Valsangiacomo’s local income tax proposal) 
to a modest Republican measure that sought to simply add additional sales tax dollars to 
the existing Foundation Plan (H. 115, 1995; H. 166, 1995). According to one legislator, 
property tax reform’s high profile compelled many representatives, including those not 
particularly familiar with the issue, to propose legislation as an easy way to acknowledge 
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their constituents’ concerns: “Nobody wants to say We don’t have a problem.’ It doesn’t 
take a whole lot of work to introduce a bill. You just grab a little stuff and then write 
something up” (Informant 07).  
Primary and secondary source data indicate that reform advocates Freidin and 
Cillo realized that the addition of two Republican seats in the Senate made the chances of 
passing a non-incremental piece of school finance legislation even less likely than it had 
been the previous biennium (Informants 07, 03; Hoffman, 1995a; Page, 1995; J. Freidin, 
personal communication, December 28, 1994). Reflecting upon his disappointment with 
legislative composition of the 1995/96 biennium, one pro-reform informant recalled: “It’s 
real obvious that there’s nothing going to happen of any consequence” (Informant 07). A 
political analyst writing for the Burlington Free Press summed up the early 1995 political 
landscape surrounding the issue of school finance reform in the following passage: 
A statewide teachers’ contract is dead. The idea never even made it to the 
table this year. The local income tax is almost certainly dead. Dean and 
the Senate are adamantly opposed. Expect the Ways and Means 
Committee to acknowledge this reality soon. As a corollary, there is no 
chance the Legislature will eliminate local school property taxes this year. 
That leaves the Ways and Means Committee with statewide sharing of 
property taxes as the only major reform with any chance of success. (Page, 
1995) 
 
Yielding to this political reality, Freidin and Cillo were forced to prioritize the 
five policy goals37 they had developed during the 1993/94 biennium. Consequently, they 
oversaw the creation of a Ways and Means Committee bill designed to appeal to both 
Governor Dean and moderate senators by foregoing the local residential income tax 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 According to informant reports, Freidin and Cillo’s five school finance policy goals 
included: 1) reducing property taxes; 2) equalizing the ability of all towns to raise money 
for public school; 3) basing the education tax on ability to pay; 4) taxing farm and forest 
land at its current use rate; and 5) ensuring that all towns – not just poor ones – have a 
stake in a school finance plan’s long-term viability (Informants 07, 08).  
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which had facilitated the duo’s goal of taxing based on ability to pay. They also 
eliminated “current use” provisions for the taxation of farm and forest land. According to 
one House leader, it was “a statewide property tax on all property. No split [between 
residential and non-residential]. No local income tax. Just property tax rates, so it solved 
the horizontal equity problem” (Informant 03).  
The new legislation, titled H.351, distributed state aid through a guaranteed yield 
formula that enabled each district to raise the same amount of revenue per pupil per 
penny of school property tax. The initial guaranteed yield set by H.351 was $42 per pupil 
per penny. Under the guaranteed yield system, districts that raised less per pupil than the 
equalized yield received the difference from a school board trust fund; districts that raised 
more than the equalized yield sent the excess to the school board trust fund. The bill’s 
authors estimated that approximately $19 million in sharing funds from 50 property-
wealthy towns would be generated in the plan’s first year of implementation. The 
legislation also called for an additional $60 million in new general fund taxes to replace 
the $60 million reduction in local property taxes. The bulk of these taxes would be raised 
through the extension of the fifth penny on the sales tax and a two percent increase in the 
rooms and meals tax. Finally, the measure provided a homestead exemption of 50 percent 
capped at $25,000. (Sneyd, 1995c; H.351, 1995; Vermont Legislative Council, 1995a).  
According to documentary and informant data sources, this bill reflected the 
House leadership’s primary motivation to address the school finance issue by reducing 
the spending and taxing disparities between property-poor and property-rich school 
districts by evening out the ability of school districts to raise money through an equalized 
tax effort. In short, it sought to “put the resources of the whole state behind the education 
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of every Vermont child” (Freidin, 1995). It also had the desired effect of putting all towns 
on the same footing in terms of requiring state support. This outcome was a key goal for 
both Cillo and Freidin. Regarding this point of view, Freidin (1995a) noted in his speech 
introducing H.351: 
For property tax relief to be sustainable – to prevent it from melting away 
as it has done every other time this legislature has changed its education 
finance system – the new system must differ from all those of the past in 
one simple but fundamental way: the new system must be able to attract 
7638 votes for the annual appropriation needed to give Vermonters tax 
relief. (pp. 2-3) 
 
As one newspaper editorial put it, a major outcome of the bill would be to make sure all 
school districts would  “…squawk if the state tried to shirk its duty…” with regard to 
adequately funding schools (“Now is the time,” 1995, p. 14). 
While Cillo and Freidin were ambivalent about the bill’s heavy reliance upon the 
use of the property taxes to fund schools because it did not address their ability to pay 
concerns,39 the two regarded some measure of structural reform as better than simply 
adding state funds to the existing aid formula, as advocated by more conservative-minded 
legislators (Informants 07, 03; Hoffman, 1995b; Sneyd, 1995b). In a memo to his fellow 
Ways and Means Committee members regarding H.351, Freidin displayed his mixed 
feelings concerning the bill when he wrote:   
Personally, I still believe that H.11540 – with its guaranteed yield local 
income tax – provides the best answer to school finance, for it enacts a 
system whereby Vermonters pay for schools according to their ability to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The number 76 reflects the number of votes a bill would need to receive a majority 
vote in the Vermont House of Representatives. 
39 Ability to pay is more formally known in school finance reform discussions as “vertical 
equity.” 
40 H.115 was the bill sponsored by John Freidin and Oreste Valsangiacomo. It closely 
mirrored Cillo and Freidin’s H.541 of the previous biennium in that it called for a local 
income tax and statewide nonresidential property tax. 
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pay – their taxable incomes – and whereby each town has an equalized 
ability to raise revenue to educate its children. I campaigned on that plan, 
and I hope that someday this legislature will adopt it. But today is not that 
day. This is not the time to try to pass an income-based school finance 
plan….  So I think we should aspire to what we can reach. (Personal 
communication, February 16, 1995, p. 1) 
 
Concurring with Freidin, House Majority Leader Cillo deemed the plan “… a moderate 
proposal that delivers substantial property tax relief to Vermonters” (Hoffman, 1995b, p. 
14).  
Senate Leadership 
 The 1995/96 biennium saw the leadership of the Senate significantly changed as 
well. Just a few weeks before the legislative session was set to begin, President Pro 
Tempore John Bloomer died in an automobile accident. In the wake of his death, the 
senate elected Finance Chair Stephen Webster as the new President Pro Tempore. Fellow 
Finance Committee member Sara Gear was elected to the position of Senate Majority 
Leader following John Carroll’s departure to run for a seat in the U.S. House of 
Representatives.   
 Multiple primary and secondary sources indicated that the senate leadership, 
pressured from constituents suffering under the weight of increased property taxes, 
showed signs of being open to collaborating with the House in the beginning weeks of 
the 1995 session to address Vermont’s school funding/property tax issue (Informants 03, 
17, 07, 02, 19; Page, 1995). For example, in personal communication to Representative 
John Freidin, pro-reform ally Micque Glitman wrote: “…I have become more optimistic, 
strictly due to Webster’s ascendency and the public comments he has made about 
property tax reform. Webster’s support deradicalizes and gives a public tip of the hat to 
bi-partisanship” (Personal communication, January 18, 1995, p. 3). One informant 
	  
 258 
detailed a meeting he had with President Pro Tempore Webster regarding the 
development of a compromise bill: 
So I met with him and said, “Look, the Senate said they didn’t want a non-
residential statewide property tax, they didn’t want a local income tax and 
they didn’t want more than $25 million in revenue. If I pull a bill together 
that does that, is it something you can pass?” (Informant 03) 
 
According to the informant, Webster gave a positive response and that legislator believed 
“the door was open” to negotiation. Newspaper reports substantiate the informant’s 
description of events. A February article in the Rutland Herald notes that Senate Pro 
Tempore Stephen Webster received the House’s school finance reform proposal 
favorably and commended its willingness to drop the income tax provision that had been 
a part of the last biennium’s school finance reform bill (Hoffman, 1995b). Documentary 
evidence also indicates that he worked with Senate Minority Leader Peter Shumlin to 
design a property tax reform plan that was philosophically similar to that put forth by the 
House (Vermont Legislative Council, 1995b). 
 Interview informants and newspaper reports indicate that Senate Majority Leader 
Sara Gear was also involved in working to find common ground between House and 
Senate leaders on the school finance issue (Informants 02, 19, 17; Bloomer, 1995; Sneyd, 
1995d). One proximate informant observed: 
Paul [Cillo] and John [Freidin] had cut a deal with the Senate Majority 
Leader… Some kind of an arrangement that would have made it 
somewhat easier for the property-poor school districts to fund their 
education programs. And she went along with it, Sara Gear. She was the 
Senate Majority Leader. (Informant 19) 
 
Additionally, a March 6, 1995 article in the Rutland Herald indicated that Senate and 
House leadership had agreed on the broad outline of school finance reform that included 
property tax sharing and that H.351 reflected these agreements (Bloomer, 1995). 
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 Assessing Gear’s motivation for her conciliatory approach towards House 
Democrats’ school finance reform efforts, one proximate observer commented: 
I know [Gear] never wanted to go as far as Ralph Wright, in particular, 
wanted but she was willing to try to do something. She could see it. She 
came from Burlington and Burlington wasn’t one of the poor towns, but it 
also wasn’t one of the gold towns. She could see how it would help her 
constituents. And because she was a senator, she also represented all of the 
county and she had towns that were doing poorly. She was from the old 
New England Republicans and was willing to meet Democrats half way. 
(Informant 17) 
 
However, primary and secondary source data reveal that many within the Senate 
Republican rank and file did not support the tax sharing measures touted by the House 
leadership for financial as well as ideological reasons. For example, Senator Ruth Harvie 
of Windsor County disliked the House bill because it would raise property taxes for 
residents in 10 of the 24 towns in her district. In addition, as the owner of a bed and 
breakfast, she feared that increasing the rooms and meals tax by two percentage points 
would have negative repercussions for the state’s tourism industry (Gregg, 1995). Other 
senators could not accept state control of property tax revenues. A Republican senator 
typifies this point of view in the following statement: “My perception was [the bill] was 
probably good for every property taxpayer in my district but I was still hung up on local 
control” (Informant 02). Another Republican senator who considered himself a moderate 
found this sentiment prevalent among his fellow Republican caucus members: 
I think I was one of the few Republicans, there weren’t many, that were 
supporting a statewide funding mechanism. Because Vermont is made up 
of so many very, very small towns, local control is really thought of as the 
way the state needs to operate and to even consider letting the state have 
more control over our local schools was not a popular idea. (Informant 04) 
 
Sensing the membership’s unease with the reform plan under discussion, Senate leaders 
took the highly unusual step of holding a secret caucus meeting at a hotel in the 
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neighboring town of Berlin, Vermont. There, the Senate leadership held a straw vote 
where they found very little support among the Republican base for any property tax 
reform plan that included a tax sharing provision (Pfeiffer, 1995).  
Lieutenant Governor Barbara Snelling 
 In the wake of John Bloomer’s death and John Carroll’s departures from the 
Senate, Lieutenant Governor Barbara Snelling emerged as the respected elder 
statesperson of the Republican coalition (Informants 17, 02). As the 1995/96 biennium 
commenced, Snelling was coming off a close victory against her liberal Democratic 
opponent, Douglas Racine, a former Vermont state senator from Richmond. Poll 
watchers defined this race as a test of ideology. Although previously considered a 
moderate, she cast herself for this election as a “Ronald Reagan-style” tax cutter opposed 
to the “tax and spend” ways of her liberal opponent (Pfeiffer, 1994c).  
Documentary and informant data indicate that during the 1995/96 biennium, 
Snelling served as a conservative counterweight to the newly elected, more moderate 
Senate Republican leadership and offered a strong and clear voice against property tax 
sharing and tax increases (Informants 17, 07; Pfeiffer, 1994a; Pfeiffer, 1994c; Freyne, 
1996). For example, in her capacity as an opposition party lieutenant governor, Snelling 
developed Republican legislative priorities for the 1995/96 biennium. Included in these 
priorities was the statement: “Resist proposals for funding education that introduce any 
form of a statewide property tax” (Snelling, 1995, p. 5). According to primary and 
secondary source data, Snelling resisted a statewide property tax because she mistrusted 
“Montpelier’s” ability to spend local money wisely and, second, the increased taxes in 
gold towns would be bad for business (Pfeiffer, 1995; B. Snelling, personal 
	  
 261 
communication, May 31, 1995; “If you think,” 1995). Instead, as a means to reduce the 
state’s property taxes, Snelling proposed short-term “relief” through funding of 
Vermont’s low-income property tax rebate program (S. 322, 1996) and long-term cuts to 
education spending as recommended in the Republican Education Financing Reform 
Committee’s Challenge to Change (1995) publication, which had been commissioned by 
her office. 
Business Organizations 
 The goals and motivations of the business community with regard to school 
finance reform for the 1995/96 biennium remained largely the same as those for the 
1993/94 biennium in that they were motivated by a desire to prevent the imposition of 
additional taxes on businesses and business owners. As one legislative informant noted: 
“…all the [lobbying organizations] that were from the for profit sector, from the ski areas 
to the accountants, every single one of them was against [property tax sharing]” 
(Informant 07). A representative from the business community concurred, stating: “All of 
the business groups were pretty much opposed to the bill” (Informant 11). 
However, while in the previous biennium the business community highlighted the 
negative impacts of high income taxes on businesses and the economy, organizations 
such as the Vermont Chamber of Commerce and the Vermont Lodging and Restaurant 
Association now focused on the negative repercussions that higher property taxes in gold 
towns resulting from property tax sharing schemes would have on the state economy. 
According to the business insider mentioned above: “There was definitely concern that 
increased property taxes on second homes would hurt Vermont’s tourist economy” 
(Informant 11). To that end, these organizations opposed even the modest property tax 
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sharing advocated by Governor Dean in his school finance reform proposal and charged 
that his plan raised “serious economic development issues relating to business investment 
in low tax recreational and resort towns (Lake Champlain Regional Chamber of 
Commerce et al., business correspondence, January 11, 1995, p. 2).  
One informant highlighted the perceived interconnectedness between the state’s 
economic health and the gold town’s business interests among members of the business 
community when he noted:  
I think the Chamber of Commerce sees the ski industry as important to the 
state so, you know, they’re not going to say anything… The Chamber of 
Commerce isn’t going to come out and support something that raises taxes 
on the resorts. Even if it benefits somebody else, they’re not going to do 
that. (Informant 18) 
 
An executive at a leading Vermont business organization supported this informant’s 
view: 
 
The winter recreation economy, and the downhill industry in particular, is 
hugely important to Vermont’s winter economy. The winter economy is 
based on snow, snow, and snow and I am not underestimating that. Ski 
areas contribute tremendously to the state economy. Tourism is Vermont’s 
biggest industry. Without the winter recreation industry we would be in 
deep doo-doo. It is critically important to the economic well being of the 
state…. There was definitely concern that increased property taxes on 
second homes would hurt Vermont’s tourist economy. We thought 
increased taxes would be detrimental to the second home community. 
(Informant 11) 
 
Ray Ault, representing the Vermont Association of Realtors, summed up the business 
community’s position in testimony before the Senate Finance Committee when he 
commented: “We are against a statewide property tax in any form” (Sneyd, 1996b, p. 16).   
Gold Towns/Ski Areas 
 Primary and secondary source data indicate that gold towns and ski areas 
remained more opposed than ever to the various school finance reform plans proposed 
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during the 1995/96 biennium. During the 1995/96 biennium, the median school property 
tax rate in Vermont was $1.30 per $100 of assessed property value. However, gold towns 
enjoyed substantially lower property tax rates. For example, taxpayers from the town of 
Stowe paid $0.66 per $100 of assessed property value; taxpayers from the town of 
Sherburne possessed a school property tax rate of $0.33; and, at the extreme, the town of 
Stratton paid a tax rate of just $0.05 per $100 of assessed property value (Freidin, 1996). 
For taxpayers from gold towns such as these, the passage of either the House or the 
governor’s proposal would mean significantly higher property taxes with the money 
derived from those taxes being diverted to needy towns to help even out the state’s 
widely disparate property tax base. Informants explain gold town residents’ opposition to 
local property tax sharing provisions in the following passages: 
…what it meant for them is that their tax rates would go up. Bottom line 
they had to pay more money. Because [with] a lot of tax base [and] not 
many kids, they didn’t have to contribute much and so those towns could 
put on a pretty nice facility, educational program and spread around a 
large tax base. (Informant 16) 
 
…it is very difficult for people who have had a certain draw and resources 
to pay for their schools to have decisions about how much they would 
have in the future taken over by the state. I mean, they still have the 
decision but they have to live with the consequences on an equal basis 
with everybody else… (Informant 20) 
 
[Stowe] said, “If we want to spend $1.00 on our schools, we have to raise 
like $7.00 in taxes in order to do it. We’ll put all our businesses out of 
business. We’ll drive people out of their homes.” (Informant 05) 
 
Feeling threatened, gold town residents railed against being singled out for paying 
additional taxes through the tax sharing mechanisms included in both Governor Dean’s 
and the Ways and Means Committee’s bills. For example Edward Warner, a resident of 
Rutland Town decried property tax sharing as “socialism.” Another Rutland Town 
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resident, John Flory, called such measures the product of a “dictatorship” and questioned 
their fairness: “What they’re actually doing is penalizing the well-to-do towns. It’s not 
fair to put that burden suddenly on our town” stated John Flory, a Rutland Town select 
board member (Bloomer, 1995, p. 11). These sentiments were supported in informant 
interviews where one gold town resident reflecting on the Legislature’s plan for property 
tax sharing noted: “That’s not the political system in the United States. We’re all for 
safety nets. We’re not for socialism” (Informant 05).  
Vermont League of Cities and Towns 
 The motivations and goals for the Vermont League of Cities and Towns remained 
largely the same for the 1995/96 biennium as they had been during the 1993/94 
biennium. The VLCT justified its continued involvement in the school finance reform 
issue because as it noted in a memo to municipal officers “…two-thirds of the revenues 
from [towns’] only tax base must now be used to fund schools” (R. Bast, VLCT, personal 
communication, October 13, 1995, p.2). As state aid to education continued to be level 
funded under the Dean administration, the burden of funding schools increasingly fell 
upon local property taxes. As a result, the organization’s highest legislative priority for 
the 1995/96 biennium was “…the reduction in the burden on the property tax.” They 
sought to achieve this goal by having “the state pay for one-half the total cost of 
education in the state” through increased broad based general fund taxes (R. Bast, VLCT, 
personal communication, October 6, 1995, p. 2). 
Throughout this period, the League continued to oppose a statewide property tax 
on the basis that it was an encroachment upon the towns’ sole revenue source (Informants 
09, 16, 21). As one official affiliated with the VLCT noted: 
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I think that there were enough people that were either a) alright under the 
property tax and b) who were very concerned about giving the state the 
property tax that we were able to continue to have a rather substantial 
majority of municipal officials who were opposed to a statewide property 
tax. (Informant 09) 
 
Not surprisingly, primary and secondary source data reveal that the VLCT 
opposed both the governor’s and the House Ways and Means Committee’s bill because 
each measure continued the state’s heavy reliance upon the local property tax and 
included a property tax sharing mechanism which the League considered to be 
tantamount to the levying of a statewide property tax (Jeffrey & Horn, 1995). VLCT 
Executive Director Steven Jeffrey was quoted in a newspaper report opposing even the 
governor’s minimum education tax on the basis that it “would simply open the door to a 
broader state property tax” (Hoffman, 1994l, p. 7). While Jeffrey opposed the property 
tax sharing mechanism, he favored the House’s guaranteed yield system. However, he 
believed that the guaranteed yield should be funded exclusively from general fund tax 
dollars rather than through property tax dollars (Hoffman, 1995b; Informant 09).  
Pro-School Finance Reform Groups/American Civil Liberties Union  
  Primary and secondary source information indicates that the entrance of the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) into the macro arena during the 1995 legislative 
session invigorated the pro-school finance reform camp. The ACLU had become 
motivated to investigate the issue during the failed, highly partisan legislative battle of 
1994 (Informant 19). In the wake of the legislature’s inability to find consensus on the 
matter, pro-reform advocates brought the idea of suing the state as a means of compelling 
the legislature to reform the state’s funding system to the attention of the organization’s 
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screening panel. According a ACLU-affiliated informant, the ACLU “literally knew zero 
about the problem” but decided to look further into it:  
I had a pretty good understanding of how uneven property taxation was 
and I’d never done anything about it. But I thought about it and it was 
really extreme here in Vermont. Very, very low tax rates in some towns 
and very, very high tax rates in others, depending on what was there…. It 
really was brand new. It was a brand new issue to me. (Informant 19) 
 
After a review of the facts surrounding the case, interested volunteer lawyers led 
by Robert Gensburg began to examine their options for bringing suit against the state 
based on high correlation between local property wealth and property tax rates. The 
informant continued: 
I remember when I first started doing this I looked at the data. I looked at 
the data that was involved and we had a much worse problem here [than in 
other states]. Our level of state aid was the second worst in the country. 
South Dakota was first. Mississippi was third. When the issue was 
presented to my colleagues and me, I mean to me it was pretty clear. It 
jumped right out at me once I had an understanding of what was actually 
happening here and how unfair it was. (Informant 19) 
 
In a commentary piece for the Burlington Free Press, Attorney Gensburg laid out the 
ACLU’s justification for considering a school finance lawsuit against the state of 
Vermont: 
People who live in property-wealthy towns should pay their fair share of 
the cost of educating the state’s children, and this undoubtedly means they 
will pay more taxes in some form…. Constitutional fairness means that 
people living in Stannard and Hardwick not be compelled to pay more 
than people living in Peru or Plymouth to educate the state’s school 
children. ACLU’s lawsuit is about kids and about fairness. We are 
disappointed that the Legislature, for whatever reason, has been unable to 
work for Vermont’s school kids and for fairness. It has become necessary 
to ask our courts to tell the Legislature to do so. (Gensburg, 1995, p. 5E) 
 
In legal terms, the ACLU’s case was founded upon the Vermont constitution’s equal 
protection clause which in other states had been interpreted to mean that a state’s laws 
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should not discriminate against one set of citizens based upon where they live with regard 
to the provision of a fundamental right, which in this case was education. As one ACLU-
affiliated informant noted: 
Frankly, it didn’t take long for me to realize there really was a serious 
equal protection problem. I remember the numbers because it was so 
extreme but in 1995, one school district the [property tax] rate was $0.02 
per $100 of valuation – these are outliers but still they’re there – and the 
other extreme was $2.40 per $100 of valuation. (Informant 19) 
 
In seeking a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court on the equal protection issue, 
Gensburg’s main goal was to compel the legislature to enact a school aid formula that 
relied upon the resources of the state, rather than the resources of a local jurisdiction, to 
fund public schools. As one informant noted: “Equal educational opportunity was [the 
ACLU’s] goal and they were defining that financially” (Informant 05). 
Macro Arena 
1995/96 Biennium: Actors’ Resources and Strategies 
 
 This section describes the resources and strategies utilized by those actors 
participating in the macro arena. In this biennium, as in the previous one, the tone of 
participant interactions continued to be highly partisan and reflected key differences in 
worldview. In the macro arena, actors once again relied on the media, powerful symbols 
and dire predictions for Vermont’s future to help win votes for their side.  
House Leadership 
The pro-school finance reform contingent within the House of Representatives 
gained significant positional authority in the 1995/96 biennium as Paul Cillo became 
House Majority Leader and John Freidin took over Cillo’s position as the Vice Chair of 
the Ways and Means Committee. As a result, the two gained substantial legislative 
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resources, including an increased ability to set the policy agenda, enhanced access to the 
media and expanded authority over bills leaving the Ways and Means Committee. 
However, these House leaders also understood that the Senate’s pick up of two 
additional Republican seats in the November 1994 election made finding a compromise 
measure all the more important if they wanted to see a piece of structural school finance 
reform legislation successfully enacted into law (J. Freidin, personal communication, 
December 28, 1994). As one Democratic strategist put it: “Unless and until the make-up 
of the general assembly changes, any attempt to pass broad property tax reform will be 
wheel spinning…” (M. Glitman, personal correspondence, January 18, 1995). 
Consequently, Cillo and Freidin’s main strategy focused on developing a compromise 
position to win over Governor Dean and the Senate leadership, whose approval would be 
critical to the passage of any school finance reform bill. In personal correspondence to 
Cillo, Freidin (December 28, 1994) outlined the concessions the House leadership would 
be willing to make in order to obtain a deal with the governor and the Senate 
Republicans. These concessions included: 1) that school taxes would not be based on 
ability to pay (i.e. income tax); and 2) that new general fund taxes would be limited to 
those acceptable to the governor such as maintaining the fifth cent on the sales tax, 
property tax sharing among towns or a possible increase to the rooms and meals tax. 
Their positional authority within the House allowed Cillo and Freidin the ability 
to enter into negotiations with Senate leaders to determine acceptable parameters for a 
school funding bill (Informants 03, 19, 07). It subsequently enabled them to craft a 
compromise position in the Ways and Means Committee without dissenting factions 
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obstructing their efforts. A proximate observer described the critical roles played by Cillo 
and Freidin in passing school finance legislation in the new biennium: 
Now Oreste Valsangiacomo, he was an elderly man. He was chair of that 
[the House Ways and Means] committee but the real people who were 
doing the moving and shaking were John Freidin as the Vice Chair and 
Paul Cillo who was Majority Leader. It was basically, what they would do 
is… there’s this house next to the capitol building up on the second floor. 
That little room up there is where they would do all of the computer runs 
and the modeling and what have you. It was basically Paul Cillo and John 
who were doing the masterminding. Figuring all these things out and 
making them so they would pass the Ways and Means Committee and 
pass the House. (Informant 12) 
 
The bill that emerged from the House Ways and Means Committee reformed 
school funding in Vermont within the parameters negotiated between House and Senate 
leaders in that it included neither a statewide property tax nor an income tax. Governor 
Dean supported the compromise approach and urged House members to pass something 
the Senate could accept (Page, 1995; Associated Press, 1995). Freidin’s memo to House 
Ways and Means Committee members discussing their school funding bill highlighted 
the compromise provisions included in the measure: 
Having spoken to R[epublican]s and D[emocrat]s, to members of the 
House and the Senate, I believe we should build our bill within the 
parameters that a majority of members are willing to consider. (We must 
not allow the ideal to become the antagonist of the good). I think those 
parameters are: 1) no local income tax; 2) continuation of a property-based 
tax system; 3) approximately $60 million of broad based taxes to replace 
$60 million of property taxes; 4) modest tax sharing among the towns; 5) 
reasonable restraints on spending. (Those towns which spend the most 
should have to tax themselves the most. The less a town spends, the lower 
its tax rate will be. No more new Cadillacs at used Subaru prices); and 6) 
taxation of eligible farm and forest land at use value. (Personal 
communication, February 16, 1995, pp. 1-2) 
 
In keeping with their conciliatory approach, the Ways and Means leadership 
created a bill that was broadly similar to the school funding measure proposed by 
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Governor Dean in that it did not rely on the income tax, required sharing of property 
taxes between property-wealthy and property-poor school districts and relied heavily on 
the sales tax for additional revenue. The bill also closely mirrored an alternate provision 
being developed at the time in the Senate Finance Committee by Senators Stephen 
Webster and Peter Shumlin (Vermont Legislative Council, 1995b). 
Cillo and Freidin’s deep technical comprehension of school funding formulas 
allowed them to understand that there was more than one way to achieve their goals. 
H.351 was a vastly different bill from H.541. However, both forwarded the goals of 
evening out the tax base and ensuring that all towns had a stake in keeping the state aid 
formula fully funded, even if H.351 was not reform advocates’ preferred method. In 
addition, their clear goals and persistence enabled them to “…not allow the ideal to 
become the antagonist of the good” as they worked towards passing a more generally 
accepted school finance package. As one informant noted: 
[Paul] now knew this stuff inside out and he could essentially turn it in to 
anything he wanted to do. You know, give him the criteria, he’ll make this 
perform. You know, an equalized yield system, it was a messy system. 
Bad policy, but it worked. The numbers worked. (Informant 03) 
 
Once the bill was written and approved by the Ways and Means Committee by an 
8-3 margin, House leaders turned to selling the bill to the rest of the legislature and the 
public at large. Documentary and interview data indicate that House Democrats were 
very much aware that Senate Republicans had successfully branded H.541 as “ too 
radical” in the previous biennium (Informant 03; J. Freidin, personal communication, 
December 28 1994; M. Glitman, personal communication, January 29, 1995; Hoffman, 
1995b) In the new legislative session, they aimed to publicly position H.351 as a 
reasonable compromise measure. For example, Speaker of the House Michael 
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Obuchowski characterized H.351 as “…an honest compromise on behalf of the House 
made in good faith” (Sneyd, 1995a). An informant confirmed this House Democrat 
strategy when he noted: “We just kept repeating, ‘The Senate said this, the Senate said 
that, the Senate said this and this bill is all of those things…’”  (Informant 03). The 
Democratic leadership’s use of compromise in crafting H.351 not only enhanced the 
likelihood of passing a structural reform measure, but also provided potential political 
leverage if Republicans balked by making them seem disingenuous about their desire for 
reform. 
Throughout the 1995 session, John Freidin emerged as the public face of the 
House’s pro-reform contingent. He utilized his media savvy to convey a message of 
moderation. To do so he engaged in multiple policy debates on the issue and wrote 
numerous newspaper commentaries in which he emphasized the bill’s fairness and 
invoked the words of previous Republican governors in an attempt to bolster the middle-
of-the-road nature of the Ways and Means Committee bill. For example, in an April 7th 
Readers Forum printed in the Burlington Free Press, Freidin (1995b) countered a 
Republican critic by saying:  
[Luther] Hackett’s ideas are also a major departure from traditional 
Vermont views eloquently expressed by Republican Governor Deane 
Davis 25 years ago: “The people of the state want… every child… to have 
the opportunity for a good education… whether that child lives in a rich or 
a poor family… a rich or a poor town.” (p. 7A) 
 
Again, in a prepared statement for a debate on the Chittenden County local access 
television show Point, Counterpoint, Freidin (1995) commented:  
As Governors [Deane] Davis and [Richard] Snelling urged, H.351 puts the 
resources of the whole state behind the education of every Vermont child. 
H.351 says that all 100,000 Vermont students are the students of Vermont, 
not merely of their hometowns. And that for the sake of Vermont as well 
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as the sake of each one of these students, they all deserve a fair chance for 
a good education. (p. 2) 
 
On March 2, 1995, H. 351 received final approval in the House of 
Representatives. Typical of a compromise measure, liberal legislators disliked that the 
“ability to pay” provisions had been removed while conservative legislators thought that 
the tax sharing provisions of the bill went too far (Sneyd, 1995a; Sneyd, 1995b; Sneyd, 
1995e). Exemplifying the latter’s perspective was Representative Rene Blanchard of 
Essex. In his floor remarks, Blanchard outlined the three key reasons why many 
representatives did not lend their support to H.351: 
I cannot support this bill for the following reasons: 1) This bill has 
devastating economic impacts on my community, both the residential and 
commercial sectors; 2) This bill strips the local governments of the state 
their last remaining taxing authority, namely the property tax; 3) Lastly, I 
feel that this bill is a non-incentive/non-growth bill, which sends the 
message that Vermont is anti-business. (Journal of the Vermont House of 
Representatives, 1995, p. 421) 
 
However, thanks to the positional authority of the pro-reform contingent in the House, 
these critiques did not gain traction in the form of amendments and the bill easily passed 
in the House by a healthy margin of 89-54 (Sneyd, 1995c; Sneyd, 1995f).  
Senate Leadership 
Although imbued with the institutional authority that accompanied their positions, 
the Senate Republican leadership team was new and untested. Being new to the positions, 
neither President Pro Tempore Stephen Webster nor Senate Majority Leader Sara Gear 
could count on the political resources that those in leadership positions traditionally 
accrue over time through demonstrations of power and effectiveness. For example, they 
lacked the ability to call in accumulated favors or chits from reluctant legislators, they 
were not feared because they did not yet have a track record of retaliation for 
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disobedience, and as novices, their names did not help candidates win elections in their 
home districts. As a result, they lacked the institutional resources generally associated 
with leadership positions. 
The two also appeared to lack an understanding of the Republican membership’s 
mood on the key issue of school finance reform. Primary and secondary source data 
indicate that both Webster and Gear were noticeably more willing than their base to stake 
out a compromise position on the issue of school finance (Informants 02, 19, 10, 17, 03; 
Vermont Legislative Council, 1995b; Hoffman, 1995b; Bloomer, 1995; Sneyd, 1995d). 
This truth was revealed to them during the straw poll taken at the extraordinary secret 
Republican caucus meeting on March 15, 1995. At this meeting, the rank and file 
membership rejected their leadership’s plans for passing a compromise school funding 
bill. 
Sara Gear abruptly withdrew her support for property tax sharing based on the 
results of the straw poll (Informant 19). In announcing her decision, she noted: “I have 
not given up on the fact that we may well do some sharing at the appropriate time. The 
appropriate time is not this year” (Sneyd, 1995d, p. 1). In press statements, Gear claimed 
that she revoked her support due to fears that Vermont could not afford the tax increases 
outlined in the House bill. (Sneyd, 1995d, Hoffman, 1995c). However, informants 
attributed her change of heart to political realities (Informants 04, 17, 02, 10). A 
proximate observer described Gear’s predicament as follows: “I would say in Sara’s 
defense, I think she was serious about trying to appeal and she couldn’t get it through her 
caucus” (Informant 17). A Republican Senate member supported this analysis:  “Sara 
Gear couldn’t round up the Republicans in the Senate on that and I was one of those in 
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that I wasn’t getting anywhere with the revenue sharing at that point” (Informant 02) 
Another Republican recalled: “Sara Gear couldn’t really get anything going…. My real 
conservative colleagues didn’t want the state involved at all” (Informant 04).  
Democrats, pro-reform advocates and Governor Dean were stunned by the news 
of Gear’s reversal (Sneyd, 1995d; Informants 19, 10). Speaker of the House Michael 
Obuchowski responded to her announcement by saying: “That’s completely contrary to 
everything we’ve been told. If it’s true, we’re utterly disappointed, especially based on 
representations that have been made to us” (Sneyd, 1995d, p. 1, 6). Gear came under 
serious political fire for her change of heart on the school funding bill. One newspaper 
report noted: “Senator Sara Gear has been publicly denounced as a traitor and a liar who, 
on the issue of property tax reform, caters to the rich at the expense of the poor” (Allen, 
1995 p. 11). Angry constituents sent letters such as the following one from the town of 
Middlebury’s Board of Selectmen:  
It is with great disappointment that the Middlebury Board of Selectmen 
views the apparent failure of property tax reform in the legislature this 
year. We expected progress. We do not find it acceptable that the 
legislature has apparently capitulated in the face of complexity and is 
apparently unwilling or unable to even fashion a plan which will head us 
in the direction of equitable funding for education…. We recognize and 
appreciate those legislators who have worked long and hard toward 
changing the inequities of the present system. At the same time we deplore 
the actions of those legislators who have refused to participate in the 
creation of meaningful change. (Organizational communication, March 
28, 1995, p. 1) 
 
In the wake of the Republican caucus revolt, further attempts at school finance 
reform in the Senate proved to no avail. Demonstrating the limits of positional authority, 
not even the powerful Senate Pro Tempore Stephen Webster, described in newspaper 
reports as a “lonely voice inside his caucus for a statewide property tax” (Derby, 1996, p. 
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10), could muster the votes needed to pass a property tax sharing measure out of the 
Senate Finance Committee, which he chaired (Allen, 1995b; Informant 10).  
Finally, in the waning days of the 1996 legislative session the Senate passed a 
meager property tax relief measure that included a $10,000 homestead deduction for 
FY1998, education spending caps, and a plan for reducing block grant contributions for 
transportation, special education and teacher retirement costs to property wealthy towns 
(H.351 Senate Proposal of Amendment, 1996). In the end, the issue of property tax 
sharing simply proved to be too divisive for the Senate’s Republican caucus. As one 
legislative watcher noted: “…until the court ruled [in the Brigham case], it was the 
Republican’s problem that they couldn’t figure out what to proactively promote” 
(Informant 17). Seeking to explain the lack of Republican support for structural change in 
the way schools received state aid, Senate Pro Tempore Webster commented in news 
reports that the idea of property tax sharing “…panicked a lot of people in the business 
community” and “just built up enormous resistance” in the minds of legislators (Derby, 
1996, p. 10).  
Governor Howard Dean 
 As governor, Howard Dean possessed ample resources to impact the school 
finance reform debate. Chief among them were his widespread popularity, his reputation 
as a moderating voice, his ability to attract media attention and his ability to set the 
political agenda (RDH, 9/23/94; Informants 07, 02, 15, 05, 08; Becker Institute, 1995b). 
Before the start of the biennium, Dean used his school finance reform plan (which would 
subsequently become H.74) to tout his bona fides as moderate on the campaign trail. In 
this way he was able to get out ahead of an issue that figured prominently in the minds of 
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many Vermonters as indicated by polling data (Hoffman, 1994i; Becker Institute, 1995a). 
As early as September 1994, Dean signaled the contours of his bill to the news media 
through press briefings (Hoffman, 1994h; Page, 1994). All but ignoring his attempt to 
revolutionize the provision of health care in Vermont during the previous biennium, Dean 
recast himself as the consummate moderate when he commented on his school finance 
plan: “I’ve always believed that if you do things moderately, they have a much better 
chance of working than if you try to reform the whole thing in a single year” (Hoffman, 
1994h p. 8). 
Dean’s moderate approach received plaudits from editorial writers who approved 
of him “taking the initiative” on the issue as opposed to ceding control to the legislature 
as he had done in the previous biennium (“Dean’s Tax Plan,” 1994). Two Rutland Herald 
reporters handicapping the new legislative session noted: “The fact that he has an 
approach at all, and a bill, differs from last year’s session when he let lawmakers take the 
lead” (Derby & Pfeiffer, 1995, p 4.) By taking a stand on school funding reform, Dean 
not only set the agenda for the coming legislative session but also established the basis 
for what passed as a “moderate” school finance reform bill. Importantly, Dean placed his 
“moderate” imprimatur on the concept of property tax sharing through his inclusion of a 
$0.67 minimum property tax. The perception of Dean’s plan as a middle-of-the-road 
approach received an additional boost when Democratic leaders such as Speaker of the 
House Ralph Wright and Senate Education Committee Member Jeb Spaulding criticized 
it for providing too little relief, despite the inclusion of a property tax sharing provision 
(Page, 1994).  
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Once his bill was submitted, Dean took on the role of cheerleader, urging the 
House to pass a bill that the Senate would find acceptable (Associated Press, 1995; Page, 
1995). Dean’s cheerleading for a moderate approach appeared to have had some 
influence since the House bill contained some elements similar to those found in his bill 
(e.g. local property tax sharing and the use of sales tax dollars to fund the reform 
package). Of course, House leaders also knew that a moderate approach was their only 
viable solution in the face of an increasingly Republican Senate. 
Ultimately, however, Dean proved to be dissatisfied with the House bill. 
According to news reports, Dean did not communicate his dissatisfaction during House 
negotiations to help ensure that a bill passed (Sneyd, 1995g). However, once the bill had 
passed, Dean sent his Secretary of Administration William Sorrell to testify before the 
Senate Finance Committee where he offered the administration’s point-by-point critique 
of H.351. Specifically, the Dean administration contended: 1) that the House’s financial 
assumptions were overly optimistic; 2) that gold towns would not maintain their current 
per-pupil funding in the face of large tax increases, thus threatening the amount of money 
available for the guaranteed yield; 3) that the homestead exemption was a tax shift to 
businesses; and 4) finally, that the bill lacked a mechanism for restraining education 
spending growth (Sorrell, 1995). In his address to the Senate Finance Committee, Sorrell 
(1995) stated that he looked forward to working with the Senate Finance Committee 
“with the hope that [the House bill] can become the vehicle for our shared hopes for 
property tax and education quality reform” (p. 1). The newspaper reporter covering the 
testimony deemed Sorrell’s comments “…practically an open invitation to rewrite major 
portions of the House bill” (Sneyd, 1995g, p. 11). In short, Dean employed the strategy of 
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discounting the actions of the more liberal House of Representatives in favor of 
negotiating with the more conservative Senate to produce a moderate school finance 
reform package. This approach would be repeated the following year as Dean negotiated 
legislation in the wake of the Brigham decision (Informant 15).  
Gear’s abrupt decision to curtail school finance negotiations in the Senate during 
the 1995 legislative session upset Dean, who had made school finance reform the 
centerpiece of his reelection campaign (Sneyd, 1995d; Derby & Pfeiffer, 1995). 
However, he appeared unwilling to use his political capital to compel the Senate to 
further action. By the beginning of the 1996 session, pro-reform legislators criticized the 
governor for not taking a more active role in property tax reform (Liley, 1996; Derby & 
Marro, 1996). For example, Representative Daniel Deuel commented to news reporters 
that “…the governor needs to get out in front on the property tax issue. Right now it 
doesn’t seem like his commitment is there emotionally” (Derby & Marro, 1996, p. 6). 
According to informants, Deuel’s assessment was correct. In their estimation, Governor 
Dean simply did not have a passion for school finance reform. Administration, legislative 
and interest group sources confirm that the school funding issue did not hold personal 
significance for the governor:  
He was never a great supporter of equity in the sense of if he had to do it 
all by himself, would he have done it? No. (Informant 20) 
 
Neither Dean nor anyone on his staff cared about the issue. (Informant 07) 
 
Howard was never a big cheerleader [for school finance reform]. 
(Informant 11) 
 
We would try to meet with him and talk with him and try to, you know, 
tell him about our plans and stuff. …he didn’t seem to be interested in the 




Quite frankly, education funding was not a top priority. (Informant 15) 
 
My reaction is Howard wasn’t too engaged. He was immensely engaged 
on every issue of health. He was immensely engaged on every issue that 
led to a balanced budget. He didn’t like taxes a lot…. I was meeting with 
the governor weekly or more frequently than that and I don’t know that he 
ever once said to me anything about how are we coming on education. 
(Informant 02) 
 
Still others attributed Dean’s ability to call it a day on an issue in the face of 
insurmountable opposition an intrinsic part of his personality. No fewer than three 
informants recounted a vignette from the former Speaker of the House Ralph Wright’s 
biography in which Governor Dean abruptly abandoned his campaign for universal 
healthcare in the face of imminent defeat in the Senate (Informant 20, 18, 15). For Wright 
and these informants this story encapsulated how Dean, a physician, practiced politics the 
way he practiced medicine. Wright’s story is recounted by one informant in the following 
way: 
Ralph Wright had a really good description of him. I mean, he would get 
involved with things and, you know, he’d fight for them. But once it was 
over, whether he’d won or lost, he’d move on very quickly. Ralph sort of 
compared it to his having to learn to deal with patients dying. You go in, 
you try to treat them and someone dies and you just have to move on. 
Ralph thought that’s how Dean dealt with a lot of issues: fight, try to do 
something, but if he saw it wasn’t going anywhere, he’d just drop it and 
move on… (Informant 18) 
 
Lieutenant Governor Barbara Snelling 
As lieutenant governor, Barbara Snelling possessed few formal powers other than 
that she served as President of the Senate. In this capacity, she maintained a seat on the 
influential Committee of Committees that appointed Senate committee members and 
assigned bills to committees. However, because she was a Republican lieutenant 
governor with a presiding Democratic governor, “she was seen as the de facto leader of 
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the Republican Party” (Informant 17). In this capacity, she served as the standard bearer 
for the Republican Party and provided a political counterweight to the governor. Her 
association with her late husband, the much-admired former Republican Governor 
Richard Snelling, also strengthened her informal authority. One informant characterized 
her as the “heir-apparent to her husband’s legacy” (Informant 17). 
Contemplating a gubernatorial run against Dean in the 1996 elections, Snelling 
positioned herself to the right of the newly-elected Senate leadership and utilized her 
stature within the party to rally the base around the traditionally conservative policies of 
low taxes, reduced government spending and respect for local control (Informants 02, 17; 
Pfeiffer, 1994c). In terms of resources, Snelling could thus bank on her relatively high 
profile as an opposition party lieutenant governor, her husband’s reputation as an honest 
broker and her popular conservative message. As one conservative Republican legislator 
noted: “I was sure that Barbara Snelling, with her family name and her energy for the 
campaign and [her position on] this issue, I was sure that she could take it to the next step 
and beat Howard Dean” (Informant 02).  
Her forceful stance against property tax sharing, as laid out in her Republican 
Legislative Priorities for the 1995/96 biennium, made her the leader of the anti-school 
finance reform movement (Informants 02, 07; Snelling, 1995). In this capacity, she 
employed two main strategies to derail the possibility of a property tax sharing bill 
passing the legislature during the 1995/96 biennium. First, she worked to brand the 
property tax sharing provisions of H.351 as radical and dangerous because: 1) it gave 
“Montpelier” control over local property taxes; and 2) because the gold town property tax 
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increases called for in the bill would be potentially damaging to the state economy 
(Pfeiffer, 1994a). 
To disseminate her point of view, the Republican Party paid for a media campaign 
that condemned the state for taking control of local property taxes. Paid political 
advertisements with the tag line: “If you think property taxes are high now… Wait till 
you pay them to the state” appeared in at least three of the state’s daily newspapers. In 
smaller print below, the advertisement cautioned against the state’s usurpation of local 
control, noting:  
H.351, the House property tax reform proposal, would give Montpelier the 
power to take property taxes from 50 towns around the state. That’s today. 
Will they tax your town tomorrow? If you give property taxation power to 
Montpelier, you have no control over education spending. (“If you think,” 
1995, p. 1) 
 
At the bottom of the page, citizens were then directed to call their State senator or 
representative to express their opinion on the bill. According to one proximate observer, 
the Republican’s approach on the issue of property tax sharing resonated with Vermont’s 
conservatives: “I think that the Republicans were just so, not angry at the Democrats, but 
so unwilling to go very far because ‘you give them an inch, they’ll take a mile’ I think 
was the view” (Informant 17). Democrats responded angrily to the advertisements. 
Senate Minority Leader Peter Shumlin accused Snelling of using “…Newt Gingrich-type 
politics by preying on the people’s worst fears through distortion…” (Sneyd, 1995h, p. 
18). However, Snelling countered that she was forced to resort to such tactics because her 
ideas for school finance reform had not been given fair treatment by the state’s news 
reporters and editorial writers (Sneyd, 1995h). 
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Snelling’s second strategy involved reframing the issue of high property taxes in 
Vermont. In this line of thought, high property taxes were the result of overspending on 
education rather than the skewed distribution of valuable property throughout the state. 
Rather than raising general fund taxes and requiring property tax sharing, Snelling 
proposed that the state reduce overall education spending. To develop an alternate policy 
proposal for financing education supporting this solution, Snelling utilized her position as 
lieutenant governor to commission a Republican summer study committee. In keeping 
with Snelling’s mandate to focus on “cost containment,” the Republican study 
committee’s A Challenge To Change report concludes that: “Given the level of high 
spending, and the fact that we cannot increase the state’s share of education funding 
through new taxes, the educational system must be restructured to reduce spending and 
taxes” (Republican Committee, 1995, p. 17). The policy proposal recommended cutting 
costs through increased competition, reduced state mandates and increased student-to-
teacher ratios. The report estimated that the state could save $60 million by simply 
raising its student-to-teacher ratio to the national average (Republican Committee, 1995). 
In formulating this solution, Republican legislators relied heavily on the work of 
Arthur Woolf, an economist who had conducted studies for both the Vermont Business 
Roundtable and the Associated Industries of Vermont indicating that Vermont’s class 
size was too small. Republicans cited these business-funded analyses as the basis for their 
Challenge to Change recommendation to increase class size (Republican Committee, 
1995). The report even included a statement from Woolf noting: “In my opinion, the 
single most important factor contributing to high education costs in Vermont is a low 
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student-to-teacher ratio found in Vermont. The Vermont student-to-teacher ratio is 
second lowest in the nation” (Republican Committee, 1995, p. 34). 
Democrats derided the study commission’s recommendations as overly simplistic. 
For example, one informant reflecting upon the Challenge to Change report commented: 
Barbara Snelling does a stupid study over the summer…. “Oh, we just 
have to raise the class size. Just get it up to the national average.” Of 
course now her sons had gone to [the private boarding school] Andover. 
(Informant 07) 
 
Introduced as S. 322 during the 1996 legislative session, Snelling’s proposal was deemed 
“controversial” and “radical” in newspaper reports (Sneyd, 1996a). For example, a 
Burlington Free Press editorial referred to the bill as a “…flawed document that offered 
more cause for concern than reason for support” (“School Reform Carrots,” 1996, p. 4E). 
While Snelling’s measure did not gain traction in the Senate Education Committee, her 
message that property tax sharing was both dangerous and unnecessary resonated in the 
Senate sufficiently such that compromise within the Republican caucus proved elusive.  
Business Organizations 
The major business organizations returned for the 1995/96 biennium with largely 
the same resources and strategic plan they utilized during the 1993/94 biennium. They 
continued to rely on their sizable, well-organized membership and their firmly 
established lobbying presence in Montpelier to oppose the school funding reform 
packages proposed in the 1995 legislative session (Informant 11). They also continued to 
hone their message of fear by replacing dire warnings about the impact of high income 
taxes upon the state economy with dire warnings about the impact of high property taxes 
upon the state economy. Specifically, they cautioned that increased taxes resulting from 
property tax sharing schemes would be particularly detrimental to the drivers of 
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Vermont’s economy located in the state’s tourist centers. A KPMG Peat Marwick (1994) 
report, commissioned by leading business organizations such as the Vermont Chamber of 
Commerce, the Vermont Ski Areas Association and the Vermont Lodging and Restaurant 
Association at a cost of $40,000, indicated that even the $8 million in limited sharing 
outlined in Governor Dean’s plan raises “…serious economic developmental issues 
relating to business investment in low tax recreational and resort towns” (p. 2). 
Commenting on the report to the Rutland Herald, Chamber of Commerce Executive 
Director Christopher Barbieri remarked: “I think [the report] brings some credible factual 
information to an issue that was a highly emotional debate. It confirms a lot of what 
people assumed” (Sneyd, 1995 p. 5). 
To disseminate this message to the wider public, business organizations 
frequently relied on their surrogates in the legislature to sound off against the various 
property tax sharing plans floating around the statehouse. For example, Republican 
Representative Frank Mazur from business heavy South Burlington commented in a 
Burlington Free Press reader’s forum:  
On the surface, the data and news reports show this proposal [H.351] to be 
a help in shifting property tax burdens more equitably around the state and 
provide property owner’s relief of school taxes. After all, that is what the 
voters asked for last November. However, in my view, the General 
Assembly was not too sensitive to the fragile state of the Vermont 
economy when it passed a tax increase which includes a major statewide 
property tax…. I think this new plan will have a very negative impact on 
our economic development in Vermont by increasing property taxes on all 
business/commercial, some middle-income households and vacation 
properties in the state. (Mazur, 1995, p. 9A)  
 
In another approach, the business community attempted to provide another 
explanation for the state’s property tax problem. Relying on the research of economist 
Arthur Woolf, business organizations blamed overspending on education, rather than 
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uneven property taxes as the major culprit regarding Vermont’s school funding woes. In a 
study conducted for Associated Industries of Vermont, Woolf found that state could save 
$100 million if it brought its student-to-teacher ratio in line with the national average 
(Hoffman, 1995d). Testifying before the Senate Finance Committee, Woolf stated:  
Any solution that addresses only inter-town spending differentials or the 
mix of state and local government education financing sources and not the 
overall cost issue will not be able to address the underlying structural 
problems of education finance. Without addressing cost issues, property 
tax levels will be a perennial problem in Vermont over the long term. 
(Hoffman, 1995d, p. 12) 
 
As noted earlier, Woolf’s proposed solution found a friendly reception among Republican 
senators and Lieutenant Governor Barbara Snelling who attempted to enact his 
suggestions in S.322 (1996). 
Ski Areas/Gold Towns  
In the 1995/96 biennium, gold towns and ski areas maintained the resources 
afforded to them as the state’s engine of economic growth. However, for this biennium, 
gold town residents keyed in on the issue of fairness and played on the fears of economic 
catastrophe in opposing property tax sharing plans. For example, in a position paper on 
property tax reform and education financing, community leaders from the Town of Stowe 
(1995) asserted: “We reject the targeting of a new property tax on only a select group of 
towns and view such an approach as an inappropriate, radical departure from how current 
taxes are levied”  (pp. 1-2). The document further noted that tax sharing measures would 
unfairly harm poor residents living in property-wealthy community by dramatically 
raising their property taxes. To this end, the paper remarked: 
Towns do not pay taxes, people do. Modest and low income Vermonters, 
regardless of where they live, need relief from an onerous property tax. 
The property tax is income blind, based on the assessed value of the 
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property, not ability to pay…. To ask these individuals to pay higher 
property taxes while wealthy individuals living in so called “poor towns” 
pay less as some legislation proposes makes no sense. We reject the 
targeting of a new property tax on only a select group of towns and view 
such an approach as an inappropriate, radical departure from how current 
taxes are levied. (pp. 1-2) 
 
The position paper went on to note that singling out certain communities for additional 
taxation was not only unfair but also potentially damaging to the state’s economy: 
Targeting certain centers of economic activity with an extremely high new 
tax will lead to a choking of such activity threatening jobs and reducing 
the state general fund revenues generating capability of the center. (p. 2) 
 
To demonstrate and dramatize their opposition, gold town residents held protests 
and urged collective action on the part of the 50 towns most likely to be affected by 
H.351. A newspaper reporter described one protest gathering in the town of Manchester 
attended by approximately 200 residents representing 36 gold towns in the following 
way: “…much of Saturday’s meeting was spent painting apocalyptic scenarios of life 
under statewide property tax reform and formulating strategies to fight it…” (Bandler, 
1995, p. 7). According to the reporter, these residents promised to “bombard” legislators 
with telephone calls, letters and faxes and to “flood” newspapers with letters to the 
editors that expressed their opposition to property tax sharing measures. In a show of 
support, Lieutenant Governor Barbara Snelling attended the event and received heavy 
applause when she quipped: “I don’t know why they [property tax reform supporters] use 
the word sharing. I always thought sharing was voluntary” (Bandler, 1995, p. 7).  
Vermont League of Cities and Towns 
For the 1995/96 biennium, the Vermont League of Cities and Towns relied on 
similar resources and strategies as they had the previous biennium. First and foremost, 
they utilized their extensive membership to disseminate their “slippery slope” message 
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that once the state got its hands on property taxes there would be little left to fund local 
expenses. To that end, the organization outlined its position in newspaper commentary 
pieces written by League members such as Jeff Wennberg, the mayor of Rutland. In an 
editorial for the Rutland Herald critiquing H.351, Wennberg (1995) drove home the 
League’s message regarding the need for more broad-based taxation to fund schools: 
We will never solve the property tax problem by sending more money and 
more power to Montpelier. We can only solve this problem by forcing 
Montpelier to return money and power to the people. Real relief must go 
to both the taxpayers and the schools. And real reform must be financed 
by broad-based state revenues, not by an expansion of the same tax we 
seek to reduce. (p. 16) 
 
Another VLCT supporter, Bob Messner (1995) from the town of Warren, reiterated 
Wennberg’s sentiment in his commentary for the Montpelier-Barre Times Argus 
newspaper: 
God only knows how quickly successive Legislatures will lose the 
commitment to use state property tax just for education or once 
established, will increase the take for other pet projects. Then most of the 
80 percent of the towns who may now think H.351 is a good deal for them 
will have another thing coming. They better watch out! (n. p.) 
 
As with the gold towns, VLCT focused on the issue of fairness with regard to the 
singling out of certain towns for additional taxation and even coined its own alternative 
school finance reform plan “The Fair Tax Plan.” Their perceived alliance with gold towns 
on the issue of property tax sharing earned them the nickname of “the league of big cities 
and gold towns” among residents of property-poor towns (Informant 21). VLCT’s Fair 
Tax plan sought to achieve 50 percent state funding by broadening and expanding sales 
taxes, implementing local option taxes and increasing state aid to needy taxpayers. One 
VLCT insider characterized the organization’s approach to tax reform in the following 
way: “We would come up with proposals for, you know, expanding the sales tax, 
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increasing the sales tax, switching to a local income tax – anything but coming up with a 
statewide property tax” (Informant 09). 
Finally, seeing the opportunity to forge an alliance between municipal 
governments and the business community in their joint opposition to a statewide property 
tax, the VLCT contributed funds to help defray the expenses associated with the KPMG 
study warning of the negative consequences of property tax sharing upon businesses in 
gold towns. In a “Dear Legislator” letter, the coalition warned that “[t]he hotel and 
lodging industry is especially sensitive to large increases in business property taxes due 
to imposition of a statewide property tax or a minimum school property tax” (Lake 
Champlain Regional Chamber of Commerce et al., business correspondence, January 11, 
1995, p. 2).  
While the VLCT allied itself with both gold towns and business organizations to 
defend against the enactment of a statewide property tax sharing mechanism, its 
leadership was frustrated by the lack of traction the League’s ideas received within the 
legislature. Remarking upon this frustration, one League member noted: “We started 
every session trying to be proactive and coming up with a proposal and every year we 
ended up being reactive and opposing a statewide property tax” (Informant 09). A 
proximate observer concurred with this statement and deemed VLCT Executive Director 
Steven Jeffrey “…probably the most frustrated person in Vermont…” because “year after 
year [the VCLT] would come back with big [school finance reform] proposals” to no 
avail (Informant 01). So while the League and its allies proved effective in blocking 
unwanted reform measures such as the statewide property tax, they were less able to 
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encourage the legislature to coalesce around their alternate ideas for reforming how 
schools were funded in Vermont.  
Pro-School Finance Reform Advocates/American Civil Liberties Union  
The entrance of the ACLU into the school funding debate infused the pro-school 
finance reform movement with a variety of valuable resources in that it: 1) provided a 
vehicle for a variety of highly localized and disparate pro-reform advocates to join forces; 
2) lent credibility to pro-reform claims of systemic inequity; 3) raised the profile of the 
student equity aspect of the school funding issue; 4) provided dedicated legal expertise; 
and 5) brought in dollars through an alliance with the Vermont School Boards 
Association (VSBA). In discussing its willingness to provide financial assistance to the 
ACLU case, VSBA Executive Director John A. Nelson (1996) pointed to the success of 
other states in bringing about school finance reform through court mandate: “It is because 
of the experience of states like Kentucky that the board of directors of the Vermont 
School Boards Association decided in March to lend financial support to the school 
funding lawsuit in Vermont” (p. C3). According to one informant: “I was very glad to be 
on the board of the Association. We did take up a motion to provide some financial 
support. As far as I know, it’s the only outside financial support [Gensburg] received” 
(Informant 20).  
In the wake of the Senate’s unwillingness to pass school finance reform 
legislation during the 1995 legislative session, the ACLU attorneys, led by Robert 
Gensburg, filed their lawsuit, known as Brigham v. State of Vermont, in March 1995 in 
Lamoille County Court. One informant described the ACLU’s decision to move forward 
with litigation in the following passage:  
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Sara withdrew her approval of what she had agreed to and what she had 
actually introduced as a sponsor and that’s when – now we had already 
started working on it – we said, “That’s it. Forget everything, we’re going 
to sue.” (Informant 19) 
 
A proximate observer supported this chain of events: 
The next biennium, which would have started in ’95 – would have been 
the 1995/96 biennium – that’s what finally led to the lawsuit. I can’t 
remember when the lawsuit was filed but I think it was after the ’95 effort 
failed. (Informant 17) 
 
In filing their lawsuit, the ACLU’s main strategy entailed bypassing the legislature to 
obtain a ruling stating that Vermont’s system of school finance was unconstitutional and 
in need of corrective action by the legislature. When designing its case, the ACLU plotted 
a comprehensive approach that included three different categories of plaintiffs, each 
category warranting its own equal protection claim: 1) students; 2) taxpayers; and 3) 
school districts. Lawyers purposefully selected plaintiffs based upon a variety of criteria 
that were designed to showcase how some school districts were forced to heavily tax their 
citizens but were still not able to obtain adequate funding for their schools due to an 
overreliance upon the local property tax to fund schools in Vermont. One informant 
described how the ACLU selected its lead student plaintiff: 
One of the things that came out when we invited Bob [Gensburg] to talk to 
our school board members is that Whiting – the town of Whiting is a small 
dairy town – it fit the profile for the ideal plaintiff, which was a 
community that really wanted a good quality education but was being 
taxed exorbitantly to do it. We also wanted a student from that school 
district who was young. We did not want a case where the plaintiff, the 
lead plaintiff, would be mooted out because she graduated. (Informant 12) 
 
Another informant described how his school district became involved in the ACLU 
lawsuit as a plaintiff: 
I got a call from Bob Gensburg, cooperating attorney with the ACLU. I 
had no association with the ACLU at that point. Bob Gensburg said, “OK, 
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there’s a team of us working with the ACLU putting together a lawsuit. 
We’re looking for towns that might be plaintiffs. You seem to be a town 
that might fit the profile of having to have a high tax rate to raise a small 
amount of money.” I said, “That’s true.” He said, “Do you think your 
[school] board will consider joining the lawsuit?” I said, “Yes. I’ll ask 
them.” We had a meeting coming up that week. It took our board literally 
five minutes to decide to sign on to the lawsuit. (Informant 20) 
 
In short, the ACLU attorneys sought plaintiffs representing property-poor school districts 
that taxed themselves heavily to pay for their schools due to a lack of property wealth. 
Of note is the fact that many of the lawsuit’s plaintiffs had been working locally 
on the issue for years but had not previously worked together. One informant described 
how pro-reform advocates from disparate parts of the state came together to work on the 
Brigham case:  
There was this handful of people scattered around the state and, of course, 
you get to know each other over time. You hear of each other whether you 
are on this side of the mountain or the other side of the mountain. Allen 
Gilbert was pushing from his area – he’s in the Montpelier area – and Bob 
Gensburg’s up in the Northeast Kingdom so they started nosing around… 
and then I got pulled into the thing and at a certain point we went plaintiff 
shopping. (Informant 12) 
 
According to informants, Bob Gensburg started reaching out to these individuals to 
inquire as to whether they would be willing to join forces. Thus, the Brigham lawsuit 
provided an opportunity for these individuals to join forces in a concerted effort to help 
bring about reform. 
In addition to taking education taxing and spending histories into consideration, 
ACLU attorneys also strategically selected plaintiffs representing a wide variety of 
counties so that they could select a favorable venue in which to file the suit. 
We went shopping around to the different counties so that when the time 
came to bring a suit we could look and see what judges were sitting in the 
various county courts and select a judge who we thought was sympathetic. 
This really was an honest choice. We weren’t looking so much for 
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sympathy for the cause as we were for legal scholarship and rigor. 
(Informant 19)  
  
One informant involved with the lawsuit noted that the strategy of seeking potentially 
friendly judges was particularly important because: “…litigation depends not only on 
having lawyers who can present good cases but on having judges who are willing to 
understand the law in a way that can make an important change” (Informant 20). 
Eventually, ACLU attorneys decided to file the Brigham case in Lamoille County 
because of the presence of Judge John Meeker, whom ACLU attorneys believed would 
regard their taxpayer case favorably (Informant 19).  
A final aspect of the ACLU attorney’s strategy for victory entailed selecting the 
type of constitutional challenge they would bring against the state. Throughout the 1990s, 
many school finance plaintiffs had successfully litigated cases claiming that state 
contributions to education were inadequate to meet the needs of certain groups of 
students. However, the ACLU decided to limit its suit to an equal protection claim, an 
approach that had been popular during the 1970s. Two informants described how 
attorneys arrived at this key strategic decision:  
The adequacy case, we just saw there was no end to it. There was just no 
end to it. It was partly selfish, the time constraints it was going to impose. 
It was also partly strategic. If the case was going to get complicated it was 
going to lose a lot of public appeal that we were trying to create for it. We 
wanted something clean and clearly understood by anybody that was 
willing to look at the data. It was largely a political question. What kind of 
a political impact was the lawsuit going to have? If you start getting 
bogged down in an adequacy argument it’s going to lose some of its 
punch. When you have such dramatic data, just stick with the equity 
argument. (Informant 19)  
 
I had a meeting with one of the lawyers and the question was, and I had 
actually studied the case law enough to know how these decisions had 
gone. He said, “There’s two ways we could go with the lawsuit. We’re 
trying to figure out which way to go.”…. They said, “We could do equity 
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or we can do adequacy.” I knew what both of those meant and I said, 
“Look the problem with adequacy is funding.” The foundation plan was an 
adequacy plan. What happens with an adequacy plan is the legislature sets 
what is adequate based on the resources they have, not what the kids need. 
All the studies tell us we need $14,000. The legislature says $7,000, so 
we’re calling it adequate. So they declare adequate whatever they have 
and that’s a fundamental flaw with the system. So I said, “ It has to be an 
equity case if you really want change.” (Informant 03) 
 
Vermont’s extreme taxing disparities, coupled with its perceived lack of success in 
implementing past adequacy-based school funding plans, led attorneys for the plaintiff to 
determine that an equity-based approach would be more likely to produce a favorable 
court decision.   
 Of note is the fact that the ACLU did not ally itself with the pro-school finance 
reform legislators in the General Assembly to create a concerted two-pronged approach. 
One ACLU-affiliated lawyer described how school finance reform advocates in the 
legislature were somewhat wary of the ACLU’s decision to file suit because it removed a 
weapon from their political arsenal: 
So both Paul Cillo and John Freidin had been working [on this issue]. I 
remember them in 1994 with the statewide teacher’s contract proposal. 
They were trying to do all these things to ameliorate the problem. They 
kept threatening a lawsuit with the deepest belief that the lawsuit would be 
unsuccessful. They liked having it as a club and never wanted to actually 
use it when they were in political discussions with the governor and the 
senators and the people from the Republican Party. (Informant 19)  
 
A key legislative insider did not acknowledge dismay at the Brigham filing but did admit 
to a widely held belief that such a suit was futile: 
I wasn’t aware of what was going on [with the lawsuit], not in any real 
way. I may have heard that there was a lawsuit but the conventional 
wisdom had always been, you know, you’re not going to win this. 




By filing the lawsuit, many in the pro-reform camp signaled their lack of faith in the 
macro arena to affect the type of non-incremental change they desired. Disenchanted with 
the political gridlock they encountered in that venue, pro-reform advocates were willing 
to buck conventional wisdom and place their hopes for change in the judicial arena’s 
ability to demand reform through a court mandate. An excerpt from Hirschman’s (1970) 
classic political work, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, provides an explanation as to why the pro-
reform coalition exited the macro arena for the judicial arena: 
No matter how well a society’s basic institutions are devised, failures of 
some actors to live up to the behavior which is expected of them are bound 
to occur… Each society learns to live with a certain amount of such 
dysfunctional or misbehavior; but lest the misbehavior feed on itself and 
lead to general decay, society must be able to marshal from within itself 
forces which will make as many of the faltering actors as possible revert to 
the behavior required for its proper functioning. (p. 1) 
 
In terms of political theory, these reformers can be seen as exercising their right to exit 
the macro arena for the judicial arena in the hopes that it could compel legislative reform.  
Macro Arena 
1995/96 Biennium: Concluding Interactions and Outcomes 
 
The 1995/96 biennium came to a close with the House and the Senate unable to 
reconcile their two very different school funding bills. While the House had passed what 
they believed to be a conciliatory measure in H.351, the Senate responded with a bill that 
focused on providing modest property tax relief without any significant alteration to the 
established processes for the collection and distribution of state aid to education. Despite 
the formation of a Conference Committee, the two sides never reached agreement on a 
compromise package and eventually stopped meeting all together. One House leader 
recollected the failed Conference Committee as follows: “Because it was a House bill, the 
Senate was chair of the overall conference committee. They just stopped calling 
	  
 295 
meetings. [It] just went away, dissolved” (Informant 03). Another House member 
remembered: “It was a very frustrating Conference Committee because it was clear that 
the Senate and the House were not going to get any place where they could agree” 
(Informant 13). 
Once again, for the second biennium in a row, the issue of how to reform the 
manner in which Vermonters paid for public education could not be resolved in the 
Legislature. Division within the Senate, fierce opposition from powerful interest groups 
and a governor who largely “sat on the sideline” (Informant 02) throughout the course of 
the biennium made the passage of even the more moderate H.351 impossible. Storied 
Vermont political reporter, Peter Freyne (1996), summed up that biennium’s legislative 
actions in the following way: 
…the Vermont Senate, with its 18-12 Republican majority, has been in the 
eyes of pro-business interests, the defender of the faith….With Lieutenant 
Governor Barbara Snelling presiding and Rutland Sate Senator Tom 
Macauley chairing the Appropriations Committee, every 
liberal/progressive scheme cooked up by the Democrats, who rule the 
roost in the House, has been checkmated. (p. 7) 
 
Mazzoni (1991) notes that the possibility of non-incremental policy change in the 
macro arena “[h]inges primarily on the relative power and leadership of the competing 
coalitions and on the responsiveness of institutional arrangements to the mass-based 
demands that these coalitions can generate” (pp. 117-18). What started as Ralph Wright’s 
provocative assault on the school funding status quo quickly energized a counter 
mobilization among powerful groups who stood to lose financially if such a plan was 
enacted. Over a four-year period, this policy dispute blossomed into a high profile 
ideological battle between opposing political factions pitting pro-reform groups 
represented largely by House Democrats against business groups, gold towns, ski areas, 
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and municipal governments represented by Senate Republicans. However, because each 
opposing coalition controlled a legislative chamber, their respective resources were 
effectively “checkmated.” Neither side could claim victory. Governor Dean’s refusal to 
exert forceful advocacy one way or the other on the matter of school finance reform 
exacerbated the “inflexible and protracted issue conflict” that so often can be the 
hallmark of politics in the macro arena (Mazzoni, 1991, p. 130). 
Despite the inability of actors to make headway in the macro arena, the issue 
remained stubbornly persistent. By the close of the 1995 legislative session, a Becker 
Institute survey found that 53 percent of Vermonters considered high local property taxes 
a “very serious” problem; that percentage represented an increase of 14 points from the 
previous year (Becker Institute, 1995a). In the wake of the second successive biennium 
where the Republican-led Senate proved incapable of passing reform legislation, study 
informants indicated that leaders in the Democratic Party pursued a strategy of electoral 
change by seeking to blame Republicans for their intransigence on the issue. A House 
Democratic legislator described his party’s approach:  
You know, we were going nowhere [with the Conference Committee] but 
it was at the end of the [legislative] session so all that we really wanted to 
do was set the stage for the election. So, you know, [Majority Leader] Paul 
Cillo makes it his goal that we’re going to make it clear that the issue is 
the Democrats want to do something and here’s what it is and it leads to 
equality and the Republicans don’t want to do nothing. (Informant 07) 
 
This strategy began to pay off as the mainstream press picked up on the “blame the 
Republicans” message. For example, a March 1996 editorial from the Burlington Free 
Press referred to the Republican-controlled Senate as “the bone yard of tax reform 
legislation” (“Tax Reform Breakthrough,” 1996, p. 2C). In interviews, one legislator 
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recounted the media’s increased willingness to place blame upon Republicans for the 
school finance reform stalemate as the 1995/96 biennium came to a close: 
[Republicans] did not get blamed for killing the bill in 1994. It was seen as 
a draw. In 1996, the Republicans got blamed. The mainstream press was 
writing about this. Vermont This Week and everybody was saying, “You 
know, Republicans, this is the second time they did it.” The message was 
good for us so our goal was for the Democrats to take back the Senate. 
(Informant 03) 
 
Indeed, primary and secondary source data indicate that the legislature’s inability to come 
to grips with a plan for enacting property tax reform propelled the issue into the 
November 1996 election with Democrats promising fast action on the issue if voters 
returned a Democratic majority to the Senate. News reports from that time period 
highlight Democrats’ efforts to run on the property tax reform issue during the 1996 
election season: 
Democrats hammered away at the GOP primarily on the issue of property 
tax reform. They accused Republicans, especially those in the Senate, of 
blocking every attempt to reform the way Vermont pays for education and 
they asked voters to elect Democrats who would settle the issue. (Marro, 
1996b, p. 7) 
 
Democrats campaigning for the Senate this fall promised that they would 
act on property tax reform, and Dean frequently asked voters to give him a 
Democratic majority in the Senate. (Hoffman, 1996a, p. 14)  
 
According to one senator: “…for the first time in Democratic history in the Senate we 
made a concerted effort to raise money, recruit candidates to win an election to get out of 
the minority” (Informant 14). These Democratic efforts succeeded. They captured a slim 
17-13 majority in the Senate for the 1997/98 biennium and toppled Senate Pro Tempore 
Stephen Webster in the process.  
School finance reform also became a key issue in the lieutenant governor’s race 
where Democratic candidate Douglas Racine made the issue the centerpiece of his 
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campaign. As they had with the Senate elections, political reporters described the race as 
a: “…referendum on property tax reform…” with Racine running on the promise of 
redistributing “revenues from low tax towns to towns with higher tax burdens” as a 
means to “make Vermont’s education system better” (Marro, 1996b, pp. 1, 7). A 
proximate observer described a pivotal moment in the campaign that highlighted the 
importance of property tax reform not only to the candidates but also to the electorate at 
large: 
I just remember this really key press conference that John Carroll had. 
John Carroll had called a press conference to rail against something that 
Racine had said about property taxes and I remember [the reporters] 
couldn’t quite tell what the heck he was trying to get at. I don’t remember 
who asked, “Well, do you really think there’s a problem with property 
taxes? Do we need property tax reform?” but, ultimately, [Carroll’s] 
response was, “No, not really.” It’s what lost him the race. He could have 
beaten Racine, I think, but that’s what lost it for him right there. 
(Informant 17) 
 
Racine went on to defeat Carroll in the November election by a two-to-one margin. In his 
victory night speech, Racine boldly guaranteed: “We are going to deliver property tax 
reform in the next legislative session” (Marro, 1996b, pp. 1, 7).  
In the Gubernatorial election, Howard Dean claimed an easy 70-point victory 
against his Republican opponent, John Gropper. A Rutland Herald editorial credited 
Dean’s lopsided victory to his “command of the political center” (“In Vermont,” 1996, p. 
14). Lacking meaningful competition, Dean lent some of his political capital to Racine 
and campaigned on his behalf. Regarding Dean’s efforts to assist Racine’s campaign, 
Nick Marro of the Rutland Herald wrote: “…this year Dean made it clear early and often 
that he preferred Racine to Carroll, telling Vermonters he needed Racine elected 
lieutenant governor in order to pass property tax reform” (Marro, 1996b, p. 7). 
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Racine’s victory in the lieutenant governor’s race, coupled with the Democratic 
gains in the Senate, meant that Democrats entered the 1997/98 biennium controlling 
every elected leadership position in the Vermont state government. This sizable 
positional authority virtually guaranteed some form of movement on the school finance 
issue if party leaders could agree on a plan. Study informants, both proponents and 
opponents, recalled a sense that the 1996 elections provided a “window of opportunity”41 
for the passage of a school finance reform bill: 
So the Senate became Democratic and at that point you knew something 
was going to happen. (Informant 21) 
 
Even we know there is going to be a statewide property tax in the 1997 
session that would become law because of the loss of the Senate by the 
Republicans. It was more than an inkling. We were convinced that we 
were going to have a statewide property tax by the end of the 1997 
session. All the Democrats had run on property tax reform platforms. 
There was no obstacle to it being adopted so we were pretty sure that it 
was going to end up that way. (Informant 09) 
 
That election year, the Democrats took over both houses and many people 
said that was a mandate to do something about education funding and they 
were talking to me about what my ideas might be, what they could do 
since they had control of both houses. (Informant 16) 
 
As a means to achieve their majority status, Democratic leaders had successfully 
framed the legislative gridlock on the school finance issue as a problem of Republican 
intransigence. In doing so, they positioned Republicans in the Senate and their allies in 
the business community and gold towns as the principal roadblocks to reform. With the 
Republicans now reduced to the minority party, Vermonters of all stripes viewed school 
finance reform as a likely outcome of the 1997/98 biennium. In Mazzoni’s terms, 
Democratic efforts at electoral change can be viewed as an attempt to shift the issue out 
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of the macro arena and into the leadership arena where all of the state’s top Democratic 
leaders were on the record as being in favor of enacting some form of school finance 
reform, ranging from Governor Howard Dean’s modest property tax sharing proposals to 
the Democratic House Leadership’s sweeping overhauls of the state’s system of school 
finance.  
Leadership Arena 
Mazzoni (1991) remarks that “[t]he leadership arena consists of the policy-
oriented interactions that occur among top-level government officials and between these 
officials and the private groups or individuals – if any – who control them” (p. 125). 
Within the leadership arena, the state’s top leaders engage in elite bargaining to develop 
policy proposals. In engaging in the bargaining process, these elites rely on both their 
positional and personal resources to obtain favorable policy outcomes. 
According to primary and secondary source data, top Democratic leaders viewed 
their party’s sweep of the 1996 elections as a mandate for passing a school finance 
reform package. Having run on the issue and won, they perceived that they were now 
under pressure to enact a reform measure during the 1997/98 legislative biennium. This 
sense of urgency was evident in both informant statements and documents dating from 
that period. For example, an article in the Burlington Free Press noted: “Now that 
they’ve won control of both chambers, Democrats know voters will identify them with 
the success – or failure – of tax reform. When the 1997 session begins Wednesday, the 
pressure is on” (Good, 1997a, p. back page). A letter from Co-House Majority Leaders 
Paul Cillo and Sally Fox to Speaker of the House Michael Obuchowski regarding their 
plans for the 1997/98 biennium acknowledges this sentiment:  
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On November 5th voters not only returned us to power in the House, but 
they gave the Senate and the lieutenant governor’s office to Democrats as 
well. We have the opportunity and the responsibility to address the issues 
that are important to Vermonters this session – first and foremost is 
property tax reform. (P. Cillo & S. Fox, personal communication, 
November 16, 1996, p.1)  
 
In interviews, a Democratic senator recalled feeling a similar sense of responsibility: 
“Once we’d gotten on them [Republicans] for not being sensitive, I felt that we better 
darn well do something about the property tax burden now we’re in power.” (Informant 
10) 
The urgency to pass reform legislation expressed by Democratic leaders, coupled 
with their newfound positional power, placed the issue squarely in the leadership arena. 
Given the nature of the issue at hand, key actors in the leadership arena included 
Governor Howard Dean, Speaker of the House Michael Obuchowski, House Majority 
Leaders Paul Cillo and Sally Fox, Senate Pro Tempore Peter Shumlin and the chairs of 
the two legislative tax-writing committees, Oreste Valsangiacomo and John Freidin from 
the House Ways and Means Committee and Cheryl Rivers from the Senate Finance 
Committee. By and large, these actors were veterans of previous finance reform battles in 
past legislative biennia. However, with political power now consolidated in the hands of 
the Democratic Party, leaders traded the ideological confrontation and gridlock of the 
macro arena in favor of the elite bargaining that Mazzoni (1991) considers prevalent in 
the leadership arena.  
 The following discussion of policymaking in the leadership arena is divided into 
two sections. The first section describes the actors, goals, motives, resources, strategies 
and interactions at play in the leadership arena prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
the Brigham v. State case. The second section describes the changing political landscape 
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of the leadership arena brought about by Brigham and reveals the ruling’s sizable impact 
upon the actors, their motives and goals, and their resources and strategies utilized to 
achieve favorable policy outcomes. In chronicling this course of events, this section will 
describe how Brigham upended the balance of political power in the leadership arena and 
reoriented the locus of power from the governor to the House of Representatives. 
Leadership Arena 
Pre-Brigham: Actors, Goals and Motives 
 
This section outlines those actors participating in the leadership arena in the 
period of the 1997/98 legislative biennium prior to the Brigham decision. It also reviews 
these actors’ motivations for participating in the leadership arena along with the policy 
goals they wished to achieve through their involvement. Consistent with Mazzoni’s 
(1991) expectations for the leadership arena, the issue of school finance reform was the 
subject of elite bargaining by some of Vermont’s most powerful state political leaders. 
Governor Howard Dean 
By the fall of 1996, polling data suggested that the Democrats would take control 
of the Senate for the 1997/98 legislative session. Like other Democrats that electoral 
season, Howard Dean also campaigned on the issue of property tax reform (Hoffman, 
1996a; Marro, 1996b). Although interview data clearly indicate that the issue was not 
high on his personal political agenda, running on this issue could be considered good 
politics given its perceived importance to voters in the 1996 elections. Primary and 
secondary source data reveal that Governor Howard Dean, optimistic about the 
Democrats’ chance of taking control of the Senate, began to engage legislative leaders on 
the issue in an effort to develop a single party-backed school finance reform bill: 
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So in late October it was clear to the governor and Senate leadership that 
they were going to pick up seats. And so we started having these meetings 
with the leadership of the Senate…. “OK, it looks like we’re going to have 
a Democratic House, Democratic Senate and Democratic governor. What 
do we do now folks?” This is where the governor started talking about 
what he wanted… (Informant 03) 
 
We would have meetings. We would go to the health department, this 
windowless cement building in Burlington, literally windowless 
conference room, lights, pizza boxes. We’re there with the governor; he’s 
in the room for six hours, fall and into January. (Informant 03) 
 
There were meetings going on with the governor’s office before the 
session started. I wasn’t included in any of it. Mouse meetings. I think I 
remembered describing it as mouse meetings – nothing much. (Informant 
10) 
 
I remember meeting in the governor’s conference room and it was when 
Doug [Racine] and Peter [Shumlin] and Paul [Cillo] and I forget who 
else… The big tables all filled and the governor is at the head of it and just 
a real sense of we’re going to make it work, it’s going to happen. It was 
real exciting. (Informant 06) 
 
According to an administration informant, the governor sought to garner support for a 
“moderate, small sharing plan” similar to H.74, the reform package he had introduced 
during the 1995/96 legislative biennium (Informant 15). Interview informants similarly 
described Dean’s plan as a modest effort: 
He came out with a proposal earlier that year that was a minimal kind of 
thing. (Informant 09)  
 
I think Howard’s proposal that year before the Supreme Court ruled; it’s 
not like profit sharing but there was going to be some money taken from 
like a dozen of the gold towns. It would have added up to just, you know, 
a handful of millions. (Informant 01) 
 
Governor Dean, described by one business industry insider as “a good friend of the 
business community,” sought this moderate course so as to not unduly harm the state’s 
economic interests (Informant 11). According to an article in the Burlington Free Press, 
Dean explained that his overriding concern for the state’s fiscal health impacted his 
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stance on school finance: “Jobs are still the number one priority for most Vermonters. So 
anything that raises taxes on the business community is probably not going to help 
Vermont in the long run” (Good, 1997c, p. 4A). This perspective also framed Dean’s 
longstanding opposition to the implementation of an income tax to fund state aid to 
education, a concept strongly supported by House Democrats. A member of the Dean 
administration explained the governor’s antipathy to raising the income tax to fund 
schools:  
He knows at that time that even at the 24 percent rate that we had gotten 
to, Vermont was still a very high income tax state. We’ve always been a 
very progressive income tax state and there is this myth out there in 
Vermont… that you can just somehow put this burden onto the income 
tax…. So here we are in 1997… there are 12,359 returns for people paying 
over $100,000… so they are 4.54 percent of all returns contributing 42.8 
percent of the income tax…. So Howard Dean knew this…. Intellectually, 
he saw the picture that you can’t cost shift [school funding] onto a small 
state. There were 12,000 [wealthy] people in the state of Vermont and 
you’re going to ask them to pick up the hundreds of millions of dollars of 
costs for education? (Informant 11)  
 
Taking Dean’s policy parameters into account (i.e. modest efforts to promote 
taxpayer equity without unduly burdening the business community or wealthy individuals 
with high property or income taxes), an outline of the Democratic leadership’s plan began 
to take shape by early January. In a presentation before the House Ways and Means 
Committee, Tax Commissioner Tom Pelham outlined the details of the governor’s 
proposal which included: 1) a property tax cut targeted at people whose incomes lag 
behind their property tax bills; 2) general fund tax increases to compensate for property 
tax cuts; 3) limited property tax sharing by property-wealthy communities through the 
establishment of a minimum local property tax; 4) strategies for slowing the growth of 
education budgets; and 4) a revamping of the current use program. To fund the measure, 
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Dean proposed $61 million in new taxes, including $41 million from an increase to the 
gas tax and the expanded levying of sales tax and $8 million in property tax sharing (Joint 
Fiscal Committee, 1997). According to news reports, Dean’s primary objectives for his 
plan were to reduce property taxes, to avoid raising the income tax and to control the 
costs of education. “If we can do those three things, we have a plan” he said (Derby, 
1997, p. 6).  
Senate Leadership 
The Senate returned for the 1997/98 biennium with an entirely new leadership 
team thanks to that chamber’s change in party control. The former Senate Minority 
Leader, Peter Shumlin, ascended to the position of Senate Pro Tempore. Having served as 
a member of the Senate Finance Committee in past legislative biennia, Shumlin, 
described by a colleague as “a pretty savvy politician” (Informant 07), was well versed in 
the school finance issue and eager to pass reform legislation (Marro, 1996a). Another key 
player in the Senate was Cheryl Rivers, Chair of the Finance Committee. Rivers, 
described as a “rock-ribbed working class Democratic liberal” (Informant 20) with a 
reputation for bluntness (Informant 08), had also served on the Senate Finance 
Committee in recent biennia and was similarly motivated to enact school finance reform 
(Informants 10, 14).  
In early public statements on the issue, President Pro Tempore Shumlin appeared 
to align himself with Dean’s modest, anti-income tax approach to school finance 
legislation. In a statement to the Rutland Herald, Shumlin remarked: “My own feeling is 
that we can do this without raising income taxes” (Hoffman, 1996a, p. 14). A legislative 
informant confirmed Shumlin and Dean’s likeminded stance: “The alliance was that 
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Howard [Dean] and [Peter Shumlin] were in sync and the House was disappointed when 
they weren’t going to do income tax” (Informant 14). Even the Senate’s more liberal 
members disliked the income tax approach. As one informant commented: “I don’t agree 
that it’s the best way to fund education in this state because we have too many second 
homeowners.” (Informant 10) 
Indeed, in interviews House Democrats expressed disappointment that the 
opportunity provided by the 1996 election might realize only relatively minor changes to 
the way school aid was raised and distributed to schools thanks to the modest goals 
embraced by Governor Dean and Senate Pro Tempore Shumlin (Informants 07, 21, 03). 
Two House members articulated this sentiment as follows: 
Now we’ve got a little wind in our sails but not a lot. We do have a 
Democratic Senate but the Senate and the House are different…. So 
anyway, we’re not getting any signs out of the Senate that they’re with us 
and we’re sure not getting any encouragement from the governor.  
(Informant 07) 
 
I just had this sense of “What will the Senate enable us to do?” and “We 
really need to push this in the House.” (Informant 21) 
 
Similarly, a senator reflecting upon this time period agreed that significant change to the 
school funding system was not a likely outcome in the Senate during the early weeks of 
the 1997 legislative session: “…I can tell you right now, you know, Howard Dean and 
the Senate Democrats weren’t going to do anything.” (Informant 10). One informant 
summed up the legislative environment at the onset of the 1997/98 biennium when he 
noted: “Incremental approaches were still on the table…” (Informant 16). 
House Leadership 
Following the November 1996 elections, the House leadership team returned 
intact for the 1997/98 biennium. Unlike Dean, who was personally ambivalent about the 
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property tax and school funding issue, the House leadership sought to pass a piece of 
school finance reform legislation that session. To this end, the House took the step of 
putting other legislative priorities on hold in favor of the school finance issue. In the 
Burlington Free Press, House Speaker Obuchowski announced: “We’re going to ask the 
Ways and Means Committee to clear the decks and work just on that issue. It’s our hope 
that at this point that property tax reform will be fully debated and passed by the House 
by Town Meeting Day.42 That’s an aggressive agenda” (Sneyd, 1997a, p. 3B). 
As noted earlier, pro-reform advocates in the legislature believed that this 
legislative session was their best chance in several years to see the passage of a school 
finance reform measure in the General Assembly. However, Dean’s moderate, business 
friendly plan was proving to be seriously at odds with the more ambitious goals of House 
Democrats. Despite Dean’s stated opposition to the income tax approach, House leaders, 
including Speaker Obuchowski and Majority Leaders Sally Fox and Paul Cillo, 
maintained publicly that such an approach was still “on the table for consideration” 
(Hoffman, 1996a). These leaders favored the use of the income tax because they believed 
its progressivity promoted greater “vertical equity,” one of their five longstanding goals 
for school finance legislation (Ways and Means Committee, 1997a). 
According to study informants, many House members, including the rank and file, 
also remained committed to an income-based approach to school funding (Informants 21, 
07, 03). One informant recounted a Ways and Means Committee discussion on the use of 
the income tax in the early weeks of the 1997 legislative session: 
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It was our committee. We were in Room 11 and it was open to any 
legislator. I remember a former legislator from Charlotte… standing up 
and saying, “We’ve passed the right thing already. You just need to pull it 
out and do it again.” That had been the plan from 1994, which was an 
income-based plan. And then not long after him, a Republican from the 
Wakefield district got up. [Wakefield] is a resort community. It’s a ski 
town. He got up and said, “I don’t really like any of these options but if we 
have to go through this, it needs to be income-based.” His point was he 
represented a property wealthy town and if we were going to require that 
property wealth to be “shared,” he was concerned about low-income 
residents and that property value is not a measurement of wealth. 
(Informant 21) 
 
However, despite this desire for an income-based approach, Dean’s decision to engage 
the Legislature in direct policy discussions forced House members to temper their goals 
for the 1997 session. One House member described the pressure he was under from his 
leadership to create a bill that acceded to the governor’s policy parameters: 
…after the elections, we’re still at $10 million max [in property tax 
sharing]. So [Speaker of the House] Obie says, “Can you work with this?” 
I said, “Oh my God, this is so bad. I mean this is the worst.” It was bad 
enough we had to pass H.351 but this was really getting bad. (Informant 
03)  
 
As a result of Dean’s intervention, the House’s pro-reform contingent faced two 
unappealing options: 1) stand their ground on their policy preferences and potentially 
wind up without a reform measure passing; or 2) acquiesce to Dean’s policy conditions 
and get far less than they had originally hoped. House Co-Majority Leader Sally Fox 
spoke of this political consideration to the Burlington Free Press: “The governor has said 
publicly that he’s going to veto any bill that’s got an income tax increase. We’ve got to 
be cognizant of that” (Good, 1997d, p. 4A). According to study informants, the House 




[The governor] wanted like $10 million it. It was tiny and I was doing 
everything I could to contain myself because it’s the governor…. So we 
had this anemic plan that we came up with. It was some anemic thing that 
we were going to pass…” (Informant 03) 
 
So we go into 1997 with an anorexic bill because there is just no support 
for a H.541 [measure]… (Informant 07) 
 
When asked by a news reporter why his caucus did not press Governor Dean harder on 
the income tax issue in their negotiations, Speaker of the House Obuchowski 
acknowledged the political reality that the House was not in a position to dictate the 
terms of the agreement: “We needed the governor to sign the bill. We had to get what we 
could get” (Good, 1997e, p. 1E). 
Leadership Arena 
Pre-Brigham: Actors’ Resources and Strategies 
 
 This section describes the resources and strategies utilized by those actors 
participating in the leadership arena. In the leadership arena, participants relied on 
resources and strategies derived from political skill as well as positional authority to 
influence the policymaking process 
Governor Howard Dean  
Governor Dean emerged from the 1996 election possessing multiple potent 
policymaking resources derived not only from his position as the state’s top elected 
official but also from his resounding electoral victory. In terms of institutional authority, 
Dean’s position as governor allowed him to set the party’s political agenda, afforded him 
an opportunity to frame the issue as he saw fit, compelled deference among top 
Democratic legislative leaders, and provided the power to check any radical plans that 
might emanate from the more liberal House through the use of a gubernatorial veto. 
Dean’s strong showing in the 1996 election also signaled his enormous personal 
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popularity and, by extension, the popularity of the moderate, business-oriented policies 
he advocated.      
To further his goal of enacting modest property tax reform during the 1997 
legislative session, Dean embarked on a strategy of legislative engagement. As noted 
earlier, beginning in the fall of 1996 Dean worked cooperatively with Democratic leaders 
in the House and Senate to craft a joint school funding measure. The Burlington Free 
Press lauded Dean’s newfound engagement on the issue: 
Before a single committee has voted on property tax reform, this year’s 
work on the issue has already surpassed prior efforts: For the first time, 
Gov. Howard Dean has joined the fight. Dean’s proposal offers a firm 
foundation, too. The plan can be improved – indeed, it must be – but the 
odds of reform actually occurring soar when the state’s chief executive 
comes in off the sidelines. (“Dean’s Interest Marks,” 1997, p. 4E) 
 
However the Free Press also warned that Dean must not give up on the issue, like they 
believed he had in past legislative sessions: 
His job will be to guard against misguided proposals such as a raid on the 
income tax. In the past, he has dropped reform efforts at the first sign of 
serious controversy; this year he must see the battle to the end. (“Governor 
Dean Has,” 1997, p. 6A) 
 
Dean’s early engagement signaled a newfound willingness to deploy resources in favor of 
his desired vision for property tax reform and worked to his favor in multiple ways.  
First, his positional authority gave him a natural edge at the negotiating table. 
This advantage, coupled with Democratic legislators’ need to deliver a school finance 
reform bill, strengthened his hand in securing the modest reforms he sought. As Speaker 
of the House Michael Obuchowski noted in the Burlington Free Press: “The public is not 
going to tolerate failure” (Good, 1997b, p. 1). Thus, if legislators refused to negotiate a 
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mutually agreeable solution, they faced the unappealing possibility of returning to their 
districts empty handed thanks to a gubernatorial veto. 
Second, by getting a head start on the issue, Dean appeared to be responding 
proactively to voter concerns. As noted earlier, a full 53 percent of Vermonters believed 
high property taxes to be a very serious problem (Becker Institute, 1995). Had Dean held 
back and waited for the House Ways and Means Committee to devise its own plan, he 
might very well have been forced into the defensive position of vetoing a measure the 
public wanted. His proactive stance allowed him to shape the contours of the bill while at 
the same time receiving political credit for doing so. 
  Dean knew that the public wanted school finance reform. However, he also knew 
that the business community largely opposed the tax increases and tax sharing measures 
that such reforms contained. In fact, the business community had publicly opposed even 
the modest property tax sharing proposed in Dean’s last foray into school finance 
legislation – H.74 (KPMG Peat Marwick, 1994). To clear the way for their support of his 
1997 property tax reform effort, Dean engaged in strategic dealmaking with the business 
community. A report by the lobbying firm Keller and Fuller (1998) detailed how this 
agreement came about:   
In the spring of 1996, Howard Dean and Peter Shumlin were quietly 
canvassing Vermont’s movers and shakers with a strong message. For yet 
another biennium, the GOP majority in the Senate had stonewalled on 
meaningful property tax reform, and so the governor and then Minority 
Leader Shumlin developed what they though would be a winning strategy 
to put in place the kind of legislature that would finally end the reform 
deadlock. Their message was simple, seductive, and ultimately successful: 
“Help us elect moderate Democrats, especially to the Senate, and we will 
deliver a property tax reform package that will not economically disrupt 




 …a clear but unspoken agreement between business leaders and 
Democratic moderates, including Dean, that business would downplay its 
historic opposition to even a moderate tax sharing plan in exchange for 
strong support by Dean and Shumlin on [electrical] restructuring. (p. 2) 
 
While informants did not directly reference this quid pro quo with the business 
community sufficient evidence can be pieced together to support the claims made by 
Keller and Fuller. First, one informant did reference a Dean/Shumlin alliance on school 
finance reform (Informant 14). Second, archival evidence in the House leadership’s files 
indicate huge public interest in the electrical utility restructuring issue, such that it seems 
credible that it could have been used as a political bargaining chip. Finally, a tidbit buried 
in the House Ways and Means Committee meeting minutes offered support to Keller and 
Fuller’s claims. When asked to provide her opinion of the governor’s plan, Ann Lindburg 
of the Vermont Retail Association, indicated she had “no opinion on the governor’s 
proposal” (Ways and Means Committee, 1997b). This position differed from 1995, when 
the overwhelming majority of the business industry opposed the governor’s H.74. 
Senate Leadership 
As the 1997 legislative session got underway, Senate Democrats were anxious to 
shed their chamber’s reputation as the “bone yard of property tax reform” by passing a 
piece of school finance reform legislation (Informants 10, 14). To further this end, they 
utilized the authority provided by their majority status to appoint reform-friendly 
members to the Senate Finance Committee. According to one senator, the issue of school 
funding figured so prominently on the Senate leadership’s political agenda that they 
“…built a finance committee primarily based upon getting property tax reform done” 
(Informant 14). This senator recollected that Senate leaders specifically selected Cheryl 
Rivers to serve as committee chair because she was “committed to equity” (Informant 
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14). The senator further recollected that leaders sought to facilitate the passage of a 
reform measure by placing moderate Republicans such as Jim Greenwood on the 
committee. Described as “a gentleman” (Informant 15), Democrats thought of him as a 
potential ally “…because he came from a property poor community” (Informant 04). 
In an “unusual” move, Shumlin also placed himself on the Senate Finance 
Committee (Informant 14). The appointment of the chamber’s highest-ranking senator to 
the committee signaled the leadership’s interest in controlling and managing any school 
finance bill that might emerge. According to another informant, it also signaled the 
Senate leadership’s wariness of the notoriously liberal Cheryl Rivers (Informant 10). In 
this senator’s opinion, Shumlin placed himself on the committee “to keep an eye on” 
Rivers for the business community, which had expressed reservations about her 
appointment to Senate Finance in a legislative session that was sure to see action on the 
school funding issue (Informant 10; Allen, 1997) 
In terms of strategy, Senate leaders, led by Shumlin, aligned themselves with 
Governor Dean in terms of favoring moderate reform measures and opposing an income-
based approach to paying for school aid (Informant 14; Keller & Fuller, 1998). This 
stance was probably born of practicality as much as political strategy given the 
geographic composition of senatorial districts. Because senators represent significantly 
larger geographical areas than House members, almost every senator has gold town 
residents as constituents. As a result, the presence of both property-poor and property-
wealthy school districts had a moderating effect on Senate plans for school finance 
reform that emphasized minimal financial harm to any one constituency. Two informants 
highlighted the moderating forces at work in the Senate: 
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Because even though the Senate had gone Democratic, a fair number of 
those senators were from districts… you know, Senate districts are big. 
Chittenden county senators were representing Essex too. Lamoille County 
has Stowe in it. Bennington has Manchester. Almost all of them other than 
Franklin County and Addison County have those very loud and powerful 
[gold town] constituencies. (Informant 21) 
 
If you’re representing [just] Stowe, you’re fighting like mad or you won’t 
be back next January. If you’re representing Killington, you’re fighting 
mad. So in the House it’s much clearer what side you’re on. In the Senate, 
it’s not. (Informant 01) 
 
Whether born of practicality or political strategy, the Senate’s philosophical alignment 
with Dean heightened the likelihood that a modest school funding package would pass in 
the 1997 legislative session. 
House Leadership 
In public statements, the House leadership expressed pleasure that Governor Dean 
had decided to engage legislators in the process of school finance policymaking. For 
example, House Speaker Obuchowski commented to the Burlington Free Press: “The 
excitement is we’ve got a willing player in the governor and a willing player in the 
Senate. And that’s important, because a lot of times, we’ve felt like we were out there 
alone” (Good, 1997d, p. 1A). However, an engaged Dean actually curtailed the free hand 
House Democrats had previously enjoyed in developing and promoting their own school 
aid proposals. With Dean exerting political pressure to write a joint bill, the House was 
compelled to participate in a process governed by Dean’s more modest policy objectives, 
namely the reduction of property taxes through a minimal tax sharing mechanism. While 
taxpayer relief was one of the House leadership’s five goals, they also considered student 
funding equity a major issue they wanted to address through legislation (Informant 07). 
Lacking sufficient resources to overrule Dean’s plan, House leaders’ main strategy 
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entailed pushing back on it as wholly insufficient to alleviate Vermonters’ heavy property 
tax burden: 
[Dean] would put out these proposals and then we’d run into some brick 
wall because [the funding amount] was so little the property tax rates 
weren’t going down. There was no relief. I’d say, “You’re not going to get 
any relief if all you’re doing is transferring $10 million and don’t want to 
raise other general fund taxes. There’s no magic here. The money’s got to 
come from somewhere.” They didn’t want to raise general fund taxes in 
general and he didn’t’ want to raise the statewide property tax. OK, we’re 
just chugging along. It’s like we did all this work to get here? (Informant 
03) 
 
These efforts at persuasion failed to change Dean’s mind on the matter and by early 
February the House Ways and Means Committee was poised to pass out a plan to provide 
moderate property tax relief to Vermont taxpayers. One House member recalled activities 
in the Ways and Means Committee in the period leading up the Brigham decision: 
So I got this call from Bob [Gensburg]. Bob says, “I don’t know what the 
Supreme Court is going to say but I think we’re going to win this case. 
Well, we were within days of voting this anorexic bill out of committee so 
I put on the brakes and we put the bill aside and waited and did some other 
work. (Informant 07) 
 
Leadership Arena 
The Supreme Court Rules in Brigham v. State 
 
Bob Gensburg’s comments proved prescient. Just a few days following this 
telephone conversation, the Supreme Court weighed in on the matter with its verdict in 
the Brigham v. State case. Their unanimous ruling declared the state’s system of school 
finance to be unconstitutional and charged the legislature with rewriting the state’s school 
aid legislation. The court’s ruling made it clear that school funding could no longer be a 
function of district wealth.  
In terms of public response, the ruling took Vermonters by surprise. One 
informant expressed his shock at the court decision: “…the Supreme Court surprised us 
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all. Nobody thought that case was going to win and so we are all going “What?!” 
(Informant 16). Informants characterized pro-reform reactions in the following ways: 
When it was decided, it was one of those moments that means so much to 
you, you still remember where you were and what you were doing at the 
time of the day. I remember going to the Statehouse the next day with Bob 
Gensburg and everybody being perfectly excited because it was the first 
time the legislature had been told, “You have to do this.” (Informant 20)  
 
The Supreme Court came out with its decision and everybody said, “This 
is amazing. This is great.” Everyone cheered. I remember when Bob 
[Gensburg] first came in the Statehouse. I don’t know if it was the next 
day, the next week or something. The Democratic caucus gave him a 
standing ovation. Everywhere you went people tried to touch him like he 
was a rock star. He was the hero. He was on every talk show. (Informant 
01)  
 
It was great, like now we have to do something. I remember Bob 
Gensburg speaking in the Legislature and just this amazing sense of it’s 
going to happen. We have to do it. (Informant 06)  
 
Those who had opposed the type of tax sharing plans advocated by policy 
Representatives Paul Cillo and John Freidin over the last several years reported being 
resigned to the fact that change would be forthcoming. Informants described reform 
opponent reaction in the following ways: 
My opinion was the Supreme Court decision on Brigham was a message 
that something has to change here. (Informant 02)  
 
So Brigham comes up. We say: “We’re putting everything on the table. 
We’re willing to talk.” Nobody wanted to talk. I don’t blame them. Then 
[the House] started cooking up the plans. (Informant 09) 
 
…it’s a Supreme Court decision. You’re not going to negotiate with this. 
It’s not going to go away and something is going to be done this session. 
(Informant 15)  
 
Vermonters from across the political spectrum widely interpreted the ruling as 




When the court ruling came down, I had watched it for years. So even 
thought [school finance reform] wasn’t my thing, I knew quite a lot about 
the politics and I knew that the statewide property tax was it. (Informant 
10) 
 
Richard Mallary, a respected former U.S. Representative who also served as 
Secretary of Administration to two former Republican governors weighed in with 
a similar opinion: 
There is no question in my mind that the practical effect of the Court’s 
decision is that there must be some sort of statewide uniform collection of 
revenues from the property tax. (Personal communication, February 19, 
1997) 
 
The Vermont Legislative Council agreed but also left the door open for other 
types of sharing mechanisms: 
Although shifting completely to a state tax source would certainly satisfy 
the Court’s ruling… local taxes may still be used to support schools, and 
they may be local property taxes. The Court’s ruling requires, however, 
that if local property taxes are used to support education, the capacity or 
access to property wealth be equalized among the districts. (Vermont 
Legislative Council, 1997, p. 2) 
 
These interpretations favored the more extensive tax sharing plans that had been 
emanating from the reform-minded House Ways and Means Committee since 1994. By 
essentially agreeing with the House’s efforts to label Vermont’s school funding issue a 
matter of student equity as well as a matter of taxpayer equity, the court decision swayed 
political momentum away from Howard Dean and his modest sharing proposals that 
focused on taxpayer equity and towards the House of Representatives with its plans for 
structural changes to both school aid revenue collection and distribution. As one House 
member excitedly noted: “So now we had the Court requiring equal educational 
opportunity, so the Court was requiring one of our key goals” (Informant 07).  Thanks to 
the ruling, House “solutions” such as H.541 and H.351, which just weeks before 
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appeared politically unviable, received renewed consideration (Informants 07, 03, 08, 
06). Politicians and pundits, alike, highlighted Brigham’s impact upon the balance of 
power in Vermont state policymaking on the issue of school funding: 
…thanks to the sweeping impact of the Feb. 5 court decision, Dean lost 
whatever leverage he once had to keep House and Senate liberal 
Democrats from pushing for too revolutionary a version of tax reform. 
(Sam Hemmingway, 2/14, p. 1B, BFP) 
 
 …the Brigham decision changed everything. To me, that’s what did it. 
The legislature was primed to move. They had campaigned on it. They 
didn’t think they could go too far. The Supreme Court throws out the 
Foundation Formula. The door is wide open. (Informant 16) 
 
With all its eloquent calls, though, the Court has sent all of this legislative 
session’s proposals to the recycling bin. The Legislature is faced with 




Post-Brigham: Actors, Goals and Motives 
 
 This section describes how policy actors operating within the leadership arena 
revised their goals and motives in the wake of the political realignment brought about by 
the Supreme Court’s verdict in Brigham v. State. Specifically, it explores how the court 
ruling emboldened pro-school finance reform advocates to eschew compromise measures 
in favor of structural reform. 
House Leadership 
When presented with the news of the Supreme Court ruling, one Democratic 
House member active in education issues recalled: “I just remember feeling like winning 
the lottery” (Informant 13). Emboldened by the court’s forceful ruling, House leaders 
immediately moved to scrap the modest tax sharing plan they had been formulating in 
conjunction with Governor Dean in favor of more wide ranging measures. Speaker of the 
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House Michael Obuchowski publicly expressed the House leadership’s sentiments in his 
comments to the Burlington Free Press: “In light of the decision, what the governor has 
proposed was a Band-Aid. The sky’s the limit now” (Lisberg & Good, 1997 p. 2A). In 
interviews, a House leader recollected Paul Cillo’s efforts to halt the governor’s plan 
immediately following the court’s decision: 
We heard about the decision on the 5th, the end of the day on the 5th. So 
Paul called Freidin in the committee room at 11:00 in the morning and 
said, “John, change of plans. We’re not presenting the anemic plan at 1:00. 
We’re going to have Bob Gensburg in to talk about the lawsuit. And we’re 
going to go back to the drawing board because the governor’s plan doesn’t 
do the job.” (Informant 03)  
 
With the spotlight now on achieving “substantially equal” educational opportunity 
rather than some measure of property tax relief, pro-property tax reform members of the 
House wasted no time retrieving reform proposals that had just recently been considered 
politically extravagant. House Ways and Means Committee chair Oreste Valsangiacomo 
noted that his committee would indeed consider ideas that had died in previous years 
(Lisberg & Good, 1997). 
Documentary and interview data reveal that within days of the Brigham ruling the 
House engaged in efforts to revitalize the highly controversial H.54143 as a viable policy 
option for meeting the Court’s mandate. Archival research discovered a memo to Steve 
Klein of the Joint Fiscal Office from Deb Brighton asking for updated educating 
spending information from the Department of Education “to revive H.541” (D. Brighton, 
personal communication, February 10, 1997). House Ways and Means Committee 
minutes indicate that Ann Winchester of the Legislative Council’s Office met with 
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coupled with a local guaranteed yield income tax. 
	  
 320 
Committee members to discuss the various components of H.541. Interview informants 
also recalled a push to place H.541 back into play as a legislative response to the court’s 
decision: 
I’m pretty sure we said to Catherine Benham [of the Joint Fiscal Office], 
“Let’s, you know, run H.541 with current levels of spending and what do 
we come up with?” (Informant 07) 
 
This was amazing because we had [H.541] written. It was already 
written…. The governor didn’t want an income tax but so what, they can 
take it out in the Senate. So we put an income tax in. I wanted it on the 
table. (Informant 03) 
 
Although conceptually similar, the bill that the House Ways and Means 
Committee developed in the wake of the Brigham decision (H.527 as it would come to be 
known) differed from H.541 in three significant ways: It did not include a statewide 
teachers contract; it distributed funds to students through a block grant; and it included a 
small residential property tax in addition to the local income tax. This last provision was 
added after Ways and Means Committee members ran H.541’s taxing and funding 
formula with current data and quickly realized that they needed a minimal homestead 
property tax to supplement the local income tax or else the local income tax rates would 
be too high. Regarding this situation, a House member commented: 
Well, we came up with local income taxes of 22 percent in some towns. 
That’s a little high. We can go as high as a local income tax of 10 percent. 
That’s a little too high. We need more revenue. We can’t get it all by 
general [fund] taxes, right? So we’ll have a 47-cent property tax and we’ll 
split the grand – 47 cents for residential people. We’ll have a fixed tax for 
nonresidential of $1.10 because they don’t pay the income tax and have an 
equalized yield for spending above whatever.44 (Informant 07)  
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Noting that “the House had already passed an income-based plan” in a previous 
biennium, a member of the House Ways and Means Committed did not recall the revival 
of the basic concepts embraced by H.541 as “being terribly complicated or controversial” 
among her colleagues (Informant 21). Another informant attributed the ease with which 
the Committee accepted a plan than just a few years ago had been deemed  “radical” to 
the ceaseless advocacy efforts of Paul Cillo on behalf of his school finance reform 
proposals: “Through the years, people started being more familiar with the concepts and, 
you know, this was sort of Paul’s work all along. Just sort of hammering away at equity 
and the concept of yield” (Informant 06). 
However, the Ways and Means Committee member did recall significant 
committee discussion revolving around the setting of particular tax rates to fund the 
guaranteed yield formula. Informant statements and committee minutes reveal that the 
Ways and Means Committee utilized an iterative process that entailed adjusting the rates 
of various taxes up and down to develop a revenue package that did not unduly harm any 
one district: 
A big discussion was around the equalized yield: What would that be? 
And, you know, we looked at spreadsheets with: “This is [the income tax 
rate at] $42 dollars per penny, here is $41 dollars a penny, here is $39 
dollars a penny. We spent days looking at different components. You 
could have a lower statewide property tax rate and then a higher 
guaranteed yield [income tax]. (Informant 21) 
 
This negotiation reflected the varying geographic and financial circumstances of 
member districts as well as personal preferences: 
I remember Al Perry was on our committee. He is from Northern County; 
very low property wealth but very low income wealth. He was very much 
pushed, I mean he was not in favor of a high statewide property tax rate. 
Whereas Danny Deuel was from the Rutland area and he would have 
preferred a higher statewide property tax and a higher block grant because 
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he felt that the equalizing wasn’t enough, that we really needed to make 
sure that the low income students’ schools would spend more. He is a 
teacher. [He felt] we needed to push the low spending schools. Whereas 
Al Perry was saying, “ This is local control and that’s their determination 
and I don’t want their tax rates to go up.” (Informant 21) 
 
Ways and Means Committee minutes revealed that similar negotiations occurred with 
regard to the use of almost every tax included in the revenue package. These tax rates 
were repeatedly adjusted to examine their impact upon various constituencies. Similarly, 
the amount of the per-pupil block grant was adjusted several times in response to the 
amount of revenue produced by the various tax packages.  
By late February, the House Ways and Means Committee coalesced around a 
general school funding tax package that provided a weighted per-pupil block grant to 
school districts. This block grant was comprised of funds from a $1.31 uniform statewide 
non-residential property tax, a $.39 uniform statewide residential property tax and 
approximately $320 million in general fund dollars. All spending above the block grant 
would be funded through a guaranteed yield local property tax (Ways and Means 
Committee, 1997c). Ways and Means Committee members unanimously voted this 
package out of committee on March 13, 1997.  
In his introduction of H.527 to the full House on March 18, Ways and Means 
Committee Vice Chair John Freidin (1997) listed the measure’s three broad goals: 
Today we have the opportunity to meet three great challenges: 1) To 
provide Vermonters with property tax relief, which has been an issue of 
study, debate, and action before this body almost without pause since at 
least 1992; 2) To comply with the unanimous February 1997 Supreme 
Court decision that outlaws our current education finance system and 
provides that every Vermont child has a constitutional right to equal 
educational opportunity, and further that it is the responsibility of the state 
to deliver that opportunity; and 3) To preserve Vermont’s valuable 
tradition of local control over school budgets. The bill before you meets 




Because of the Court’s mandate, the Ways and Means Committee addressed student 
equity as well as property tax equity issues. Freidin also justified the Ways and Means 
Committee’s inclusion of a local income tax as means to satisfy Brigham:   
…the weakness of an equalized, property-based system is that it is easier 
for a district where incomes are high to pay property taxes than it is for a 
district where incomes are lower…. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, your Ways 
and Means Committee decided that to equalize district wealth on the basis 
of property wealth was insufficient to meet the standards of the Brigham 
decision. An equalized, property-based system would continue to allow 
disparities in district wealth – income wealth – to influence local spending 
decisions. Therefore, the Ways and Means Committee has created an 
education finance system, an equalized, income-based system. Though it 
relies on local income tax revenues for only 12.5 percent of its revenues..., 
the equalized, income-based system preserves local control over how 
much each community can spend to educate its students. But by using 
state aid to even-up what the local income tax generates in each town, 
H.527 enables each school district to have available for its spending the 
same amount of money per pupil for each percent or fraction thereof of 
local equalized income tax. (pp. 3-4) 
 
In short, an income tax helped satisfy the Committee’s key goal of basing school taxes on 
“ability to pay” in a way that funding formulas based on property taxes, alone, could not.  
Floor debate on H.527 lasted three days. During this period, the bill survived two 
serious challenges, most prominently an effort by House Republican Ruth Dwyer to strip 
all taxing provisions out of the bill in favor of a two percent gross receipts tax.45 The 
gross receipts tax idea made a splash at Town Meeting Day among those Vermonters 
searching for an alternative to the statewide property tax (Lisberg, 1997b; D. Pratt, 
personal communication, March 6, 1997). However, economists from across the political 
spectrum did not embrace the move to an untested taxing source as a means to fund 
schools (T. Kavet, personal communication, February 3, 1997; Joint Fiscal Office, 1997; 
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Sneyd, 1997c). House members voted down Dwyer’s amendment on a vote of 90 to 57. 
Finally, after turning back last minute efforts to delay the consideration of the school 
finance effort as well as entreaties by the Dean administration to eliminate the income tax 
component, the bill passed the House on March 21, 1997 by a vote of 81 to 62.  
Governor Howard Dean 
 In the days following the Supreme Court’s ruling, Governor Dean lauded the 
Brigham decision. In remarks to the Burlington Free Press, he commented: “I think it is 
very positive. I hope it will give property tax reform a boost” (Donoghue, 1997, p. 6A). 
An informant described a similarly positive response by the governor in the immediate 
aftermath of the Court’s decision: 
I just remember the statehouse being abuzz with, “Wow, now we have to 
do something.” By the time they came back the next week… there was a 
kind of political consensus that, “OK, the court has ruled. We’ve got to do 
something.” I think the governor set the tone. As I recall, I seem to 
remember him saying that “We’ve got to do something.” (Informant 17) 
 
However, the ruling had shifted political momentum away from enacting the modest 
reforms Governor Dean had spent the last several months developing. Regarding this 
fact, one informant noted: 
Howard thought he was dealing with the issue. But what was clear after 
the Supreme Court acted was all they were doing was putting just a little 
money into something that needed a lot of money. (Informant 01)  
 
Despite the significant change in approach now called for by the court, informant 
responses indicated that Dean did not spend a significant amount of time studying the 
ruling or formulating a thoughtful response to the court’s decision. Instead, he wasted no 
time in interpreting the court’s mandate for equality of educational opportunity as a 
mandate for equal spending. Given this interpretation, Dean began advocating for a state 
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funding mechanism that provided a uniform block grant to all students. Politicians and 
special interest group leaders condemned this policy prescription as overly simplistic and 
ill conceived: 
It was interesting, the night the decision came out, Montpelier was having 
its “Welcome Back Legislators” dinner. The city of Montpelier, they have 
a little buffet dinner at the hotel. So I was in line behind Howard Dean. 
We heard the decision. He said, “I think what we should do, I think the 
only way we could meet the Supreme Court decision standard is to take all 
the money for public education and the divide it up among the 100,000 
kids and the students in the school district. So I said, “You’re going to say 
the school districts can’t raise any more money on their own?” He didn’t 
understand this stuff. He said, “No, they can raise money if they need it 
but we’ll just do that.” I said, “As soon as you do that, Howard, that’s not 
going to meet the [Supreme Court’s] test.” (Informant 03)  
 
The governor pretty quickly got into a corner of, “We’re just going to give 
everybody x number of dollars and that’s it.” The legislature felt like that 
was too… It went against the grain of [local control]. (Informant 13) 
 
His initial reaction to Brigham was: “We’re going to go to a flat per-
student grant for every school district and that’s all you’re going to be able 
to spend.” Because that was, you know, his literal interpretation of what 
Brigham required. (Informant 09)  
 
The Brigham decision comes. We all go into the governor’s office and 
Howard Dean said… He was heading to a hockey game for one of his kids 
and he said, “I’ve got a great idea. This is perfect. We’ll do a statewide 
property tax. We’ll give everybody a block grant for education of $6,500, 
whatever the number is.  We’ll tell them that’s all we can do and they’re 
on their own after that.” And I said, “Governor, I don’t think that is going 
to be very popular to be telling communities that Montpelier is going to 
tell them what you can spend on school finances.” He wanted to contain 
costs as well as do equity. So did we all but I said, “Maybe you are not 
running for reelection, but the rest of us are.” (Informant 14)   
 
After his immediate, off-the-cuff policy recommendations were rebuffed, Dean shied 
away from further policy prescriptions other than cautioning that “…any new plan should 
not touch the state’s income tax…” (Donoghue, 1997, p. 6A). Commenting upon Dean’s 
seeming inaction on the issue, newspaper columnist Sam Hemmingway wrote: “…it’s 
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clear there will be no dramatic, risk-taking speech from Dean laying out a blueprint for 
education” (Hemingway, 1997, p. 1B). Multiple interview informants concurred with the 
assessment that blocking the income tax became Dean’s policy priority in the days 
following Brigham: 
Dean certainly didn’t want to be pushed as far as the income-based 
system…. He put his foot down on income tax. He did that publicly. 
(Informant 18)  
 
Anybody that knew anything knew that it was going to be property tax 
only… clearly an income tax was a deal breaker for him. (Informant 02)  
 
…two days after Brigham came down, the governor said any proposal that 
had an increase in income tax or Powerball46 in it would be vetoed. I felt 
that was a terrible mistake on his part. I mean he’s the one who that said 
that this is the most important event that has occurred in Vermont since 
the Civil War. That was a quote from him. I’m a Dean fan, don’t 
misunderstand me, but for him to take anything off the table as a part of 
the discussion I thought was bad government. (Informant 19) 
 
However, in what one newspaper columnist described as a “deliciously 
impertinent” move, the newly empowered House leadership ignored this warning and 
continued with its plan to include a local school income tax (Good, 1997e, p. 1E). 
Informant data indicate that the House’s decision to cross this “line in the sand” 
(Informant 01) angered Dean who viewed the move as yet another example of liberal 
taxing policies that shifted expenses onto the wealthy: 
Howard Dean was not at all enamored with what was going on in the 
House. On this I mean they used it to kind of push a much broader agenda 
than just equal education within the definition of the Brigham decision. 
There was all this, you know, “Throw it on the income tax. Soak the rich.” 
(Informant 15) 
 
In just a matter of weeks, the Brigham decision had transformed the governor 
from a proactive policy negotiator to a defensive bystander on the issue of school 
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funding. A business lobby publication condemned Dean’s performance in the period 
following the court ruling: 
Following [Brigham’s] release, Governor Dean all but vanished from the 
politics of tax reform. The court decision was interpreted in a manner that 
made Dean and his fellow moderates non-players. For the balance of the 
’97 session and while Act 60 was being written, Dean’s only goal and 
success seemed to be in opposition to the use of the state income tax as the 
basis for the legislation. (Keller & Fuller, 1998, pp. 2-3) 
 
Senate Leadership 
During the opening weeks of the 1997 legislative session, members of the Senate 
Finance Committee spent their time taking testimony from experts and interested 
individuals on various aspects of school funding while they waited for the House Ways 
and Means Committee to weigh in with its final version of the reform bill it was 
negotiating with Governor Dean. One informant characterized this period in the 
following way:  
You know, there had been discussions and the reason was property taxes 
were continuing to escalate at a rate that was not sustainable. So the 
discussions were, “Let’s try to come up with ideas of how can we fund 
education other than [through] property taxes? Does anyone have any 
ideas? Can we use a different tax? Or is there a different method to fund 
education?” (Informant 04)  
 
The informant further noted that the Brigham served as a wake up call for the 
Committee in terms of focusing its attention more fully on the school funding 
issue. In response, the Committee began in earnest to develop its own vision for 
state aid to education: 
It wasn’t long after that the court decision came down and then it was 
more: “We’ve got to do this, so let’s get started on it.” That’s really when 
various versions came up and some were much more than I was willing to 
talk about and so there were huge discussions and debates about where we 




In the wake of the decision, senators expressed their motivation to pass legislation 
that addressed notions of fairness, school equity and educational quality. These motives 
largely mirrored those of House members: 
What I found was a lack of equality in small towns. I found a town that 
was spending $3,400 in my district but Stowe was spending somewhere 
around $12,000 per student. Even though my colleagues on the right 
didn’t agree with me, I found a great amount of unfairness…. I said, “You 
know, this really isn’t fair because these kids are coming out of these 
schools with an inferior education because the town can’t raise the money 
to provide [educational resources].” (Informant 04) 
 
I knew it was going to be a huge help in getting equity in school finance. 
Let’s talk about the big picture. Our most important responsibility in a 
democratic society is educating our kids. (Informant 14) 
 
For me, it wasn’t about property tax relief. I don’t care about that really. I 
can say that. There were some places where the property tax was a real 
burden but that isn’t something I would risk my political neck over. But 
the idea that we would give all Vermont kids a good decent chance at a 
good education, that’s what it was for me. (Informant 10)  
 
While similarly interested in passing reform legislation that addressed student 
equity as well as taxpayer equity, senators were almost universally opposed to the 
House’s use of the income tax as an equalizing mechanism in its school funding formula. 
As informants explained: 
I didn’t like the House local income tax at all. I knew the governor wasn’t 
going to sign it. It was going to be a donnybrook…. Plus, I don’t agree 
that it’s the best way to fund education in this state because we have too 
many second homeowners; too many income taxes on the backs of the 
residents. (Informant 10) 
 
The House went to work and passed a plan that was going to be dependent 
upon income tax as the primary equalizer. I felt that there wasn’t enough 
income tax in Vermont to replace a billion dollar property tax revenue 
source.  There’s not that many rich people in Vermont…. It’s not a big 





The Senate balked at the income tax. Governor Dean was having a fit over 
the income tax and they just refused to do it that way. (Informant 21) 
 
Given their opposition to the use of the income tax, Senate leaders concentrated on 
reform measures that continued Vermont’s longstanding tradition of using the property 
tax as the primary source of revenue for state aid to education: 
In my opinion, the property tax was the only place to go because I wanted 
to be sure my out-of-state neighbors were helping to pay for our kids. 
(Informant 02) 
 
My kind of hero was Scudder Parker who was the first senator that 
proposed a statewide property tax. I just thought he was great, ahead of his 
time…. So what I thought when the court decision came down… I have 
the opportunity to get this done. So my goal is a statewide property tax 
bolstered by as much non-residential property tax revenue as I could 
possibly muster to go with it. (Informant 10) 
 
When contemplating the broad parameters of any potential plan, Senate Finance 
leaders took into account their desire to garner bipartisan support for it: 
I think on the Senate side, in particular, they were looking to have a 
bipartisan bill; something they could claim as bipartisan. (Informant 02) 
 
The Democrats didn’t want… they wanted to at least be able to go on the 
floor to debate this bill with a bipartisan group. That way it would show 
that our Finance Committee was… I don’t think it was unanimous, but it 
was bipartisan. (Informant 04) 
 
Because Senate leaders, including Finance Chair Cheryl Rivers, desired a bill with 
bipartisan support, two moderate committee members became the key players in the 
negotiation process: Republican Jim Greenwood from Essex/Orleans and Democrat Dick 
Sears from Bennington. Respondents emphasized their centrality to the negotiation 
process in the Senate Finance Committee: 
Getting those two on board was key to any plan because Dick [Sears] was 
a moderate Democrat and Greenwood was a moderate Republican 




If you didn’t have [Sears and Greenwood], you didn’t have the rest of the 
Senate either. They were kind of the moderates. Dick is a lot more liberal 
than Jim but they were both pragmatic. (Informant 17) 
 
 According to informants, these gentlemen represented constituencies that would 
have been penalized by the House bill’s inclusion of an income tax and a high non-
residential property tax. Thus, the Committee’s bill aimed at addressing these two 
moderate senator’s particular concerns with the House’s bill to bring them on board with 
a bipartisan reform package: 
As a matter of political convenience they couldn’t go home and support 
the House plan. I mean Dick Sears was like, “Maybe they will like it in 
Bennington but they will kill me in Manchester.” So they were looking for 
something that they could sell at home. Greenwood was a big one because 
he was all property tax wealth up in the Northeast Kingdom – lots of land 
and few kids. (Informant 15) 
  
Jim Greenwood and Dick Sears had a couple of things in common which 
primarily was Dick Sears had the northern part of Bennington County. 
[The county] has a lot of property wealth [such as] Manchester next to the 
ski communities and Jim had some aberrations in his community too 
because of the lake up there, the fact that there were camps on these lakes 
which had a similar effect [of creating property wealth]. (Informant 14) 
 
By mid-April, members of the Senate Finance Committee began to coalesce 
around the concept of an income sensitive statewide property tax. One informant recalled 
being favorably impressed by a plan Lieutenant Governor Doug Racine developed for the 
Committee’s consideration: “[Deb Brighton] had spoken with Doug Racine about 
devising an income sensitive property tax and I loved it…. I thought that was an even 
better idea than just a statewide property tax. So I felt enthusiastic about it” (Informant 
10). Racine noted in the Montpelier-Barre Times Argus that “making the income tax 
property sensitive” would be a suitable “alternative” to the House’s local income tax in 
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that it could similarly address concerns with vertical equity or “ability to pay” without 
having to use an income tax (Bever, 1997). 
Racine presented his plan to the Senate Finance Committee on April 14, 1997 
(Racine, 1997). This initial plan consisted of a $5,400 block grant that was funded 
through an income-sensitive47 homestead (house and two acres) property tax, a uniform 
non-homestead property tax of $1.33 per $100 of assessed value and additional 
unspecified general fund taxes. Should a school district choose to spend over the block 
grant, it had the option of levying a second-tier guaranteed yield local property tax on its 
homestead property. This second-tier local property tax would also be income sensitized. 
Several days later, on April 25, 1997 Senators Greenwood and Sears, who had 
been working closely with representatives from Governor Dean’s tax office, presented 
their own property tax reform proposal (Greenwood, Sears & Shumlin, 1997). 
Conceptually similar to the Racine plan, the Greenwood/Sears plan proposed a $4,562 
block grant for elementary students and a $5,702 block grant for secondary students that 
would be funded through a uniform $1.00 statewide property tax and an additional $60 
million in new general fund taxes. To make the plan income-sensitive, Sears and 
Greenwood included a rebate that would pay for the part of the tax burden that exceeded 
a certain percentage of household income on the homestead portion (in this case a house 
plus six acres) of a taxpayer’s property. Those school districts wishing to spend above the 
block grant would be allowed to levy additional property taxes. Those additional taxes 
levied on the homestead portion of a taxpayer’s property tax would remain with the 
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taxes ranging from $0.50 per $100 of property value to $1.33 per $100 of property value, 
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school district while the non-residential portion would flow to the state depending upon 
the town’s property wealth.  
Eventually Senate Finance Committee Chair Cheryl Rivers developed a 
compromise plan she dubbed “Senate Finance 1.” A Committee member recalled the 
process of melding the two proposals: 
We incorporated ideas from other people. We had a block grant so that 
Dick Sears would feel happy. That was their proposal. They [Sears and 
Greenwood] had a very crude, simple proposal that wasn’t very 
progressive, I didn’t think. But we kept the block grant idea. The income-
sensitive property tax was Doug Racine’s idea. We had the current use 
incorporated, but not at the local level. We had to allow spending above 
the block grant [through a guaranteed yield second tier property tax]. 
(Informant 10)  
 
Respondents recollected a negotiation process similar to that in the House where all 
members sought to find a mutually agreeable balance of revenue sources and distribution 
methods: 
I would look at printouts before I released them so I didn’t send Senator 
Sears over the rainbow and probably tweak it a little bit... it would have 
been the size of the block grant. One of the factors was how big was the 
block grant going to be? And there was a guaranteed yield [property tax] 
in there. What was that going be? (Informant 10) 
 
What happened in committee was that everyone was trying to make sure 
that we passed a bill but also that their own districts weren’t harmed. 
(Informant 14) 
 
As I recall, we set the per student amount at somewhere around 
$6,800/$7,000 so that meant many of my poor towns… were going to 
benefit. They would be a receiving town and not a sending town. 
(Informant 04) 
  
After much negotiation among the competing factions within the Senate Finance 
Committee members emerged on May 15, 1997 with a finalized compromise version of 
H. 527 that passed on a vote of six-to-one (Senate Finance Committee, 1997). This plan 
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proposed a uniform block grant of $5,022 per pupil with additional $636 in categorical 
funding provided for secondary students, English language learners and low-income 
students. Special education, transportation and small schools received additional funding 
under separate budget lines. The block grant was funded through a uniform statewide 
property tax of $1.10 that would be income sensitive for households earning up to 
$60,000 annually and an additional $57 million in general fund taxes, including a two 
percent increase to the rooms and meals tax, a three-cent increase in the gas tax, a one 
percent increase in the purchase and use tax and revenue from the Powerball lottery. 
Those school districts wishing to spend above the block grant would have the option of 
levying a second-tier guaranteed yield property tax on its property, both homestead and 
non-residential. 
Final negotiations on the bill before the full Senate began on Wednesday, May 21, 
1997 and the bill passed on a 21-to-9 vote the following day without serious alteration to 
its original content. All of the Senate’s 17 Democrats and four of the chamber’s 13 
Republicans voted in favor of the measure, including Senate Finance Committee 
members Jim Greenwood and William Doyle. 
While the content of the school funding plan was not meaningfully altered, one 
Senate leader did recall efforts to secure the vote of moderate Republican Helen Riehle 
from Chittenden County by attaching an unrelated sales tax break for the purchase of 
building materials costing over $1 million. This tax break would assist in the construction 
of a factory for the Husky plastics company in Riehle’s district and demonstrated the 
Senate Democratic leadership’s interest in obtaining bipartisan support for the measure:  
This is one I’m not the proudest of. We did something for Husky. I did 
that to get somebody’s vote. I do remember that Helen Riehle was 
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wavering about whether she was going vote for the bill or not. There were 
people that were angry with me over that but I was into racking up the 
votes…. I was heavily into getting, I felt we had to have a good, solid vote 
because then, you know, you start losing [moderate Republicans], the 
Democrats start to get shaky and timid. And for some reason I really 
wanted… Helen is a pretty moderate Republican. I wanted her vote so I 
tried to figure out what it would take to get her vote. (Informant 10) 
 
The Senate leaders’ generosity proved successful as Riehle joined three other 
Republicans in voting to support the school finance reform measure. With her support 
secured, members of the Senate leadership turned their attention to the upcoming 
Conference of Committee where the differences between the House and Senate versions 
of H.527 would be reconciled to create a joint bill. 
Leadership Arena 
Post-Brigham: Actors’ Resources and Strategies 
 
The previous section explored the motives and goals of the various actors 
operating in the leadership arena with regard to the issue of school finance reform in 
Vermont. The section revealed a set of liberal legislators in both the House and Senate 
emboldened by Brigham’s mandate for equality of educational opportunity to pass a 
significantly more expansive piece of school finance legislation that what had been 
conceptualized at the onset of the 1997 legislative session. The court decision’s emphasis 
on achieving “substantial equality of educational opportunity” allowed legislators not 
only to propose significant general fund tax increase to augment the state’s education 
budget but also to put forth plans for extensive tax sharing between property wealthy and 
property poor towns that just weeks earlier appeared politically impossible. With Howard 
Dean either unwilling or unable to develop his own vision for school funding under the 
terms set by the Brigham mandate, the House and Senate’s more expansive vision faced 
no meaningful opposition and resulted in conceptually similar bills emerging from each 
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chamber. This section describes the various resources and strategies utilized by the actors 
in the leadership arena to pass these substantive changes to Vermont’s existing school 
funding policies. 
House Leadership 
The Brigham decision benefitted the House leadership’s relative power within the 
leadership arena by not only providing new resources such as the student equity mandate 
and a newfound sense of urgency to pass reform legislation, but also by strengthening the 
potency of existing resources such as the legislators’ positional authority, preparedness, 
vision for change and the state’s moralistic culture. This robust allocation of resources 
allowed this group of leaders to realize their long-term goal of passing meaningful school 
funding reform in the months immediately following the Supreme Court’s February 5, 
1997 ruling.  
The fact that the pro-finance reform contingent within the house was led by the 
House Majority Leader and the Vice Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee 
whose actions had the blessings of the similarly-minded Speaker of the House and the 
Chair of the Ways and Means Committee, meant that the positional authority of the 
House leadership could be brought to bear on devising their preferred version of a school 
funding bill. Also, because the House had been anticipating action on the issue even 
before the Supreme Court weighed in, significant time and energy had gone into the 
Ways and Means Committee appointments for that legislative biennium. As an example 
of this thoughtfulness, two informants described how the House leadership took the 
unusual step of appointing freshman Representative Gaye Symington to the Ways and 
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Means Committee specifically because of her perceived facility with the school funding 
issue:  
We had done our homework and found out she was into [school finance 
reform]. She had taken courses in school and was smart and a math head. 
She had a computer. She was put on Ways and Means. She really lived up 
to it. She was great. (Informant 03) 
 
I remember Gaye Symington who had gotten on the Ways and Means 
Committee… because she demonstrated as a candidate when she came to 
talk to me about our work on [school funding] just such an amazingly 
quick and clear and deep understanding of what we were doing. It was 
amazing. (Informant 07) 
 
She was interested in education finance and she was solid from the 
beginning. [She was] thoughtful, a good thinker, just wonderful. 
(Informant 06) 
 
In addition to appointing knowledgeable legislators, the House leadership took care to 
appoint lawmakers whose districts would benefit from their proposed initiatives. For 
example, although Gene Sweetser of Essex Junction was described as a “good 
Republican,” he went along with the Committee’s proposal because “[Essex Junction] 
was a very heavily taxed town” where “people were dying under their property taxes” 
(Informant 07). 
With their preferred legislators installed in the Ways and Means Committee, 
Democratic leaders capitalized on their positional authority to ensure that their ideal bill 
was passed out of House Ways and Means Committee and, subsequently, the full House 
of Representatives in just six weeks time with virtually no alteration to the original bill 
(Informant 07). One informant described how Paul Cillo and John Freidin capitalized on 
their leadership positions in the following passage: 
Paul and John were on autopilot. I mean they knew where they were 
going. They knew that Brigham was the coup de grace. They were: 
“We’re going to run as big a train down these tracks as we can.” I mean I 
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don’t blame them. I think that they understood and they were right; they 
had the opportunity to do it and they took advantage of it. (Informant 09) 
 
The massive accumulation of positional authority allowed House Democrats to pass their 
preferred bill over the objections of opponents both inside and outside the legislature. 
Writing in the Springfield Reporter, Republican Representative Gary Richardson (1997) 
expressed a sense of powerlessness in the face of Democratic control: 
Have you ever noticed how there is no listening to citizens by the liberal 
left? Did you attend any of the hearings on education property taxes run 
by the House Ways and Means Committee around the state a few weeks 
ago? They don’t feel they have to listen anymore because they are 
convinced that they know what is best for us. They were so certain of this 
that they refused to consider the Gross Receipts Tax, which was popular 
with many Vermonters, and would have eliminated both the sales tax and 
the education property tax. (n. p.) 
 
Richardson’s frustrations at being shut out of the school funding debate reflected the 
House Democrats’ ability to tightly manage the legislative process. 
In addition to benefitting from positional authority, House Democratic leaders 
benefitted from the tenor of the court’s ruling. The ruling specifically labeled the 
Foundation Plan, with its heavy reliance on local property taxes and wide funding 
disparities, unconstitutional, noting: 
The current system for funding public education in Vermont is in violation 
of the State Constitution. A legitimate governmental purpose cannot be 
fathomable to justify the gross inequities in educational opportunities 
produced by this system, with its substantial dependence on local property 
taxes and resultant wide disparities in revenues available to local school 
districts. The distribution of a resource as precious as educational 
opportunity may not have as its determining force the mere fortuity of a 
child’s residence. (Brigham v. State, 1997, p. 1) 
 
In this regard, the mandate for change set forth by Brigham meshed nicely with House 
reformers’ vision for school finance reform and validated their efforts to pass legislation 
that evened out the ability of school districts to raise money through equalized tax effort. 
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In testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee, legal scholar Peter Teachout 
(1997) described how the House’s approach met Brigham’s test: 
It is my judgment that the bill currently under consideration by the House 
Ways and Means Committee… places every community in the state on a 
level playing field as far as access to basic school revenues is concerned. It 
eliminates the “wide disparities in revenues available to local school 
districts” under the existing system. It eliminates the “gross funding 
inequities resulting from interdistrict property wealth.” It affords the 
children in every school district in the state, in the Court’s own words “ a 
substantially equal opportunity to have access to similar educational 
revenues.” There may be other ways to do so, but in my view, the House 
Ways and Means’ proposal clearly meets the standard set forth by the 
Vermont Supreme Court in the Brigham case. (p. 1) 
 
The Vermont Legislative Council (1997) also interpreted the Court ruling as 
favoring the House’s longstanding goal of implementing tax sharing and guaranteed yield 
schemes: 
The court’s ruling requires, however, that if local property taxes are used 
to support education, the capacity or access to property wealth be 
equalized among the districts…. Formulas that reward equal effort 
coupled with tax sharing among districts would be equally acceptable 
solutions (p. 2) 
 
These interpretations helped to inoculate the House bill against criticism and persuaded 
fence sitters and even some past opponents that House policy goals such as tax sharing 
were now required. As one informant remarked: “I think what the court case did was you 
couldn’t just say, ‘I hate it. I have no alternative.’ You can’t just say, ‘No’” (Informant 
06). In this same vein, a Republican legislator recalled how the Brigham decision 
changed his mind with regard to accepting a statewide property tax:  
I think the Supreme Court put a lot of charge in the issue. I know, in my 
case, it forced me to look at it very, very differently than I had before. The 
current method was not acceptable. The message here is you have to go 





Several informants highlighted how John Freidin and Paul Cillo’s tireless actions 
on behalf of school finance reform throughout the 1990s served as a major contributor to 
the House’s ability to formulate their response to Brigham’s mandate for “substantial 
equality of educational opportunity” in such a short period of time. Their issue expertise, 
achieved through years of preparation and clear vision for change, proved instrumental in 
encouraging the House Ways and Means Committee to immediately revive and retool 
1994’s H.541 to meet the parameters set forth by the Supreme Court:  
The good thing about all the work that John and Paul had done was they 
had all the pieces of a plan in place. They knew what to do so they didn’t 
have to fumble around trying to figure out how the system was going to 
work. They knew what would work and how it could work. (Informant 20)  
 
They were ready to run with it. They had the information. They had 
worked on it. (Informant 08) 
 
People thought it was rushed through but it was sort of interesting. Here 
were Cillo and Freidin and when Ralph [Wright] was speaker, they had 
sort of done all this work. They’d gotten the bill ready. They did exactly 
the same thing. And they understood it… They had really done all the 
work and they sort of knew exactly how to do it. (Informant 01) 
  
Yeah, they’d been doing it for seven or eight years. There was a huge 
amount of homework being done. Lots of things proposed. Lots of things 
were run up the flagpole and shot down. With various permutations and 
combinations and tweaks for political expediency…. Through all of the 
stuff that had been happening in the past seven or eight years they had 
vetted some ideas. They had floated things out there and said, “Ahh that’s 
pretty good.”  Then they’d float something else out there and say, “Ugh, 
not so good. That one didn’t work like we thought it would.” So they had 
a chance to model and critique things and sort of pick some of the best 
ideas. (Informant 12) 
 
The sense of urgency expressed by the Supreme Court in mandating immediate 
change proved to be yet another resource that benefitted the House in its pursuit of non-
incremental school finance reform. At the forefront of this effort was plaintiffs’ lawyer 
Bob Gensburg who was quoted by the Burlington Free Press as stating: “If the 
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Legislature does not develop a remedy, the court is going to have to impose a remedy – 
and nobody is going to like that” (Lisberg & Good, 1997 p. 2A). The House Judiciary 
Committee (1997) also interpreted the court’s ruling as requiring immediate attention by 
the legislature: 
We should assume that the Court will not be tolerant of much delay in 
enacting new corrective legislation because it has found the current laws 
to be unconstitutional. We believe that the best advice is that new 
corrective legislation ought to be enacted this session. (p. 3)  
 
The non-partisan Legislative Council’s (1997) office reached a similar conclusion: 
The court is unlikely to tolerate the legislature taking much time to enact 
corrective legislation. The best advice is that it ought to be done in this 
legislative session. (p. 3) 
 
Respondents also recalled a pervasive sense that the legislature was compelled to 
act quickly: 
After the Supreme Court ruled there was a sense of urgency. (Informant 
01) 
 
I think there was an implicit threat if they didn’t act quickly then the risk 
is that court would impose some sort of solution. (Informant 18)  
 
I felt that we had to produce a product. (Informant 02) 
 
This “sense of urgency” proved helpful in getting legislators to expedite their action on 
the issue and to accept the breakneck speed with which the House was moving.  
It also served as a useful counter to opponents seeking to slow down the process 
by urging delay. The House leadership routinely ignored calls from leading business 
groups to “…stop and study exactly what is mandated by the Supreme Court” (Informant 
11), by citing the Supreme Court’s mandate for reform. A March 13, 1997 article 
appearing in the Burlington Free Press quoted John Freidin responding to the Vermont 
Business Roundtable’s request to slow down the legislative process by saying: “These 
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business groups have opposed property tax reform since 1993. I think the difference is 
that the necessity of change exists now where previously there was only a widespread 
desire for change” (Sneyd, 1997c, p. 1B).  
The state’s moralistic political culture served as a final resource to the House’s 
pro-reform contingent. As noted earlier, in a moralistic political environment government 
is broadly viewed as an instrument of the people to promote the common good. Citizens, 
therefore, expect government officials to work earnestly on their behalf to solve issues 
that are of general concern. While many politicians personally opposed the concept of tax 
sharing, they nonetheless believed they were obligated to follow the Supreme Court’s 
directives. Even the House’s top Republican, Walter Freed, acknowledged the 
legislature’s duty to act responsibly in the face of the Court’s demand for change. In 
remarks to the Burlington Free Press he noted: “I don’t think we’re going to get to the 
point were the courts are going to order a solution in Vermont. You have to take some 
action because no action at all would leave us vulnerable to chaos” (Lisberg, 1997a, p. 
6A). Study informants concurred with Freed’s assessment that opponents in the 
legislature were not inclined to block the passage of a court-mandated reform measure: 
There’s a respect for the opinion of the court. The court says you’ve got to 
do something so they do it. I think it’s because Vermont’s legislature is 
small enough; well, they represent such a small population, maybe 4,000 
people per House member that they have a connection with folks and I 
think they feel the pressure. (Informant 17) 
 
Other states, my recollection, they have had similar court decisions and I 
had heard that some states had been working on it for 10, 12, 15 years and 
still had not come up with a solution. I said, “You know, I think it’s 
important that we do make a decision.” (Informant 04) 
 
…it’s a Supreme Court Decision. You’re not going to negotiate with this. 





This deference to the common good made political opponents less willing to deploy their 
resources in an effort to counter the House and Senate Democrat’s actions. In this regard, 
Vermont stood in contrast to other states such as New Jersey, Texas and New Hampshire, 
where school finance reform dragged on for years due to political intransigence on the 
part of reform opponents.  
Armed with these ample resources, the House leadership sought to influence the 
decisionmaking process in the leadership arena through the use of two concerted 
strategies. The first strategy entailed developing an immediate response to the court 
ruling to capitalize on momentum as well as to deny opponents the time needed to 
orchestrate a coordinated response. Relying on their positional authority, issue area 
expertise and the sense of urgency brought on by the court ruling, the House worked to 
move as quickly as possible to enact reform legislation. Informants described how House 
leaders deployed their resources in the interest of expediting the passage of H.527: 
So we passed [the bill] out… We moved quickly. It was all ready. Nothing 
had to be written. (Informant 03) 
 
I just remember working crazy hours but it was all stuff that I’d worked on 
before if that makes sense. It was all tweaking the basic concepts. 
(Informant 08)   
 
Of course, we got all kinds of grief because it happened so fast. (Informant 
07) 
 
A lot of the reaction was the legislature moved too fast and shouldn’t we 
study this and how can they do this and the fact is they’d studied it for 100 
years. They’d really worked hard on it for 10 years…. And they never got 
anywhere until the court said, “Do it.” So they were ready to do it….  So 
they were actually way ahead of the public and way ahead of the gold 
towns and everything like that. The bill pops out. They go through it 
everybody is, “What’d you do?” And it took a while for the public to 




While this strategy engendered criticism from opponents who condemned House 
Democrats for “ramming its radical reform proposal down the chamber’s throat” (“The 
Right Attitude,” 1997, p. 8A), it proved successful in allowing the House to pass a bill 
that departed significantly from the status quo.  
The Democratic leadership’s second strategy entailed relying on its positional 
authority, the court’s mandate and the opposition’s fealty to Vermont’s moralistic 
political culture to frame the negotiation parameters for H.527. The House’s ability to 
pass out its ideal version of a school funding bill meant that it would have room for 
compromise during subsequent dealings with the governor and Senate. One House leader 
alluded to this strategy when he discussed the inclusion of the income tax provision in 
H.527 over the express veto warnings of Governor Dean: “So we put an income tax in. I 
wanted it on the table” (Informant 03). Another informant nicely summed up the House’s 
strategy in the following paragraph: 
I think they thought that the roadblock was the governor… Dean had made 
it clear from day one that it won’t be an income tax. This was a very 
strong-willed group of people. I know the House was more liberal at the 
time and they thought they had to kind of set the marker if you will. Tax 
bills have to originate in the House so they set the marker: “This is what 
we’ll accept.” It really framed the debate when it got to the Senate. 
(Informant 17) 
 
Thus, by including the income tax provision in the face of opposition from both the 
governor and Senate leaders, House leaders hoped to secure a bargaining chip to provide 
leverage in future negotiations. 
Governor Howard Dean  
In the weeks and months following the Brigham decision, newspaper editorials 
and opponents of school finance criticized Howard Dean for not taking action with regard 
	  
 344 
to formulating a policy response to the Court ruling. The Burlington Free Press editorial 
board called Dean’s inaction on the issue “… an abdication of [his] obligation as the 
state’s chief executive to help solve a complex and urgent issue” (“Too Late to Lead,” 
1997, p. 8A). A pro-business lobbying publication similarly condemned Dean for not 
taking a leadership role in responding to the Court’s mandate: 
Other than insisting that income tax stay out of the package, he and his 
administration essentially took a walk on [the issue]. Dean repeatedly 
rejected advice from political allies that he personally take charge of 
explaining the court decision and the issues raised by it to Vermonters, 
and lead the effort to respond to it. Instead, he publicly stepped aside and 
let the Legislature craft Act 60. (Keller & Fuller, 1998, p. 3) 
 
Although in possession of multiple resources that he might have utilized to 
favorably influence the policymaking process in the leadership arena, Dean appeared to 
rely largely on veto threats as his principle tool for preventing the inclusion of an income 
tax provision in any new school funding legislation. While veto threats can serve as a 
useful tool for chief executives, they imply a reactive rather than proactive stance and it 
appears that most Vermonters did indeed perceive Dean as taking a defensive posture on 
the issue. The following quote from a leading lobbyist exemplified Dean’s public persona 
vis a vis the school funding debate: 
He was never much of a player in the final design other than “Don’t give 
me something with an income tax.” I mean, he may have been behind the 
scenes working with the Speaker [Obuchowski] and Paul [Cillo] and 
Shumlin but basically from my perspective and from the public’s 
perspective he was a non-factor on the issue. (Informant 09) 
 
Even legislators viewed Dean as being largely absent in terms of working to formulate a 
legislative response to the Brigham ruling: 
I don’t remember the governor or his staff being very heavily involved 
other than you know they really continued to push for “Lets just give x 




According to a Dean administration official, this House legislator was correct in her 
assessment that neither Dean nor his administration officials became particularly 
involved in the House’s school funding negotiations. Per this informant’s recollections, 
the inaction was by design: 
We didn’t even spend time in the House. It was dead on arrival, the 
Cillo/Freidin plan. We didn’t even go over there because Howard Dean 
would have vetoed the bill and we knew we had the votes to sustain a 
veto. Maybe not in the House but certainly in the Senate so it was like why 
waste our time over there. (Informant 15)  
 
 Instead, this administration official indicated that high-ranking cabinet members 
began to quietly reach out to perceived moderate members of the Senate Finance 
Committee to help negotiate a bill that would better reflect Governor Dean’s policy 
preferences. One informant described the genesis of this relationship: 
You pick up the vibes from people that they aren’t happy with the House 
bill either. I know Dick Sears. Greenwood, I always liked. Just a 
gentleman. So I don’t know how it happened but you can see that they 
were looking for a different path. We all found each other somehow. It’s 
not that we were probing in the dark. You deal with them on 100 other 
issues, you know. So you know who they are. It’s like, “Hey, Jim, what do 
you think of this?” or I used to smoke cigarettes so I’d bum a cigarette 
from Dick Sears now and then on the [Capitol] steps and say, “Well, what 
do you think?” “Well, we’ve got to find something different than this.” 
(Informant 15) 
 
This strategy proved fruitful as members of the Dean administration began working with 
select members of the Senate Finance Committee to develop an alternate to the House’s 
proposal. 
To facilitate the development of this proposal, the Finance Commissioner’s Office 
relied upon its own data and staff to create a modeling capacity similar to the one used by 
the Joint Fiscal Office to run taxing and distribution policy options. The Dean 
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administration developed its own modeling capacity because officials believed it was 
important to provide the governor with an independent resource: 
You can’t have a major issue like that come along and leave the governor 
naked in terms of having to rely on the other branch of government to do 
your technical analysis. It just can’t happen. (Informant 15) 
 
This concern with independence centered upon their fears that members of the Joint 
Fiscal Office had become philosophically aligned with House Democrats. 
Multiple informants recall daily contact between senators and Dean 
administration finance officials as they sought to craft a school funding measure. Both 
administration and Senate Finance sources recall a similar process with regard to their 
collaborative working relationship. A Dean informant described the process from his 
perspective: 
We would be printing stuff out by town. We would take the model, you 
know, and [the senators] would come in the morning and look at it and 
give us their comments from the night before. By the end of the day, we 
would have rerun it trying to fix the problems that they had. They’d come 
at the end of the day, pick up the documents, take them home and then 
come back the next morning…. Finally, we got the concepts down, with 
the grand list per pupil and the sharing pool and all this kind of 
complicated stuff. We got to a point were we were not into the income tax, 
we’re sweetening income sensitivity. (Informant 15) 
 
A Senate informant provided a similar description of the policy development process: 
We would need daily calculations of “OK, if we set this as the base tax 
rate how much revenue are we going to get?” And, you know, “How much 
was education costing?” You had to do it really by town… Of course as a 
senator, as a politician, you wanted to see your towns; you want to make 
sure that too many of your towns weren’t going to be pounded…. So what 
we did was we continued to change the way we would tax towns and their 
grand lists so we would go back and say, “If we raised the level of where 
we’re going to start taxing or making them a sending town rather than a 
receiving town, how high can you go?”…. So that’s why we used the 
[governor’s] finance office to do calculations. They were with us nearly 
every day. Every day we would go over and say, “What if we do this? 
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How will that affect it?” and they would do the calculations and tell us 
how it affected different towns. (Informant 04) 
 
Finally, a proximate observer described the relationship in the following way: 
The Senate worked really closely with the governor. I remember there 
were a series of negotiations. There were some key members in the Senate 
finance committee who would go up to the fifth floor. They negotiated and 
came up with their own parameters, what they were willing to accept… It 
was different. It wasn’t as far reaching. It wasn’t the income tax but they 
created the hybrid. (Informant 17)  
 
Out of this alliance came the Sears/Greenwood plan, which served as a catalyst for the 
Senate Finance Committee’s development of a moderate, bipartisan school funding 
measure.  
 In an interesting aside, one informant recalled how on one occasion the Dean 
administration attempted to use its newfound alliance with Senate Finance moderates to 
marginalize the committee’s more liberal members, including Senate Finance Chair 
Cheryl Rivers. According to this informant, Dean sought to undercut Rivers on her 
school funding revenue package by negotiating behind her back. The informant described 
a secret meeting convened by the governor:  
Oh yeah, they were going to throw [Cheryl Rivers] over on her revenue 
package. The plan was to get rid of her as a player…. So they must have 
had Shumlin, Sears and Greenwood. I don’t know if Doyle was in there or 
not. But they didn’t have Rivers and McDonald and they didn’t have 
Baehr and they tried to cut a deal except Kathy Hoyt was Secretary of 
Administration. She gets to the meeting and she says, “Where’s Cheryl?” 
Oh, Cheryl hadn’t been invited. She said, “You can’t do this, Governor.” 
So somebody came to get her. (Informant 10) 
 
The informant indicated that Rivers was furious at both Dean and Senate Pro Tempore 
Peter Shumlin for their deception. Although this particular maneuver did not result in any 
deal, it highlighted the low key, “behind closed doors” negotiating approach preferred by 




As in the House, the Brigham decision enhanced the Senate leadership’s relative 
power within the leadership arena by providing the justification needed to pass out a 
statewide property tax – a longstanding goal of Senate Democratic icons such as Scudder 
Parker who had pushed for a statewide property tax during the 1980s (Informants 10, 14). 
As noted earlier, a statewide property tax satisfied the Brigham mandate by dissolving the 
relationship between a town’s property wealth and its per pupil expenditures. To pass 
their bill, the Senate Finance Committee relied on the chamber’s generally amicable 
working relationships as well as its consensus-driven approach to policymaking.  
When contrasting the working relationships in the Senate from those in the 
House, one informant noted: “The Senate always works better together” (Informant 01). 
Respondents attributed this heightened cooperation to the moderating forces of the 
chamber’s larger districts and intimate scale (Informants 08, 01). As a result, senators are 
believed to “have a better policy sense of the big picture” (Informant 08). Indeed, 
senators spoke with pride of their ability to work consensually and productively in an 
independent setting (Informants 10, 02, 04). For example, one senator explained his 
opinion that the Senate emphasized policy over politics: 
The politics of the House are very different from the politics of the Senate. 
In the Senate, my view of the Senate is we were the last stop as the train is 
leaving the station…. When it came it to the Senate, we have a different 
attitude. We wanted to make it the best it could possibly be. (Informant 
02)  
 
Efforts to foster a positive working environment can be seen in the Senate Finance 
committee’s decision to conduct a joint information gathering tour before commencing 
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their work on the school funding bill. One informant recalled the study tour’s positive 
impact upon committee members in the following manner: 
We got a van. We started going around the state to carefully selected 
places to listen to the public and that was the best thing that we did 
because it was then I knew we could do it [i.e. pass a school funding bill]. 
(Informant 10)  
 
The bus tour not only nurtured better relationships among newly appointed committee 
members, but also focused their attention on the vast disparities between property poor 
and property wealthy school districts in the state. Two informants recounted their 
committee’s tour experiences at two very different stops:  
So I said, “Wait a minute now.” I went to the town to say, “Why don’t you 
people provide a better education with more equipment, better 
textbooks?”…. It was because the people in that town were very poor and 
there was no grand list. I mean the properties weren’t worth much so the 
only way you could raise money is you would have a tax rate that is five 
times greater than a gold town. (Informant 04) 
 
The public hearings strengthened my resolve. You go up to [the gold 
town] South Burlington and they say, “Oh, we’ll lose the string program.” 
What the hell? You’ve lost me. What is the string program?… Up there, 
they’ve got kids in closets getting tutored. “OK, so we might lose the 
string program. I would hate to see that happen. However, something tells 
me you won’t lose your string program. You’ll find a way.”…. My 
committee members they listened to that for a while and it was just 
striking, really. I think they had the reverse effect than they intended. 
Sometimes that happens in public hearings. If you let people go, it’s like 
“Whoa.” (Informant 10) 
 
In the weeks following, senators relied on the common understanding fostered by 
the bus tour to engage in a policymaking strategy aimed at attracting the support of 
Senate moderates. With a 17 to 13 majority, Senate Democrats could have mirrored the 
House’s process of muscling their own liberal school funding bill through the Senate. 
However, the leadership decided to take a more consensual approach and proactively 
sought bipartisan support. In many respects, this was a natural strategy for a more centrist 
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set of Democrats whose leader, Senate Pro Tempore Peter Shumlin, had previously 
aligned himself with Governor Dean on the issue earlier in the legislative session. The 
moderate approach also better suited a chamber where many Republican members had 
spent the last two biennia shunning any form of school finance reform. Finally, it suited 
the consensual style of the Senate, where compromise was a more common aspect of 
policymaking (Informants 04, 08, 01).  
  Documentary and informant data indicate that Senate Finance Committee Chair 
Cheryl Rivers led the way with this inclusive approach (Graff, 1997; Allen, 1997, “The 
Right Attitude,” 1997). According to one informant: “Cheryl Rivers positioned herself as 
being the great compromiser” (Informant 10) in that she sought consensus by blending 
the Racine Plan with the Sears/Greenwood Plan. In the process of charting this middle 
course, Rivers worked to keep moderates Sears and Greenwood on board. One proximate 
observer recalled that each iteration of the Senate’s proposal was developed with these 
two in mind: “Here is a plan. What will Dick and Jim think of it?” (Informant 17).  
As a Republican collaborating with a Democratic majority seeking bipartisanship, 
Jim Greenwood attracted particular attention. His decision to join the school finance 
negotiations elevated his status and provided leverage for his policy goals. Multiple 
informants recalled how his savvy politicking reaped rewards for his district in the 
Northeast Kingdom: 
[The bill] was going to pass, no doubt about it. Totally was going to pass. 
That’s why Jim [Greenwood] had some things in there that were good for 
the Northeast Kingdom. (Informant 02) 
 
In the Senate, you had Jim Greenwood from Newport and he hated the 
Brigham decision. He really did. But he said, “What can I do to make sure 




The small school provision was given to Jim Greenwood to get his vote, to 
be candid. Basically, what it said was that small schools would be 
reimbursed… would be weighted to get additional revenues from the state. 
That’s how we brought Jim’s vote in. (Informant 14) 
 
Through this elite bargaining process, Finance Chair Rivers passed H.527 out of 
her committee with six of the committee’s seven members voting in the affirmative. In a 
letter to Senator Rivers, Kathy Hoyt, Governor Dean’s Secretary of Administration, 
lauded Rivers’ performance with regard to the successful negotiation of H.527 by noting: 
“Your consensus-oriented leadership has allowed a plan to emerge that may balance the 
many competing interests involved in this complex issue” (Personal communication, May 
12, 1997). The news media similarly congratulated Rivers and her committee for their 
conciliatory approach to the negotiation process. Burlington Free Press columnist Susan 
Allen (1997) commented: “Rivers pulled a balancing act worthy of the Wallendas, 
juggling Statehouse factions while quieting public fear of reform” (p. 1E). Associated 
Press Reporter Chris Graff wrote that the Senate Finance Committee “…forged a 
compromise that goes a long way toward meeting the needs of the property poor 
communities while easing the fears of the property rich communities” (Graff, 1997a, p. 
6E). Finally, the Burlington Free Press editorial weighed in with the following 
commendation: “The property tax reform bill… was designed by consensus. Crafted by a 
Democrat and a Republican on the Senate Finance Committee, and supported by all but 
one panel member. It has clout” (“The Right Attitude,” 1997, p. 8A).  
Leadership Arena 
Post-Brigham: Concluding Interactions and Outcomes 
 
 While relying on different combinations of resources and strategies, both the 
House and the Senate successfully passed out their own version of school funding bill 
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H.527. Per Vermont legislative regulations, these bills passed to a Committee of 
Conference where their differences would be reconciled by a group of six legislators – 
three each from the House and Senate. Mazzoni (1991) termed the conference committee 
a leadership arena par excellence because it provides an even more insulated setting for 
elite bargaining among top-level officials. In the conference committee, a small number 
of selected representatives are empowered to negotiate a final bill that legislators must 
accept or reject in its entirety. No subsequent alterations or amendments are permitted. 
This stipulation means that the negotiating team wields wide authority in determining 
what the final policy measure will contain. It also means that even the most powerful 
interest groups can be shut out of the policymaking process if they are not represented at 
the bargaining table. Thus, substantial positional resources accrue to legislative leaders in 
a position to appoint like-minded legislators to the conference committee.  
Although the House and Senate responded to the Brigham mandate with two very 
different funding mechanisms, the underlying goal of each was to spread the burden of 
school funding more evenly across the state and to tax Vermonters more on their ability 
to pay than on the value of their home. These shared goals boded well for advocates of 
reform who had been seeking the implementation of such measures for several years. 
Pro-reform advocates also benefitted from Governor Dean’s stated support for a measure 
that generally resembled the Senate version of H.527. In a letter addressed to the 
Conference Committee, Governor Dean outlined his acceptable policy parameters for a 
final bill: 1) new general fund taxes not to exceed $49 million; 2) the elimination of 
Powerball as a revenue source; 3) a uniform statewide property tax rate, preferably set at 
a rate of $1.10 per $100 of assessed property value; 4) local spending permitted above the 
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block grant; and 5) the inclusion of an income sensitivity provision similar to the one 
included in the Senate bill (H. Dean, personal communication, May 28, 1997).  
 The Conference Committee commenced on May 27, 1997. Majority Leader Paul 
Cillo, John Freidin, Vice Chair of the Ways and Means Committee and Martha Heath of 
the Education Committee represented the House on the committee, while Senate Pro 
Tempore Peter Shumlin, Cheryl Rivers and Jim Greenwood, all members of the Finance 
Committee, represented the Senate in the negotiation process. That both the House 
Majority Leader and the Senate Pro Tempore essentially nominated themselves to serve 
on the committee signaled the issue’s high legislative agenda status. It also meant that 
Democratic policy priorities would be well represented. 
Statehouse journalists described an intense interest in the negotiations among the 
state’s lawmakers, lobbyists and legislative staff members. In covering the first day of 
negotiations, one journalist reported that 80 bystanders had packed themselves into a 
small conference room to observe the negotiations, which per Vermont’s open meeting 
law were required to be held publicly. Informants also remembered keen interest in the 
negotiations, with one informant calling the scene “crazy” (Informant 13) and another 
recalling that “[t]here were House members crowded around everywhere” (Informant 
10). 
Because the bill originated in the House, Vermont regulations stipulated that a 
Senate member chair the Committee of Conference. The committee selected Cheryl 
Rivers to chair as she had overseen the development of H.527 on the Senate side. Rivers 
commenced the reconciliation process with 29 outstanding issues that needed agreement 
(C. Rivers, personal communication, May 17, 1997). To reconcile these issues as quickly 
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as possible, the committee developed a process where they divided into three two-person 
groups. John Freidin and Peter Shumlin were tasked with resolving outstanding 
differences with regard to forest and farmland current use provisions. Martha Heath and 
Jim Greenwood negotiated transportation and education quality issues. Finally, Cheryl 
Rivers and Paul Cillo took the lead on negotiating the school funding mechanism. An 
informant described the Conference Committee’s process as follows: 
We divided up the issues this way: We said, “OK, we need to work out 
some of these mechanisms.” We made an issues list. Then we assigned 
them to teams from each side to work out…. It did resolve a bunch of 
issues because people came back and said, “We’ve worked out a plan. 
Here’s our plan.” The rest of the committee would say, “OK that sounds 
good” because it was a credible person from each side coming back. 
(Informant 03) 
 
Documentary reports indicated that by using this negotiation strategy, the 
Conference Committee quickly dispatched with issues surrounding the education quality, 
transportation and current use portions of H.527 (Committee of Conference on H. 527, 
committee communication, May 27, 1997). The committee then turned its attention to 
negotiating the bill’s most high-profile component, the school funding formula. 
According to one informant: “It was very clear that the Senate wasn’t going to move to 
pure income” (Informant 13). In fact, Committee Chair Rivers had made this point on the 
very first day of conference proceedings when she noted publicly:  
I’ve gotten to the point where I’m a very pragmatic person. It’s no secret 
that while I certainly have a lot of affection for the income tax… that 
proposal had no chance of passage in the Senate or even the Finance 
Committee. (Lisberg, 1997c, p. 10A) 
 
Indeed, this statement came as no surprise to House negotiators who had spent the 
last two months observing the Senate’s policymaking process. However, according to one 
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House member, Cillo and his fellow House negotiators remained highly motivated to 
negotiate an income tax provision. In the words of this informant: 
It’s what they believed in. It’s what people in the House wanted. In the 
House, that’s what we were hearing in our communities: “We want it 
based on our ability to pay.” [We were hearing it] in enough communities 
to be the majority of votes (obviously not the property wealthy 
communities). We wanted it on the table. (Informant 13) 
 
One informant recollected Paul Cillo’s negotiating stance on the income tax issue:  
He said, “Cheryl, I need the income tax that’s a big thing that’s in the 
House plan. You guys have this rebate thing. That’s not going to cut it. 
We need the income tax.” And she was going, “You know I don’t think I 
can pass an income tax and Howard’s not going to sign an income tax. 
Why push this?” He said, “I am not giving up on the income tax. This is 
mainly what the House did.” (Informant 03)  
 
Faced with this impasse, informants indicated that Cillo “did what he had always done” 
when he needed technical assistance and consulted with Deb Brighton to develop “an 
income tax that didn’t look like an income tax” (Informants 03, 10, 06). An informant 
discussed the approach Cillo and Brighton eventually devised to circumvent the 
governor’s and the Senate’s income tax prohibition: 
We could give people the choice. Who could argue against choice? You’re 
not telling people they have to pay based on income but you’re giving 
them the opinion based on income so you’re not forcing it on anybody. 
But it would be a way of preserving our income thing. So we’ll allow 
people to pay their school taxes either based on property or based on 
income. (Informant 03) 
 
This concept met with the Senate team’s approval (Senate Conferees, committee 
communication, June 4, 1997). However, cost constraints led the negotiating team to put 
an income cap in place for those households who would be eligible to choose their 
payment method. A conference participant described the negotiating process that 
subsequently led to the leveling of a $75,000 income cap:  
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The next question was what kind of a cap will there be? I wanted it to be 
“no cap” on who was eligible [to pay using the income option]. Then it 
started to be $125,000, then $100,000 because every time you cut it down 
it cost less money and reduced the general fund commitment so we ended 
up at $75,000. (Informant 03) 
 
Under a final plan agreed to by conferees, taxpayers with household incomes of $75,000 
or less (approximately 80 percent of Vermont households) could choose to pay their 
school taxes by paying the lesser of either: 1) two percent of their annual income on 
property taxes levied against their house and two acres; or 2) the standard amount levied 
through the statewide property tax rate on their home and two acres. Regardless of 
choice, any remaining acreage would be taxed at the standard statewide property tax rate. 
Informants indicated that Conference Committee members derived the two percent figure 
from the statistic that Vermonters with incomes over $75,000 paid, on average, no more 
than two percent of their income on property taxes (Informants 03, 06, 13).  
  While this compromise would help the majority of Vermonters to see reductions 
in their property tax bills, some citizens lived in towns where property was worth so little 
that they would not see relief under the “income sensitized” option because they were 
already paying less than two percent of their income in property taxes. In a move to shore 
up the support of lawmakers from these towns, the conferees decided to include a 
$15,000 homestead exemption. One informant called this provision “nutty” because these 
residents already paid very little in property taxes (Informant 08). However, others 
viewed its inclusion as a helpful vote getter: 
We had to do a homestead exemption as well because the income 
sensitivity wasn’t going to give tax relief to people in poor parts of the 
state. We weren’t going to get any votes from the property wealthy towns 
but we needed the Northeast Kingdom votes. So we added a homestead 




That $15,000 doesn’t really fit with anything but that was to get the votes 
from people who wouldn’t see any benefit from the income provision. 
(Informant 06) 
 
Maybe they don’t need a property tax break. Maybe they’re not paying 
that much. But, you know, as a politician you have to win. Your 
constituents need to get something. (Informant 08) 
 
Informants indicated that Joint Fiscal Office Consultant Deb Brighton played an integral 
role in devising the formulas required to enact this highly complex funding plan. As one 
participant noted: “[She] spent a lot of time on the technical aspects of the bill that we all 
benefitted from…. Without Deb’s help, it would have been difficult” (Informant 10).   
In a memo to the House Democratic caucus dated June 7, 1997, Paul Cillo and 
Sally Fox indicated that the majority of the Conference Committee’s 29 initial differences 
had been settled. However, two sticking points remained: the general fund revenue 
package and the level of state’s reimbursement for local special education expenses (P. 
Cillo & S. Fox, personal communication, June 7, 1997). On that same day, the Burlington 
Free Press’ front page blared: “Education Funding Talks Falter” (Remsen, 1997). In 
negotiating the general fund revenue package, House conferees sought $65 million in 
new general fund taxes while the Senate team drew the line at $56 million in new taxes. 
The Burlington Free Press quoted Senator Jim Greenwood as being steadfastly opposed 
to increasing new taxes to the level demanded by the House negotiating team: “I have a 
very difficult time to get any where near $65 million. It was a real stretch to get me to 
$57 million. (Sneyd, 1997d, 1B).  
Primary and secondary source data attribute the difference between the House and 
Senate tax package to the House’s desire to reimburse 70 percent of school districts’ 
special education expenses (Informants 10, 03; Sneyd, 1997d). In their version, the 
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Senate had limited reimbursements to 50 percent. On informant described the 
disagreement with regard to special education funding: 
There was a major disagreement about what level to spend to fund special 
education. That was one of the most difficult things for the Conference 
Committee. You know, I couldn’t argue with their goal. It was good. My 
limitation was the size of the revenue package that I could get past. You 
know, it was out of sight. I knew I couldn’t do it. Even if I vote for it, I 
couldn’t get the votes to do that and Howard wasn’t for it. I tried to 
explain that to them and it, you know, they had a narrow focus so that was 
the most difficult part in the Conference Committee. (Informant 10) 
 
Another recalled this impasse as the low point of the Conference Committee’s 
negotiation process: 
The only time that I can remember just feeling totally scared was 
Conference Committee. We got to Conference Committee and I can’t even 
remember what the issue was but Cheryl just wasn’t going to buy it. I 
remember meeting with Paul and Cheryl and some people from the Joint 
Fiscal Committee…. That was the only time that I felt like “What are we 
going to do now?” But until then everything was sort of reasonable. 
(Informant 06) 
 
In the end, the Senate and House conferees worked with Governor Dean’s 
Secretary of Administration, Kathy Hoyt, to negotiate a final general fund tax package 
that raised $58 million in new taxes and allowed for a 60 percent reimbursement of local 
special education expenses. A conferee expressed her surprise with Dean’s readiness to 
compromise on the funding issue: 
A big challenge before we went public with [the Conference bill] was to 
get Howard to go along with it…. There was some part of the revenue 
package that I wasn’t sure the governor would go for. I remember talking 
to Kathy [Hoyt] and she said she’d talk to the governor. She called back 
and said, “OK” and I’m like, “What did you do? What did you do?” I 
couldn’t believe it. Maybe, in retrospect, [the Senate] had done a lot to 
protect him from a lot of other things [the House] wanted to do, so he 
should have gone along with it. He couldn’t just keep going, “No, no, no.” 





Primary and secondary source data indicate that Dean’s willingness to go to $58 million 
in new general fund taxes, from a previously stated limit of $49 million, was contingent 
upon the removal of Powerball lottery revenues as a funding sources (Lisberg & Remsen, 
1997; Informant 10). An informant congratulated the Senate’s foresight in including 
Powerball as part of their general fund revenue package:  
…it was Powerball that we put in knowing that it would go because 
Howard didn’t like it. Oh it was a very valuable little thing for us to put in 
because I knew the governor didn’t like it and the governor wanted it out. 
(Informant 10)  
 
Using Powerball as leverage, the Conference Committee successfully negotiated an 
additional $9 million in new general fund revenues. To make up for the loss of Powerball 
revenues, the committee slightly increased the gasoline tax, corporate income taxes and 
brokerage fees.  
Relying on a potent combination of positional authority, common underlying 
goals, strong leadership and technical expertise, the Conference Committee members 
engaged in strategic negotiations to devise a bill that broadly reflected the contours of the 
Senate bill, including the Senate’s use of a larger block grant, an income-sensitive 
property tax for lower income Vermonters, a uniform statewide property tax rate for both 
residential and non-residential property, and a second-tier spending option that relied 
upon property tax (rather than income tax) to fund it. Specifically, the bill included a 
statewide property tax of $1.10 per $100 of assessed value on all property and raised an 
additional $58 million in state revenue largely through a four-cent increase to the gas tax, 
a two percent increase in the rooms and meals tax, and a one percent increase in the 
purchase and use tax on vehicles and automotive parts. Families making under $75,000 
would be not compelled to pay more than two percent of their income on property taxes. 
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Money raised from this plan would provide a $5,000 block grant to each student with 
provisions for additional funding based on special needs. Towns wishing to spend more 
than the amount of the block grant would be able to levy an equalized yield local property 
tax.  
On June 12, 1997, H.527 passed the House by a vote 87 to 56 and the Senate by a 
vote of 22 to 7. Two weeks later, on June 26, 1997, Howard Dean signed the Equal 
Educational Opportunity Act into law in Whiting, Vermont, with lead plaintiff Amanda 
Brigham by his side. Analysts estimated that the measure succeeded in reducing property 
taxes for the residents of approximately 200 towns, while increasing property taxes for 
the residents of an estimated 50 previously low-tax towns (Hoffman, 1997). Summing up 
the work of Vermont state leaders on this issue, one informant commented: “Howard 
Dean was certainly more moderate than I would say Paul and John and Cheryl but they 
worked through it and found a way to find something that everybody could buy into” 
(Informant 08).  
  Mazzoni’s (1991) arena model stipulates that the leadership arena’s ability to 
serve as a locus of innovation by translating its impressive power into policymaking 
influence depends upon four factors: 1) unity among top-level actors; 2) a willingness to 
commit influence resources; 3) an issue’s lack of public visibility; and 4) weak 
countervailing pressure from interest groups and grassroots constituencies (p. 125). As 
Mazzoni notes: “When these conditions hold… then the leadership arena is one where 




This analysis of the policymaking process relating to the passage of Act 60 
demonstrated that the Brigham decision unified House and Senate leaders in a manner 
that allowed them to jointly pursue the goals of student equity as well as taxpayer equity. 
The analysis also demonstrated legislators’ willingness to commit resources on behalf of 
these goals. This willingness was particularly evident among House leaders such as Paul 
Cillo and John Freidin who essentially dedicated their legislative careers to enacting 
school finance reform. Despite the very high profile of the issue in Vermont, these pro-
reform advocates were able to utilize an impressive array of resources, including 
technical knowledge, preparedness, political savvy and positional authority, to largely 
exclude the opposition from the policymaking process. The absence of countervailing 
forces within the legislature following the Brigham decision and Governor Dean’s 
relative lack of engagement on the issue proved especially critical to the pro-reform 
camp’s ability to enact non-incremental policy change in the form of Act 60. Act 60 
signaled a sea change in the manner in which Vermont funded its schools and provided a 
huge win for those long seeking a way to more evenly distribute the burden of school 
funding across the state.  
Gauging a Win: Interpretation of the Policymaking Process 
 This chapter arrayed case findings according to the constructs of the conceptual 
framework guiding the study. Relevant actors, along with goals, motives, resources 
influence strategies and interactions have been examined in each of the four policy arenas 
outlined in the Mazzoni Model (1991). The evidence gathered from interviews as well as 
from primary and secondary source documents and categorized according to the 
components of the conceptual framework provides a plausible explanation for the 
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passage of a non-incremental school funding measure in Vermont. This final section 
aggregates the data in an attempt to develop conclusions regarding the final policy 
content, relevant actor resources, effective strategies and tactics, and to explain the broad 
influence patterns that produced the final outcome. As stated in Chapter Two, employing 
multiple power assessments develops an overarching analytic interpretation of actor 
influence. With this fact in mind, a broad portrait of actor influence will be developed by 
taking into account: 1) the content of the policy outcome with respect to actors’ goals; 2) 
reputational assessments of power; 3) assessments of available resources; and 4) evidence 
of issue suppression. This multiple methods approach will create a composite portrait that 
gives a strong vote of confidence to a researcher’s findings concerning the power of key 
actors or groups (Pfeffer, 1981; Gamson, 1968). 
Decision Outcome Method 
The decision outcome method for assessing power examines policy outcomes in 
light of actors’ goals as a means to gauge influence. In this approach, power is assessed 
through an analysis of political winners and losers. The case narrative describes how, 
over a period of five years, pro-reform advocates steadfastly fought to enact a school 
finance reform package that more equitably distributed taxing burdens and school funds 
across the state of Vermont. Study data support the claim that their efforts culminated in 
the passage of Act 60. Informant reports indicate that pro-reform advocates, notably 
Representatives Paul Cillo and John Freidin, developed five clearly enumerated policy 
goals that undergirded their influence attempts with regard to the issue of school finance 
reform. These goals, which remained consistent over the course of three legislative 
biennia (Informants 07, 08), provide a useful yardstick for measuring whether or not Act 
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60 constituted a win for the pro-reform faction. Their five goals included: 1) reducing 
property taxes; 2) equalizing the ability of all towns to raise money for public schools; 3) 
basing school taxes on “ability to pay” principles; 4) taxing farm and forest land at 
current use prices; and 5) creating a system where every single school district had the 
identical interest and stake in state aid to education. 
A review of the components of Act 60 supports the claim that its passage 
constituted a win for the pro-reform camp on all five counts. With regard to the first goal, 
the infusion of $58 million in additional annual general fund tax revenue, the introduction 
of a $1.10 statewide property tax, a guaranteed yield second tier property and the income 
sensitivity provision served to reduce taxes for the vast majority of Vermonters. As noted 
earlier, newspaper reports estimated that Act 60 reduced taxes for residents of 200 towns 
and increased taxes for residents of 50 towns. (Hoffman, 1997). Those Vermont 
homeowners that did see tax increases resided in the historically low-tax gold towns.   
 In terms of the second goal, Act 60 equalized the ability of all towns to raise 
money through the use of a uniform, statewide property tax, a block grant and a 
guaranteed yield second tier property tax. All school funds raised above the block grant 
were pooled and reallocated back to towns based on their tax effort so that equal dollars 
were provided to each town for equal taxing effort. Informants described the equalizing 
aspects of Act 60 as follows: 
[It included] a statewide property tax delivering a per-pupil block grant to 
each district and if you wanted to spend more then we had this other pot of 
money outside the education fund – what we call the above block 
spending. It was a guaranteed yield or equalized yield. So it was a 
mathematical calculation that would determine what the tax rate needed to 
be to scale it so that the more you spent, the more you raised and the more 




We almost have an absolutely equal system here. It really is that your 
equalized penny raises the same amount of money no matter where you 
are and you can’t backdoor it. (Informant 15) 
 
You can’t maintain equity, fund schools in a fair way, meet the demands 
of Brigham and design a better system than we designed. The fact that it 
has held up all these years is pretty unusual for school funding formulas. 
(Informant 14) 
 
 The third goal concerned reformers’ efforts to make sure that education taxes 
reflected a taxpayer’s ability to pay. This concern hinged on their belief that property 
value no longer served as an accurate reflection of many Vermonters’ wealth. The refusal 
of Howard Dean and the Senate to consider the use of a true income tax meant that 
legislators relied on the use of an income sensitive property tax as a proxy. However, 
with approximately 80 percent of Vermont households eligible to pay their taxes using 
the income sensitivity option, the vast majority of Vermonters could pay in accordance 
with their annual income. Informants concurred that the majority of Vermonters now pay 
their property taxes based on their annual household income: 
Dean succeeded in not getting it added to the income tax but in essence we 
ended up with an income tax. (Informant 18) 
 
John and Paul had one bill that was going to impose an income tax and I 
believe that is when the splitting of the grand list [between residential 
property and non-residential property] was done because you obviously 
cannot impose an income tax on non-residential property owners. So they 
wanted to be able to keep drawing property tax revenues from the non-
residential base while using the income tax to draw money from the 
residential base. What has finally happened was exactly that plan, because 
75 percent of Vermont homeowners and renters pay according to their 
income. (Informant 20) 
 
They did put in that income sensitivity, which, in reality, right now we do 
have a local income tax for education…. if you look at it closely you’ll see 
that a lot of people are paying based on their income, not on their property 




 The fourth goal related to making the state reimburse localities for property taxes 
lost when taxing property at its current use rate rather than its fair market rate. This 
popular land conservation measure protected farm and forest land from being sold by 
farmers and other property holders who could not afford fair market property taxes on 
large tracts of land and was included as a stand alone provision in Act 60. 
Finally, pro-reform advocates sought a funding mechanism whereby legislators 
from all districts would be equally interested in ensuring that the state fully funded its 
education aid commitment. Reform advocates pushed for such a provision because they 
believed that a major flaw in the Foundation Plan had been the lack of incentive for 
legislators from property-rich districts to fully fund state aid to education because their 
district did not receive a benefit. Informant data indicates that Act 60 succeeded in 
putting all Vermont towns “in the same boat” (Informant 21) with regard to state aid to 
education: 
Now the big success is that it is absolutely funded and people fight over 
it… The politics of that was one of the big successes that I think Paul 
envisioned and it worked (Informant 08) 
 
So now there are no representatives who are proud about reducing state 
aid to education. (Informant 07) 
 
Legislators know that if the towns are going to be funded, it has to be 
enough money or everybody gets hit. (Informant 16) 
 
But once Act 60 was there… we were both arguing for full funding of 
special education and for full funding of current use – the property 
wealthy towns and the poor towns. It has the same impact. If you’re going 
to underfund special education it’s going to have the same impact in 
Stowe as it does in Richmond. (Informant 21) 
 
Table 5.1 displays the pro-reform contingent’s policy goals along with the components of 
Act 60 that correspond to these goals. 
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Table 5.1 Summary of Pro-Reform Policy Goals and Corresponding Components of Act 60 
Pro-Reform Policy Goals Corresponding Component of Act 60 
• Reduce property taxes  • $58 million in additional annual 
general fund tax revenue 
• $1.10 statewide property tax 
• Guaranteed yield second tier 
funding option 
• Income sensitivity for household 
incomes of $75,000 or less 
• Equalize the ability of all towns to 
raise money for public schools 
• $1.10 statewide property tax 
• $5,000 per-pupil block grant 
• Guaranteed yield second tier 
funding option 
• Base school taxes on “ability to 
pay” principles 
• Income sensitivity for household 
incomes of $75,000 or less 
• Tax farm and forest land at current 
use value rather than fair market 
value 
• State reimbursement to localities for 
lost property taxes due to taxing 
land at its current use value versus 
its fair market value 
• Create a system where every single 
school district had the identical 
interest and stake in education 
funding 
• $1.10 statewide property tax 
• $5,000 per-pupil block grant 
• Guaranteed yield second tier 
funding option 
 
While Act 60 succeeded in meeting the broad reform goals outlined by Cillo and 
Freidin, reform proponents were not absolute policy victors because Act 60 was 
undoubtedly a product of bargaining, negotiation and compromise. The policy 
proponents’ “win” involved compromise with and concessions to the policy stances of 
other powerful players, notably the governor and the Senate opposition to the use of an 
income tax to fund schools. Informant and documentary data support the conclusion that 
bargaining permeated all aspects of the policy development process from determining 
property tax rates to special education reimbursement rates to the income sensitive 
eligibility income level to the general fund tax package. Political compromises resulting 
from this bargaining process helped policymakers to strike a balance between the need to 
satisfy Brigham’s requirements and the political imperative to deliver benefits to 
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constituents. As one informant noted: “…you know, as a politician you have to win. Your 
constituents need to get something” (Informant 08). Many informants described how 
compromise proved an integral aspect of the policymaking process: 
My main point that year was there wasn’t one person who felt that Act 60 
was the solution or the best solution. It was the solution that got enough 
votes to pass and there had to be a lot of horse trading to make that 
happen. So if you were to hand anyone and everyone a blank piece of 
paper and say, “How would you start off by financing education?” it 
would have been an entirely different result. (Informant 01)  
 
I think basically it would be so nice to be able to do something that’s just 
really pure but you just know that’s not going to get through. (Informant 
06) 
 
But politically, sometimes, you just have to realize that it’s hard to get 
everything all at once. What we got was historic and substantial. 
(Informant 10) 
 
Right or wrong, I think it showed that two parties even in an extremely 
controversial issue can work together in a moderate way. I don’t like all 
parts of Act 60. I don’t today because I am a little bit locally oriented and I 
do think some of my colleagues have a good point that the state doesn’t 
necessarily do a better job than the local government. At the same time, I 
saw the great inequity of poor towns’ students getting a far inferior 
education to a rich town and that bothered me. (Informant 04) 
 
So essentially [Paul] worked with Catherine Benham, Cheryl Rivers, 
Martha Heath a little bit because she’s a mathematician and probably a 
little bit with [Peter] Shumlin and they essentially cut a deal and came up 
with this cockamamie system of income sensitivity…. It was a messy 
solution. (Informant 07) 
 
I thought the bill was the best we could possibly make it. Was it perfect 
for me? No. Was it better than what we had? Well it was constitutional. 
(Informant 02) 
 
I never liked the sharing pool [but] we went with it. (Informant 03) 
 
Partisan proponents’ willingness to make concessions reflected the limitations of 
their power as well as a political strategy to ensure the measure’s passage. These actions 
also reflected the pluralistic power-based policy formation process outlined in Mazzoni’s 
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(1991) arena model. However, while informants viewed compromise as politically 
necessary to secure Act 60’s passage, they believed the numerous concessions made the 
bill highly complex and, thus, confusing to average Vermonters: 
One of the complications is the whole income sensitivity is essentially 
designed to make property tax look like an income tax and the algebra gets 
so complicated that nobody can quite explain it. (Informant 02) 
 
So they thought they had this wonderful solution that did take income into 
account. But it was too complicated for any person to understand. So when 
they would stand there and say, “OK, well either you can you’re going to 
pay your education tax based on this or you will pay it thorough your 
income tax, no more than three percent all this.” There was no one who 
could understand it. It was just way too complicated. (Informant 01) 
 
I remember John Freidin would come back into the committee and set up 
at the blackboard working [the bill] through and one time he described 
what we now have and he realized after about 45 minutes that he was 
wrong and he had to go back and talk to Paul to get it right. It was that 
complicated. It was just hard. (Informant 21) 
 
[After Act 60] we used to be constantly on the road doing presentations. 
One of my first ones I went to one of the towns that wasn’t a happy town 
and I had [my presentation] on a Power Point overhead with slides and I 
did this full presentation. Here we were in the gym and the first guy gets 
up and says, “I work with numbers every day and I didn’t understand a 
word you said.” (Informant 16) 
 
When Act 60 came around nobody could explain it and you could have 
people standing up there till they were blue and they couldn’t explain it 
and so that really fed into the opponents because the opponents didn’t 
have to explain it, they could just criticize it. (Informant 01) 
 
As the last informant noted, the bill’s complexity had negative implications for the 
implementation process as policy opponents latched on to the bill’s many imperfections 
as a means to criticize it and as a justification to try to block its enactment. 
Reputational Assessment Method 
To further validate assertions made using the decision outcome method, this 
analysis will employ the reputational method as a means to assess actor influence. The 
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reputational method for assessing power eschews the tallying of decisionmaking 
outcomes in favor of tapping people’s perceptions of patterns of influence and authority. 
Newspaper articles and interviews with those involved in the policymaking process 
identified Paul Cillo, John Freidin and a small cadre of affiliated political actors, 
including Cheryl Rivers, Deb Brighton, and Martha Heath, as instrumental in securing 
the passage of Act 60. Informants credited these actors with bringing awareness to the 
issue, devising creative policy solutions and pushing for the enactment of these solutions 
across policy arenas. While all of these policy actors were given their due for their critical 
thinking and hard work on behalf of school finance reform, documentary and informant 
data particularly recognized Paul Cillo and to a lesser extent John Freidin as the 
lynchpins of the reform movement. For example, Burlington Free Press columnist, 
Jeffrey Good (1997f), praised Cillo and Freidin for carrying the school finance reform 
torch in the years preceding the Supreme Court’s Brigham ruling: 
1997 will be the Year of Property Tax Reform, and there’s no shortage of 
lawmakers lining up for credit. The one who deserves the most 
recognition, however, is the one least likely to seek it: Rep. Paul Cillo, D-
Hardwick…. For better than five years Cillo has worked against long odds 
to narrow the gap between have and have-not in the school funding 
system. He hasn’t done it alone; Rep. John Freidin, D-New Haven, and 
other lawmakers also have played key roles. But many credit Cillo for 
keeping the effort alive before the Supreme Court demanded reform this 
year, and for keeping it together since. (p. 1E). 
 
In interviews, informants similarly lauded Paul Cillo, John Freidin and their small 
group of legislative allies for their efforts on behalf of passing comprehensive 
school finance reform legislation: 
Paul and John were the architects of all this [i.e. Act 60] They are 
extremely smart people… They’re highly intelligent, very sophisticated 





Paul pulled this together. Paul is really brilliant in figuring this stuff out. 
(Informant 06) 
 
I see Doug [Racine] as the person who was absolutely critical in terms of 
the aftermath. But the prior scribing, that was done by Paul Cillo. 
(Informant 12) 
 
So Paul and John Freidin, you know, it was remarkable what they did. 
(Informant 01) 
 
I know Catherine Benham and Deb Brighton – I call them the mothers of 
Act 60 – [they] are very smart people [who] I think were instrumental in 
some of the mechanisms behind it. (Informant 16) 
 
Martha [Heath], Gaye [Symington], John and Paul were the four 
legislative people who really were the brains [behind Act 60]. Cheryl 
[Rivers] was in the Senate at the time and she was also very important in 
making sure the law passed. (Informant 20) 
 
While Paul Cillo and John Freidin’s technical expertise and political savvy proved 
integral to Act 60’s conceptualization and subsequent passage, many informants credited 
the Supreme Court’s influence for providing the force needed to break the decade’s old 
policy logjam on the school funding issue. As columnist Christopher Graff (1997c) 
wrote: “It is one thing for a politician to decry a system as unfair, it is another for a court 
to declare it illegal” (p. 6E). The power of the court’s mandate for change resonated with 
legislators and compelled reforms that had been previously considered too radical to 
garner passage. Graff further reflected:  
The odds are some type of property tax relief would have passed this 
legislative session even if the Supreme Court had not declared 
unconstitutional the system of financing schools. It probably would have 
done more than the Band-Aids of years past, but there is no doubt it would 








Interview informants similarly highlighted the court’s influence in this regard: 
We would still be fighting the same fight we were in the 1980s and 1990s 
if it hadn’t been for the Brigham lawsuit. That’s just so clear. We’d have 
the same old fights over the same old issues. (Informant 20)  
 
You know, governors in Vermont had been saying this for 100 years and 
until the Court forced action… no one would take action. (Informant 01) 
 
No way would Act 60 have passed without the Supreme Court ruling. 
There would have been something else but not as radically different. 
(Informant 11) 
 
Thus, without the court ruling, Cillo and Freidin, despite their best influence 
efforts, lacked the power to deliver a bill with the non-incremental policy change offered 
by Act 60. However, in the absence of Cillo and Freidin, the Brigham ruling might not 
have found advocates in the political sphere with the skill and will needed to effectively 
utilize the power of its change mandate. One respondent nicely characterized the critical 
nexus between policy advocate and propitious event: 
I happen to think having Paul and John who had the time and the 
commitment to really work on this for many years was enormous. And 
Cheryl Rivers, difficult as she was to some people, she also sort of carried 
the weight in the Senate for it. I’ve seen a lot of things fail because the 
right individual isn’t there. Thing is its easy for things to fail in the 
legislative process. They had the Supreme Court ruling so something was 
going to have to happen but it could have dragged on for years…. That’s 
where I think the right individual makes a huge difference. (Informant 08) 
 
Mazzoni (1991) refers to skillful policy advocates such as Cillo and Freidin as 
idea champions. This term is a refinement of Kingdon’s (1995) concept of a policy 
entrepreneur and specifically refers to skilled policy advocates working inside 
government to enact non-incremental policy change. According to Mazzoni, idea 
champions, relying on a broad array of resources and strategies, take advantage of 
propitious moments such as a Supreme Court ruling to “…push their pet solutions or to 
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push their attention to their special problem” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 165). Citing Daft and 
Becker (1978), Mazzoni cites three key qualities of idea champions: 1) persistence; 2) 
persuasiveness; and 3) willingness to push others to accept a policy innovation (i.e. 
assertiveness). These personal qualities mesh well with those outlined by Kingdon when 
describing a policy entrepreneur. They include: 1) technical expertise; 2) positional 
authority; 3) political savvy and 4) persistence. Taken together, these qualities can also be 
viewed as resources that have utility across policy arenas for actors seeking to influence 
the policy process. They will be utilized to frame the discussion of actor power vis a vis 
resources in the next section. 
Resource Assessment Method 
A resource assessment provides yet another method for gauging power through an 
examination of the resources available to policy actors. This technique assumes that 
because influence is exercised through the strategic deployment of resources, potential 
power can be assessed by estimating the resources available to a particular actor or group 
and the skill and will with which they are deployed. Detailed accounts of actors’ 
resources help to determine if the judgment based on decision outcomes and attributional 
data constitute a plausible interpretation of the policy process. While the resources noted 
above are just a few of the myriad resources described by policy scholars, they have been 
identified as being particularly effective in helping actors to influence policy outcomes 
(Kingdon, 1995; Daft & Becker, 1978). 
 Primary and secondary source data present Paul Cillo and his political ally John 
Freidin as hard charging idea champions willing to deploy both personal and positional 
resources across policy arenas on behalf of their vision for school finance reform. In 
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terms of technical expertise, primary and secondary data paint a portrait of two 
individuals deeply immersed in the technical minutia of school finance formulas and their 
associated tax implications: 
Paul and John spent almost all of their time outside the committee room, 
which is not common when the committee is in session… And they spent 
time just working in a separate room developing their ideas about this [i.e. 
school finance reform]. (Informant 07) 
 
Paul and John and Deb, and to some extent Martha Heath, were the people 
who knew the issue, who had worked on it for years. (Informant 13) 
 
I bet Paul and John were the first two people who ever carried laptops to 
the legislature. Paul got one and he suggested John get one. It would have 
been hard to do the spreadsheets [without them]. (Informant 07) 
 
Study informants frequently highlighted Paul Cillo’s particular ability to conceptualize 
and craft school funding structures: 
When you talk to Paul your going to find a very principled human being 
there who is incredibly knowledgeable of tax structures. (Informant 12) 
 
[Paul] would be in there with all these stacks of paper and he could rattle 
[statistics] off. Probably still can tell you haw version x affects Stowe and 
Greensboro. (Informant 17) 
 
Their deep understanding of the technical underpinnings of school finance 
legislation provided them with the ability to craft a variety of measures that responded to 
the prevailing political climate. It also allowed them to act quickly to devise a bill in the 
wake of the Supreme Court’s Brigham decision. One pro-reform informant recalled Cillo 
and Freidin’s ability to respond rapidly to the court’s mandate: 
Once the Brigham decision hit, I remember sitting in a conference room in 
the statehouse and feeling the warm Xerox paper as it had just come out of 
these models that had been run during this period when we didn’t have the 
political muscle or the court decision behind it. So it was literally: “Take 
some of that homework that had already been done and put it together.” 




With regard to positional authority, informant and documentary evidence point to 
a steady ascent up the legislative political ladder for both Cillo and Freidin throughout the 
period under study. Informant interview data indicated that both gentlemen entered the 
legislature purposefully seeking appointments to the House Ways and Means Committee 
so that they could work on the school funding issue. Each succeeded in receiving his 
respective appointment during his second term in office. Working together on the Ways 
and Means Committee, they produced H. 541 in 1994. During the 1995/96 biennium, 
Paul Cillo subsequently became House Majority Leader. From this perch, Cillo assisted 
the Speaker of the House with committee appointments and set the legislative agenda for 
the Democratic caucus. Using the authority of his office, Cillo ensured that John Freidin 
occupied his former position as Vice Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee. 
He also ensured that the issue of school funding received top billing on the House’s 
legislative agenda. From his position as Vice Chair of the Ways and Means Committee, 
Freidin controlled the development of school funding bills that emanated from his 
committee, including H.351 in 1995 and H.527 in 1997.  
  Kingdon writes that policy actors who combine technical expertise with political 
savvy are able to exert significant influence in the political sphere. As noted earlier Cillo 
and Freidin took the time to develop a significant knowledge base with regard to school 
finance formulas and their associated taxing structures. However, informants also 
perceived the two as politically astute. Primary and secondary source data support the 
claim that both gentlemen were well versed in Vermont state policymaking and 
understood how to pull the levers of power within the system: 
Paul is in my mind one of, if not the, smartest political minds around and 




So [Paul and John] committed a lot of political energy to understanding 
the trade – not just the numbers – because Deb Brighton and [redacted] 
were crunching zillions of numbers. But also the politics of how you put 
an idea out there and what happens with it? What is the political reaction? 
What is the public reaction? How do you respond to those issues and what 
are the real problems with property tax funding? (Informant 08) 
 
Paul and John had gone around the state for years working through the 
system and developing concepts. They new the politics of districts really 
backwards and forwards. They knew all these pieces and how they fit 
together. (Informant 21)  
 
In an especially revealing vignette, one informant recounted how Paul Cillo understood 
the influence that even menial legislative positions could offer: 
Paul became the clerk of the committee. He developed a regular 
relationship with the chair and the chair just delegated all of the witness 
scheduling, selecting witnesses – amazing amounts of power. The vice 
chair could have done that, anybody could have done that but Paul could 
see [the power in] setting the order, you can set the whole committee 
agenda by saying, “ We’re going to do this first, that later.” I mean it was 
amazing. He was there for four years and he was like running the 
committee. (Informant 03) 
 
Their understanding of Vermont politics taken in conjunction with their technical 
expertise and positional authority, allowed the two to pass out of the House three 
different school funding bills in three successive legislative biennia.  
 Throughout the better part of the 1990s, Cillo and Freidin invested time and 
energy amassing the technical expertise, positional authority and political know-how 
needed to influence the school funding policy process. Their willingness to continue 
amassing these resources despite legislative defeats in 1994 and 1996 signals a certain 
level persistence on their part. Interview informants credit this persistence as key to their 
preparedness when the Supreme Court issued its Brigham ruling:  
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When the Supreme Court ruling came along, people think [Cillo and 
Freidin] just created something quickly but… in fact, it was the result of 
many years of work. (Informant 08) 
 
They’d been doing all this work since 1994 [the year H.541 passed]. 
Decision comes out in 1997. Paul and John had been working even before 
then – 1992? 1993? So you had five or six years of hard thinking about 
what would constitute a fair education finance system. (Informant 19) 
 
[Paul Cillo and John Freidin] had been doing it for seven or eight years. 
There was a huge amount of homework being done. Lots of things 
proposed. Lots of things were run up the flagpole and shot down.  
(Informant 12)  
 
In the absence of this persistence, informants believed that legislature would not have 
been able to respond as quickly and as expertly as it did to the court’s mandate for 
change. As such, the legislative outcome could have been vastly different. 
 In addition to persistence, Cillo and Freidin worked hard to persuade Vermonters 
that their current system of school finance was unfair to taxpayers and students in 
property-poor towns. They routinely utilized opportunities to appear on television, on the 
radio or in print to disseminate their views to the general public (Informants 07, 03). John 
Freidin, in particular, wrote many commentary pieces for local newspapers expounding 
upon the persistent inequity of the Foundation Plan. 
One informant characterized Paul Cillo’s persuasive abilities by noting: “Paul was 
really good at getting people to start thinking about what people should be paying. 
What’s a fair amount for people to pay for school?” (Informant 06). This informant 
further detailed the impact that persuading others to think in these terms had on the 
legislative process: 
When new legislators came in, they kind of knew this [i.e. the school 
funding discussion] was happening which is kind of different than when 
you’ve got sitting legislators and someone plunks a new idea out there. 
But instead, now you’ve got more people coming in, kind of learning from 
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these other people. Through the years people started being more familiar 
with the concepts and, you know, this was sort of Paul’s work all along. 
Just sort of hammering away at equity and even the concept of yield. 
(Informant 06) 
 
Cillo’s efforts at persuasion were genuine. By all informant accounts, he and John 
Freidin passionately believed in the cause of educational equity and did not shrink from 
seizing opportunities to assert their policy goals across policy arenas. This assertiveness 
is perhaps best captured in their unwavering fealty to the use of an income tax in their 
school funding proposals despite significant opposition by the business community, the 
Senate and Governor Howard Dean. Cillo’s interest in the use of an income tax first 
manifested itself in 1992 in the design of the Blue Ribbon Commission’s Composite 
Plan. Although not particularly well developed, the Composite Plan served as the basis 
for Cillo and Freidin’s first joint school funding initiative, H.541, which relied on a 
statewide non-residential property tax and a local income tax to fund schools. Finally, an 
income tax provision reappeared in 1997 in the House’s version of H.527. Despite 
Governor Dean’s repeated veto threats, Cillo and Freidin wanted an income tax “on the 
table” (Informants 13, 03). In the end, their willingness to stand firm on their belief that 
an income tax served as an appropriate vehicle for fostering taxpayer equity paid off in 
the form of the “income sensitive” property tax provision included in the final version of 
H.527.   
 A resource assessment aids in confirming judgments based on decision outcomes 
and attributional data by gauging whether it is plausible to believe that certain policy 
actors possess the resources needed to influence policy outcomes. This assessment has 
confirmed that Paul Cillo and John Freidin, in their capacity as idea champions, 
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possessed the capacity to influence policy outcomes through resources such as technical 
skill, positional authority, political savvy, persistence, persuasiveness and assertiveness.  
As noted in the reputational assessment section, informants credited Paul Cillo 
and John Freidin with being the driving forces behind Act 60. However, informants also 
acknowledge that school finance reform owed a great debt to the Brigham decision. 
Although skilled policy advocates and idea champions, the power of Cillo and Freidin’s 
resources only extended to one legislative chamber. Thus, passing their desired 
legislation required the cooperation of the Senate and the governor. In the years leading 
up to the Brigham decision, this cooperation was not forthcoming thanks to deep-seated 
ideological differences in the Senate and Governor Dean’s insistence on incremental 
reform. These policy opponents repeatedly deployed their own ample stores of resources 
to block the passage of structural reforms devised by Cillo and Freidin. 
Not until the Brigham decision shifted the balance of power within the leadership 
arena, were reform advocates able to successfully push their agenda by capitalizing on 
the “window of opportunity”48 opened by the court. The Supreme Court’s decision not 
only provided Cillo and Freidin with additional resources such as a mandate for student 
equity, it also strengthened existing resources such their technical knowledge, 
preparedness and vision for change. Conversely, the ruling weakened the resources of 
issue opponents by declaring their preferred policy initiatives unconstitutional and 
creating a sense of urgency around the topic. Enabled by the ruling, Cillo and Freidin 
strategically deployed their resources to obtain a policy “win” in the form of Act 60.  
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Analysis of Non-Decision Method 
 The final method for assessing influence is termed analysis of non-decision. This 
approach seeks to uncover instances where elites may have exerted influence and 
authority to suppress issues that might compromise their interest and position in society. 
The arena model’s sensitivity to the contextual features of policy arenas allowed for an 
exploration of the manner in which Vermont’s broader socio-political traditions shaped 
the school finance issue and the dynamics of the policymaking process surrounding it. 
The case analysis reveals that gold town residents, municipal interests and 
business organizations undoubtedly exploited Vermonters’ fears of state control and 
economic downturn to block the implementation of property tax sharing schemes. 
Informants described the arguments utilized used by anti-property tax reform factions to 
defend a status quo that benefitted the minority at the expense of the majority in the 
following passages: 
We have strong political interests who favored the system that we used to 
have. The Chamber of Commerce [and] ski areas, you know, those towns 
do exert a fair amount of influence because skiing is so important to the 
economy. They made the argument that [reform] would raise the property 
taxes way too high…. When you’re talking about the fact that property 
taxes might go up a little bit, [the Chamber of Commerce] is the first one 
there saying, “You know, this is going to kill business. This is bad.” 
(Informant 18) 
 
…we may not be a gold town this year, but all of a sudden the state is 
going to be using the property tax for this and this and we’re going to 
become a quote ‘gold town’ collecting more property taxes and we’ll lose 
for our own school because there is a new pig at the trough which is the 
state. So I think that was the key to our being able to have the coalition 
that continued to oppose the statewide property tax. (Informant 09) 
 
If we’re not raising our own money and paying for our own schools, we’re 





…they felt there would be strings attached and they wouldn’t be able to 
make decisions about [schools] if the money was coming from 
Montpelier. Or if this was a state system, then the state would want to 
exert more control over what went on in the schools. (Informant 18) 
 
These arguments against school finance reform resonated with Vermonters. Over 
the course of many years, multiple governors attempted to address the vast disparities in 
property tax rates and per-pupil expenditures between property-wealthy and property-
poor school districts through the implementation of measures such as a statewide 
property tax. However, legislators repeatedly balked at these initiatives despite the fact 
that they would have reduced property taxes in a majority of towns. This counterintuitive 
reaction can, in part, be explained by the efforts of privileged groups to reinforce fears of 
state intervention and economic decline among Vermont citizens. Despite widespread 
acknowledgement that the school finance system was “broken,” it took the Supreme 
Court’s intervention in Brigham v. State to break the political logjam on this issue and to 
bring about structural reform that prioritized student and taxpayer equity over local 
control.  
Summary 
This section employed multiple methods for assessing power to develop a broad 
portrait of actor influence in the policymaking process. In doing so, this process 
confirmed that Act 60’s policy outcomes aligned with the pro-reform contingent’s policy 
goals. It also confirmed that interview and documentary data point to the role of Paul 
Cillo, John Freidin and a small group of their reform allies in heightening awareness of 
the school finance issue, devising creative policy solutions and advocating for the 
enactment of their preferred policy proposals. Finally, the assessment confirmed that both 
Paul Cillo and John Freidin possessed the resources deemed essential by political 
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scholars for serving as effective idea champions. Taken together, this composite 
assessment offers a strong vote of confidence to the assertion that a small group of pro-
reform advocates led by Paul Cillo and John Freidin capitalized on favorable contextual 





ASSESSMENT OF THE ARENA MODEL 
This chapter attempts to answer this study’s second research question: In what 
ways does Mazzoni’s arena model account for or fail to account for the policymaking 
process that led to the passage of Vermont’s Act 60? This assessment is carried out in 
three ways. First, it revisits the rationale for selecting the issue of school finance reform 
as an appropriate topic and the passage of Vermont’s Act 60 as an appropriate site for 
testing the utility of Mazzoni’s (1991) arena model. Second, the chapter discusses the 
Vermont case’s findings in light of the precepts of the arena model as well as related 
school finance policymaking literature. In doing so, the chapter attempts to evaluate 
individual arenas as well as the model as a whole in terms of its ability to explain the 
policymaking processes at work in enacting non-incremental policy change. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with suggestions for future research on the topic of state education 
policymaking in the domain of school finance reform. These include the potential 
addition of a “judicial arena” to Mazzoni’s model to more fully address the interplay 
between the judicial and political systems that is frequently an aspect of state education 
policymaking as well as the consideration of other analytic frameworks that could shed 
light on the phenomenon of non-incremental policy change with regard to the issue of 
school finance reform.  
Topic and Case Selection Rationale  
 This section revisits the nature of the policy problem along with the study’s 
purpose and conceptual framework to assess the appropriateness of school finance as a 
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topic and the Vermont case as a site for testing the effectiveness of Mazzoni’s arena 
model. 
Policy Problem 
Public education in the United States has traditionally been paid for through the 
assessment and collection of property taxes at the local level (Ward, 1998; DeMoss, 
2003, Schmidt, 2004, Shelly, 2011). However, disparities in taxable local district wealth 
have frequently led to sizable differences in school funding levels among school districts 
within any given state. Since the late 1960s, the courts have served as the primary vehicle 
for groups seeking to address inter-district discrepancies in school finance. While courts 
have ruled favorably in approximately half of all school funding cases, court-mandated 
school finance reform has proven to be frequently contentious and legislative compliance 
with court mandates has been quite slow in several states (Carr & Fuhrman, 1999; 
Dayton & Dupre, 2007).  
However, just four months after having its school finance system declared 
unconstitutional, the Vermont legislature responded to its Supreme Court’s mandate for 
change by passing Act 60, a comprehensive school funding plan that redistributed 
property wealth from property-rich school districts to property-poor school districts 
through a statewide property tax and a guaranteed yield second tier local property tax. 
Fowler (1994) notes that “[n]on-incremental education reforms are of considerable 
theoretical interest because in the American policy process it is not easy to innovate” (p. 
335). Therefore, Act 60 has served as an interesting case for examining the type of state 
policy environment that produces non-incremental school finance legislation with a 
strong fiscal equity thrust. Despite the relatively recent reemergence of school finance 
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reform as an important policy matter confronting state legislators, comparatively little has 
been written about the policy processes involved in devising and enacting school finance 
literature following court-ordered reform mandates. What little exists is dated and 
frequently atheoretical in nature (Kirst, 1990; Nelson, 1997; Cibulka, 1994; Fowler, 
2006). 
Study Purpose 
This study sought to extend knowledge in the area of state education 
policymaking for school finance reform by examining the policymaking process leading 
to the Vermont legislature’s passage of Act 60. This research, grounded in political 
theory, had two major purposes: first, to explain a case of non-incremental policy change 
within the realm of school finance reform; and second, to test the utility of Mazzoni’s 
(1991) arena model for explaining state-level school finance policymaking. With these 
goals in mind, this case study explored how key political actors, taking advantage of 
favorable reform conditions, utilized power derived from positional authority as well as 
personal influence to impact the passage of Act 60. 
Conceptual Framework  
 As noted above, the theoretical framework used to focus this study was Mazzoni’s 
(1991) arena model. The arena model rests on three key assumptions: 1) that arenas 
structure not only the institutional and social context of policy formation, but also the 
relevant players, the relative value of their resources, and their strategies for wielding 
influence; 2) that politically skillful policy actors utilize their positional and personal 
power to shift the policymaking process to arenas that they believe are likely to produce 
favorable outcomes; and 3) that the concept of an arena shift to these favorable policy 
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venues can help to explain large-scale policy change. This conceptual framework situates 
the analysis of education policymaking within a broader external policy environment 
shaped by the state and nation. This policy environment is influenced by cultural norms, 
social values, and political traditions.  
Within this broader context, the conceptual framework highlights four 
overlapping policy arenas where court-mandated school finance reform is mediated: 1) 
the policy subsystem; 2) the macro arena; 3) the leadership arena; and 4) the commission 
arena. Mazzoni’s arena model is grounded in and derived from research on state 
education policymaking and has been found by other researchers in education 
policymaking to be a fruitful heuristic for explaining educational policy innovations at 
the state level (i.e. Fowler, 1994; Cody, 1994; Freedman & Hughes, 1998).  
Assessment of the Individual Components of the Arena Model 
Study findings illuminate a highly contentious policy process that involved a 
small group of reform-minded legislators and their allies persistently pressing for reform 
across all four policymaking sites incorporated in Mazzoni’s arena mode. The policy 
contest unfolded over several years, yielded multiple policy options and included steep 
opposition from Republican politicians as well as social and economic elites. In the end, 
this group of politically savvy and technically knowledgeable politicians took advantage 
of a favorable policy environment in the wake of the Vermont Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Brigham v. State to meet their policy goals. Within this favorable policy environment, 
they pushed legislation that accorded with their vision for school funding in Vermont 
with relatively minor concessions for political expediency. Using the components of the 
arena model as an orienting framework, this section reviews how the group secured non-
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incremental policy change and discusses key findings in light of the literature on state 
education policymaking and the politics of school finance reform. 
 Subsystem Arena 
 The arena model describes a policy subsystem as a relatively stable cadre of 
legislative committee members, bureaucratic specialists, interest groups, and academics 
involved with a specific policy issue. In the realm of state education policymaking, 
relevant actors at the subsystem level generally include bureaucrats from the state 
department of education, members of legislative committees dealing with education 
issues, and educational interest groups. Within the subsystem, this stable group of 
interested parties tends to engage in pluralistic bargaining to help accommodate as many 
interests as possible (Mazzoni, 1991; Fowler, 1994). While conflict may be present, it 
tends to be short lived and mediated through pragmatic logrolling and calculated 
negotiation. Because the subsystem is already biased in favor of the interests represented 
in the policy subsystem, actors are not inclined to contemplate any major policy reform 
that may change the existing balance of power between competing interests (Redford, 
1969). As a result, policy change tends to be incremental in nature. 
Case of Vermont in Light of Model Expectations 
An application of Mazzoni’s arena model reveals a state-level school finance 
policy subsystem that consisted mainly of the governor and legislators working on an 
annual basis to appropriate general fund revenues to the state aid to education program. 
Constrained by tight economic circumstances and a governor who did not wish to 
appropriate additional funds to education, legislators acted to divide scarce state dollars 
across a variety of policy sectors to appease as many voters as possible. 
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According to Arnold (1990), legislators support or oppose policies by determining 
the policy preferences of their constituents and how likely it is that those preferences will 
impact voting decisions. Indeed, as general fund dollars tightened, spending tradeoffs 
heightened friction between representatives from property-poor and property-rich 
districts. Legislators from high property wealth districts increasingly voted down 
education aid packages because they knew that under the terms of the Foundation Plan 
aid money would not be destined for their schools (Rebell & Metzler, 2002; Curtis, 
2002). Instead, legislators from those areas preferred apportioning state funds to other 
programmatic areas that would benefit constituents in their districts. The legislators’ self-
serving approach, while understandable, helped to create a cycle whereby reduced 
funding to state aid led to fewer towns “on the formula.” In turn, this cycle meant that in 
subsequent years, even fewer legislators had an incentive to prop up the education aid 
budget and even more towns fell off the formula. Nelson (1997) writes that school 
funding choices can be thought of as “…a collective action problem, in which individual 
voters and their representatives engage in short-term self-interested behavior which 
reduces their collective welfare in the long run” (p. 60). This scenario appeared to be the 
case in Vermont’s education finance policy subsystem where policy decisions reflected 
the bias of interests represented in the subsystem.  
Consistent with the expectations of Mazzoni’s (1991) arena model, the policy 
subsystem did not prove to be a fruitful locus of reform. Vermont’s revenue shortfalls 
heightened “protectionist turf-guarding” and ” fueled “zero-sum bargaining” among 
legislators and prevented the use of state money to “facilitate non-incremental, 
redistributive policies” through the provision of side payments to property-wealthy 
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school districts or leveling up property-poor school districts” (pp. 118-119). Attempts by 
House Ways and Means committee members such as Paul Cillo (H.556, 1991) and Oreste 
Valsangiacomo (H.907, 1992) to pass school finance reform legislation did not gain 
traction during this time period.  
Case of Vermont in Light of Related Literature 
Vermont’s experience with school finance subsystem policymaking during the 
early 1990s supported existing research on the politics of school finance reform in three 
ways and differed from the experiences of other states in one respect. First, this case 
study revealed that Vermont’s fiscal downturn hindered the ability of Vermont legislators 
to allocate finance resources to its poorer school districts. Multiple school finance reform 
researchers (i.e. Geske, 1976; Fuhrman, 1978; Fuhrman et al., 1979; Berke et al., 1984) 
highlighted the connection between successful school finance reform measures and fiscal 
surpluses. Through practices such as side payments and leveling up, states utilized fiscal 
surplus to “…mollify the ‘haves’ while aiding the ‘have nots’” (Fuhrman et al., 1979, p. 
84). Conversely, Carr and Fuhrman (1999) emphasize the difficulty faced by reformers in 
Texas, New Jersey and Alabama attempting to respond to court mandates for change in 
the face of the anti-tax, anti-government sentiment prevalent in the 1990s. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that the type of non-incremental policy change envisioned by Mazzoni was 
not enacted in a time of scarce state resources.  
Second, the Vermont case highlighted the important role played by legislators and 
governors in school finance policymaking. Primary and secondary source data revealed 
that Vermont’s unique political culture and history of reform contributed to a situation 
whereby state-level elected officials were virtually the only actors operating in the school 
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finance policy subsystem. Fuhrman et al. (1979) observe that while the legislative and 
gubernatorial interest in education matters such as teaching and curriculum was a 
relatively new phenomenon in the late 1960s and early 1970s, these policy actors had 
historically taken an interest in matters of school finance: 
If there was ever an education issue in which general government was 
active despite the tradition of isolation, it was finance. When it came to 
dollars, governors and legislators had to take an interest. They had to 
question expert decisions more thoroughly on money matters than on other 
issues because the responsibility for allocating scarce dollars fell to them. 
(pp. 79-80)  
 
Indeed, the Vermont case exemplifies the process of governors and legislators “allocating 
scarce dollars.” Wong (2008) notes that this allocation process perpetuates the status quo 
because a state’s school finance structure mirrors the balance of power within a given 
state. As a result, policymakers have little incentive to reform the system.  
Third, the Vermont case revealed the absence of the traditional education lobby in 
the school finance policy subsystem. Mathis (2000) explains that organizations such as 
the Vermont National Education Association and the Vermont Superintendents’ 
Association “…would adopt generalized position statements favoring reform but did not 
take an activist position nor advocate for any particular reform” (p. 8). In her case studies 
of four Midwestern states, Siegel (1976) attributed the absence of the traditional 
education lobby to the fact that school finance reform is a divisive issue for statewide 
membership organizations in that it pits the interests of members from property-wealthy 
school districts against the interests of members from property-poor school districts. Carr 
and Fuhrman (1999) emphasize that these organizations avoid divisiveness by advocating 
for policies that increase state education funding when they note: “Teachers unions, 
which in many states are traditionally politically powerful entities, have been noticeably 
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quite in most school finance reform debates, except to argue for increased overall 
spending” (p. 142).  
A noticeable departure from school finance subsystem policymaking in other 
states was Vermont’s lack of a meaningful advocacy coalition representing property-poor 
school districts. Two states grappling with the school finance issue during the same time 
period provide a contrast to Vermont’s experience in this regard. For example, Pittner, 
Carleton and Casto’s (2010) exploration of school finance reform in Ohio details the 
formation of two advocacy groups aimed at raising the profile of inter-district funding 
disparities in that state.  First, a group of concerned superintendents from southeastern 
Ohio came together to form the Coalition of Rural and Appalachian Schools (CORAS) to 
advocate for increased funding to schools in that region of the state. CORAS leaders 
subsequently recognized the need for a statewide advocacy organization and created the 
Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy of School funding. Over time, this coalition 
grew to include more than 500 school district members from across the state and filed 
suit against the state in 1991 when its demands for a more equitable school funding 
system were not met. Similarly, Dove (1991) explains how Kentucky’s Council for Better 
Education, led by former governor and federal judge Bert Combs, was founded to address 
the vast inter-district funding discrepancies that existed throughout the state. As in the 
case of Ohio, the Council for Better Education eventually initiated school finance reform 
litigation after 66 of the state’s 177 school districts agreed to participate in the lawsuit 
(Dove, 1991).  
Conversely, a statewide school funding coalition that advocated for reform never 
developed in Vermont. As noted in Chapter Five, this absence was attributed to the 
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state’s strong tradition of local control, a fragmented budgeting process and the 
intermittent nature of the issue. One informant noted that the passage of Act 60 served as 
the impetus for creating a stronger statewide alliance. As the informant commented: “The 
coalition after [Act 60] was passed was a stronger organization than had existed before” 
(Informant 12). Thus, in the case of Vermont, it took the enactment of Act 60 to foster the 
development a statewide advocacy coalition for school finance.  
Utility of the Subsystem Arena in Light of the Vermont Case and Related Literature 
This review of the Vermont case both in light of the arena model and related 
literature reveals that Mazzoni’s model accurately predicted the policymaking process in 
the subsystem arena. Both the Vermont case and related literature support Mazzoni’s 
supposition that because subsystem policymaking is biased in favor of those interests 
represented in the policy subsystem, actors lack incentive to contemplate any major 
policy reform. This bias allows funding discrepancies to persist over time and compels 
courts to intervene. In addition, both the Vermont case and related literature support 
Mazzoni’s claim regarding the difficulty of policy change in times of fiscal constraint. 
Without extra funds to “mollify the ‘haves,’” (Fuhrman et al., 1979, p. 84) school finance 
reform policymaking devolves into “protectionist turf guarding” (Mazzoni, 1991, p. 118). 
In terms of key actors, the arena model accorded with the related school finance 
literature but parted ways with the Vermont case regarding the presence of a school 
reform advocacy group in the policy subsystem. As noted earlier, Vermont-specific 
contextual issues most likely account for this difference. The Vermont case and related 
literature also indicate the presence of very high-level political officials in the school 
finance policy subsystem. Future researchers utilizing the arena model to investigate 
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school finance policymaking may need to look beyond the usual subsystem actors such as 
interest group leaders, bureaucrats and related legislative committee leaders when 
identifying key actors in the policy subsystem.  
Commission Arena 
According to Mazzoni, a commission arena is typically comprised of a relatively 
small group of individuals representing diverse interests on an issue of concern. Actors 
engage in pluralistic bargaining as a means to persuade group members to a particular 
point of view. In Mazzoni’s view, because the commission arena is not burdened by the 
“overwhelming establishment bias of the subsystem,” it does have the capacity to “do 
more than incrementally extend existing legislation” (Mazzoni, 1991, p. 130). In 
Mazzoni’s analysis, the major strength of commission arenas is their ability to legitimate, 
consolidate, and extend new policy ideas.  However, the commission arena’s emphasis on 
consensual bargaining among competing interests ultimately makes it an unlikely site for 
major policy overhauls.  
Case of Vermont in Light of Model Expectations 
Berke et al. (1984) observe that because “meaningful change in raising and 
distributing revenues for education affects important social interests,” school finance 
reform cannot be considered routine policymaking (p. 58). This finding proved true in 
Vermont. Reform initiatives failed to gain traction in the policy subsystem. The 
subsystem’s practice of level funding the aid to education budget, while helping to 
resolve the state’s debt problem, aggravated existing inter-district disparities in local per-
pupil expenditures. The pressure to raise local property taxes to offset state aid shortfalls 
in property-poor school districts heightened political tensions as residents of these towns 
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began to resent having to take what they perceived to be inordinate taxing measures just 
to fund basic educational necessities while their property rich-counterparts could afford 
to offer a wide array of educational enhancements with a relatively light taxing effort. 
Facing mounting pressure to “do something” about rising property taxes, 
Governor Howard Dean shifted the issue from the policy subsystem to the commission 
arena by forming the Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Educational and 
Municipal Financing Reform in May 1992. In the commission arena, representatives 
from various stakeholder groups including legislators, education professionals, municipal 
government officials, governor’s staff members, business organization members and tax 
experts met 14 times over the course of eight months to develop and submit consensus 
“legislation for improving the cost and financing structure of education services” in 
Vermont (Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission, 1993, p.1).  
Mazzoni (1991) indicates that within the commission arena, structural innovations 
are likely to reach the discussion agenda but are unlikely to be recommended. In this 
regard, the Vermont case performed in accordance with the expectations of the arena 
model. The principle policy innovation to emerge from the Blue Ribbon Commission was 
the development of a school finance reform plan that came to be known as the Composite 
Plan. The Composite Plan, advocated by Representative Paul Cillo and tax expert Deb 
Brighton, combined a local income tax with a statewide nonresidential property tax to 
fund schools. Informants and press reports, alike, described the Composite Plan as a 
“radical” departure from the existing funding formula (Informant 06; Graff, 1992b; 
Hoffman, 1992e). As such, it faced almost no chance of becoming the consensus pick of 
such a diverse group of Commission members. Instead, the group approved a modest 
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proposal to provide property tax relief through the levying of municipal-level taxes and a 
minimum property tax on vacation homes. In the face of Dean’s consensus mandate, his 
admonitions against the use of income taxes and the Commission’s diverse set opinions 
concerning the best way to fund education in Vermont, the Blue Ribbon Commission 
produced what Mazzoni termed a “lowest-common-denominator solution” (p. 124).  
Case of Vermont in Light of Related Literature 
Researchers studying the politics of school finance observed that demand for 
property tax relief served as a major impetus for public support of school finance reform 
(Geske, 1976; Fuhrman, 1978). Nelson (1997) found that connecting property tax reform 
with school finance reform served as an effective strategy for broadening a pro-reform 
coalition. Because Vermonters vote directly on both local property tax levies and local 
school budgets at Town Meeting Day, they understood the connection between property 
taxes and school funding. Consequently, residents of property-poor school districts began 
to press for increased state aid to education.  
Governor Dean, however constrained by Vermont’s deficit, could not afford to 
appear completely indifferent to citizens’ property tax struggles. Mazzoni (1991) notes 
that “…establishing the arena for decision is a fundamental political strategy…” (p. 116). 
Policy actors with the power and resources to do so will shift an issue to a more favorable 
arena. Dean, seeking a strategy that would allow him to look sympathetic without costing 
money, shifted the issue of school finance reform to the commission arena. In charging 
the Blue Ribbon Commission to devise a “specific plan of action to get a bill through the 
legislature” (Graff, 1992a, p. 10), the Governor placed responsibility for finding a 
“solution” to Vermont’s school funding woes in the Commission’s hands.  
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Interestingly, however, Dean appeared to stack the deck against “solving” the 
problem by appointing representatives from the same stakeholder groups that had been at 
odds with one another on the issue for the past several decades. Concerning the 
Commission’s composition, one informant observed: “It was a smart group of people 
from a wide variety of organizations tasked with obtaining a unanimous vote. That means 
the policies are not going to go too far off the reservation” (Informant 15). In his research 
on study commissions, Sulzner (1971) notes that one purpose of commission formation 
can be political pacification. He discusses the “pacification effects” of study commissions 
as follows: 
Pacification effects are usually possible when a commission is established; 
its creation is likely to accommodate or appease not only the proponents of 
innovation but also the opponents of change. The proponents are pleased 
that something is being done and that an issue is being kept alive; the 
opponents are satisfied that no modifying steps will be taken without a 
preliminary investigation of the problem. (p. 446) 
 
Like Mazzoni, both Fuhrman et al. (1979) and Siegel (1976) highlight governors’ use of 
task forces and commissions to conceptualize and advance structural reform measures. 
However, the experience of Vermont reveals that governors may also use commission 
arenas as an escape valve for pent up demand for change during politically inopportune 
times such as a fiscal crisis. Thus from Sulzner’s (1971) perspective, it is possible to 
argue that the Commission delivered exactly the modest policy proposal originally 
envisioned by Dean. 
This analysis of the Blue Ribbon Commission also supports Fowler’s (1994) 
finding that commission arenas do not always function independently of the leadership 
that convened them. In the Vermont case, evidence points to the fact that Governor Dean 
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at least partially impacted Commission proceedings and outcomes through his 
nominations of friends and key allies as well as his pointed public comments.  
However, Dean’s control did not fully impede the ability of a highly motivated 
and politically skillful idea champion such as Paul Cillo to utilize the commission arena 
as a means to forward his policy proposals. Despite the incremental nature of its final 
recommendations, the Commission did serve as a useful site to publicize the Little Tax 
Group’s school finance policy proposal. Thus the value of the arena may not be so much 
in its immediate outcomes but rather in its ability to familiarize a wide variety of 
stakeholder groups with a new idea. In this way, the commission arena might be viewed 
as a locus for “softening up” the policy environment (Kingdon, 1995). School finance 
reform scholars viewed this softening up process as an essential aspect of passing reform 
legislation. Fuhrman et al. (1979) encapsulated these findings when they noted: 
… the case studies indicate vividly that reform is not likely to take place 
overnight. Reform generally follows years of prior effort and study, years 
during which policymakers, staff and citizen representatives acquire the 
necessary expertise and skills. By the time reform is achieved, it can 
usually be seen in retrospect as a logical progression from previous 
proposals and formula changes even though it may appear at the time to be 
radical in nature. (p. 81)  
 
Similarly, Berke et al. (1984) argue that policymakers require “technology, familiarity, 
and/or time to bolster confidence that a new system is feasible” (p. 64). 
The Vermont case highlights a final issue with commission arenas in that their 
slower, more consensual process can sometimes mean that they can become obscured by 
fast-paced changes in other arenas. Political momentum can, at times, render the work of 
this more deliberative arena moot. In the case of Vermont, by the time the Blue Ribbon 
Commission’s final report was completed in March 1993, attention had already shifted to 
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the House where Paul Cillo was teaming up with House Speaker Ralph Wright to 
introduce his Composite Plan as part of a larger school finance reform package in the 
legislature. To gain a sense of how quickly momentum for school finance reform 
changed, Blue Ribbon Commission Chair David Wolk’s April 1993 presentation of the 
Commission’s final recommendations was accompanied by his assessment of the House’s 
plan (Wolk, 1993). By April 1993, Paul Cillo, rebuffed in the commission arena, had 
already shifted to friendlier territory in the legislature. The Rutland Herald highlighted 
this phenomenon in an April 15, 1993 editorial: 
Before this legislative session, property tax reform had grabbed public 
attention when Gov. Howard Dean’s Blue Ribbon Commission 
recommended a plan to shift the cost of education largely to broad-based 
state taxes and a statewide tax on non-residential property. That proposal 
was soon forgotten, however, when House Speaker Ralph Wright shifted 
the debate by suggesting that the state should assume the cost of teachers’ 
salaries and benefits by negotiating a single statewide teachers’ contract. 
(“Progress on Tax Reform,” 1993, p. 16). 
 
Utility of the Commission Arena in Light of the Vermont Case and Related Literature 
The review of the Vermont case both in light of the arena model and related 
literature indicate that the commission arena’s scope of participation and policymaking 
process operated largely as expected by Mazzoni’s model. As Mazzoni supposed, the 
commission arena was comprised of representatives from a wide variety of groups 
interested in school finance and property tax matters, and included legislators, municipal 
groups, business organizations and educational associations. Although structural reform 
did reach the discussion agenda in the commission arena, it ultimately proved too 
“radical” to garner the consensual approval typically required of such groups.  
The Vermont case departs from the expectations of the arena model and the 
findings of related school finance literature with regard to the intended function of the 
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commission. While Mazzoni (1991), Fuhrman et al. (1979) and Siegel (1976) described 
the utility of commissions appointed by governors pushing for reform, the Vermont case 
reveals a commission that was appointed as a means to forestall reform. This contrast 
highlights the issue of gubernatorial intent and compels researchers to examine the 
reasons why a commission has been appointed. It also reinforces Fowler’s (1994) 
findings that question the autonomy of commission arenas. Both Fowler’s (1994) 
experiences in Ohio and the Vermont case serve to underscore the influence that 
commission “conveners” wield over a commission’s composition, goals, findings and 
recommendations. Future researchers may wish to explore whether the commission arena 
is sufficiently autonomous to warrant its status as a stand alone arena.  
Finally, the Vermont case and related literature highlight the importance of the 
type of “softening up” that can occur in commission arenas when structural reform 
reaches the discussion agenda. The Blue Ribbon Commission’s extensive review of the 
Composite Plan confirms Mazzoni’s supposition that Commission Arenas can help to 
legitimate, consolidate and expand the scope of new policies.  
Macro Arena 
Politics at the level of the macro arena provides a stark contrast to the low profile 
incremental accommodation found in the subsystem arena and the politics of persuasion 
operating in the commission arena. Here “…policymaking is much more visible, 
accessible, ideological, and contentious…” (Mazzoni, 1991, p. 117). Those issues 
debated in the macro arena are normally matters of broad societal concern (Redford, 
1969). Thus they tend to expose the basic philosophical divisions within a society. The 
contentious nature of these core social issues opens up the macro arena to a wide array of 
	  
 399 
public voices. While this widespread participation has the potential to create “a political 
momentum and a ratio of power that gives non-incremental and redistributive policy a 
real chance for enactment,” it also has the potential to create “inflexible and protracted 
issue conflict” (Mazzoni, 1991, p. 117, 130).  
Case of Vermont in Light of Model Expectations 
Mazzoni’s model supposes that powerful policy actors rely on their positional 
authority and political skills to instigate arena shifts that facilitate the implementation of 
preferred policies. In this instance, Speaker of the House Ralph Wright and Ways and 
Means Committee Vice Chair Paul Cillo utilized their substantial institutional and 
political resources to shift the issue of school finance reform into the macro arena. Their 
provocative reform plan, which included provisions for a statewide teachers contract, a 
local income tax and a statewide non-residential property tax, initiated four years of fiery 
debate between Republicans and Democrats and drew some of Vermont’s most powerful 
lobbying entities into the school finance macro arena such as the state teachers’ union, 
the Vermont League of Cities and Towns, the business lobby and the gold town/ski area 
lobby. Throughout this time period, the Republican-controlled Senate consistently 
rejected every school funding initiative that originated in the Democratically-controlled 
House. 
As predicted by Mazzoni (1991), the tone of participant interactions in the macro 
arena was contentious, highly partisan and reflected key differences in worldview. House 
Democrats generally represented the interests of property-poor school districts and sought 
to more evenly distribute tax revenue to schools throughout the state. On the other hand, 
Senate Republicans tended to represent those interests benefitting from the status quo 
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such as businesses and gold town residents. They predicated their objection to school 
finance reform on the basis that it would harm Vermont’s economy and threaten the 
state’s longstanding tradition of local control.  A lack of demonstrated leadership by 
Governor Dean left the two chambers stalemated as each effectively countered the other’s 
power in the legislative process. In Mazzoni’s (1991) terms, the result was “inflexible 
and protracted issue conflict” (p. 130).  
Case of Vermont in Light of Related Literature 
 The tumultuous policy environment of the macro arena reflects the findings of 
state education policymaking research. This research observed that as the state education 
policy arena became increasingly open to multiple competing interests throughout the 
1960s and 1970s, policymaking became more pluralistic and contentious and has 
continued to remain that way  (Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976; Geary, 1992; Mazzoni, 
1993). In the realm of the politics of school finance reform, Campbell’s (1979) 
examination of the political turbulence in New Jersey following the Robinson v. Cahill 
(1973) decision suggested that this unrest was the product of an open decisionmaking 
setting in which a number of policy actors pursued their own specific interests. Campbell 
argued that this openness constrained policymaking by creating larger amounts of 
environmental stress in the decision arena as groups vied to pass legislation that served 
their own narrow interests. 
Campbell’s assessment rings true in Vermont as multiple powerful interest groups 
entered the macro arena to advocate for their narrow policy preferences. The issue of 
school finance reform became intractable precisely because each new reform proposal 
that attempted to reduce the state’s reliance upon the local property tax to fund schools 
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also damaged the financial interests of a powerful lobbying group. For example, the 
Vermont League of Cities and Towns opposed the imposition of a statewide property tax 
on the basis that it would remove a revenue stream from municipal governments and it 
threatened local control. Gold towns and ski areas also opposed such a measure because 
it was certain to increase property taxes for residents of low-tax towns. At the same time, 
business lobbying organizations such as the Vermont Chamber of Commerce vehemently 
opposed the imposition of an income tax to pay for schools on the basis that high 
marginal income tax rates discouraged business investment. They also opposed sales tax 
increases because they believed them to be damaging to Vermont businesses located 
across the border from sales tax-free New Hampshire. As one informant noted: 
… look there are only three taxes that count: the income tax, the sales tax 
and the property tax. You’re not going to fund a state system [of education 
finance] on fishing fees. You’re not going to fund it on lottery receipts. 
They’re just too small. So you’ve got the three major taxes… (Informant 
12) 
 
The unwillingness of powerful Vermont interests to compromise on the issue of taxation 
paralyzed policymaking and produced a legislative gridlock that was not broken until the 
Supreme Court weighed in with the Brigham decision. 
 In their analysis of the politics of school finance reform in the 1990s, Carr and 
Fuhrman (1999) highlighted an emerging partisan divide on the issue. They write: 
“School finance is an increasingly partisan issue in most states as the parties take a more 
sharply defined position on the issue” (p. 168). This situation was certainly the case in 
Vermont where pro-reform interests generally aligned themselves with Democrats and 
reform opponents tended to ally themselves with Republicans. Apart from political 
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differences, the division on the issue of school finance reform along party lines may also 
be viewed as one front in Vermont’s broader struggle with rapid cultural change. 
Up until the 1960s, the Republican Party held a firm grip on Vermont politics. A 
strong Republican identity was reinforced by the notion that Republican philosophy 
meshed will with small town, rural life. However, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the 
state experienced an influx of new, more liberal residents from neighboring states such as 
New York and Massachusetts. These recent arrivals provided an infusion of liberalism 
that strengthened the state’s commitment to progressive social causes such as poverty 
alleviation, the environment and education. This social progressivism has, at times, come 
into conflict with Vermont’s tradition of small-town freedom and self-reliance. Such is 
the case with the issue of school finance reform where progressive Democrats 
emphasized reform as a matter of fairness and equity while conservative Republicans 
opposed reform fearing a loss of local autonomy. The deep-seated cultural conflict at the 
heart of the school funding debate helps to explain at least some of the political rancor 
surrounding the issue in the macro arena, particularly among those citizens who feared 
that school finance reform signaled an end to the local control of schools. It is consistent 
with research that has found that school finance reform produces a conflict between the 
goals of equity and liberty (Guthrie, Garms & Pierce, 1988).  
Utility of the Macro Arena in Light of the Vermont Case and Related Literature 
This review of the Vermont case both in light of the arena model and related 
literature reveals that Mazzoni’s model accurately described the policymaking process in 
the macro arena. Both the Vermont case and related literature support Mazzoni’s claim 
that macro arena politics is contentious and involves matters of broad societal concern. In 
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the case of school finance reform, the issue of redistributing taxes from property-wealthy 
communities to property-poor communities energizes a large number of policy 
stakeholders because it touches on two competing core social values relating to 
education: equity and liberty. Because these key values are at stake, macro arena actors 
rely on ideological appeals to generate issue constituencies. As was the case in Vermont 
and other states where the issue of school finance reform has proven contentious (i.e. 
Texas, New Jersey and California), this widespread, ideologically-based participation in 
the policymaking process led to the type of legislative gridlock predicted by the arena 
model. 
Leadership Arena 
In the leadership arena, the state’s top leaders engage in elite bargaining to 
develop and implement innovative policy proposals. These elites utilize their formidable 
stores of positional and personal resources to obtain favorable decision outcomes. 
Mazzoni contends that the leadership arena holds the greatest chance of producing 
structural policy breakthroughs thanks to the ability of elite policymakers to persuade, 
induce and intimidate issue opponents as well as manipulate legislative agendas, 
structures and procedures. 
Case of Vermont in Light of Model Expectations 
 In the highly volatile macro arena, non-incremental policy innovation is 
dependent upon the ability of policy actors to skillfully deploy their resources to build a 
winning coalition. However, in the case of Vermont, pro-reform advocates could not 
amass a coalition powerful enough to overcome the reform roadblocks established by the 
opposition. The ensuing political stalemate propelled the issue into the November 1996 
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elections. Democrats, led by Governor Dean, promised fast action on the school finance 
issue if voters returned a Democratic majority in the Senate. These efforts to bring about 
electoral change succeeded as the Democrats captured a slim 17-13 majority in the 
Senate. With the Senate victory, Democrats entered the 1997/98 legislative biennium 
controlling every elected leadership position in Vermont’s state government.  
Kingdon (1995) writes that “[i]n government, turnover has powerful effects on 
agendas” (p. 163). When voters returned a Democratic House, Senate, Governor and 
Lieutenant Governor to office for the 1997/98 legislative biennium, property tax and 
school finance reform shot to the top of the political agenda. Consequently, legislative 
leaders in both chambers paid particular attention to the appointment of members to the 
House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee because these 
committees would be responsible for crafting school finance legislation. It soon became 
evident, however, that Governor Dean’s vision for reform proved to be considerably 
more modest than that of many legislative leaders, particularly those in the House. Pro-
reform advocates such as Representatives Paul Cillo and John Freidin were frustrated by 
Governor Dean’s ability to control the legislative process and were on the verge of 
reluctantly acquiescing to Dean’s modest policy initiative requiring a scant $10 million in 
property tax sharing by property-wealthy towns when the Supreme Court delivered its 
decision in Brigham v. State. By agreeing with the House’s efforts to label Vermont’s 
school funding issue a matter of student equity as well as a matter of taxpayer equity, the 
court decision proved critical in swaying political momentum away from Governor Dean 
and his modest sharing proposal and towards the House of Representatives with its plans 
for structural changes to both school aid revenue collection and distribution. 
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As Dean’s influence diminished in the face of the court decision, the House and 
Senate embarked upon significant changes to Vermont’s existing system of school 
finance through a process of elite bargaining first within each respective legislative 
chamber and later in the Committee of Conference. This process of “elite bargaining” 
sought to “forge working alliances” among a wide variety of property-poor communities 
throughout the state (Mazzoni, 1991, p. 129). Consistent with the expectations of the 
Mazzoni model, the leadership arena with its concentration of motivated like-minded and 
well-situated reform advocates yielded policy innovation in the form of Act 60. 
Case of Vermont in Light of Related Literature 
An application of the arena model to the Vermont case again reinforces 
Mazzoni’s supposition that the establishment of a policymaking arena is a key political 
strategy. Vermont Democrats understood that the possibility of reform remained unlikely 
as long as Republicans controlled the Senate. In Mazzoni’s terms, Democrats’ efforts at 
electoral change can be viewed as an attempt to capitalize on resources such as access to 
the bully pulpit, Governor Dean’s enormous popularity with the Vermont electorate and 
the Democrats’ established reputation as reform advocates to shift the issue out of the 
politically contentious macro arena and into the leadership arena where all of the state’s 
top Democratic leaders were on the record as supporting the enactment of some form of 
school finance reform. 
Bardach (1972) observes how political leaders exploit favorable policy arenas to 
manipulate decision sites, institutional agendas and time schedules. These strategies 
proved to be essential to the Democrats’ victory on Act 60. Utilizing the positional 
authority afforded to them as a result of their majority status, Democratic bosses in the 
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leadership arena stacked committees, placed school finance reform atop the policy 
agenda and greatly accelerated the policymaking process to prevent opposition from 
galvanizing against the reform proposals under consideration. The fruitful use of these 
key strategies underscores the importance of positional authority within an arena as a 
means to manage policymaking through the control of rules, procedures and appointment 
power.  
As with the Mazzoni model, the literature on state education policymaking and 
the politics of school finance reform underscores the centrality of political leaders in 
enacting policy innovation. For example, the Fuhrman et al. (1979) review of the politics 
of school finance reform discovered that legislative leadership was a critical component 
of enacting reform. With regard to the role of legislative leaders, they remarked: “It was 
these legislators who masterminded and executed a strategy for reform resorting to all 
varieties of compromise and persuasion to convince their colleagues” (p. 83). Similarly, 
Berke et al. (1984) found that in each state where meaningful school finance reform 
occurred, political leaders such as governors or legislative committee chairs seized upon 
school finance reform as their central issue. These leaders took the time to develop policy 
proposals, form coalitions, and shepherd bills through the legislature. Reviewing school 
finance reform cases from the 1990s, Carr and Fuhrman again highlight that “…political 
leadership from the governor and key legislators is essential in passing school finance 
reform to reduce inter-district inequities” (p. 167).  
Though the actions of legislative leaders such as Paul Cillo, John Freidin in the 
House and Cheryl Rivers in the Senate closely accord with the expectations of the politics 
of school finance reform literature, Governor Dean’s relative inaction on the issue 
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appears to be an anomaly.  While not a vocal resistor of school finance reform, Dean 
could not be considered an ally either. Relying on his positional authority as governor, 
Governor Dean consistently attempted to set firm parameters for acceptable reform 
policies that focused: 1) on limiting any negative impact on the state budget; and 2) 
avoiding the use of a state income tax. These parameters promoted an incremental 
approach to school finance reform.  
Conversely, Siegel’s (1976) study of the politics of school finance reform in Ohio, 
Wisconsin, Michigan and Minnesota emphasized the role of governors in enacting reform 
legislation: 
Where state departments of education, school finance experts, or 
educational interest groups may have been promoting change for years, 
the executive office contributed the political resources to accomplish this 
end. Governors, therefore, became the major factor in translating pressures 
for change into actual pieces of legislation. (p. 232) 
 
Fuhrman et al.’s (1979) study of school finance reform policymaking in seven other 
states not studied by Siegel also revealed that the governor played a leading role in 
effecting reform in six of those states. In their case findings, they comment: “The fact 
that governors initiated and steered reform proposals through the legislature clearly 
indicates how important an education policymaking role they have assumed” (p. 83).   
Yet by all accounts, Governor Dean paid only sporadic attention to matters of 
school finance reform in Vermont and largely ceded the issue to the legislature in the 
wake of the Brigham ruling by assuming the position of defensive bystander. Dean’s 
foray into school finance reform policymaking in the early days of the 1997 legislative 
session proved that he was able to control the policymaking process. During that period, 
House leaders struggled to pass a more extensive bill but were stymied by his insistence 
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on a modest property tax sharing initiative. However, following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in the Brigham case, Dean rather inexplicably receded from the policymaking 
process and handed responsibility for negotiating with the legislature to administration 
surrogates such as Tax Commissioner Tom Pelham and Secretary of Administration 
Kathy Hoyt.  
Carr and Fuhrman’s (1999) more recent work on the politics of school finance 
research discovered that gubernatorial leadership on school funding reform is unlikely 
without the presence of at least one of three key catalysts. These catalysts include: 
outside pressure from the courts, widespread support among the population or the 
existence of a fiscal surplus. Based on these findings, one could expect Dean’s 
engagement on the issue as a result of either the court ruling or pressure for reform from 
Vermont citizens. However, despite the presence of these catalytic factors in the 
policymaking process Dean remained largely on the sidelines. One informant recollected 
that the legislature’s accomplishment of Act 60, despite the inaction of Governor Dean, 
was highly unusual in Vermont:  
This wasn’t something that I observed or could observe but it was told to 
me by a guy named Hamilton Davis who was a lifelong journalist and had 
been the House for a little while. He said, “You know, it is virtually 
unheard of for a major legislative effort to come out of the legislature and 
not out of the governor’s office.” (Informant 07) 
 
Utility of the Leadership Arena in Light of the Vermont Case and Related Literature 
Both the Vermont case and related literature reinforce the arena model’s claim 
that political elites drive policy innovation. This research supports Mazzoni’s view that 
elite political leaders possess the combination of political skill and positional authority 
needed to successfully pull the levers of legislative power. In the service of reform, these 
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powerful political leaders serve as equal parts policy persuaders, dealmakers and arm 
twisters. Without these crucial resources, politicians would be unable to amass the 
coalitions needed to enact non-incremental policy change. 
Assessment of the Arena Model as a Whole 
The literature on school finance reform reveals a process that is both conflict-
laden and highly contextual. These attributes require the use of a conceptual model that 
focuses on actor roles and relationships yet is also sensitive to the impact of institutional 
and environmental forces upon human interaction. The literature on school finance 
reform highlighted the incremental nature of policy change due to the need to build large 
statewide coalitions. However, Vermont’s Act 60 stands out as an example of non-
incremental policy change in that it sought to redistribute funds from property-rich school 
districts to property-poor school districts through the use of a statewide property tax and a 
local property tax recapture provision. The attributes of the policy issue required the use 
of a conceptual framework that could help to explain the circumstances under which non-
incremental policy innovation occurs. 
Like those conducted by Fowler (1994), Cody (1994) and Freedman and Hughes 
(1998), this analysis of state education policymaking in Vermont has found Mazzoni’s 
arena model to be generally helpful as a framework for explaining non-incremental 
policy change in a politically charged, context driven policy environment. In addition to 
substantially corroborating the policymaking processes at work in the four policymaking 
arenas, study findings also corroborate the arena model’s main assumptions. The model’s 
first assumption is that state education policymaking is situated within a broader external 
policy environment influenced by cultural norms, social values, and political traditions. 
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The Mazzoni model proved adept at demonstrating how Vermont’s highly unique socio-
cultural heritage, particularly its moralistic political culture, dedication to direct 
democracy and reliance on municipal governance, impacted the state’s school finance 
policymaking process across arenas. 
Second, the Vermont case clearly demonstrated that each arena included its own 
set of policy actors and prioritized certain resources and policymaking strategies over 
others. For example, the subsystem arena was comprised of the governor and state 
legislators involved in a process of self-interested zero-sum bargaining to allocate scarce 
resources. The commission arena was party to a broad representation of policy 
stakeholders who utilized persuasion and compromise to arrive at a modest policy 
proposal. Policymaking in the macro arena included the participation of many powerful 
lobbying groups who structured policymaking along partisan and ideological lines. 
Finally, in the leadership arena, like-minded Democratic legislative leaders engaged in a 
process of elite bargaining to agree on the parameters of Act 60.  
Third, this case study analysis underscores the premise that arena shifts do 
favorably alter policymaking process for those policy actors powerful enough to initiate 
shifts. Data from this study reveal that each arena shift advanced the interests of those 
policy actors instigating the arena shift. For example, Governor Dean shifted the school 
finding and property tax issue from the policy subsystem to the commission arena as a 
means to appear proactive on a matter of increasing importance to his constituent. 
Subsequently, Paul Cillo induced Ralph Wright to shift the school finance issue from the 
commission arena to the macro arena in an effort to garner further action on the 
Composite Plan. Finally, Democrats sought to shift policymaking from the macro arena 
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to the leadership arena to eliminate the partisan logjam that had bogged down the school 
funding issue for two consecutive legislative biennia. 
Relatedly, data from the Vermont case reinforce the critical role of idea 
champions as skillful policy actors who not only instigate arena shifts but also develop 
and advocate for policy proposals within and across arenas. In particular, case study data 
highlight the role played by Representative Paul Cillo as a key idea champion who 
pursued school finance reform by developing policy proposals, promoting initiatives and 
taking advantage of propitious events such as the Brigham decision across all four 
policymaking arenas. Daft and Becker (1978) describe an idea champion in the following 
manner: 
Some individual has to want the innovation badly enough to do the 
groundwork necessary to carry the innovation forward to adoption… His 
or her distinguishing characteristic is to connect the idea to a perceived 
need and then to manage the idea to the point of gaining acceptance. (pp. 
178-80) 
 
This description aptly fits Paul Cillo’s efforts on behalf greater fiscal equity for taxpayers 
and students in Vermont. Ultimately, his efforts were rewarded through the passage of 
Act 60.  
 The arena model’s final assumption is that an arena shift to a favorable policy 
venue can help to explain large-scale policy change. With regard to the passage of Act 60 
in Vermont, policymaking in each arena generally performed as predicted by Mazzoni’s 
model: the policy subsystem saw general inaction on the matter of state aid to education; 
the commission arena developed a proposal for incremental policy change; policymaking 
in the macro arena devolved into partisan gridlock; and, finally, initiative joined with 
influence in the leadership arena to produce non-incremental policy change in the form of 
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Act 60. The leadership arena’s ability to couple personal enterprise with positional 
authority, particularly in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Brigham ruling, greatly 
assisted in achieving this policy innovation. 
While Mazzoni’s arena model largely succeeded in serving as a framework for 
explaining non-incremental policy change in state education policymaking, its ability to 
account for the manner in which the Brigham decision changed the balance of power 
within the leadership arena proved awkward and required both a “before” and “after” 
analysis to account for how the ruling altered relevant actors, motivations, goals, 
strategies resources, interactions and outcomes within the arena. 
In this regard, the arena model as currently devised presented the Brigham 
decision as nothing more than a “propitious event,” a “favorable context,” or a “window 
of opportunity” that reoriented policymaking within the existing arena structure. 
However, informant data indicate that the presumed author of the Brigham ruling had 
served as Madeleine Kunin’s Secretary of Administration and was intimately involved 
with her attempts to enact school finance reform in the mid-1980s. Multiple study 
informants indicated that this judge’s political experience influenced both the content and 
the timing of the court’s ruling (Informants 19, 05, 06).  
Finally, Mazzoni’s arena model failed to satisfactorily explain why an entire set 
of policy actors, namely those pro-school finance reform actors allied with the American 
Civil Liberties Union, left the macro arena with their policy goals still unmet. An 
informant recollected that frustration with the policymaking process in the macro arena 
led the ACLU to seek reform through an alternate route, namely through the courts: 
[Senate Majority Leader] Sara Gear withdrew her approval of what she 
had agreed to and what she had actually introduced as a sponsor and that’s 
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when – now we had already started working on it – we said, “That’s it. 
Forget everything, we’re going to sue.” (Informant 19) 
 
Hirschman (1970) observes that “exiting” the political process is a strategy used by actors 
to express their dissatisfaction with the status quo. Using Hirschman’s concept of exit, 
this group of pro-reform advocates can be thought of as exiting the macro arena in hopes 
of finding a more receptive policy venue in the “judicial arena.” 
These shortcomings with regard to the arena model’s explanatory power point to 
the conclusion that the model may benefit from the inclusion of a “judicial arena” that 
could help to explain the relationship between the courts and other policy arenas in 
matters of state education policymaking. Indeed, Mazzoni, himself, acknowledged that 
work remained to be done in terms of further refinements to his model. Specifically, he 
noted that other possible arenas, including education agencies, interest group coalitions 
and state courts, required “empirical investigation and comparative analysis for their 
innovative potential,” (p. 132).  
Suggestions for Future Research: Refining Mazzoni’s Arena Model 
The preceding sections have highlighted a variety of areas where future inquiry 
may be warranted to strengthen the general utility of the arena model in terms of its 
ability to describe policy innovation in state education policymaking. However, this 
section focuses on one critical innovation that may help to improve the utility of the 
model when examining cases involving court-mandated reform. This section will briefly 
sketch the policymaking process within the judicial arena for use by future researchers 
wishing to explore the interaction between the court system and the political system in 
education issues involving judicial intervention. The inclusion of the judicial arena is 
based not only upon Mazzoni’s suggestion that other arenas be investigated for their 
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innovative potential but also upon the presence of a body of theoretical and empirical 
literature that cites the role of courts as relevant political actors in matters of school 
finance reform (Carr & Fuhrman, 1999; Nelson, 1997; Dayton & Dupre, 2007). As 
arbiters of law and interpreters of the constitution, the courts have served as a catalyst for 
reform among state legislatures on a variety of issues. According to Nelson (1997), 
“[c]ourt mandates can have powerful agenda effects, forcing an issue to the decision 
point when it might more conveniently be ignored by the political system” (p. 54). 
Mazzoni’s revised arena model assumes that each arena’s decisionmaking processes, 
scope of participation, and relative visibility work together to shape policy outcomes. 
These characteristics serve as a useful device for organizing this discussion of the state 
court system as a policy arena. 
Scope of Participation 
A particularly unique feature of the judicial arena is that any individual has the 
right to file a case and have it considered before the court. As Chayes (1976) notes: 
“Unlike an administrative bureaucracy or legislature, which can delay action indefinitely, 
the judiciary must respond to the complaints of the aggrieved” (in Elmore & McLaughlin, 
1982, p. 20). Given that the particular organizational structure of the judicial system 
allows for all plaintiffs to “have their day in court,” groups lacking political clout in 
traditional policy arenas have found the courts to be sympathetic to expressions of 
discontent with regard to the legislative status quo and useful for compelling action 






As a political arena, the judiciary possesses its own rules, regulations, and 
operating procedures (Glick, 2004). Reform advocates maintain that the judiciary’s 
reliance on legal principle and constitutional interpretation and their relative isolation 
from the rough and tumble world of legislative politics have made it more receptive to 
the claims of traditionally underrepresented groups (Elmore & McLaughlin, 1982; Carr & 
Fuhrman, 1999). Regarding this view, Nelson (1997) comments: “Insulated from political 
accountability, [judges] are able to make unpopular decisions which would amount to 
institutional suicide for legislators” (p. 10). This notion of complete insularity may be 
challenged in instances where judges are elected to their positions (Glick, 2004). 
However, judges’ perceived impartiality and reliance on precedent to decide cases makes 
them generally more receptive to the claims of underprivileged populations than their 
counterparts in the political sphere.  
 The ability of judges to impact policy is derived from the positional authority 
granted to them as agents of the court. In the U.S. system of government the judicial 
branch has been granted the right of judicial review of laws enacted in the legislative 
branch. Importantly, because “[s]tandards of judicial decisionmaking are extremely 
fluid,” they are “sensitive to differences in decisionmaking styles among judges within 
and between jurisdiction” (Elmore & McLaughlin, 1982, p. 38). Therefore, legal rulings 
can differ substantially from court to court depending on a judge’s ideological 
orientation. Regardless of their ideological bent, judicial decisions are binding and 
compel actions on the part of others. However, because their power to legislate is 
indirect, judges have been termed “shadow players” in coalition politics (Elmore & 
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McLaughlin, 1982) and various critics of judicial intervention have questioned the 
ultimate capacity of the courts to effect political and social change (Rosenberg, 1991).  
Visibility 
Although their impact on policymaking can be highly consequential, the general 
public rarely recognizes the courts as major players in state politics (Glick, 2004). This 
perception is not surprising given the judiciary’s low profile in the media and citizens’ 
lack of direct contact with the court system on a day-to-day basis. However, the 
judiciary’s profile rises substantially among particular interest groups who understand the 
power of judicial intervention. These groups are not only more likely to use the courts to 
further their political goals, they are also more likely to attempt to influence the 
composition of the courts to better fit their belief systems (Glick, 2004).  
Policy Outcomes 
 In terms of policy outcomes, the broad interpretive powers granted judges coupled 
with their relative isolation from public scrutiny, create an environment that is potentially 
ripe for non-incremental policy change. Under these circumstances, a number of judges 
have been willing to interpret laws and constitutions in novel ways that mandate 
wholesale policy changes. The judiciary’s “power to set agendas, frame issues, and 
mobilize interests” is another important influence on policy outcomes (Nelson, 1997, p. 
54). While the courts must ultimately rely on the legislative system to carry out their 
mandates, judges are in a “…strategic position in policy conflict to assure that decisions 
are emphatically enforced” (Wirt & Kirst, 1989, p. 272). Indeed, Nelson’s (1997) 
research on the impact of court rulings upon fiscal equity found pro-plaintiff verdicts to 
be a “dynamic force for policy change” (p. 142). A potential definition of a judicial arena 
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derived from this brief description might read as follows: A policy arena in which 
plaintiffs seek legally binding mandates for change. In this arena, decisions turn on 
litigants’ use of evidence and legal principle as well as judicial interpretations of 
constitutional and statutory law.  
In the U.S., courts have played an important role in state education policymaking 
across several issues, including desegregation, special education and school finance 
reform. For this reason, the addition of a judicial arena to Mazzoni’s arena model may 
help to enhance its explanatory power in those areas where court mandates have shaped 
policy outcomes such as Vermont’s Act 60. Appendix H provides a diagram of 
Mazzoni’s arena model reconfigured to include a judicial arena. While it is not intended 
to supplant Mazzoni’s more extensive portrait of the policymaking process (see 
Appendix A), it is designed to demonstrate how the inclusion of a judicial arena reorients 
pressure for change and compels political elites to shift the issue to a policy arena for 
further action.  
Suggestions for Future Research: Beyond Mazzoni’s Arena Model 
This research study explored Mazzoni’s arena model for its potential to explain 
non-incremental state education policymaking involving school finance reform. This 
evaluation approach is consistent with that of policy analysts such as Allison (1971) and 
Shapiro (2004) who seek to develop and refine mid-range theory on policymaking 
through empirical research. According to Shapiro (2004), this process involves: 
“…exhibiting [a theory’s] presuppositions, assessing their plausibility, and proposing 
alternatives when they are found wanting” (pp. 37-38). 
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However, this approach is just one of several that might be used to further 
knowledge with regard to state education policymaking for school finance. Other 
possibilities include exploring the issue of non-incremental school finance reform 
utilizing additional conceptual frameworks that analyze policy innovation such as 
Kingdon’s (1995) policy streams model or Baumgartner and Jones’ (2009) punctuated 
equilibrium model. Findings derived from such studies could add to our existing 
knowledge of how some states innovate following court-mandates while others do not 
and could help to build a broader theoretical understanding of policy innovation. This 
future research also offers the potential to generate analytic conclusions concerning the 
relative strength of various models or lead to the development of a hybrid model for 
analyzing state education policymaking for school finance. 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter evaluated the ability of Mazzoni’s arena model to account for the 
policymaking process that led to the passage of Vermont’s Act 60. In doing so, it 
validated and strengthened an established analytic framework for examining state 
education policymaking by extending its application to the issue of school finance 
reform. It also affirmed, enhanced and updated the existing body of literature relating to 
the politics of school finance reform and provided suggestions for future research on the 
topic. Through this process, the study’s findings enhanced the theoretical understanding 
of the political process that undergirds one of state government’s most important 

















Informed Consent Form 
Project Title The Politics of School Finance Reform: 
 A Case Study Analysis of Vermont’s Act 60 
 
Why is this research 
being done? 
This is a research project being conducted by Dr. Betty Malen and 
Kimberly Curtis at the University of Maryland, College Park.  We are 
inviting you to participate in this research project because you have 
specific knowledge relating to the passage of Vermont’s Equal Education 
Opportunity law, commonly referred to as Act 60. 
 
This research, grounded in political theory, has two major purposes: 1) to 
explain a case of redistributive policy innovation within the realm of school 
finance reform; and 2) to test the utility of Mazzoni’s (1991) arena model for 
explaining state-level school finance policymaking. These goals will be 
accomplished through an examination of the Vermont state legislature’s 
policymaking process in response to the Vermont Supreme Court ruling 
declaring the state’s system of school finance unconstitutional. 
 
What will I be 




You will be asked to respond to either an open-ended or semi-structured 
interview protocol, depending on your knowledge of and participation in 
the development of Act 60.  You will be asked a series of questions such 
as the following:  Who were the central participants in the design and 
passage of Act 60? How did these individuals or groups influence the 
decision making process? Interviews are expected to last one to two 
hours. You may decline to answer any questions that you do not feel 
comfortable answering. All interviews will be audio-recorded for the 
purposes of transcription unless you do not agree to this procedure. 

























Project Title The Politics of School Finance Reform:  





We will do our best to keep your personal information confidential.  To 
help protect your confidentiality, we will utilize the following 
procedures: 
 
With your permission, interviews will be tape recorded. In addition, 
researcher notes will be taken while the interview is being conducted. 
These notes will serve as the basis for an interview debriefing memo and 
as an emergency backup in the event that the tape recorder 
malfunctions. You will have the option of turning off the tape recorder at 
any point during the interview session. Interview tapes will be reviewed 
in conjunction with field notes as soon after the interview as possible. 
Pertinent sections will be noted and transcribed as is deemed necessary. 
If needed, you will be contacted immediately thereafter to clarify 
questions or points of uncertainty. 
 
Paper documents will be stored under lock and key in traditional filing 
cabinets. Interview tapes will be copied and kept in a separate location 
to serve as emergency backups. Any files, be they paper or electronic, 
will be kept in a secure location to ensure confidentiality. In addition, 
tapes, data files, and research reports will be labeled using a coding 
system that ensures your confidentiality to the maximum extent possible. 
Only the researcher will maintain and have access to the study database 
and code identification key. Please note that your information may be 
shared with representatives of the University of Maryland, College Park 
or governmental authorities if you or someone else is in danger or if we 
are required to do so by law. 
 
 
Please initial the following:  
 
__   I agree to be audiotaped during my participation in this 
study. 






What are the risks of 
this research? 
 
Potential risks from participating in this study include an invasion of 
privacy if your identity is revealed.  Therefore, your identification will 
be held in strict confidentiality and you can reserve the right to 
withdraw from this study at any point the research study.  You maintain 
the right to review transcripts, notes, and responses pertaining to your 
interview. You have the right to delete any portion of your interview 
responses as you see fit. 
	  
 422 
      
 
Project Title The Politics of School Finance Reform:  
A Case Study Analysis of Vermont’s Act 60 
What are the 
benefits of this 
research?  
This research is not designed to help you personally, but the results may 
help the investigator learn more about the process of state education 
policymaking with regard to the issue of school finance reform.  
 
Do I have to be in 
this research? 
May I stop 
participating at any 
time?   
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  You may 
choose not to take part at all.  If you decide to participate in this 
research, you may stop participating at any time.  If you decide not to 
participate in this study or if you stop participating at any time, you will 
not be penalized or lose any benefits to which you otherwise qualify.  
 





This research is being conducted by Dr. Betty Malen (dissertation 
advisor) in the Department of Education Policy Studies at the University 
of Maryland, College Park.  
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research subject or wish to 
report a research-related injury, please contact: Institutional Review 
Board Office, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 
20742;             
(e-mail) irb@deans.umd.edu;  (telephone) 301-405-0678  
This research has been reviewed according to the University of 
Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving human 
subjects. 




Your signature indicates that: 
1) You are at least 18 years of age;  
2) The research has been explained to you; 
3) Your questions have been fully answered; and  
4) You freely and voluntarily choose to participate in this research 
project. 
Signature and Date 
 
NAME OF SUBJECT 
 
 






Description of the Case Study  




PURPOSE: This research has two major purposes: 1) to explain a case of redistributive 
policy innovation within the realm of school finance reform; and 2) to test the utility of 
Mazzoni’s (1991) arena model for explaining state-level school finance policymaking. 
These goals will be accomplished through an examination of the Vermont State 
Legislature’s policymaking process in response to the Vermont Supreme Court ruling 
declaring the state’s system of school finance unconstitutional. 
 
APPROACH: The research will employ a qualitative case method. Data collection will 
draw from an informant interview process supported by document review. Data will be 
systematically analyzed against Mazzoni’s (1991) conceptual framework, presented in 
case narrative, discussed in light of related literature, and assessed in terms of their 
relevance to theory. 
 
EXAMINER: This study is being conducted by Kimberly Curtis, a doctoral student in 
education policy at the University of Maryland, College Park under the supervision of Dr. 
Betty Malen, Professor, Department of Education Policy Studies, College of Education, 
University of Maryland, College Park. 
 
REPORT: The study will be reported as a doctoral dissertation that will be available 






Vermont School Finance Reform Chronology 
 
Sources: Vermont Legislative Bill Tracking System; The Rutland Herald;  
The Burlington Free Press 
 
• January 1994 – The Vermont legislature’s first attempt at large scale school 
finance reform in seven years. The Democrat-controlled House of Representatives 
passes a measure, H.541, replacing local property taxes with local income taxes 
and a statewide tax on nonresidential property. Gov. Howard Dean opposes the 
House’s local income tax provision. 
 
• May 1994 – The Republican-controlled Senate passes a bill in favor of a regional 
property tax.  
 
• June 1994 – The Senate version of the bill is approved by the conference 
committee and the Senate. However, it is ultimately rejected by the House by an 
overwhelming 113-13 margin. 
 
• March 1995 – The Vermont chapter of the ACLU files Brigham v. State of 
Vermont, a suit against the state on behalf of students and taxpayers in property-
poor school districts charging inequitable access to educational resources due to 
the state’s over-reliance on local property taxes as a means to fund education. 
 
• Spring 1995 – The House returns with new bill, H.351, they hope is more 
attractive to Senate Republicans and Gov. Dean which includes a power 
equalizing measure guaranteeing equal revenue yield for equal tax effort. Specific 
provisions include: increased state aid to education along with a measure 
compelling the state’s 50 most property-rich towns to share revenue with resource 
poor-districts through a guaranteed yield system. The Senate doesn’t vote on the 
measure but Republican Lt. Gov. Barbara Snelling establishes a summer study 
group on the issue. 
 
• April 1996 – The Senate responds to the House’s 1995 property tax reform 
proposal with a uniform homestead deduction and education spending caps on 
105 towns spending above the “basic” level. The conference committee cannot 
reconcile the two measures and the bill dies in conference. 
 
• July 1996 – Lawyers for the State of Vermont file a motion in Lamoille County 
Superior Court seeking summary judgment in the Brigham v. State case. 
 
• October 1996 – A Vermont Superior Court judge issues a partial summary 
judgment in favor of the defense in the Brigham v. State case. However, he 
chooses not to rule on the portion of the lawsuit regarding whether or not 
taxpayers in property-poor districts were subject to an undue burden because they 
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spent a disproportionately higher percentage of their income on local schools. 
Both sides agree to have this issue taken up by the Vermont Supreme Court. 
 
• November 1996 – Legislative elections are perceived as a mandate on school 
finance reform. Groups such as VOTE (Vermonters Organized for Tax Equity) 
target vulnerable Republican candidates and highlight the issue of property tax 
reform. Control of the Senate is ceded to the Democrats. Douglas Racine is 
elected Lt. Governor, largely on his commitment to the issue of property tax 
reform. 
 
• January 1997 – Gov. Dean unveils his own school finance reform proposal 
developed in consultation with key members of the House and Senate, including 
House Majority Leader Paul Cillo, Speaker of the House Michael Obuchowski, 
and Senate Pro Tem Peter Shumlin. This plan would generate revenue by raising 
the property tax of high property wealth towns, expanding the sales tax, and 
increasing the gas tax by seven cents. Property owners with a household income 
of $80,000 or less would pay no more than three percent of their income in 
property taxes. 
 
• February 1997 – The Vermont Supreme Court issues a unanimous decision 
declaring that the “…current system for funding public education in Vermont, 
with its substantial dependence on local property taxes and resultant wide 
disparities in revenues available to local districts, deprives children of an equal 
opportunity in violation of the Vermont constitution” (Brigham, 1997, p. 4).  
 
• March 1997 – The House acts quickly to pass a bill similar to their 1994 bill. 
H.527, dubbed the Equal Education Opportunity Act, offers a two-tiered 
statewide property tax, a local income tax, a one-percent sales tax increase, and a 
three-cent gas tax. Money would be disbursed through a $3,800 per-pupil block 
grant. The bill was approved over the objections of many citizens, business 
groups, the Senate leadership and Gov. Dean. 
  
• March 1997—Lt. Gov. Doug Racine offers his own school finance reform 
proposal consisting of an income-sensitive statewide property tax.  
 
• April 1997 – The Senate responds with a bipartisan measure that is conceptually 
similar to the Racine plan. It includes a uniform statewide property tax coupled 
with a second-tier guaranteed yield local property tax, with additional taxes on 
sales, gasoline and rooms. Money through participation the Powerball lottery is 
also dedicated to funding school finance reform. In terms of income sensitivity, it 
establishes a property tax rebate for residents making $60,000 or less. School 
funding would be disbursed through a $5,000 per-pupil block grant. Gov. Dean 





• April 1997 – Just 12 hours after the Senate bill passed, a legislative conference 
committee begins the work of reconciling the House and Senate bills. It emerges 
with a plan similar to that conceived in the Senate. Both the House and Senate 
subsequently approve the committee bill. The final measure includes a uniform 
statewide property tax of $1.10 per $100 of assessed property value, expanded 
sales taxes, and increased gas and rooms and meals taxes. Vermonters with 
household incomes of $75,000 or less would not be required to pay more than two 
percent of their income on the first two acres of property. Funds would be 
disbursed through a $5,000 per-pupil block grant. School districts wishing to raise 
additional funds could do so through a second-tier local property tax. 
 






Informal Interview Guide 
 
 
Informant Code:      Interview Date: 
Stand:        Interview Time: 
Position/Affiliation: 
 
Researcher to the Informant 
 
Thank you for agreeing to be a part of this study and taking time to discuss the 
development and adoption of Vermont’s landmark school finance reform measure, Act 
60. As you know from reading both the study description and my preliminary chronology 
of the bill, the purpose of this research is to understand the process that led to the passage 
of Act 60 in the Vermont state legislature. These questions serve merely as an orienting 
device for our conversation. Please feel free to add or correct information at any time if 











1) What do you recall from the 1993/94 biennium with regard to the issue of 
school finance reform? 
 
2) What do you recall with regard to H.541? 
 
3) What groups or people were in favor of H.541? 
 
4) Was anyone from the Governor’s office involved in the issue? 
 
5) Which individuals/groups expressed opposition to the various school finance 
plans? 
 
6) Why did they oppose these plans? What background factors were particularly 
important? 
 





8) In the Senate, support coalesced around the idea of a regional property tax to 
help even out differences in local property wealth. In your opinion, which 
individuals/groups were most responsible for the Senate decision? 
 
9) The house and senate bills were brought to conference in the spring of 1994 
but could not be reconciled. In your judgment, why do you think this was the 
case?  
 
10) To the best of your knowledge, do you remember any other intersession 





1) As you think back on the 1995/96 biennium was school finance reform seen as a 
high priority item in the session? 
 
2) I understand from newspaper reports that Governor Dean waded into the school 
finance reform issue by crafting his “tax fairness plan,” which would become H. 
74. Why? How was it received by school finance reform supporters/detractors? 
 
3) During the 1995/96 biennium no fewer than nine House bills (H.18, H.74, H.93, 
H.115, H.166, H.309, H.321, H.351, H.641) and three Senate bills (S.320, S.322 
and the Senate response to H.351) were introduced in the legislature. While 
legislators officially introduced the policy change, as you think back, were there 
other individuals or groups involved in the initiation of these measures? 
 
4) Was anyone from the Governor’s office involved in the initiation of the school 
finance reform legislation for this biennium? 
 
5) Where there (other) legislative staff, executive staff or interest group 
representatives involved in the initiation of these bills?? 
 
6) Why did these individuals/groups support school finance reform? What 
background factors were particularly important? 
 
7) Which individuals/groups expressed opposition to the various school finance 
plans? Why did they oppose these plans? What background factors were 
particularly important? 
 
8) As you look back, were other individuals or groups important participants? 
 
9) In the House of Representatives, how did support coalesce around H. 351 and its 




10) The House passed the school finance reform bill 89 to 54. In your judgment, 
which individual/group was most responsible for the House decision? 
 
11) In the Senate, support again coalesced around the idea of regional property tax 
sharing. In your opinion, why did this happen?  
 
12) The Senate passed the school finance reform bill 17 to 10. In your judgment, 
which individual/group was most responsible for the Senate decision? 
 
13) The house and senate bills were brought to conference in the spring of 1996 but 
could not be reconciled. In your judgment, why do you think this was the case?  
 
14) The Brigham v. Vermont case was filed during this biennium. In your opinion, 
did this litigation have any impact on the legislature’s actions? Governor Dean’s 
actions? 
 
15) Can you discuss the events of the fall 1996 elections that led to the creation of a 
Democratic majority in the Senate? Why did the Democrats win the majority? 




1) During the 1997/98 biennium no fewer than eight House bills (H.83, H.133, 
H.135, H.232, H.256, H.286, H. 514, H.527) and one Senate bill (the Senate 
response to H.527) were introduced in the legislature. While legislators officially 
introduced the policy change, as you think back, were there other individuals or 
groups involved in the initiation of these measures? 
 
2) Was anyone from the Governor’s office involved in the initiation of the school 
finance reform legislation for this biennium? 
 
3) Where there (other) legislative staff, executive staff or interest group 
representatives involved in the initiation of these bills? 
 
4) What groups/individuals did the school finance reform legislation authors speak 
for, whom did they represent? 
 
5) Why did these individuals/groups support school finance reform? What 
background factors were particularly important? 
 
6) Which individuals/groups expressed opposition to the various school finance 
plans? 
 





8) Whom did the opponents speak for, whom did they represent? 
 
9) As you look back, were other individuals or groups important participants? 
 
10) In the House of Representatives, how did support coalesce around H. 527 and its 
plan for a local income tax coupled with a nonresidential state property tax to 
fund schools?  
 
11) The House passed the school finance reform bill 81-62. How did that decision get 
made?  
 
12) In your judgment, which individuals/groups were most responsible for the House 
decision? 
 
13) In the Senate, support coalesced around the idea of an income-sensitive statewide 
property tax coupled with a guaranteed-yield second tier local property tax.  
 
14) The Senate passed the school finance reform bill 21 to 9. How did that decision 
get made?  
 
15) In your judgment, which individuals/groups were most responsible for the Senate 
decision? 
 
16) The house and senate bills were brought to conference in June of 1997 and were 
reconciled largely in favor of the Senate bill. In your judgment, why do you think 
the senate provisions prevailed? In your opinion, what factors allowed the House 
and Senate to reconcile a school finance bill in the wake of multiple past failures? 
 
17) As you know, the Brigham v. Vermont ruling was issued shortly after the 1997 
legislative session got underway. As you think back on the 1997/98 biennium 
how did the Vermont Supreme Court’s ruling in the Brigham case impact 
legislative outcomes?  
 
 




In-Depth Interview Guide 
 
 
Informant Code:      Interview Date: 
Stand:        Interview Time: 
Position/Affiliation: 
 
Researcher to the Informant 
 
Thank you for agreeing to be a part of this study and taking time to discuss the 
development and adoption of Vermont’s landmark school finance reform measure, Act 
60. As you know from reading both the study description and my preliminary chronology 
of the bill, the purpose of this research is to understand the process that led to the passage 
of Act 60 in the Vermont state legislature. These questions serve merely as an orienting 
device for our conversation. Please feel free to add or correct information at any time if 






1) During the 1991/92 biennium, two school finance reform bills were introduced in 
the House – H. 55649 (1991) and H. 90750 (1992). These were the first school 
reform bills since Governor Kunin signed a new school finance formula into law 
in 1987.  
1a.Why did school finance reform rise on the political agenda during this 
biennium? What background factors were particularly important?  
 
1b.What individuals or groups were most responsible for getting this issue 
on the political agenda? How did these individuals go about influencing 
and shaping the nature of the debate? 
 
2) While the legislators officially introduced these bills, were there any other 
individuals or groups involved in the initiation of these measures? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 H.556 proposed to establish a minimum education property tax. Revenue raised which 
exceeded local school needs would be paid to the treasurer. Seventy percent of this 
revenue would be dedicated to state education aid and 30 percent would be dedicated to 
property tax rebates. 
50 H.907 advocated a uniform statewide property tax to raise one-half of the foundation 
cost provided by the state. A second tier local surtax option was also included in the bill. 
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3) Was anyone from either Governor Snelling51 or Governor Dean’s office involved 
in the initiation of the school finance reform legislation for this biennium? 
 
If yes: 3a. Who? 
 3b. What did he/she/they do? 
 3c. What role did he/she/they play? 
 
4) Where there (other) legislative staff, executive staff or interest group 
representatives involved in the initiation of these bills? 
If yes: 4a. Who? 
 4b. What did he/she/they do? 
 4c. What role did he/she/they play? 
 
5) What groups/individuals did the school finance reform legislation authors speak 
for, whom did they represent? 
 
6) Why did these individuals/groups support school finance reform? What 
background factors were particularly important? 
 
7) What individuals/groups expressed opposition to the school finance plans? 
 
8) Why did they oppose these plans? What background factors were particularly 
important? 
 
9) Whom did the opponents speak for, whom did they represent? 
 
10) As you look back, were other individuals or groups important participants? 
 
If yes: 10a. Which ones? 
 10b. What positions did he/she/they take? 
 10c. Why? 
 
11) Both bills were referred to the Ways and Means committee but were never taken 
up for a further vote. In you opinion, why was this the case?  
 
12) I noticed that the school finance reform measures advocated in H. 907 are similar 
to those implemented five years later in Act 60. Can you discuss the origins of 
state property tax as an alternative to the historical use of local property tax for 
funding schools in Vermont?  
  
13) I understand that Governor Dean appointed a Blue Ribbon Commission on 
Municipal and Education Finance that met through the summer of 1992 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Governor Snelling died in the summer of 1991 between the first and second sessions of 
the biennium.  
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published a report in September of 1992. Do you recall this report? If so, do you 
remember if it contributed to the dialogue on school finance reform? 
 
14) To the best of your knowledge, do you remember any other intersession activity 




11) During the 1993/94 biennium no fewer than three House bills (H.5552, H.17653 
and H.54154) and one Senate bill (S.25555) were introduced in the legislature. 
While legislators officially introduced the policy change, as you think back, were 
there other individuals or groups involved in the initiation of these measures? 
 
12) Was anyone from the Governor’s office involved in the initiation of the school 
finance reform legislation for this biennium? 
 
If yes: 2a. Who? 
 2b. What did he/she/they do? 
 2c. What role did he/she/they play? 
 
13) Where there (other) legislative staff, executive staff or interest group 
representatives involved in the initiation of these bills? 
If yes: 3a. Who? 
 3b. What did he/she/they do? 
 3c. What role did he/she/they play? 
 
14) What groups/individuals did the school finance reform legislation authors speak 
for, whom did they represent? 
 
15) Why did these individuals/groups support school finance reform? What 
background factors were particularly important? 
 
16) Which individuals/groups expressed opposition to the various school finance 
plans? 
 
17) Why did they oppose these plans? What background factors were particularly 
important? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 H.55 introduced by Rep. Baker sought to use a local income tax in lieu of local 
property tax to fund school districts. 
53 H. 176 introduced by Rep. Waite sought to create a Municipal Education Trust Fund 
that would use a statewide property tax to fund two-thirds of the state foundation costs. 
54 H.541 introduced by the Committee on Education combined a statewide property tax 
on nonresidential property with a local income tax to fund a guaranteed yield formula.  
55 S.255 proposed to collect and distribute education funds up to the foundation level up 




18) Whom did the opponents speak for, whom did they represent? 
 
19) As you look back, were other individuals or groups important participants? 
 
If yes: 9a. Which ones? 
 9b. What positions did he/she/they take? 
 9c. Why? 
 
20) In the House of Representatives, neither H. 55 nor H. 176 left their assigned 
committee. How did support coalesce around H. 541 and the idea of a statewide 
property tax on nonresidential property and vacation homes coupled with a local 
income tax? Were there any major trades, compromises, bargains needed to get 
this bill up and out of the Ways and Means and Appropriations committee? 
 
21) Which participants were particularly effective in shepherding the legislation? 
Why were they effective? 
 
22) When the school finance reform bill came up for formal consideration in the 
House, what issues were seen as most important? 
 
23) What did participants do to win support and neutralize opposition? 
 
24) The House passed the school finance reform bill 83 to 62. How did that decision 
get made? Who persuaded (bargained, directed) whom and how did they do it? 
 
25) Were there any major compromises, trades, deals needed to win the floor vote? 
 
If yes: 15a. What were the? 
 15b. Which participants were most involved? 
 15c. How did the compromises get made? 
 
 
26) In your judgment, which individuals/groups were most responsible for the House 
decision? 
 
27) In the Senate, support coalesced around the idea of a regional property tax to help 
even out differences in local property wealth. In your opinion, why did this 
happen? Were there any major trades, compromises, or bargains needed to get this 
bill out of committee? 
 
28) Which participants were particularly effective in shepherding the legislation? 
Why were they effective? 
 
29) When the school finance reform bill came up for formal consideration in the 




30) What did participants do to win support and neutralize opposition? 
 
31) The Senate passed the school finance reform bill 20 to 10. How did that decision 
get made? Who persuaded (bargained, directed) whom and how did they do it? 
 
32) Were there any major compromises, trades, deals needed to win the floor vote? 
 
If yes: 22a. What were they? 
 22b. Which participants were most involved? 
 22c. How did the compromises get made? 
 
33) In your judgment, which individual/group was most responsible for the Senate 
decision? 
 
34) As you think back on the 1993/94 biennium was school finance reform seen as a 
high priority item in the session? 
 
35) The house and senate bills were brought to conference in the spring of 1994 but 
could not be reconciled. In your judgment, why do you think this was the case? 
Did the legislature face any negative political repercussions in the 1994 election 
as a result of its inability to reach agreement on school finance reform 
legislation?56  
 
If yes: 25a. Who? 
   25b. What happened? 
 
36) Newspaper reports characterize John Bloomer, President of the Senate, as using 
obstructionist tactics to prevent a successful conference committee. What was 
your take on the situation? 
 
37)  I understand from newspaper reports that Governor Dean waded into the school 
finance reform issue by crafting his “tax fairness plan,” which would become H. 
74. Why? How was it received by school finance reform supporters/detractors?  
 
38) Doug Racine and Barbara Snelling also debated the issue during their lieutenant 
governor’s race. Was there any impact on the outcome of the race? On future 
policy plans? 
 
39) To the best of your knowledge, do you remember any other intersession activity 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





16) During the 1995/96 biennium no fewer than nine House bills (H.18, H.74, H.93, 
H.115, H.166, H.309, H.321, H.351, H.641) and three Senate bills (S.320, S.322 
and the Senate response to H.351) were introduced in the legislature. While 
legislators officially introduced the policy change, as you think back, were there 
other individuals or groups involved in the initiation of these measures? 
 
17) Was anyone from the Governor’s office involved in the initiation of the school 
finance reform legislation for this biennium? 
 
If yes: 2a. Who? 
 2b. What did he/she/they do? 
 2c. What role did he/she/they play? 
 
18) Where there (other) legislative staff, executive staff or interest group 
representatives involved in the initiation of these bills? 
If yes: 3a. Who? 
 3b. What did he/she/they do? 
 3c. What role did he/she/they play? 
 
19) What groups/individuals did the school finance reform legislation authors speak 
for, whom did they represent? 
 
20) Why did these individuals/groups support school finance reform? What 
background factors were particularly important? 
 
21) Which individuals/groups expressed opposition to the various school finance 
plans? 
 
22) Why did they oppose these plans? What background factors were particularly 
important? 
 
23) Whom did the opponents speak for, whom did they represent? 
 
24) As you look back, were other individuals or groups important participants? 
 
If yes: 9a. Which ones? 
 9b. What positions did he/she/they take? 
 9c. Why? 
 
25) In the House of Representatives, how did support coalesce around H. 351 and its 
idea of equalized yield with a homestead exemption? Were there any major 





26) Which participants were particularly effective in shepherding the legislation? 
Why were they effective? 
 
27) When the school finance reform bill came up for formal consideration in the 
House, what issues were seen as most important? 
 
28) What did participants do to win support and neutralize opposition? 
 
29) The House passed the school finance reform bill 89 to 54. How did that decision 
get made? Who persuaded (bargained, directed) whom and how did they do it? 
 
30) Were there any major compromises, trades, deals needed to win the floor vote? 
 
If yes: 15a. What were the? 
 15b. Which participants were most involved? 
 15c. How did the compromises get made? 
 
 
31) In your judgment, which individual/group was most responsible for the House 
decision? 
 
32) In the Senate, support again coalesced around the idea of regional property tax 
sharing. In your opinion, why did this happen? Were there any major trades, 
compromises, or bargains needed to get this bill out of committee? 
 
33) Which participants were particularly effective in shepherding the legislation? 
Why were they effective? 
 
34) When the school finance reform bill came up for formal consideration in the 
Senate, what issues were seen as most important? 
 
35) What did participants do to win support and neutralize opposition? 
 
36) The Senate passed the school finance reform bill 17 to 10. How did that decision 
get made? Who persuaded (bargained, directed) whom and how did they do it? 
 
37) Were there any major compromises, trades, deals needed to win the floor vote? 
 
If yes: 22a. What were the? 
 22b. Which participants were most involved? 
 22c. How did the compromises get made? 
 





39) As you think back on the 1995/96 biennium was school finance reform seen as a 
high priority item in the session? 
 
40) The house and senate bills were brought to conference in the spring of 1996 but 
could not be reconciled. In your judgment, why do you think this was the case? 
Was there any impact for the legislature due to the fact that it could not reach an 
agreement on school finance reform legislation?  
 
41) The Brigham v. Vermont case was filed during this biennium. In your opinion, 
did this litigation have any impact on the legislature’s actions? Governor Dean’s 
actions? 
 
42) Some legislators who were high-profile leaders of the school finance reform 
movement took legislative leadership57 roles at the beginning of the 1995 session. 
What impact did this leadership transition have on the issue of school finance 
reform?  
 
43) Can you discuss the events of the fall 1996 elections that led to the creation of a 
Democratic majority in the Senate? Why did the Democrats win the majority? 




18) During the 1997/98 biennium no fewer than eight House bills (H.83, H.133, 
H.135, H.232, H.256, H.286, H. 514, H.527) and one Senate bill (the Senate 
response to H.527) were introduced in the legislature. While legislators officially 
introduced the policy change, as you think back, were there other individuals or 
groups involved in the initiation of these measures? 
 
19) Was anyone from the Governor’s office involved in the initiation of the school 
finance reform legislation for this biennium? 
 
If yes: 2a. Who? 
 2b. What did he/she/they do? 
 2c. What role did he/she/they play? 
 
20) Where there (other) legislative staff, executive staff or interest group 
representatives involved in the initiation of these bills? 
If yes: 3a. Who? 
 3b. What did he/she/they do? 
 3c. What role did he/she/they play? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 House W&M was chaired by Oreste Valsangiacomo, House W&M Vice Chair was 
Paul Freidin, and House Majority leader was Paul Cillo. 
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21) What groups/individuals did the school finance reform legislation authors speak 
for, whom did they represent? 
 
22) Why did these individuals/groups support school finance reform? What 
background factors were particularly important? 
 
23) Which individuals/groups expressed opposition to the various school finance 
plans? 
 
24) Why did they oppose these plans? What background factors were particularly 
important? 
 
25) Whom did the opponents speak for, whom did they represent? 
 
26) As you look back, were other individuals or groups important participants? 
 
If yes: 9a. Which ones? 
 9b. What positions did he/she/they take? 
 9c. Why? 
 
27) In the House of Representatives, how did support coalesce around H. 527 and its 
plan for a local income tax coupled with a nonresidential state property tax to 
fund schools? Were there any major trades, compromises, bargains needed to get 
this bill up and out of its committees? 
 
28) Which participants were particularly effective in shepherding the legislation? 
Why were they effective? 
 
29) When the school finance reform bill came up for formal consideration in the 
House, what issues were seen as most important? 
 
30) What did participants do to win support and neutralize opposition? 
 
31) The House passed the school finance reform bill 81-62. How did that decision get 
made? Who persuaded (bargained, directed) whom and how did they do it? 
 
32) Were there any major compromises, trades, deals needed to win the floor vote? 
 
If yes: 15a. What were the? 
 15b. Which participants were most involved? 
 15c. How did the compromises get made? 
 





34) In the Senate, support coalesced around the idea of an income-sensitive statewide 
property tax coupled with a guaranteed-yield second tier local property tax. In 
your opinion, why did this happen? Were there any major trades, compromises, or 
bargains needed to get this bill out of committee? 
 
35) Which participants were particularly effective in shepherding the legislation? 
Why were they effective? 
 
36) When the school finance reform bill came up for formal consideration in the 
Senate, what issues were seen as most important? 
 
37) What did participants do to win support and neutralize opposition? 
 
38) The Senate passed the school finance reform bill 21 to 9. How did that decision 
get made? Who persuaded (bargained, directed) whom and how did they do it? 
 
39) Were there any major compromises, trades, deals needed to win the floor vote? 
 
If yes: 22a. What were the? 
 22b. Which participants were most involved? 
 22c. How did the compromises get made? 
 
40) In your judgment, which individuals/groups were most responsible for the Senate 
decision? 
 
41) The house and senate bills were brought to conference in June of 1997 and were 
reconciled largely in favor of the Senate bill. In your judgment, why do you think 
the senate provisions prevailed? In your opinion, what factors allowed the House 
and Senate to reconcile a school finance bill in the wake of multiple past failures? 
 
42) As you know, the Brigham v. Vermont ruling was issued shortly after the 1997 
legislative session got underway. As you think back on the 1997/98 biennium 
how did the Vermont Supreme Court’s ruling in the Brigham case impact 
legislative outcomes?  
 
 






Informant Code:      Date: 
Informant:       Time: ______ to ______ 
Position/Affiliation:      Duration: 
Then:        Taped: ______ yes______ no 
Now: 
 
1. Informant seemed: 
 
Uninterested ______, ______, ______, ______, ______ Interested 
Reluctant ______, ______, ______, ______, ______ Enthusiastic 
Uninformed ______, ______, ______, ______, ______ Knowledgeable 
 
2. Informant distinguished between: 
 
Informant remembered events clearly?______ yes ______ no 
 
Informant was proximate to events discussed? _____yes ______ no 
 
3. Interview seemed: 
 
Hurried ______, ______, ______, ______, ______ Comfortably 
paced 
Tense  ______, ______, ______, ______, ______ 
Relaxed/conversational 
 












7. Was there informal post-interview conversation? 
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